24/08/2026
LAW AND BEHOLD: THE EVOLUTION OF A BREACH OF A PROMISE TO MARRY
By: Atty. Lj Ramos
“Will you marry me?” has got to be one of the most life-changing questions a person can ask or receive during his or her lifetime. It signifies a willingness for couples to embark on a new phase in their relationship, and the preparation for the creation of a new family unit.
But alas, even when the promise has been sealed with a sweet “I do”, it does not always end with an exchange of rings and a pronouncement by the solemnizing officer stating, “You may now kiss the bride.”
What does jurisprudence state in case of a breach of promise to marry? Under our laws, a breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. This doctrine was first pronounced in the 1960 case of Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-14628). The Supreme Court observed that the New Civil Code omitted the provisions in the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 that allowed actions for breach of promise to marry. Hermosisima treated the omission to mean that such a breach is no longer recognized as an actionable wrong.
The trend regarding these types of cases, however, is that while generally a breach of promise to marry is still not actionable, the circumstances surrounding the breach may still be a source of liability. In the 1964 case of Wassmer v. Velez (G.R. No. L-20089), the Court ruled that to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different from a mere breach of promise to marry. Here, this is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
In Baksh v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993), the Supreme Court justified the award of damages for an act of breach of promise to marry because it was in fact made with fraud and deceit. In reality, Baksh had no intention of marrying the plaintiff, and the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to obtain her consent to have sexual congress. This willful injury to her honor and reputation was committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
In Guevarra v. Banach (G.R. No. 214059), while the woman-petitioner was the one who breached the promise to marry, the Supreme Court held that it was justified because the breach occurred upon her learning of the man-respondent’s lies and deception. As the Court of Appeals found, the respondent’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit; he did not have the purest intentions in marrying the petitioner. He lied about his marital status and even hid his true name from her. These acts sufficed to justify the wedding's cancellation. Finding out that one's betrothed is still married to another person, and that they are not who they say they are, are reasons enough to conclude bad faith. Therefore, even when there was money involved, damages could not be claimed.
For decades, the breach of promise to marry has stayed in the realm of civil cases. However, in the recent case of ### v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. E-00648) promulgated on 29 July 2026, such a breach has become a possible cause of action incurring criminal liability.
In this case, a police officer, after getting a teacher pregnant, promised to marry her. His family met hers, and they even successfully lodged their marriage license application with the Civil Registrar. However, the very next day, the officer unilaterally withdrew the marriage license application. He subsequently married another woman a few months later. These series of events caused the teacher emotional anguish, depressive symptoms, and suicidal ideation.
Here, the Court ruled that the officer was not penalized for a breach of promise to marry per se, but rather because his acts constituted psychological violence, which is a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act (Anti-VAWC). His "willful" withdrawal of the marriage license—knowing the victim was pregnant and had already announced the union—constitutes a form of emotional manipulation and public humiliation that fits the definition of psychological violence. Therefore, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum.
Ultimately, our laws on human relations allow people to renege on their promise to marry as an acknowledgment of the reality that one’s heart can be fickle, and the same heart that promised everlasting love today may not feel the same way tomorrow. It is only when the promise of forever was never made out of love, but rather because of immoral lust, or with intent to deceive, or due to ulterior motives, that the law will bring down its full might against the wrongdoer.
(Disclaimer: This material is provided for general legal information only and is not a substitute for legal advice. Its application depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the firm, its partners, or its associates.)