Javar-Rabago-Tabuso Law Offices

13/02/2026

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

13/02/2026

We proudly kick off our Bar Operations 2026 with the Comprehensive Bar Lecture Series of the College of Law University of Northern Philippines, starting today with an insightful session by Atty. Edwin M. Carillo.

This initiative aims to guide law students, bar retakers, and first-time takers toward bar readiness through focused, high-yield discussions.

🔗 Join us here: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/81855367800?pwd=IF40bbCdoXkX7spIaujyIEreQPyeSo.1

Meeting ID: 818 5536 7800
Passcode: BARQUEST

Together, we prepare. Together, we rise.

13/02/2026

The UNP College of Law – Central Bar Operations 2026 proudly marks a milestone with the FIRST-EVER FACE-TO-FACE SESSION of the COMPREHENSIVE BAR LECTURE SERIES.

Join us for an insightful lecture on the Bar subject—Criminal Law, led by Pros. Freddie M. Nojara, LL.M.

This initiative reflects the UNP College of Law’s continued commitment to structured, strategic, and community-driven bar preparation. More than a lecture, this is a gathering of future lawyers united by discipline, excellence, and shared purpose.

Because at UNP-CLAW, we believe: “It takes a community to make a lawyer.”

🗓 February 14, 2026 (Saturday)
🕐 8:00 AM – 12:00 NN | 1:00 PM – 5:00 PM
📍 Tadena Hall

Pre-register here:
🔗 https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdtYpA4ut7DsAMNnnTwOci-ev8-fIZSlc2GuY9w7ABkJzoWdg/viewform

Together, we prepare. Together, we rise.

17/12/2025

𝐎𝐔𝐓 𝐍𝐎𝐖
𝐅𝐎𝐂𝐀𝐋
𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐫 𝐈𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐞 | 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐒𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫, 𝐀.𝐘. 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟓-𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟔

In a time when every glance, gesture, and fragment of our lives can be gathered and stored, we are challenged to recognize the quiet systems shaping how we move and who we become. This issue peers into that world—one where visibility feels natural, yet its weight is often left unspoken.

Within these pages are stories that illuminate the subtle mechanisms of control, the allure of convenience, and the fragile line between being connected and being contained. Here, we explore the questions that linger in the spaces between watcher and watched, truth and illusion, freedom and performance.

Step into this inquiry with us. Let the narratives disturb, awaken, and ground you. May they remind you that in the midst of all eyes, seen or unseen, truth persists and awareness remains our gentlest form of defiance.

Access the digital copy through the link below:
https://heyzine.com/flip-book/adbf5bdf2c.html
https://heyzine.com/flip-book/adbf5bdf2c.html
https://heyzine.com/flip-book/adbf5bdf2c.html

Pubmat by: Mary January R. Chan

17/12/2025

The (SC) has held that while financial details of bank deposits remain confidential, the Cybercrime Prevention Act allows disclosure of bank account holder information for cybercrime investigations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division denied the petition filed by EastWest Rural Bank (EastWest), which questioned the warrant to disclose computer data (WDCD) issued by the court and the subsequent Disclosure Order issued by the Philippine National Police Anti-Cybercrime Group (PNP-ACG) which required EastWest to disclose bank account holder information.

This EastWest bank account holder information sought to be disclosed is the account where Leonard Vendiola’s money was transferred after he was scammed by a caller posing as a bank employee.

Vendiola reported to the PNP-ACG that a caller who introduced herself as a bank employee deceived him by promising rewards contingent to disclosing his email and one-time password. When he checked his bank account, he discovered that an amount of PHP 10,000 was transferred to an EastWest account.

PNP-ACG applied for a WDCD to identify the EastWest account holder involved in the alleged scam. This was granted by the Regional Trial Court which authorized the PNP-ACG to compel EastWest to disclose and preserve data relating to the account holder. Pursuant to this, the PNP-ACG issued a Disclosure Order to EastWest.

EastWest filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the WDCD and arguing that the Bank Secrecy Law prohibits banks from revealing any information about bank deposits, including the identity of the account holder. It maintained that this rule remains in force because it was not repealed by the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

EastWest also asserted that it should not be subject to the Cybercrime law’s disclosure rules because it is a financial institution rather than a communications service provider.

The SC rejected these arguments and upheld the validity of the WDCD and Disclosure Order.

