Enemido, Espiritu, Chua & Partners Law Offices

04/08/2026

11/06/2026

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06/04/2026

Sa isang Resolusyon na may petsang Nobyembre 4, 2025, sa A.M. Blg. 24-11-02-SC, nagpatupad ang Korte Suprema ng mahahalagang reporma para palawakin ang access sa videoconferencing, lalo na para sa mga indibidwal na may limitadong kakayahang digital (digitally disadvantaged individuals), at para mapahintulutan ang mas malawak na partisipasyon ng mga taong nasa ibang bansa.

Ang Binagong mga Alituntunin ay nalalapat sa pagsasagawa ng videoconferencing sa mga first- at second-level courts, sa Court of Appeals, sa Sandiganbayan, at sa Court of Tax Appeals. Saklaw nito ang lahat ng mga gawain at paglilitis sa alinmang yugto, kabilang ang pag-aayos ng alitan o mediation, konsultasyon, deliberasyon, at ang pagpapalabas ng mga desisyon at resolusyon, kapag isinasagawa sa pamamagitan ng videoconference.

Inaatasan na ngayon ang mga hukuman na tiyakin ang access sa videoconferencing para sa mga indibidwal na may limitadong kakayahang digital, kabilang ang mga nasa malalayong lugar o apektado ng kalagayang pampolitika. Maaaring kabilang dito ang pagde-deploy ng mga kawani ng hukuman para magbigay ng pansamantala o mobile na koneksyon sa internet.

Maaari ring magtayo ang mga hukuman ng mga itinalagang “access point” sa loob ng mga judicial regions kung saan puwedeng gumamit ang mga litigant, mga saksi, at iba pang kalahok sa paglilitis ng mga kompyuter at kagamitang pang-videoconferencing sa ilalim ng pangangasiwa ng hukuman.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160150.

Basahin ang kabuaan ng Resolusyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

06/04/2026

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

06/04/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has issued guidelines in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, clarifying that it must be evaluated based on the person’s true intent and the totality of the circumstances.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC granted the accused’s petition and reduced his sentence, recognizing his surrender as voluntary even if he surrendered after learning of the issuance of arrest warrant against him.

The accused went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apply for clearance. During processing, his name registered a “hit”, indicating he had a pending case. He admitted this to the NBI officer.

He was instructed to return after one week while the records were being verified. When he came back, the NBI officer confirmed he had a pending bigamy case and an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued 13 years earlier. He then told the officer, “masuko na lang ako” (I will surrender) and asked help in posting bail. The arrest warrant was then served on him.

The NBI later issued a certificate stating that he voluntarily surrendered to their office. However, the return of the warrant and order of release described him as having been “arrested.”

During arraignment, the accused first pleaded not guilty but later entered into a plea bargain, asking the court to consider his voluntary surrender and guilty plea.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted him of bigamy and considered his plea of guilt, but ruled that he did not voluntarily surrender. It relied on the warrant’s return and release order, which stated that he was “arrested,” and noted that the case had been pending for 13 years because he could not be located. The Court of Appeals affirmed this, finding that he went to the NBI not to surrender but to apply for clearance, and that when he said he would surrender, he had no choice because he was already inside the NBI office.

The SC disagreed.

Under Article 13(7) of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been arrested; they surrendered themselves to a person in authority or its agent; and the surrender was voluntary.

In this case, the accused returned to the NBI and said he would surrender before the arrest warrant was actually served on him. He had not yet been arrested. He also surrendered to an NBI officer, a person in authority.

The SC ruled that voluntary surrender must be viewed with a “more considerate and broad-minded approach” once guilt has been established. It stressed that voluntary surrender must be assessed through the totality of circumstances, laying down the following guiding principles:

1. The voluntariness and spontaneity of the surrender must show that offender either admits their guilt or wish to spare authorities the trouble of searching for and arresting them.

2. The circumstances of the voluntary surrender is independent of the fact of the issuance of the arrest warrant. The mere fact of the arrest warrant’s prior issuance should not be taken against the accused’s claim of voluntary surrender when other circumstances point to the fulfillment of all requirements, including voluntariness. However, knowledge of the accused of the existence of an arrest warrant against them and their continued evasion of justice can negate voluntariness and spontaneity.

3. The lapse of time an accused used to evade the law could be a criterion in negating spontaneity.

4. Voluntariness is not negated by the fact that there is likelihood that the accused may be arrested anytime before they surrendered. Imminence of arrest should be coupled with an indication that the accused fled or could further escape and evade, before it could deny voluntariness.

