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Puyales Law Office, Cagayan de Oro (2026)

29/05/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s acts creating a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse, their children, and common children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct” under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 which serves as a ground for legal separation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division granted the petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife, after finding that her actions constituted grossly abusive conduct under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

The couple married in 2003 and later had two children. To support their family, the wife started selling coffee, but they still faced financial hardships. The husband studied nursing with hopes of eventually relocating their family abroad. However, his plan to move abroad never materialized.

During the marriage, the husband claimed he faced various abusive behaviors from his wife. He reported that she controlled their finances and refused to provide financial help, even when he needed treatment for his toothache and was advised to get a root canal.

The husband also claimed that at a party, his wife told their friends she wanted to cut off his p***s because they were no longer having s*x. He also alleged that she shared stories about him with family and friends, often twisting the facts to make him look bad.

The husband also said that his wife refused marriage counseling, prohibited him from seeing his friends, manipulated their children to force him to provide more financial support, and maintained a controlling attitude throughout their marriage.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for legal separation after finding that the wife’s behavior amounted to grossly abusive conduct. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that their disagreements were ordinary marital disputes.

The SC affirmed the RTC defining acts constituting “grossly abusive conduct”, which is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, to include those acts by a spouse that create a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse or the children.

The SC also stressed that courts must decide this issue on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts and evidence presented.

While the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 does not allow absolute divorce, spouses may legally separate by order of a court without ending their marriage. Unlike a declaration that a marriage is void, a legal separation does not break the marital bond.

Among the grounds for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 is repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against the spouse, their common child, or the spouse’s child.

The SC added that this interpretation is consistent with the State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage as a basic social institution.

In this case, the SC found that the wife’s actions, taken together, created a hostile and intimidating environment for the husband. He was made to constantly follow her lead, and his efforts to fix the marriage through counseling and other interventions were unsuccessful. Witnesses also confirmed her controlling behavior, which supported the finding of a hostile home environment. Because of this, the SC ruled that the husband was justified in seeking reassignment to another province to distance himself from the situation at home.

The SC granted the legal separation and sent the case back to the RTC for the dissolution and division of the couple’s property. It also directed the RTC to decide on the custody and support of their children.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164913

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164917

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

20/05/2026

SUPREME COURT: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER MAY BE APPRECIATED AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that voluntary surrender may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance or a factor that can lessen penalties in cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide involving a motor vehicle.

In a 33-page ruling authored by Associate Justice Antonio Kho, Jr., the SC En Banc upheld Noli Ilon's conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but reduced his sentence because he voluntarily surrendered to the police.

Ilon was driving his employer’s car at high speed near an intersection when he hit a trisikad, a bicycle with a mounted sidecar, driven by Lee de la Cruz, who had stopped to drop off a passenger. The impact threw de la Cruz onto the hood of the car before he fell on the road and was run over by Ilon. De la Cruz was brought to the hospital but died the following day.

Ilon later surrendered to the police and admitted he was the driver but claimed he was driving at a normal speed. He tried to avoid the trisikad, but it moved to the center of the road when the passenger alighted. He also said he attempted to help de la Cruz but left when bystanders began throwing stones at him.

The municipal trial court in Cities and the regional trial court both found Ilon guilty, ruling that he showed an inexcusable lack of precaution by speeding up instead of slowing down as he approached the intersection. He was sentenced to imprisonment ranging from two years to three years and six months.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty to a minimum of four years and a maximum of 10 years, citing Ilon’s failure to assist de la Cruz. It also did not consider his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. This prompted Ilon to elevate the case before the Supreme Court. He argued that he should not be held liable for de la Cruz’s death because de la Cruz himself was negligent in moving his trisikad to the center of the road.

In upholding his conviction with modification, the high court cited Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which provides that reckless imprudence is acting without intent to harm but still causing injury or death to another due to a clear lack of precaution.

The SC emphasized that motorists are expected to drive at a reasonable speed suited to road and weather conditions, especially near intersections. In this case, Elon admitted that he failed to slow down despite knowing he was approaching an intersection. He even increased his speed, leading him to hit the trisikad that caused De la Cruz’s death.

However, it underscored that Ilon’s voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance that reduces his penalty. It explained that while Article 365 of the RPC generally allows trial courts to impose penalties without applying the rules on mitigating and aggravating circumstances under Article 64 of the RPC, this does not apply when reckless imprudence results in death involving a motor vehicle. In such cases, Article 64 must be followed.