The SC clarified that while the Bank Secrecy Law protects the confidentiality of bank deposits and their financial details, it does not prevent the disclosure of basic identifying information when allowed by law. Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, law enforcement agencies may, with a court-issued warrant, require the disclosure of computer data necessary to investigate cybercrime offenses.

The SC ruled that EastWest is considered a service provider under the Cybercrime Prevention Act because their digital banking services, such as online banking platforms, mobile applications, and automated email notifications, allow customers to communicate and transact through computer systems. As a banking institution, EastWest also processes and stores substantial amounts of computer data both in the course of its operations and on behalf of its customers, placing it within the law’s coverage for the disclosure of computer data when authorized by a court-issued warrant.

Read the full text of the press release at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157653

Read the full text of the Decision at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157646

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

03/12/2025

03/12/2025

𝐂𝐀𝐋𝐋 𝐅𝐎𝐑 𝐕𝐎𝐋𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐄𝐄𝐑 𝐋𝐀𝐖𝐘𝐄𝐑𝐒
📢 FREE LEGAL CONSULTATION & NOTARIZATION OF SIMPLE DOCUMENTS
🗓 December 6, 2025 (Saturday)
🕗 8:00 AM
📍 Barangay Hall, Cabalanggan, Bantay, Ilocos Sur

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Ilocos Sur Chapter invites everyone to avail of free legal consultation and notarization services (for simple documents) on December 6, 2025, at the Barangay Hall, Cabalanggan, Bantay, Ilocos Sur, during the Seminar on Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

We also encourage our fellow lawyers to join as volunteers in this activity, as we continue our shared mission of bringing free legal aid and assistance closer to the community.

This initiative forms part of the Chapter’s ongoing commitment to promote accessible justice, legal awareness, and meaningful public service.

28/11/2025

SC: Mutual consent essential for voluntary arbitration in labor disputes.

The (SC) has ruled that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over a labor dispute only when both parties clearly and mutually agree to it. One party’s agreement is not enough if the other consistently objects.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division ruled that the panel of voluntary arbitrators lacked authority to resolve the monetary claims of Benjie Tandayag against Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Instead, the jurisdiction over the dispute lies with the Labor Arbiter (LA).

Tandayag, a seafarer hired by the corporation for one of its vessels, suffered a work-related injury while on board the vessel, leaving him permanently disabled. There was no collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between him and the corporation.

When the corporation refused to pay his disability and other related benefits, he filed a case with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, which referred it to a panel of voluntary arbitrators (panel).

The parties entered into a submission agreement to arbitrate before the panel. However, the corporation argued that the panel lacked jurisdiction over the monetary claims. The panel disagreed, stating that the corporation waived its right to contest the panel’s jurisdiction when it signed the submission agreement. Ultimately, it ruled in favor of Tandayag.

The corporation challenged this decision before the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled that the LA, not the voluntary arbitrators, has jurisdiction.

Upholding the CA, the SC cited the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which provides that money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed before the LA, a rule similarly stated in RA 8042 or the 𝘔𝘪𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘖𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 for claims of overseas Filipino workers. Voluntary arbitrators, on the other hand, handle disputes involving CBAs, company policies, and 𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 that 𝗯𝗼𝘁𝗵 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗴𝗿𝗲𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝗺𝗶𝘁 to them.

In this case, there was no CBA, but Tandayag and the panel relied on the parties’ submission agreement.

However, records show that the corporation promptly and repeatedly objected to the voluntary arbitrators’ authority. In fact, it even asked that the jurisdiction issue be resolved and insisted that the case belonged to the LA.

The SC explained that the submission agreement did not mean the corporation accepted the voluntary arbitrators’ jurisdiction, since it clearly raised the issue from the start.

The SC added that while voluntary arbitration is encouraged, “𝘪𝘵 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘶𝘯𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘣𝘰𝘵𝘩 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘱𝘶𝘵𝘦 𝘢𝘨𝘳𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘢𝘳𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳.” Submission to arbitration by one side is not enough if the other side consistently objects.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156011.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156005.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/11/2025

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗣𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗙𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝗪𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘀 𝗔𝗿𝗲 𝗔𝘂𝘁𝗼𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗟𝗶𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗖𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗶𝗯𝗲𝗹
A legal analysis by Dean Ralph Sarmiento

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝗰𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗹𝗶𝗯𝗲𝗹 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝗣𝗵𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗽𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗹𝗮𝘄?