5. The intention of the accused at the time of surrender must be considered with other circumstances in determining entitlement to mitigating circumstance. The offender is not required to surrender at the first opportunity.

6. If the records do not clearly show that the offender voluntarily surrendered, that doubt cannot be resolved in their favor.

As to the voluntariness of his surrender, the SC emphasized that if he intended to evade arrest, he would not have returned to the NBI. While his first visit was to secure a clearance, his decision to return despite knowing there might be an active case shows his willingness to cooperate with the authorities.

The SC also clarified that while he knew about the pending case, there was no proof that he knew a warrant for his arrest had already been issued. It also noted the absence of any attempt to flee, his open use of his real name, and the fact that he returned to the NBI on his own.

The SC also reminded judges to avoid making quick or premature conclusions, emphasizing:

“What the Court asks and expects of magistrates on the frontlines of justice is to adjudge each case wholly, fully, and fairly as discerning persons learned in the law and literate in life experience, and not as cold-hearted automatons or soulless supercomputers, for even a single judge’s role in the administration of our penal laws can indeed have far-reaching consequences for the parties and for human society as a whole… The law may be harsh, but it need not be harsher.”

The accused’s sentence was reduced from a maximum of six years to a maximum of four years in prison.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160857

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160836

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/258592-formerly-udk-no-17170-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

06/04/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that search made after a lawful arrest extends to the surroundings within the immediate control of the accused and evidence obtained during such search is admissible even if they are not within the “plain view” of the arresting officers.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Jeryl Bautista for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, or the 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘳𝘶𝘨𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2002, as amended.

During a buy-bust operation, a police officer posed as a buyer and received from Bautista 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 in exchange for PHP 500. After the officer made a pre-arranged signal, the rest of the arresting team rushed to the place of the transaction.

Bautista was arrested and a representative from the Department of Justice, and two barangay kagawads arrived shortly after.

Subsequently, the officer searched Bautista and found three more sachets of suspected 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. The officer also found a cellphone, screwdriver, weighing scale, and marked money. The police then marked the four sachets, prepared an inventory of the seized items, and took photographs.

Bautista argued that the additional sachets should not be admitted as evidence because they were not within the plain view of the police officers when seized during his arrest.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both convicted Bautista of illegal possession of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The SC upheld Bautista’s conviction and rejected his argument. It explained that the plain view doctrine is not the only justification for a warrantless search, as the search could be done to a person who has just been lawfully arrested.

Searches and seizures generally require a warrant. If police perform a search or seize property without a valid warrant, any evidence obtained cannot be used in court and is considered inadmissible. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.

One of these is the plain view doctrine, which allows police officers to seize evidence in plain sight when: (1) the officer has a lawful reason to be in the place where the item is seen, (2) the discovery of the item is unplanned or incidental, and (3) it is immediately obvious that the item is connected to a crime or is illegal.

Another recognized exception is a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. To be valid, it must meet these conditions: (1) the accused is lawfully arrested, (2) the arresting officers subsequently made a warrantless search, (3) the search is limited to the person of the accused and the area within the accused’s immediate control, and (4) the search is performed at the place of the arrest.

In this case, Bautista was arrested during a buy-bust operation. He was frisked as part of the arrest. While the sachets hidden inside his cellphone charger were not in the officers’ plain view, the SC held that the warrantless search remained valid because it was done as part of a lawful arrest and the search extended to those that are within the immediate control of the accused at the time of the arrest.

To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the drug, that the possession was not authorized by law, and that it was done knowingly and freely.

The SC found that all these elements were present. The search revealed three additional sachets of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. Bautista could not explain why he had the drugs nor show any authority allowing him to possess them. His act of hiding the sachets inside the charger also showed his intent to keep them.

Bautista was sentenced to a maximum of 16 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

06/04/2026

For the guidelines on the assignment of judges for night court duty, please see A.M. No. 25-10-18-SC (https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161361).

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161372.

06/04/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the manning agency for the payment of disability benefits to seafarers under Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Special First Division granted the motion for partial reconsideration of its earlier Decision, which had held that only Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) and Princess Cruises Ltd. (Princess Cruises) are liable for the disability benefits of its seafarer. The SC ruled that Magsaysay Fleet Director Sorwin Joy G. Rivera (Rivera) is also solidarily liable, meaning he can be made to pay the full amount due.

Magsaysay, a manning agency, hired Ruthgar T. Parce as an electrical fitter for its foreign principal, Princess Cruises. After he was injured while working on board, he was sent back to Manila, where the company-designated doctor diagnosed him with rotator tendinitis in his shoulder and recommended physical therapy.

