DAMC Law Office

20/04/2026

The (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are:
• Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
• Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
• Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
• Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
• Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent:
• Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
• Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
• Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
• Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
• Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Read the Concurring and Dissenting OpinionOpinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

17/04/2026

Nagpasya ang na hindi maituturing na nuisance o isang istorbo ang mga tunog o ingay na nagmumula sa mga regular na aktibidad ng isang eskwelahan. Hindi rin ito maaaring maging batayan para managot ang paaralan sa pagbabayad ng danyos.

Sa Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, pinagbigyan ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang petisyon ng Couples for Christ School of the Morning Star (eskwelahan) at binaliktad ang pasya ng Court of Appeals (CA) na naggawad ng danyos sa mga residente ng Saint Joseph Subdivision sa Barangay Villa Kananga, Lungsod ng Butuan kung saan matatagpuan ang eskwelahan.

Sinampahan ng kaso ng mga residente ng subdivision ang eskwelahan dahil sa naririnig nilang malakas na ingay mula sa eskwelahan tulad ng tunog ng tambol at bugle, mga gurong gumagamit ng mikropono at megaphone, at mga estudyanteng tumatakbo, sumisigaw, at naghihiyawan habang naglalaro sa multipurpose center. Ayon sa kanila, nakagagambala sa kanilang pagtulog at katahimikan sa kanilang tahanan ang mga ingay na ito na naririnig umano araw at gabi.

Depensa ng eskwelahan, nagmumula lang sa regular na klase ang anumang ingay at may kaukulang mga permit at clearance sila magmula nang magsimula ang kanilang operasyon noong 2012. Idagdag pa ng eskwelahan, nasa loob ng pinahihintulutang limitasyon para sa mga residential area ang antas ng ingay, base sa pagsusuri ng City Environment and Natural Resources Office. Nagsagawa na rin umano ito ng mga hakbang para mabawasan ang ingay gaya ng pagtatayo ng mas matataas na bakod, pagtatanim ng mga puno, paggamit ng mas maliliit na speaker, at paglilimita ng mga aktibidad mula 7:00 ng umaga hanggang 7:00 ng gabi kapag may klase.

Isinantabi ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) ang reklamo ng mga residente, pero nagpasya pabor sa mga residente ang Court of Appeals (CA).

Binaliktad ng Korte Suprema ang desisyon ng CA. Iginiit nito na hindi isang istorbo ang akademikong ingay o mga tunog mula sa mga lehitimong aktibidad sa eskwelahan.

Kasama sa maituturing na nuisance o istorbo ang anumang kaguluhan na nakasasagabal sa kaginhawahan, ari-arian, o kasiyahan ng isang tao. Para may mananagot para sa mga pinsala, ang ingay ay dapat sapat na malakas para makapinsala o magbanta sa kalusugan o kaligtasan, o para inisin o saktan ang isang ordinaryo at makatwirang tao.

Para maituring na isang istorbo ang ingay, isinasaalang-alang ng Korte Suprema, sa kasong Frabelle Properties Corp. v. AC Enterprises Inc., ang mga sumusunod:
• ang pagiging maaasahan ng mga isinagawang pagsusuri sa polusyon ng ingay,
• ang mga hakbang na ginawa para mabawasan ang ingay,
• ang pinahihintulutang antas ng ingay,
• ang layunin ng defendant na magdulot ng pinsala sa nagrereklamo,
• ang bilang ng mga nagrereklamo,
• ang pagiging kinatawan ng nagrereklamo komunidad, at
• ang mga hakbang na ginawa ng nagrereklamo para maibsan ang kanyang kalagayan.

Nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na nabigo ang mga residente na patunayan na labis at hindi makatwirang nakagagambala ang ingay mula sa eskwelahan, at nagpalala sa kanilang kalagayang pangkalusugan. Hindi rin ito lumampas sa maaaring asahan mula sa isang eskwelahan. Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na walang nuisance kung hindi naman maaabala sa tunog ang isang karaniwang tao kahit pa may isang taong labis na sensitibo rito.

Hindi rin naipakita ng mga residenteng nagsampa ng kaso na kumakatawan siła są buong komunidad.