The SC explained that the amendments to Article 365 from Act No. 3992, or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, passed in 1932, through Batas Pambansa Blg. 398 passed in 1983 and found that Congress consistently retained the clause excluding cases where death results from reckless imprudence involving motor vehicles from the usual discretion given to trial courts. This means that courts must apply Article 64 to determine the proper penalty.

Meanwhile, the highest bench did not consider Ilon's failure to render assistance, considering that it was not alleged in the Information. It emphasized that appreciating the same could violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him.

It also mentioned the inconsistency in the existing laws: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with the use of a motor vehicle may be mitigated, while those resulting in serious bodily injury or damage to property are left to the discretion of the trial courts.

Due to this discrepancy, the SC directed that copies of this decision be furnished to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives to alert its co-equal branches of this inconsistency and for possible legislative action.

It meted out the penalty of up to two years and four months in prison against Ilon. He was likewise ordered to pay the heirs of de la Cruz PHP 629,883.45 in damages.

17/05/2026

"HUMAN LIFE IS PRICELESS"

The Supreme Court (SC), speaking through Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, emphasized that human life is priceless as no amount of money can ever replace it, nonetheless the law requires that every loss of life be compensated through damages as a measure of justice.

In a landmark ruling, the SC En Banc ordered the University of Southeastern Philippines and several university officials to pay PHP 6.45 million in damages to the parents of Cheryl Sarate, who died from severe burn injuries after her costume caught fire during a university beauty pageant in 2006.

The SC found the university negligent for failing to enforce proper safety measures, provide trained emergency responders, and adequately supervise the event organized by the Guild of English Students.

17/05/2026

SUPREME COURT ORDERS UNIVERSITY TO PAY P6 MILLION IN DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE THAT CAUSED STUDENT DEATH

FIRST ON BATAS PH: The Supreme Court (SC) has ordered the University of Southeastern Philippines to pay PHP 6,450,000 in total damages to the parents of a student who died from severe burn injuries after her costume caught fire during a university-organized event, which have arisen from negligence in the conduct and safety arrangements of the activity.

In a 46-page decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, the SC En Banc has found the University of Southeastern Philippines, represented by its president, Dr. Romulo Dequito; Dr. Marie Rose Escalada; Dr. Gilbert Gordo; Professor Catherine Roble; and Ms. Emma Gobantes jointly and severally liable for damages for the death of Cheryl Sarate.

In 2006, the Guild of English Students, a recognized student organization in the university, organized a beauty pageant in the university's social hall. The organizers installed a T-shaped ramp lined with 12 small, lit candles in brown paper bags filled with damp soil. Each paper bag was tied with crepe paper, and the opening of the bags was structured like a crown to resemble a lantern. Some of the social hall's lights were switched off to highlight the candlelight.

Cheryl was the fourth candidate to walk for the pageant. She wore a snow fairy ensemble made of cotton balls glued to plastic cellophane, typically used to cover books. The lower skirt was on a tie wire to create a petticoat design. Its hem was covered with small feathers. Her tube top was covered with rolled cotton flattened to her chest.

The top of her blouse was attached to a tie wire. She held a rattan scepter and wore a butterfly headdress. Cheryl was standing on the leftmost side of the T-shaped ramp when her gown caught fire as she turned to pose. When she turned right to walk to the center ramp, she used her bare hands to ward off the small flames that
started to engulf her.

On the center ramp, the flames blazed, causing Cheryl to jump over the right side of the hall where the audience sat. She tripped as she screamed for help. Some students tried to help, and the fires were eventually put out. After the fire, Cheryl was seen topless, wearing only denim short pants. People tried to hug and console her. The ambulance arrived 30 minutes later and brought Cheryl to the hospital. Despite this, the pageant resumed. The organizers admitted that no faculty member was present to supervise the event, except for those who participated as judges.

