Atty. Jun Panuga

Atty. Jun Panuga Law-key

10/02/2026

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the ๐˜๐˜ข๐˜ฎ๐˜ช๐˜ญ๐˜บ ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฆ, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SCโ€™s Second Division granted a womanโ€™s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the ๐˜๐˜ข๐˜ฎ๐˜ช๐˜ญ๐˜บ ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฆ governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partnerโ€™s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an ๐˜ˆ๐˜ค๐˜ฌ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ธ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ๐˜จ๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the ๐˜ˆ๐˜ค๐˜ฌ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ธ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ๐˜จ๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the ๐˜๐˜ข๐˜ฎ๐˜ช๐˜ญ๐˜บ ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฆ governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the ๐˜๐˜ข๐˜ฎ๐˜ช๐˜ญ๐˜บ ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฆ only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed ๐˜ˆ๐˜ค๐˜ฌ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ธ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ๐˜จ๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIOโ€™s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

29/01/2026

By a unanimous vote of all those participating, the (SC) En Banc, denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the House of Representatives, which sought to reverse the Courtโ€™s July 25, 2025 Decision that declared the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte unconstitutional.

It affirmed that the fourth impeachment complaint transmitted to the Senate on February 5, 2025 was already barred by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) of the Constitution. Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa took no part. Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh was on leave.

The SC clarified the following points:

First, the first three impeachment complaints filed in accordance with the first mode of initiating an impeachment, that is Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), were not placed in the Order of Business within the required 10 session days.

"Session days" as used in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) or for purposes of the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint does not mean legislative session days. A session day for purposes of Article XI in the Constitution was given its plain and ordinary sense, which the Court interprets to mean a calendar day in which the House of Representatives holds a session.

Second, the SC reiterated Gutierrez v. House of Representatives. However, it further elaborated that an impeachment complaint filed in accordance with the first mode of impeachment, Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), is deemed initiated for purposes of the one-year bar in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) when:

(a) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is referred to the Committee on Justice;

(b) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is not placed in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives within 10 session days, or referred to the Committee on Justice after it has been put in the Order of Business within three session days as required by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) of the Constitution; or

(c) no Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to the Senate before the House of Representatives adjourns sine die. This means that the initiation of an impeachment complaint must occur during the term of Congress.

Third, the SC affirmed the power of the House of Representatives to promulgate its own Rules on Impeachment. However, it clarified that Section 2 of the House Rules, as it is currently worded, requires the referral to the Committee on Justice even when filed through the second mode. The second mode is provided in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) of the Constitution, where the endorsement of at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives would be sufficient to transmit the Articles of Impeachment.

In view of the current wording of Section 2 of the Rules on Impeachment as drafted and promulgated by the House of Representatives in its 19th and 20th Congress, the House mayโ€”optionally upon its own prerogativeโ€”refer an impeachment complaint already endorsed by at least one-third of all its members to the Committee on Justice only for the following purposes:

(1) to ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) to confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every member of the House has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and

(3) to respect the Committeeโ€™s prerogative to consolidate different formulations of the complaint, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

The SC observed that there is a fundamental difference between the first and second modes of initiating impeachment complaints. Thus, Article XI, Section 3, subsections (2) and (3) cover the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint while Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) covers the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint.

In the first mode, as contemplated under subsections (2) and (3), impeachment is initiated through the regular and deliberative process in the House of Representatives. A verified complaint may be filed either by a member of the House or by a private citizen with the endorsement of a member. Upon filing, the complaint is referred to the House Committee on Justice, which evaluates its sufficiency in form and substance and conducts the appropriate hearings. Only after favorable committee action does the impeachment process proceed further. This mode therefore emphasizes institutional screening and committee review.

By contrast, subsection (4) introduces an alternative and more direct mechanism for initiating impeachment. Under this provision, a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment signed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives immediately initiates impeachment proceedings.

These provisions reflect a deliberate constitutional design; subsections (2) and (3) provide a structured and committee-directed approach, while subsection (4) allows a streamlined initiation when a sufficient level of consensus already exists.โ€

Fourth, the Court affirmed that due process of law applies to the impeachment process. It stated that:

โ€œThe phrase โ€˜right to life, liberty, or propertyโ€™ should not be read with undue literalism. It must be accorded reasonable flexibility to achieve its intent of protecting inherent and inalienable rights that could not have been exhaustively articulated at the time of its framing. The due process clause embodies the fundamental constitutional commitment to reasonableness, fairness, and non-arbitrariness. It envisions that we cannot have a true democratic and republican/representative state that is arbitrary and unfair.โ€

However, due process as it applies to the impeachment process is sui generis or a class of its own. Full-blown trial happens at the Senate. At least for the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint, it only requires:

One. The grounds invoked in the complaint or resolution are those contained in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Two. The procedure is governed by the Rules on Impeachment promulgated by the House of Representatives prior to any filing of any impeachment complaint.

Three. As already provided by the current House Rules on Impeachment, all endorsing members should have been given a copy of the complaint and all its supporting evidence.

The Court also noted that the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment should be done in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, providing all the members of the House of Representatives with full copies of the complaint and its accompanying evidence mentioned in Rule IV, Section 14 of the House Rules on Impeachment.

Transmittal to the Senate, however, requires only a vote of one-third of its members for the first mode of initiating a complaint, or proof of the endorsement of a complaint by one-third of its members for the second mode.

Fifth, the operative fact doctrine cannot be invoked by the party directly responsible in the commission of an unconstitutional act. Thus, it does not apply in this case.