Dagdag pa ng Korte Suprema, hindi maaaring maghabol ng danyos batay sa sinasabing abuse of rights sa ilalim ng Civil Code kung walang sapat na batayan. Nagpasya ang Korte na walang layunin ang eskwelahan na manakit o mang-abala sa mga residente at nagsagawa pa ito ng mga hakbang para mabawasan ang ingay. Wala ring ebidensiya na sinadya ng eskwelahan ang paglikha ng ingay nang may masamang hangarin o masamang loob.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163502.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163486.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/03/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption is required even when the child is voluntarily surrendered by the mother.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division upheld the Regional Trial Court (RTC)’s dismissal of an adoption petition because it did not include a certification from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

The case began when a mother, soon after giving birth, left her baby in the care of Eleazar Robiso (Robiso) and his parents. A year later, Robiso filed a petition for adoption before the RTC.

To support his petition, Robiso submitted an 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘈𝘥𝘰𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘎𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘥𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥, executed by the mother. In the affidavit, the mother said she could not financially support her child. She entrusted the child and her parental authority to Robiso.

When both the RTC and the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for lack of a DSWD certification clearing the child legally available for adoption, as required by RA 9523, Robiso filed a petition for review on 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘳𝘪 before the SC, arguing that the certification was required only for abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.

The SC disagreed and denied Robiso’s petition.

In adoption cases, RA 9523 requires a DSWD certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. The law’s implementing rules clarified that the requirement applies to surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children.

Although the law does not define a 𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥, it defines a 𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 as one whose parents or legal guardian knowingly and willingly give up parental authority to the DSWD or an accredited child-placement or child-caring agency. The law's implementing rules adopt the same definition for a surrendered child.

The SC added that the law should be read together with Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, or the 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘠𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘩 𝘞𝘦𝘭𝘧𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which treats a child surrendered to an individual as a voluntarily committed child.

It explained: “When a parent—often a mother acting under difficult circumstances, as in this case—entrusts her child to another's care, the child is legally considered voluntarily committed. For purpose of adoption, the prospective adopter must therefore first secure the necessary DSWD certification.”

However, the SC clarified that Robiso may still pursue the proper remedy, including the streamlined administrative adoption process under RA 11642, or the 𝘋𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘈𝘥𝘰𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘭𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘊𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘵, which took effect in 2022.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162472.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162466.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/02/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that search made after a lawful arrest extends to the surroundings within the immediate control of the accused and evidence obtained during such search is admissible even if they are not within the “plain view” of the arresting officers.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Jeryl Bautista for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, or the 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘳𝘶𝘨𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2002, as amended.

During a buy-bust operation, a police officer posed as a buyer and received from Bautista 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 in exchange for PHP 500. After the officer made a pre-arranged signal, the rest of the arresting team rushed to the place of the transaction.

Bautista was arrested and a representative from the Department of Justice, and two barangay kagawads arrived shortly after.

Subsequently, the officer searched Bautista and found three more sachets of suspected 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. The officer also found a cellphone, screwdriver, weighing scale, and marked money. The police then marked the four sachets, prepared an inventory of the seized items, and took photographs.

Bautista argued that the additional sachets should not be admitted as evidence because they were not within the plain view of the police officers when seized during his arrest.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both convicted Bautista of illegal possession of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The SC upheld Bautista’s conviction and rejected his argument. It explained that the plain view doctrine is not the only justification for a warrantless search, as the search could be done to a person who has just been lawfully arrested.

Searches and seizures generally require a warrant. If police perform a search or seize property without a valid warrant, any evidence obtained cannot be used in court and is considered inadmissible. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.

One of these is the plain view doctrine, which allows police officers to seize evidence in plain sight when: (1) the officer has a lawful reason to be in the place where the item is seen, (2) the discovery of the item is unplanned or incidental, and (3) it is immediately obvious that the item is connected to a crime or is illegal.

Another recognized exception is a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. To be valid, it must meet these conditions: (1) the accused is lawfully arrested, (2) the arresting officers subsequently made a warrantless search, (3) the search is limited to the person of the accused and the area within the accused’s immediate control, and (4) the search is performed at the place of the arrest.