Cyber libel is defamation that is committed in online platforms. As defined in Section 4(c)(4) of 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗡𝗼. 𝟭𝟬𝟭𝟳𝟱 or the 𝗖𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮, it consists of the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in 𝗔𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗹𝗲 𝟯𝟱𝟱 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗣𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲 that are committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

Cyber libel is committed when someone publishes a defamatory statement about someone on the internet. The law holds the author, publisher, and anyone who takes an active role in the act of posting liable. The moment the defamatory statement is posted online and names or identifies a real person, cyber libel is consummated.

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗱𝗶𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘁 𝗿𝘂𝗹𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗶 𝘃. 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝗝𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗲?

In 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗶 𝘃. 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝗝𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗲 (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014), the Court also held that 𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗹𝗶𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴, 𝘀𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴, 𝗼𝗿 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗰𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗹𝗶𝗯𝗲𝗹 unless the act is a deliberate republication done with malice. The ruling focused on personal criminal liability and clarified that passive administrators and platform owners are not treated as publishers. The Court held:

“The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, ‘Commenting’ on it, or ‘Sharing’ it with others, to be regarded as ‘aiding or abetting?’ In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, ‘Armand is a thief!,’ he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, ‘I like this!,’ that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, ‘Correct!,’ would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.”

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝘀 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘁 𝗹𝗼𝗼𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝘁 𝗶𝗻 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰?

In Disini, the Court held that 𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗵 𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗼 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝗵𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗿 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁. The Court held:

“In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site…”

𝗙𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘀 𝗱𝗼 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝗵𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗿 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁. What the Court examined in Disini was the structure of Facebook groups, forums, and pages that existed in 2014. 𝗔𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗲, 𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗱𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗼𝘄𝗻 𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲𝘀. Page admins did not receive anonymous submissions. They did not act as editors. They did not select which statements to publish. The Court analyzed 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗳𝘂𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝘀 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝘂𝗺𝘀, 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗽𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀. That is the crucial distinction.

𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗺𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗻 𝗳𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘀 𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁?

Freedom walls as they exist today on Facebook work in a very different way. 𝗣𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗱𝗼 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗱𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗹𝘆. Their submissions are not posted automatically. People send the statements to the admins of freedom walls and it is the admins that post under the name of the freedom wall itself. The admins 𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗼 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁𝘀. Hence, every post is created by the 𝗱𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵 the same on their platform.

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗮𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝗮𝘂𝘁𝗼𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗱𝗲𝗳𝗮𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁?

Page admins of freedom walls become automatically liable the moment they publish a defamatory post about a named or identifiable individual. They are 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗲𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘀 of the online forums contemplated by the Supreme Court in the 2014 Disini case. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝘄𝗵𝗼 𝗰𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗸 “𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁.” They 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻, which is the essential element of cyber libel.

Once the page admins of the freedom wall publish a defamatory post that names a real or identifiable person and harm that person’s reputation, they 𝗯𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗳𝗮𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁. Note that the law also presumes malice because the content is defamatory.

𝗗𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗶𝗰𝘁 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗶?

No, this follows the logic of the Supreme Court in Disini. Disini only protects intermediaries or passive admins of online forums or platforms who have nothing to do with the creation or publication of the defamatory post. 𝗙𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗮𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝗱𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝘅𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗽𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗶𝘁𝗲. They take part in the content. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝘄𝗵𝗼 𝗽𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵 𝗶𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘆𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗲𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝗲𝗲.

The Supreme Court in Disini never said that a person who chooses to publish defamatory content is free from liability simply because they run a page. Disini only protects those who do not participate in the content at all, that is, those who merely like, share, react, or comment on the ongoing discussion.

𝗪𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝗲𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗲 𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗶𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝘁𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗱𝗼𝘄𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝗺𝗲𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗶𝗻𝘀?

No. 𝗖𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗹𝗶𝗯𝗲𝗹 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝘂𝗺𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 as soon as a defamatory post that names a real or identifiable person is published by the freedom wall admins. 𝗧𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗱𝗼𝘄𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗲 𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗺 𝗱𝗼𝗻𝗲. Criminal liability has already attached. At most, it can be used by the page admins to mitigate their criminal liability, but it does not undo the fact that the admins have already committed the act that consummates the crime of cyber libel.

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗳𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝗼𝗳 𝗲𝘅𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻?

Freedom of expression does not cover defamation, false allegations, or shaming of individuals without basis. Anonymous speech is allowed, but 𝗮𝗻𝗼𝗻𝘆𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗴𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗶𝗺𝗺𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝘄𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗸𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝘂𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗮𝗻𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻. Freedom walls cannot claim free speech when they choose to publish statements that destroy names and reputations.

𝗔𝗿𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗼𝗺 𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘀 𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗺𝗳𝘂𝗹?

No. Freedom walls can be helpful spaces for feedback and community issues. However, they become harmful the moment admins use their platform to destroy reputations.

