INOK Law & Notarial Office

18/09/2026

Our very own Atty. Jecelyn Pastor-Inok proudly served as one of the Proctors for this year’s Examinations. ⚖️

INOK Law & Notarial Office wishes all the examinees the very best. See you on the other side, future pañeros and pañeras!

18/09/2026

The has reiterated that what Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004, criminalizes is not marital infidelity by itself but the psychological violence that goes with it causing mental or emotional suffering to the wife.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC’s Second Division affirmed the conviction of a husband for violation of Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, which penalizes the act of causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to a woman or her child.

Married in 1999, the husband and wife’s marital problems began in 2009, when the husband started coming home late and grew distant from his family. In January 2010, the husband sent his wife text messages saying he would no longer return home, wanted to start a new life alone, and intended to seek the nullity of their marriage. The wife later discovered that her husband was living with another woman.

The husband was charged with psychological violence before the Regional Trial Court. During trial, the wife claimed that her husband’s actions caused her severe mental and emotional suffering, and loss of self-esteem and dignity. She said she experienced depression and attempted to take her own life several times.

The psychologist who evaluated the wife found signs of depression, including feelings of inferiority, sleep problems, difficulty concentrating, and problems relating with others. The psychologist linked these emotional difficulties to the wife’s conflict with her husband and his abandonment of the family for another woman.

The SC affirmed in full the finding that the husband is guilty of psychological violence under the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, sentencing the husband to up to eight years in prison and ordering him to pay a PHP 100,000 fine and PHP 30,000 in moral damages to his wife. The SC also directed him to undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

The SC explained that, depending on the circumstances, an extramarital relationship may or may not cause mental or emotional anguish to the wife. Infidelity may be one of the acts through which psychological violence is committed, but the resulting mental or emotional suffering must still be proven.

In this case, the SC held that the wife’s testimony, psychological evaluation, and other witness testimonies sufficiently proved that her husband’s acts caused her mental and emotional suffering.

Read the full text of the Press Release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=173362.

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/268619-###-vs-people-of-the-philippines/.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168031.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

12/09/2026

Nilinaw ng na walang kapangyarihang humawak ang National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) sa isang alitan kung ang dalawang panig na sangkot dito ay hindi kapwa katutubo mula sa iisang grupo.

Sa isang Desisyong isinulat ni Kasangguning Mahistrado Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, isinantabi ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte ang petisyong naglalayong utusan ang isang hukom na bawiin ang desisyon nito sa isang kasong ejectment laban sa mag-asawang nagsasabing kabilang sila sa isang katutubong pamayanan (Indigenous Peoples o IP). Iginiit ng mag-asawa na, bilang mga miyembro ng katutubong pamayanan, dapat umiral ang kanilang mga kaugalian at tradisyonal na batas sa paglutas ng kanilang alitan, alinsunod sa Republic Act No. 8371 o Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).

Nag-ugat ang kaso sa isang reklamong unlawful detainer na inihain ni Kristoffer R. Co Uy (Co Uy) para paalisin sa ari-ariang nakarehistro sa kanya ang mag-asawang Elvin at Jocelyn Sending (mga Sending).

Kapwa pumanig kay Co Uy ang Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Regional Trial Court, at Court of Appeals (CA), at iniutos ng mga ito sa mga Sending na lisanin ang ari-arian.

Matapos maging pinal ang desisyon at habang ipinatutupad ito, kinuwestiyon ng mag-asawa ang hurisdiksiyon ng MCTC. Iginiit nila na kabilang sila sa Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe, isang grupo ng mga katutubo. Sa unang pagkakataon, sinabi rin nila na dapat gamitin ang mga kaugalian, tradisyon, at nakagawiang pamamaraan ng kanilang komunidad sa paglutas ng alitan tungkol sa ari-arian, alinsunod sa IPRA. Sa ilalim ng IPRA, nasa hurisdiksiyon ng National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) ang mga alitang may kinalaman sa mga karapatan ng mga katutubo.

Dinala ng mag-asawa ang kaso sa Korte Suprema matapos tanggihan ng MCTC ang kanilang mosyon na ipagpaliban ang pagpapatupad ng desisyon. Iginiit nila na ang Higaonon Tribe at ang Dadantulan Tribal Court, at hindi ang MCTC, ang dapat na may hurisdiksiyon sa kanilang kaso.

Hindi sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema at nilinaw na, sa ilalim ng Section 66 ng IPRA, may hurisdiksiyon lang ang NCIP sa mga alitang may kinalaman sa mga karapatan ng mga katutubo kung ang lahat ng partido ay kabilang sa iisang katutubong grupo. Kung may isang partido na hindi kabilang sa parehong katutubong pamayanan, nasa regular na hukuman ang hurisdiksiyon sa kaso.

Sa kasong ito, hindi kabilang si Co Uy sa anumang katutubong grupo. Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na hindi magiging patas kung isasailalim siya sa mga kaugaliang batas ng isang katutubong pamayanan na hindi naman siya kasapi.