Students said they had not seen fire extinguishers in the venue, although the university maintained that there were two inside the social hall. Eventually Cheryl died in the hospital due to "cardiac arrest due to septic shock; the antecedent cause is secondary to flame burn, 80% total body surface area (TBSA) involving face, neck, anterior chest, back, and both upper and lower extremities." Cheryl's parents, Antonio and Rosita Sarate, then filed a case for damages against the University of Southeastern Philippines and the Guild of English Students.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the University and the Guild of English Students jointly and severally liable for the incident. It found that the university is negligent for its lack of preparedness for foreseeable emergencies. The RTC later on modified its first ruling by granting the university's motion for partial reconsideration and absolving it from liability and declared the guild adviser and university faculty member solely liable for the incident. Dismayed, the parents of the victim elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted the appeal and reinstated the first ruling of the RTC. The CA found the university liable through its administrators and officers-in-charge based on paragraph 4 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, since there was collective negligence between them. This paved the way for the university to file an appeal before the Supreme Court.

In affirming the CA ruling with modification, the high court noted that under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, schools, its administrators, and its teachers have special parental authority and responsibility over minors under their supervision, instruction, or custody, making them principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by them, and this liability applies to all their authorized activities.

The SC emphasized that the university failed to exercise the diligence required of it as an educational institution. During the incident, it was only the students who put out the fire, without help from employees of the university. The university failed to train personnel to conduct first aid, shown by the fact that only students attempted to help Cheryl.

It also flagged the university's lack of preparedness to address the emergency due to its failure to sound the fire alarm and no one used the fire extinguishers the university claims were available.

The highest bench did not give credence to the defense of the university attempting to escape liability by arguing that the beauty pageant organized by the Guild was an unauthorized activity. It insisted that the Guild did not have the required permit to hold the event, making it a private affair, and the pageant, which was held on a weekday, violated the school policy to hold extracurricular activities only during weekends.

The court highlighted that it is not right for the university to easily deny any connection with the Guild, insisting that the pageant was a private affair, especially since the latter is a campus organization, of which the members are the enrolled students of the university and the adviser of which is a permanent employee of the university.

"The holding of the activity on a date different from the schedule and the fact that it violated the university's policy of holding activities only on weekends does not make the activity illegal or unauthorized but may only open [petitioner] Roble, as its adviser, to administrative sanctions from the school," the Supreme Court said.

It cited the findings of the RTC, holding petitioner Roble's negligence as Guild adviser in the supervision and instruction of the Guild members can be considered the natural, continuous sequence preceding the cause of Cheryl's death."

The high court held that Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code are also applicable in this case, which makes the university, as an employer, liable for the damages caused by its employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.

"There is also collective negligence on the part of the petitioner university, through its administrators and officers-in-charge, when it failed to exercise due diligence in taking safety measures to ensure that no unfortunate incident would happen for those who would use its facilities," it added.

The high court ordered the university and its co-respondents to pay the parents of Cheryl PHP 300,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 5,000,000 as moral damages, PHP 1,000,000 as exemplary damages, and PHP 150,000 as attorney's fees.

17/05/2026

SUPREME COURT FINDS BANK GUILTY OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE OVER ERRONEOUS CHECK CLEARING

The Supreme Court (SC) denied the bid of a bank to compel a depositor to return the PHP 76,000 she withdrew after finding that the bank is guilty of gross negligence for erroneously validating a regional check as a local check, which caused the same to clear earlier and rendered the payment to be stopped.

In a 10-page decision penned by Associate Justice Japar Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division affirmed the acquittal of Cristina Barcellano in an Estafa case, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part when she withdrew funds mistakenly credited to her BDO Unibank savings account due to the bank’s own negligence.

In 2003, Barcellano deposited a regional check from Landbank to her savings account at BDO in the amount of PHP 151,200. The BDO teller, Gemena Tamayo, erroneously validated the check as local instead of regional, which caused it to be cleared within three banking days instead of the standard seven banking days applicable to regional checks.

As a result, Barcellano was able to withdraw PHP 76,000 from her BDO account. The following day, the check in question was returned to BDO due to a stop payment order. At this point, Tamayo learned of her mistake in processing the check as a local instead of a regional check.

Thus, the branch manager reached out to Barcellano and asked her to return the money she withdrew from her account. Notwithstanding her initial promise to do so, Barcellano never remitted the amount BDO requested.

As it happened, Barcellano, through counsel, demanded that she be allowed to withdraw the remaining balance from her BDO account. BDO countered by sending Barcellano a final demand letter, which remained unheeded.

Eventually, BDO lodged a complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code against Barcellano before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lucena City. After a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor filed an Information, charging Barcellano with estafa.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquitted Barcellano, noting that the prosecution failed to establish fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part. The RTC found that BDO did not place the withdrawn amount in her trust, nor was she an administrator of the funds, as she was not an employee of the bank.

The Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the RTC decision, emphasizing that the principle of solutio indebiti was inapplicable to the case, considering that the undue payment to Barcellano was not caused by her mistake but by BDO's gross negligence. This prompted the bank to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In upholding Barcellano's acquittal and denying BDO's plea to compel the return of money, the high court ruled BDO committed gross negligence due to its multiple errors. It noted that BDO credited the amount of the check deposited by Barcellano without clearing it with the drawee bank, and the bank teller improperly cleared the check as a local check instead of a regional one.

It also flagged BDO's failure to detect the erroneous clearing and did not even learn of it until it received a stop payment order.

The bank also failed to demonstrate that Barcellano knowingly received a benefit to which she was not entitled when she withdrew the funds from her account. It found that Barcellano was in good faith when she withdrew the remaining balance from her account.

The SC explained that solutio indebiti cannot be applied in this case because the said concept is only applicable when undue payments have been made by reason of either an essential mistake of fact or a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law.

In this case the mistake of BDO in paying the amount of the check cannot be considered as an error, misconception, or misunderstanding of banking rules and policies. Rather, it was due to BDO's failure to perform its duty of exercising extraordinary diligence and reasonable business prudence.

"A bank's disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence, or that which is "characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and unintentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected," the Supreme Court said.

"Finally, given that the factual milieu of the case does not give rise to unjust enrichment, there exists no constructive trust to compel the return of the amount to BDO." it concluded.

16/05/2026

"ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT HOSTILE TO MARRIAGE"

The Supreme Court (SC), speaking through Associate Justice Ricardo Rosario, held that Article 36 of the Family Code, which recognizes psychological incapacity as a ground for marital nullification, is not hostile to marriage but rather serves as a protective means to strengthen the institution of marital bonds.

This came after the High Court declared null and void the marriage of a husband and wife who claimed they were unhappy throughout their almost 30 years of marriage, after finding both parties psychologically incapacitated to comply with their marital obligations.

It noted that compelling spouses to remain bound in a union that, from the start, functioned as a psychological cage rather than a shared life of freedom and meaning does not strengthen marriage. It instead transforms marriage into a site of quiet misery.

"The law protects the institution of marriage not by insisting on its preservation at all costs but by distinguishing, true marriages from, those that, from their inception, lacked the essential psychological foundations for mutual commitment, intimacy, and shared life." the Supreme Court added.

16/05/2026

SUPREME COURT REITERATES: EXPERT TESTIMONY NOT REQUIRED IN NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CASES INVOLVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

The Supreme Court (SC) reiterated that psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullification of marriage is a legal, and not a medical concept, which does not require a clinical diagnosis or expert testimony as its determination focuses on the incurable personality differences of spouses that make them incapable of complying with essential marital obligations.

In a 32-page decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo Rosario, the SC’s First Division declared null and void the marriage of a husband and wife who claimed that they are unhappy throughout their almost 30 years of marriage, after finding both parties psychologically incapacitated to comply with their marital obligations.

The husband and wife met and became friends while they were college students. After graduation, they remained in contact and grew closer when they both attended a six-week training program. They were eventually hired by a bank. In May 1981, they officially considered themselves a couple. As officemates, they spent at least 10 hours together each day. The wife eventually got pregnant, which prompted them to get married in September 1983.

During the period of their wedding preparations, the wife noticed that the husband showed little concern for her pregnancy. He did not accompany her to her regular prenatal checkups, prompting her to ask her friends to go with her instead. The wife began to harbor reservations about their relationship, sensing a lack of affection from the husband, who was emotionally never expressive. The wife wondered whether they were marrying out of love or merely because of her pregnancy.

Despite these doubts, the wife did not express her concerns and ultimately decided to proceed with the wedding. After the wedding, the couple lived in the house of the husband's parents. The birth of their daughter introduced new challenges to their married life, particularly in their differing approaches to parenting. The husband would often tell the wife that she was spoiling their daughter whenever she devoted time and attention.

Since they are living with the parents of the husband, the mother of the husband intervenes by exerting considerable influence over her husband. The wife also felt that he would never oppose his mother and that his mother's presence intruded permanently into their married life. The wife attempted to persuade the husband to move out of his parents' home. When the husband relayed this plan to his mother, she rejected it, and eventually the husband complied with her decision.