Months later, Parce was told he had reached the maximum medical treatment and that his sickness allowance would be discontinued. Based on this, Princess Cruises found him fit to work.

Parce continued to feel pain, so he sought a second medical opinion. The doctor he consulted found him unfit for sea duty. Parce then requested Magsaysay for a referral to a third doctor, as required under the rules, and for copies of his medical records. Magsaysay refused and asked instead for a copy of the second doctor’s report to explore a possible settlement. Parce then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses.

The LA ruled in his favor, ordering Magsaysay and Princess Cruises to pay Parce USD 60,000 in disability benefits. The LA considered the company-designated doctor’s report incomplete because it failed to clearly state that Parce was fit to work. The National Labor Relations Commission upheld the LA and also stated that Rivera was liable alongside Magsaysay and Princess Cruises.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, noting that Parce did not immediately question his medical assessment, which weakened his case.

The SC disagreed. It held Magsaysay and Princess Cruises liable because the company-designated doctor’s report was incomplete, giving Parce nothing to properly contest. The SC affirmed the LA’s ruling that he was already deemed permanently disabled under the law.

Parce filed a motion for partial reconsideration, asking the SC to also declare Rivera solidarily liable with the companies. The SC granted the motion.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, clearly provides that when a recruitment agency is a corporation or partnership, its officers, directors, or partners are liable with the company for any money claims awarded to overseas Filipino workers.

The SC explained that while corporate officers are generally not personally liable for contracts entered into by their company, an exception applies when a law specifically makes them accountable. In this case, Rivera, a corporate officer of Magsaysay, was held solidarily liable with the company for Parce’s permanent disability benefits. Rivera was named in the complaint as “Owner/President/Manager” and had signed the employment contract on behalf of the company.

The SC added that when Magsaysay applied for its license to operate as a manning agency, its officers and directors were required, under Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules, to submit a verified undertaking, making them solidarily liable for claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.

The SC emphasized that Section 10 of RA 8042 and the relevant POEA Rules are considered part of every seafarer’s employment contract. “These provisions are in line with the State’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating the workers’ plight and are meant to assure overseas Filipino workers immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them,” the SC said.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161450

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161442

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

06/04/2026

The Judiciary adopts flexible work arrangements and energy conservation measures starting March 9, 2026 in Memorandum Circular No. 02 - 2026 issued by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.

In the Memo, the (SC) observes a four-day on-site and one-day work-from-home (WFH) work arrangement, citing Friday as the generally observed WFH day and provided that at least 25% of the employees in each office or division shall report on-site every Friday, as determined by the head of office or division, to ensure continuity of operations.

The Office of the Chief Justice, the Office of the Senior Associate Justice, the Offices of the Associate Justices, the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, the Docket-Receiving Section of the Judicial Records Office, the Management Information Systems Office (MISO) with respect to its essential staff, and the Office of the Judiciary Marshals are excluded from this work arrangement, and shall maintain the regular work arrangements.

The Court of Appeals (CA) shall observe the same work arrangements prescribed for the SC, provided that on Fridays, at least 25% of the employees in each office or division shall report on-site, and, at least, three Justices comprising one division, on a rotation basis, shall be available to act on urgent matters, including petitions for extraordinary writs and petitions and motions in connection with Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals shall continue to observe a full five-day on-site workweek, without special work arrangement.

The First- and Second- Level Courts shall likewise observe a four-day on-site and one-day WFH arrangement.

In single-sala courts, Presiding Judges may adopt either of the following on-site work schedules: (1) on-site work from Monday to Thursday, with Friday designated as the WFH day, or (2) on-site work from Tuesday to Friday, with Monday designated as the WFH day; Provided that pairing courts shall not be on WFH schedule on the same day.

In multiple-sala courts, the four-day on-site and one-day WFH arrangement shall be implemented alternately. Within the same week, odd-numbered branches shall initially report on-site from Monday to Thursday, with Friday designated as the WFH day, while even-numbered branches shall report on-site from Tuesday to Friday, with Monday designated as the WFH day. In the following week, the schedules shall be reversed (i.e., the odd-numbered branches shall report on-site from Tuesday to Friday, with Monday as the WFH day, while the even-numbered branches shall report on-site from Monday to Thursday, with Friday as the WFH day.) This alternating schedule shall continue every week until the four-day workweek arrangement is lifted.

The flexible work arrangements prescribed in Memorandum Circular No. 02 - 2026 shall commence on March 9, 2026, and shall remain in force until modified or lifted by the SC.

Read the full text of Memorandum Circular No. 02 - 2026 at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161689