Finally, the Court noted all the motions for intervention and pleadings filed by individuals who were not parties to the case.

The Resolution is immediately executory upon digital service on all parties.

No further pleadings will be allowed.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159965

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-sara-z-duterte-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al-atty-israelito-p-torreon-et-al-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ramon-paul-l-hernando-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-henri-jean-paul-b-inting-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ricardo-r-rosario/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-amy-c-lazaro-javier/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-raul-b-villanueva/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIOโ€™s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/01/2026

The ๐˜Œ๐˜ฏ ๐˜‰๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ค, during its session today, January 28, 2026, denied the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, which questioned the removal of an annotation on respondent Antonio V. Mitraโ€™s (Mitra) land title.

Mitra owns a parcel of land in Quezon City. After his transfer certificate of title (TCT) was presumed lost or destroyed, he applied for administrative reconstitution.

Following Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26, the law that governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles, the reconstituted title contained an annotation stating that it was without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted on the original copy at the time it was lost or destroyed.

Twenty-seven years later, Mitra asked the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the annotation, pointing out that no one had claimed any interest in the property during that period. The RTC granted the request and ordered the removal of the annotation. The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC, ruling that the publication and posting requirement no longer applied because of the long lapse of time since the title was reconstituted.

Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the SC explained that under R.A. No. 26, posting and publication are required only if the petition to cancel the mandatory annotation is filed within two years from the date of administrative reconstitution, and no petition to annotate an omitted interest has been filed during that period.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159902.

The full text of the Decision in G.R. No. 264862, Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio V. Mitra, shall be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

27/01/2026

Isinantabi ng ang kasong adultery na inihain ng kinatawan ng isang lalaki laban sa kanyang asawa. Muling iginiit ng Korte na tanging ang mismong asawang nasaktan o naagrabyado ang may karapatang magsampa ng ganitong kaso.

Sa isang desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., binaliktad ng Ikalawang Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang pasya ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) na nag-utos na muling buksan ang kasong adultery laban kina Aurel Ann Chua-Chiba at kapwa-akusado na si Michael Llona.

Nagsampa, sa pamamagitan ng isang kinatawan, ng kasong adultery at grave threats si Jin Chiba laban sa asawa niyang si Aurel at kay Michael.

Hindi pinagbigyan ng Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ang kasong adultery sa dahilang tanging ang mismong asawang naagrabyado lamang ang maaaring magsampa nito.

Binaliktad ng RTC ang desisyon ng MeTC at pinagtibay na tumugon sa mga pamantayang legal ang pagsasampa ng kaso, dahil nakalakip naman sa reklamong inihain ng kinatawan ni Jin ang mismong complaint-affidavit ni Jin.

Hindi ito sinang-ayunan ng Korte Suprema at muling iginiit na ang adultery ay isang pribadong krimen na maaari lamang usigin kung may reklamong inihain mismo ng asawang inagrabyado. Binanggit ng Korte ang Rule 110, Section 5, ng Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure at ang Article 344 ng Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na umiiral ang kahingiang ito โ€œbilang paggalang sa panig na inagrabyado, na maaaring mas piliing tiisin na lamang nang tahimik ang dinanas na paglabag kaysa humarap sa eskandalo ng isang pampublikong paglilitis.โ€ Pinahihintulutan ng batas ang asawang inagrabyado na magpasya kung dadalhin ba ang usapin sa hukuman o aayusin ito nang pribado.

Sa kasong ito, ang reklamong adultery ay hindi sinimulan ng mismong asawang inagrabyado kundi ng kanyang kinatawan. Bagaman nagsumite si Jin ng sarili niyang complaint-affidavit, ito ay isinama lamang bilang kalakip o annex sa reklamong inihain ng kanyang kinatawan.

Dahil hindi natugunan ang mga kahingian sa ilalim ng Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure at ng Revised Penal Code, itinuring ng Korte Suprema na walang wastong reklamo naisampa at tuluyan nitong ibinasura ang kaso.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159759

Basahin ang kabuuang teksto ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159743

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159748

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/01/2026

Ang labis na pagdidisiplina sa isang bata ay maituturing na child abuse kapag mayroong malinaw na layuning sirain ang dignidad ng isang bata.

Hinatulang guilty ng Korte Suprema ang isang ama ng child abuse o paglabag ng RA No. 7610 o ang Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act matapos isailalim sa marahas at labis na disiplina ang kanyang 12-anyos na anak na babae at 10-anyos na anak na lalaki.

Mula 2017 hanggang 2018, binugbog ng ama ang kanyang mga anak โ€” sinipa, hinila ang buhok, hinampas ng kahoy na pamalo at dustpan, at pinagmumura.

Sa ilalim ng Section 3(b) ng RA No. 7610, ang anumang pagkilos na nagpapababa sa dignidad ng isang bata ay itinuturing na child abuse.

Ayon sa Korte, malinaw na lumabag sa makatwirang pagdisiplina ang ginawa ng ama, na nagpapakita ng isang malinaw na layunin na sirain ang dignidad ng mga bata.

Bagama't may karapatan ang mga magulang na disiplinahin ang kanilang mga anak, paalala ng Korte, ang mga naturang hakbang ay hindi dapat maging marahas, sobra-sobra, o higit pa sa maling nagawa.

Ang Desisyon ay mula sa Second Division ng Korte Suprema na isinulat ni Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.

Basahin ang buong press release: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-excessive-discipline-that-harms-a-childs-dignity-is-child-abuse/

Basahin ang buong teksto ng Desisyon: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/268457-###-vs-people-of-the-philippines/



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