In this case, Bautista was arrested during a buy-bust operation. He was frisked as part of the arrest. While the sachets hidden inside his cellphone charger were not in the officers’ plain view, the SC held that the warrantless search remained valid because it was done as part of a lawful arrest and the search extended to those that are within the immediate control of the accused at the time of the arrest.

To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the drug, that the possession was not authorized by law, and that it was done knowingly and freely.

The SC found that all these elements were present. The search revealed three additional sachets of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. Bautista could not explain why he had the drugs nor show any authority allowing him to possess them. His act of hiding the sachets inside the charger also showed his intent to keep them.

Bautista was sentenced to a maximum of 16 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

30/12/2025

26/12/2025

The has laid down guideposts for proving who owns or controls a social media account in criminal cases.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of an individual (###) for committing psychological violence under Section 5 (i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊) 𝘈𝘤𝘵 against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬.

The SC sentenced ### to up to eight years in prison, imposed a PHP 100,000 fine, and ordered ### to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

The SC stressed that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender.

It explained that for crimes committed through social media, the basic features of the platform such as 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬, must be considered.

Noting that 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 is widely used in the Philippines, the SC held that a 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 account can easily be created by anyone claiming to be at least 13 years old with an email address or mobile number.

Once an account is created, the user can add friends, exchange private messages, and post statements, photos, or videos visible to others depending on the user’s privacy settings. Fake or dummy accounts can easily spread, enabling disinformation, identity theft, or crimes.

Given this, the SC ruled that guideposts are necessary to establish who owns or controls a social media account. It said the following must be shown to prove ownership or access:

1. Admission of ownership or authorship;
2. Being seen accessing the account or composing the post;
3. Containing information known only to the offender or a few people;
4. Language consistent with the offender’s characteristics;
5. Records from the internet service provider, telecommunications company, or social media site, and results from device forensic analysis showing geolocation features, and other attributes linking the account to the offender;
6. Acts consistent with previous posts; or
7. Other instances showing ownership, access, or authorship.

Applying these, the SC found that several factors proved ### wrote the 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 post. The account name bore his full name, and the profile photo showed him with his child from his current live-in partner.

AAA’s sister had also received messages from the same account for years.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158535.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158446.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/11/2025

The (SC) has ruled that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over a labor dispute only when both parties clearly and mutually agree to it. One party’s agreement is not enough if the other consistently objects.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division ruled that the panel of voluntary arbitrators lacked authority to resolve the monetary claims of Benjie Tandayag against Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Instead, the jurisdiction over the dispute lies with the Labor Arbiter (LA).

Tandayag, a seafarer hired by the corporation for one of its vessels, suffered a work-related injury while on board the vessel, leaving him permanently disabled. There was no collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between him and the corporation.

When the corporation refused to pay his disability and other related benefits, he filed a case with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, which referred it to a panel of voluntary arbitrators (panel).

The parties entered into a submission agreement to arbitrate before the panel. However, the corporation argued that the panel lacked jurisdiction over the monetary claims. The panel disagreed, stating that the corporation waived its right to contest the panel’s jurisdiction when it signed the submission agreement. Ultimately, it ruled in favor of Tandayag.

The corporation challenged this decision before the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled that the LA, not the voluntary arbitrators, has jurisdiction.

Upholding the CA, the SC cited the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which provides that money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed before the LA, a rule similarly stated in RA 8042 or the 𝘔𝘪𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘖𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 for claims of overseas Filipino workers. Voluntary arbitrators, on the other hand, handle disputes involving CBAs, company policies, and 𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 that 𝗯𝗼𝘁𝗵 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗴𝗿𝗲𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝗺𝗶𝘁 to them.

In this case, there was no CBA, but Tandayag and the panel relied on the parties’ submission agreement.

However, records show that the corporation promptly and repeatedly objected to the voluntary arbitrators’ authority. In fact, it even asked that the jurisdiction issue be resolved and insisted that the case belonged to the LA.

The SC explained that the submission agreement did not mean the corporation accepted the voluntary arbitrators’ jurisdiction, since it clearly raised the issue from the start.