25/11/2025

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Lorenzo R. dela Rosa, a member of the Remedial Law Department of the Philippine Judicial Academy, discusses
mortgage and sale of properties under RA 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, in Episode 94: When Agrarian Land is Mortgaged or Sold.

What is Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? What is the logic and wisdom behind the prohibition on the sale or transfer of awarded lands within 10 years of the award?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6YH60c0erH64qWOV3ABchQ?si=CVMIysfiSJ-0pRet8wGwnw

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000736719029

YouTube: https://youtu.be/MkfL9RK92hw

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/19rssC3zrQ/

25/11/2025

Nagpasya ang maaaring ma-forfeit ang hindi maipaliwanag na kayamanan o ari-arian na nakuha ng isang pampublikong opisyal sa panahon ng kanilang panunungkulan kahit na nakarehistro ang mga ito sa pangalan ng ibang indibidwal.

Sa isang Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, pinagtibay ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang forfeiture ng properties, bank deposits, at investment accounts na nakapangalan kay retired Lieutenant General Jacinto C. Ligot (General Ligot) pati na ang mga asset na natunton sa kanya pero nakarehistro sa kanyang asawa, mga anak, at kamag-anak.

Nagsagawa ang Ombudsman ng isang lifestyle check para matukoy kung ang mga ari-arian na nakuha niya sa panahon ng aktibong serbisyo ay lumagpas sa kanyang suweldo at iba pang legal na kita.

Nakita sa pagsisiyasat sa mga idineklarang ari-arian ni General Ligot sa kanyang Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth mula 1982 hanggang 2003 na hindi ito sumasalamin sa mga aktwal na ari-arian sa ilalim ng kanyang pangalan at ng mga malapit niyang miyembro ng pamilya. Kaya naghain ang Ombudsman ng isang petition for forfeiture na inihain laban sa kanya sa Sandiganbayan. Pinangalanan din sa petisyon ang kanyang asawa, kanilang mga anak, at kanyang kapatid na babae at bayaw, na ginamit umano bilang mga front para itago ang kanyang ari-arian.

Napag-alaman ng Sandiganbayan na labag sa batas ang nakuhang ari-arian ni General Ligot at ipinag-utos nito ang forfeiture ng mga ari-arian na nagkakahalaga ng PHP 102 milyon at mga deposito at pondo sa pamumuhunan na nagkakahalaga ng PHP 53 milyon.

Pinagtibay ng Korte ang desisyon ng Sandiganbayan at binigyang-pansin na walang sariling pinagkukunan ng kita ang asawa at mga anak ni General Ligot pero nagmamay-ari pa rin ng mga ari-arian at may hawak silang malalaking bank at investment account sa ilalim ng kanilang mga pangalan.

Binayaran ni General Ligot ang mga condominium ang mga amortization nito kahit na may titulo sa pangalan ng kanyang kapatid. Ang condominium na nakalista sa ilalim ng pangalan ng kanyang bayaw ay unang binili ng asawa ni Heneral Ligot, na walang sariling kita.

Ayon sa Korte, lumalabas na si Heneral Ligot ang tunay na may-ari kahit pa nasa pangalan ng ibang tao ang mga legal na titulo.

Sa ilalim ng Republic Act No. 1379, ang mga ari-arian ng mga pampublikong opisyal ay ipinapalagay na iligal na nakuha kapag ang mga ito ay halatang wala sa proporsyon ng kanilang legal na kita.

Nalalapat ang pagpapalagay na ito hindi lamang sa mga ari-arian sa ilalim ng pangalan ng pampublikong opisyal kundi pati na rin sa mga ari-ariang nakatago o inilipat sa iba, hangga't ang tunay na pagmamay-ari ay matututunton sa pampublikong opisyal.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=155660

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=155651

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/11/2025

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Lorenzo R. dela Rosa, a member of the Remedial Law Department of the Philippine Judicial Academy, discusses key issues on land titles and the steps buyers should take before acquiring properties in Episode 95: Protecting the Integrity of Land Titles.

What is a reconstituted title, and how is it different from the original title or the owner's duplicate? What remedies are available to buyers defrauded by sellers?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/4NcLjdE0axrvAej7wGMueu?si=8BzkNdj4QIufZoL1glN-Ow

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/episode-95-protecting-the-integrity-of-land-titles/id1852172756?i=1000737742658

YouTube: https://youtu.be/KRcs30UAwwQ

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1MuvG4RZ8s/

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/