In 1987, the wife finally gathered the resolve to tell the husband that she was unhappy in their marriage and wished to live separately. The husband did not engage her in any meaningful discussion and responded with silence. A year after, the husband obtained employment in the United States.

While working abroad, the wife and their daughter visited the husband in the United States and spent Christmas together. The husband did not make any effort to reconcile or rekindle the relationship. Their time together in the United States mirrored the routine life they had in the Philippines. There were no romantic moments between them nor any bonding moments as a family.

The wife narrated that from 1989 to 2005, the husband only sent approximately $200 to $300 for the educational expenses of their daughter. Throughout these years, the husband did not maintain any stable and consistent communication with them.

In 1994, the husband filed for divorce in the United States. He admitted that he did so out of frustration and in the hope that it would prompt the wife to reconcile. However, the wife remained resolute, and the divorce was eventually granted.

In 2007, the husband returned to the Philippines permanently. He occasionally visited the wife in her house. He later told her that one of his reasons for returning was to attempt to rekindle their marriage. However, the wife refused because she felt that after all those years of separation, there was no marriage left to revive.

This prompted her to file a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their psychological incapacity.

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition despite the opposition of the husband. When elevated to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the RTC ruling and denied the petition. However, the CA, in a motion for reconsideration, abandoned its first ruling and declared the marriage null and void due to the psychological incapacity of both the husband and wife.

In upholding the said ruling, the high court found that all the requisites of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as laid down in the landmark case of Tan-Andal v. Andal, were sufficiently established in the case.

It held that the parties’ psychological incapacities were characterized by juridical antecedence, even if these manifested only after the marriage. It further ruled that the conditions are incurable in the legal sense, as they are deeply rooted, enduring, and persistent, ultimately rendering the marriage beyond repair.

The SC likewise emphasized that the incapacities were grave, arising from genuinely psychological causes, and could not be attributed merely to refusal, neglect, or ordinary marital difficulties.

It also gave weight to the psychological assessment conducted by a clinical psychologist, which found both spouses psychologically incapacitated. The wife was diagnosed with Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder, while the husband was diagnosed with Inadequate Personality Disorder, coupled with masculine strivings to the degree of an Oedipal complex.

The highest bench noted that the opposing personality structures of the spouses made them incapable of complying with the essential marital obligations. It added that their psychological incapacity greatly undermined their marital union.

"As the Court emphasized in Tan-Andal vs. Andal, the law protects the institution of marriage not by insisting on its preservation at all costs but by distinguishing true marriages from those that, from their inception, lacked the essential psychological foundations for mutual commitment, intimacy, and shared life," the Supreme Court said.

15/05/2026

The has ruled that non-verbal threatening gestures with criminal intent may be considered grave threats under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division acquitted Gregory Israel of grave threats after finding no criminal intent in his gesture of pretending to shoot and behead two individuals.

But it clarified that the crime of grave threats may be committed through non-verbal gestures and not only through spoken or written words.

Israel, who claimed to be a Belgian architect allowed to practice his profession in the Philippines, was hired by Belgian business partners Christine Helena Amanda Navez and Olivier Edmund Denonville for the construction of their building. After Israel refused to correct the construction defects in the said building, Navez and Denonville filed a case for damages against him.

Sometime in 2017, while Navez and Denonville were on their way home from the airport, they nearly collided with Israel’s motorcycle. The latter then allegedly made two overt gestures: pointing his fingers at Navez’s head as if pulling a gun trigger and drawing his fingers across his neck as if threatening to behead Navez.

Israel was convicted of grave threats. When his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he sought relief from the SC, arguing that he had no criminal intent when he performed the acts, and that Article 282 of the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 does not cover pure non-verbal gestures.

The SC acquitted Israel after finding that criminal intent was not proven. But it disagreed with his other argument, ruling that non-verbal gestures may be considered grave threats.

To convict for grave threats, the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 requires two elements: the 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗿 𝘂𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝘀 and the 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲.

The SC held that Article 282 of the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 does not differentiate between threats conveyed verbally and those expressed through non-verbal gestures. What matters is the communication of a threat intended to intimidate.

Although the second paragraph of the provision specifies that threats can be conveyed orally or in writing, it does not exclude threats conveyed through non-verbal means. Therefore, threats can be either verbal or non-verbal.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166072.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164941.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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