The SC added that while voluntary arbitration is encouraged, “𝘪𝘵 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘶𝘯𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘷𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘣𝘰𝘵𝘩 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘱𝘶𝘵𝘦 𝘢𝘨𝘳𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘢𝘳𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳.” Submission to arbitration by one side is not enough if the other side consistently objects.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156011.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156005.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/11/2025

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Lorenzo R. dela Rosa, a member of the Remedial Law Department of the Philippine Judicial Academy, discusses key issues on land titles and the steps buyers should take before acquiring properties in Episode 95: Protecting the Integrity of Land Titles.

What is a reconstituted title, and how is it different from the original title or the owner's duplicate? What remedies are available to buyers defrauded by sellers?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/4NcLjdE0axrvAej7wGMueu?si=8BzkNdj4QIufZoL1glN-Ow

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/episode-95-protecting-the-integrity-of-land-titles/id1852172756?i=1000737742658

YouTube: https://youtu.be/KRcs30UAwwQ

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1MuvG4RZ8s/

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

17/11/2025

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16/11/2025

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Lorenzo R. dela Rosa, a member of the Remedial Law Department of the Philippine Judicial Academy, discusses
mortgage and sale of properties under RA 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, in Episode 94: When Agrarian Land is Mortgaged or Sold.

What is Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? What is the logic and wisdom behind the prohibition on the sale or transfer of awarded lands within 10 years of the award?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6YH60c0erH64qWOV3ABchQ?si=CVMIysfiSJ-0pRet8wGwnw

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000736719029

YouTube: https://youtu.be/MkfL9RK92hw

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/19rssC3zrQ/

25/09/2025

Iginiit ng na maaaring managot ang mga bangko para sa moral damages na dinanas ng mga depositor dahil sa kapabayaan kahit na walang katibayan ng bad faith o malice.

Sa isang Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, inatasan ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang Banco de Oro (BDO) na bayaran sina Remedios at Angelita Antonino (Antonino) sa nalikom ng kanilang time deposit, kabilang ang PHP 100,000 bilang moral damages.

Mga U.S. green card holder na naninirahan sa ibang bansa ang mga Antonino na gumawa ng tatlong time deposit placement na may kabuuang halaga na higit sa USD 150,000 sa BDO San Lorenzo Branch sa Makati City (BDO San Lorenzo). Nakipag-ayos sila sa manager ng sangay na kung hindi ma-withdraw ang mga deposito kapag nag-mature ang mga ito, awtomatiko silang i-roll over sa mga savings account na may interes. Hindi na-redeem ang mga time deposit certificate (TDC) at itinago ang mga ito sa isang deposit box sa Banco Filipino.

Nang maglaon, nagdeklara ng pagkalugi ang Banco Filipino at tinake-over ito ng Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Itinigil ng BDO San Lorenzo ang operasyon at nagsara nang hindi nag-abiso sa mga Antonino na natuklasan lamang ang pagsasara noong sinubukan nilang bawiin ang kanilang mga investment.

Nagpadala sila ng ilang demand letter sa BDO ngunit sinabi ng bangko na na-withdraw na ang mga deposito at binanggit ang demand draft na pinirmahan umano ni Angelita. Itinanggi ni Angelita ang pagpirma sa dokumento.

Nagsampa ng reklamo ang mga Antonino laban sa BDO para bayaran sila sa kanilang time deposit.

Sa pagpasya pabor sa mga Antonino, binanggit ng Korte Suprema ang Section 9 ng mga tuntunin at kundisyon ng BDO para sa mga placement ng time deposit na nag-aatas ng pagsuko ng mga TDC kapag nag-withdraw ng mga deposito. Dahil mayroon pa ring mga sertipiko ang mga Antonino, sinabi ng Korte na hindi na-withdraw ang mga pondo.

Binigyang pansin ng Korte na sinabi ng eksperto sa PNP na posibleng peke ang lagda sa demand draft. Ipinakita rin sa mga tala ng imigrasyon at pasaporte na hindi nagpunta si Angelita sa bansa para pumirma sa draft. Dagdag pa, nabigo ang BDO na beripikahin ang pagkakakilanlan ng taong nag-withdraw ng pondo.

Dagdag pa nito, nagpakita ang mga lapses na ito ng kabiguan ng BDO na gamitin ang required diligence, lalo na kung malaking halaga ang nasasangkot.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152203.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152187.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.