Pampilo & Oquias Law Offices

09/02/2023

LANDMARK CASE ALERT! Abusive Mothers can be Offenders under VAWC Law; Fathers can File Case on Behalf of Abused Children

Knutson v. Knutson (G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022)

Facts:

In 2011, Randy Knutson (Randy) and his wife (Rosalina) lived in the Philippines with their daughter named Rhuby Knutson. (Rhuby). However, they became estranged after Randy discovered Rosalina’s infidelity.

Thereafter, Rosalina got hooked on casinos and incurred huge gambling debts which prompted her to sell their house and lot, condominium unit, and vehicles which Randy provided for the family. She even left Rhuby under the care of strangers. Randy then discovered that Rosalina committed abusive acts against Rhuby: pulling her hair, slapping her face, and knocking her head. One time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted Randy about her plan to kill their daughter and commit su***de. Ma*****na plants were even confiscated on the leased premises of Rosalina. Randy reported the matter to the police station but to no avail.

Randy then filed a petition under RA 9262 for the issuance of TPO on behalf of their daughter. RTC dismissed it, so Randy filed a certiorari case to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the father can represent the child in filing a case against RA 9262 against the abusive mother of the child.

Held:

Yes. The mother can be liable for VAWC because Section 9 (b ) of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows "parents or guardians of the offended party" to file a petition for protection orders. The statute categorically used the word "parents" which pertains to the father and the mother of the woman or child victim. The law speaks in clear language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify who between the parents of the victim may apply for protection orders. When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish.

Logically, a mother who maltreated her child resulting in physical, sexual, or psychological violence defined and penalized under RA No. 9262 is not absolved from criminal liability notwithstanding that the measure is intended to protect both women and their children. This is also in consonance with the State's policy to guarantee full respect for human rights under RA 9262, the Constitution, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Section 4 of RA No. 9262 mandates that the law "shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children." The RTC's consoling statement that children who suffered abuse from the hands of their own mothers may invoke other laws except RA No. 9262 is discriminatory. The supposed reassurance is an outright denial of effective legal measures to address the seriousness and urgency of the situation. Only RA No. 9262, unlike other laws, created the innovative remedies of protection and custody orders.

In sum, the Court refuses to be an instrument of injustice and public mischief perpetrated against vulnerable sectors of the society such as children victims of violence. The Court will not shirk its bounden duty to interpret the law in keeping with the cardinal principle that in enacting a statute, the legislature intended right and justice to prevail.

11/08/2021

The landmark case of Matabuena v. Cervantes (1971) equalized common-law relationships between a man and a woman, on the one hand, and validly married spouses on the other, in respect of the nullity of donations made between the parties. To wit:

"x x x While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. x x x"

Q: If common-law spouses cannot donate to each other pursuant to Matabuena v. Cervantes, can any of them donate any property to other persons without the consent of their common-law spouse?

A: No, because the Supreme Court in the recent case landmark case of Nicxon Perez v. Senerpida (G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021) held that:

"Given the above express prohibition [Art. 147, FC] of a party to the cohabitation to encumber or alienate by acts inter vivos even his or her share in the property acquired during the cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other party until after the termination thereof under Article 147, then the donation of any property acquired during the cohabitation by one party without the consent of the other can only be but void. The rules on ordinary co-ownership cannot apply to vest validity on the undivided share of the disposing party. The donation is simply void."

Therefore, any donation of property (except moderate gifts) without the consent of the common-law partner is void.

SC's Final Note in the case:

Matabuena equalized common-law relationships between a man and a woman, on the one hand, and validly married spouses on the other, in respect of the nullity of donations made between the parties. This case similarly pronounces that the prohibition against a spouse to donate any absolute community property or conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other spouse equally applies to common-law relations or cohabitations of a man and a woman without a valid marriage or under a void marriage.

NB: In the case, the SC nullified the donation of Mr. Eliodoro to his grandson, Mr. Nicxon, because it was made without the consent of Mr. Eliodoro's partner--the latter's renunciation and waiver was declared void.

24/02/2021

24/02/2021

Doctrine of the Day: The Legitimate Child May Now Use the Surname of the Mother.

In interpreting Art. 364 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held:

ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.

Accordingly, where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.

The trial court's reasoning further encoded patriarchy into our system. If a surname is significant for identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting the laws to mean that a marital child's surname must identify only the paternal line renders the mother and her family invisible. This, in tum, entrenches the patriarchy and with it, antiquated gender roles: the father, as dominant, in public; and the mother, as a supporter, in private.

TN: The Court interpreted the provision of the Civil Code along with the "emerging customary norm of non-discrimination against women", the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act.

[Alanis III v. CA, G.R. No. 216425. November 11, 2020]

24/01/2021

Doctrine of the Day: Doctrine of Constructive Trust

It is a general principle that one who acquires land or other property by fraud, misrepresentation, imposition, or concealment, or under any such other circumstances as to render it inequitable for him to retain the property, is in equity to be regarded as a trustee ex maleficio thereof for a person who suffers by reason of the fraud or other wrong, and is equitably entitled to the property, even though such beneficiary may never have any legal estate therein. [Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. 73733 December 16, 1986]

04/01/2021

Doctrine of the Day: Benevolent Neutrality

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion.

[A.M. NO. P-02-1651 : June 22, 2006]

17/12/2020

Doctrine of the Day: "Presidential Communication Privilege"

-Also known as Executive Privilege. Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.

In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated."

The Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch Case, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."

2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority

[Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008]
[Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]

05/12/2020

Doctrine of the Day: "Presumed-Identity Approach or Processual Presumption"

The International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption holds that where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43, 49–50 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division], quoting EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division]

04/12/2020

Doctrine of the Day: "Principle of Primus Tempore, Potior Jure"

The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater significance in case of a double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be deemed the owner. Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with good faith— that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.

[San Lorenzo Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 490 Phil 7, 23 (2005)]

27/11/2020

Doctrine of the Day: "Doctrine of Last Clear Chance"

-The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.24 Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.

[Allied Banking Corporation v. BPI, G.R. No. 188363, February 27, 2013]

25/11/2020

Doctrine of the Day: "Rule of Tender of Excluded Evidence'

Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to form part of the records of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.
[Fortune To***co Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. 192024, July 1, 2015]