Atty January Mar & Atty Arnie Magdaong Law Office

10/08/2026

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08/08/2026

SC: Mere Sharing or Reaction to Libelous Online Post Not Cyberlibel

MANILA — The Supreme Court ruled that the cyberlibel provision under Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, is constitutional insofar as it penalizes the original author of a libelous online post, but is unconstitutional when applied to persons who merely receive the post and react to it.

In Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014, the Court explained that the elements of libel include (1) an allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another, (2) publication of the charge, (3) identity of the person defamed, and (4) malice. Actual malice exists when the defamatory statement is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

The Court, however, drew a distinction between the original author of a defamatory statement and other internet users who merely react to it. It recognized that social media allows users to “Like,” “Comment,” or “Share” an existing post, and that treating every such reaction as aiding or abetting cyberlibel would create uncertainty and a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Thus, the Court declared Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post, but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it. The Court likewise struck down Section 5 insofar as it punished aiding or abetting online libel.

The Court emphasized that this does not mean that every statement made in response to an online post is protected. If a person’s comment does not merely react to the original posting but instead creates an altogether new defamatory story, that comment may itself constitute an original defamatory publication subject to the laws on libel.

The ruling thus protects ordinary online reactions from being automatically transformed into criminal liability for another person’s defamatory post, while preserving liability for the author of the defamatory publication and for a person who creates a separate defamatory publication of his or her own.

ASSIGNMENT | READINGS

Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.: 203335 (consolidated petitions), February 11, 2014, Per ABAD, J. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_203335_2014.html

06/08/2026

LEGAL BA ITO? | Can the Punong Barangay or the Lupon refuse to provide copies of Katarungang Pambarangay records to a party in interest on the ground of confidentiality?

No. As a general rule, Section 404(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the Lupon Secretary shall issue CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES of ANY PUBLIC RECORD in his custody, unless such record is declared confidential by law.

While it is true that information obtained through mediation proceedings shall be privileged and confidential, Section 13(f) of Republic Act No. 10173, otherwise known as “Data Privacy Act of 2012”, nonetheless allows the processing of sensitive personal information and privileged information necessary for the protection of lawful rights and interests.

Accordingly, information and records relating to mediation or Lupon proceedings cannot be withheld from or denied to the parties involved in the case. Parties have the right to be furnished with, or obtain copies of, records pertaining to the proceedings, including, among others, summons, minutes of meetings, and other documents relevant to their case.

-DILG Opinion dated February 3, 2021
-Section 404(b), RA No. 7160; Section 13(f), RA No. 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012); and DILG Opinion dated February 3, 2021)

For other questions ask ARA:
www.riseaurora.region3.dilg.gov.ph/ara
or send us a message via Facebook.
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06/08/2026

The delete button is not a legal defense.

06/08/2026

06/08/2026

Sa usaping kasal, legal status ang mahalaga, hindi tagal ng paghihiwalay.

06/08/2026

SC Reiterates Guidelines for Proving Ownership of Social Media Accounts in Criminal Cases

The Supreme Court reiterated that, in criminal cases involving offenses committed through social media, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused owned or had access to the social media account, or authored the post or private message. The Court emphasized that this may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence, and that no single type of evidence is indispensable.

The Court identified several circumstances that may help establish ownership, access, or authorship, including:

1. Admission of ownership, access, or authorship;

2. Being seen using or posting from the account;

3. Posts containing information known only to the accused;

4. A distinctive writing style or language pattern;

5. Digital or forensic evidence (e.g., ISP, social media, device, or geolocation records);

6. Conduct consistent with the questioned post or message; and

7. Other competent evidence linking the accused to the account or post.

These are guidelines, not exclusive requirements, and identity may be established through the totality of the evidence presented. (SC En Banc, June 29, 2026, Per Hernando, J.)

Read the full text of the Resolution in the comments section.