Napansin din ng Korte Suprema na walang ipinakita ang mga Sending na anumang ebidensiyang nagpapatunay sila ay katutubo. Hindi rin nila naipaliwanag ang kanilang mga kaugalian, istrukturang pampulitika, mga institusyon, o proseso ng paggawa ng mga desisyon.

Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na hindi basta-basta maaaring balewalain o ipawalang-bisa ang isang pinal na desisyon, lalo na kung nabigyan ang mga partido ng pagkakataong ilahad at ipagtanggol ang kanilang panig, at ang desisyon ay nabuo matapos ang masusing pagsusuri sa kaso.

Napag-alaman ng Korte Suprema na ginamit lang ng mga petisyoner ang awtoridad ng NCIP para maiwasan ang pagpapatupad ng pinal na desisyon laban sa kanila. Inihayag lamang nila na kabilang sila sa isang katutubong grupo nang nasa yugto na ng pagpapatupad ng desisyon ang kaso, sa kabila ng kanilang paglahok sa mga paglilitis sa barangay at sa mga regular na hukuman. Dahil dito, nagkaroon ng pagdududa ang Korte sa kredibilidad ng kanilang pahayag na sila ay mga miyembro ng isang katutubong pamayanan.

Inatasan ng Korte Suprema ang mag-asawa na lisanin ang nasabing ari-arian sa loob ng 30 araw mula nang matanggap nila ang Desisyon.

Basahin ang Press Release sa: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-ncip-jurisdiction-over-ip-disputes-requires-both-partiesto-be-from-same-indigenous-group/

Basahin ang kabuuang teksto ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-spouses-elvin-sending-datu-gibo-and-jocelyn-sending-bae-orange-vs-kristopper-rahda-co-uy-atty-jocelyn-pesquera-henry-p-canete-jr-and-hon-ameli-amor-r-estrada-presiding-judge-of-t/

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Kasangguning Mahistrado Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/271354-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2026

SC: No law authorizes the second placer rule. The Constitution recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

When the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the Local Government Code (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

NB: The ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.”

The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor.

The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible.

Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned.

The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns.

The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner.

The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Read the full text of the SC’s April 25, 2025 Decision in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

26/08/2026

24/08/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence.

The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch.

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence.

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/07/2026

SC: A sale of land remains VALID even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. ⚖️

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

11/06/2026

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02/06/2026

SC: A spouse’s actions that create a hostile, intimidating, and emotionally abusive environment for the other spouse or their children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct,” a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the Family Code.

In this case, the husband alleged that his wife controlled their finances, publicly humiliated him, spread negative stories about him, isolated him from friends, refused counseling, and manipulated their children against him.

The Court emphasized that determining grossly abusive conduct depends on the specific facts and evidence of each case. It held that the wife’s behavior created a hostile home environment that justified the husband’s decision to distance himself from the family home and seek legal separation. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for legal separation and remanded the case to the RTC for the division of the spouses’ property and the determination of child custody and support.

Although legal separation does NOT dissolve the marriage bond, it remains an available remedy when a spouse’s conduct becomes “grossly abusive”.

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s acts creating a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse, their children, and common children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct” under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 which serves as a ground for legal separation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division granted the petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife, after finding that her actions constituted grossly abusive conduct under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

The couple married in 2003 and later had two children. To support their family, the wife started selling coffee, but they still faced financial hardships. The husband studied nursing with hopes of eventually relocating their family abroad. However, his plan to move abroad never materialized.

During the marriage, the husband claimed he faced various abusive behaviors from his wife. He reported that she controlled their finances and refused to provide financial help, even when he needed treatment for his toothache and was advised to get a root canal.

The husband also claimed that at a party, his wife told their friends she wanted to cut off his p***s because they were no longer having s*x. He also alleged that she shared stories about him with family and friends, often twisting the facts to make him look bad.

The husband also said that his wife refused marriage counseling, prohibited him from seeing his friends, manipulated their children to force him to provide more financial support, and maintained a controlling attitude throughout their marriage.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for legal separation after finding that the wife’s behavior amounted to grossly abusive conduct. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that their disagreements were ordinary marital disputes.

The SC affirmed the RTC defining acts constituting “grossly abusive conduct”, which is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, to include those acts by a spouse that create a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse or the children.

The SC also stressed that courts must decide this issue on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts and evidence presented.

While the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 does not allow absolute divorce, spouses may legally separate by order of a court without ending their marriage. Unlike a declaration that a marriage is void, a legal separation does not break the marital bond.

Among the grounds for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 is repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against the spouse, their common child, or the spouse’s child.

The SC added that this interpretation is consistent with the State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage as a basic social institution.

In this case, the SC found that the wife’s actions, taken together, created a hostile and intimidating environment for the husband. He was made to constantly follow her lead, and his efforts to fix the marriage through counseling and other interventions were unsuccessful. Witnesses also confirmed her controlling behavior, which supported the finding of a hostile home environment. Because of this, the SC ruled that the husband was justified in seeking reassignment to another province to distance himself from the situation at home.

The SC granted the legal separation and sent the case back to the RTC for the dissolution and division of the couple’s property. It also directed the RTC to decide on the custody and support of their children.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164913

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164917

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

26/04/2026

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