WBB Law Office

23/04/2026

The (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are:
• Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
• Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
• Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
• Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
• Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent:
• Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
• Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
• Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
• Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
• Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Read the Concurring and Dissenting OpinionOpinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

07/01/2026

Congratulations to Atty. Genesis G. Dungaya Sanosuke Sagara & Atty. Clarence Joy Cangoy Clarence Joy Cangoy. From our office 🎉🎉

18/12/2025

18/07/2025

Alwad kakailyan!

𝐓𝐀𝐆-𝐔𝐋𝐀𝐍 𝐒𝐀𝐅𝐄𝐓𝐘 𝐓𝐈𝐏𝐒! 🌧️
Panahon na naman ng ulan—kaya't maging alerto, ligtas, at handa!

15/07/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that hiding one’s homosexuality from a spouse can be considered fraud and may be used as a ground to annul a marriage.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division annulled the marriage of a woman whose husband concealed his homosexuality before they got married.

The couple met on social media. On their first date, the woman noticed that the man seemed distant. The man also avoided sitting beside her. When asked about this, the man said he was just shy and lacked confidence.

The two kept a long-distance relationship as the man worked overseas. Notwithstanding this, they got married two years later.

But the man continued to avoid intimacy and often started arguments to avoid his wife. Just two months after the wedding, he returned overseas and stopped communicating with her.

Later, the woman found magazines with half-naked and naked male models among her husband’s things. When she confronted him, he admitted that he was homosexual. The woman then filed for annulment of their marriage.

The SC ruled that the woman’s consent to the marriage was obtained through fraud, and that the marriage must be annulled on the ground of fraudulent concealment of sexuality, following Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

Article 45 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 states that a marriage can be annulled if one party’s consent was obtained through fraud, as long as the couple did not continue living together after discovering the fraud. Article 46 further specifies that hiding one’s homosexuality or lesbianism from a spouse is considered fraud.

The SC gave credence to the woman’s allegations, noting that the man’s admission and his unexplained silence when his sexuality was being questioned could not be ignored. It found that the husband intentionally hid his homosexuality to persuade the woman to stay and marry him.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/ywadbxwp.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/yjn9a89f.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

10/07/2025

The (SC) has acquitted two individuals accused of illegal gambling due to the arresting officers’ failure to provide specific details of the gambling activity.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC’s Second Division overturned the conviction of Robert Plan (Plan) and Mark Oliver D. Enolva (Enolva). They were earlier convicted by the trial court for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602, which prescribes stiffer penalties on illegal gambling.

Records show that the police caught Plan and Enolva playing 𝘤𝘢𝘳𝘢 𝘺 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘻, a coin-toss betting game, after receiving a tip from a concerned citizen regarding illegal gambling activities in their area.

In acquitting the two, the SC ruled that the evidence against the two was not sufficient.

The SC found that the police failed to prove that the accused were actually placing bets. While the officers claimed to have seen pot money on the floor, they could not confirm the denomination of the bills.

The SC stressed that for a gambling conviction to hold, the arresting officer must present clear and specific details of the gambling operations. This includes identifying the players, the game being played, the person taking bets, and the actual money used.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/ms2xaktt.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/fvxypv2z.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://tinyurl.com/47ajp3md.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

08/07/2025

Our Office is now located at Room 4, 2nd Floor, Baguio Masonic Lodge, 180 Yandoc St., Kayang Extension, Baguio City.
Same building, same floor of our old office.

03/07/2025

The (SC) has ruled that an acknowledgment receipt cannot be considered a contract of sale unless it clearly shows that the seller intends to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer.

In a decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that the agreement between Virgilio B. Chavez and his fellow petitioners (Chavez family) on one hand, and Spouses Joselito and Adriana Gopez (spouses) on the other was a contract to sell, not a contract of sale.

The case involved two properties inherited by the Chavez family, which they agreed to sell to the Spouses Gopez for PHP 31.5 million. The spouses were required to pay PHP 5 million as downpayment and to prepare the necessary documents, including the contract to sell.

The spouses initially paid PHP 200,000, noted in an acknowledgment receipt as “earnest money.” This receipt was the only proof of their agreement.

Later, the Chavez family canceled the agreement, claiming that the spouses had not paid the full down payment and had delayed the paperwork. This led the Spouses Gopez to file a case to force the Chavez family to proceed with the sale.

Ruling that the transaction was a contract to sell, the SC explained that in such a contract, the seller does not agree to transfer ownership of the property just yet. The seller only commits to fulfilling their promise to sell the properties and transfer title to the buyer after an event, typically the full payment of the purchase price. If this does not happen, their obligation to sell does not arise, and the seller retains ownership of the property.

In contrast, a contract of sale clearly shows the seller's intent to transfer ownership to the buyer.

In this case, the acknowledgment receipt did not include any promise to transfer ownership. It only showed that the spouses needed to meet conditions: the payment of the purchase price and preparation of the contract to sell, deed of sale, and estate settlement.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/3zfynpbc.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/4hvfm3ze.

Read the the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://tinyurl.com/msysydyb.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s inability to love or emotionally connect with their partner, if rooted in a genuine personality disorder, may be considered evidence of psychological incapacity and a ground to declare a marriage void.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division reinstated an earlier ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which declared a couple’s marriage void from the beginning due to the husband’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital duties.

The couple met in 1999 and married in 2002. They did not live together immediately, as the husband worked in Saudi Arabia. They were only physically together for about five years, and their relationship was marked by frequent arguments and periods of separation.

In 2016, the husband filed a petition to nullify the marriage, supported by a psychologist’s diagnosis of his Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder, which made it difficult for him to maintain close relationships. The RTC initially granted his petition, but reversed the same on reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the husband’s appeal.

The SC, however, ruled in favor of the husband, finding that he had sufficiently proven psychological incapacity.

Under Article 36 of the Family Code, a marriage is void if one or both spouses are psychologically unable to fulfill their marital duties—even if the condition becomes evident only after the wedding. The incapacity must be deeply rooted in the person’s character and must have existed before the marriage.

The SC clarified that psychological incapacity can manifest long after the wedding, so a spouse who initially appears capable may later show signs of inability. If this comes from a genuine psychological condition, the marriage can still be declared void.

In this case, the SC found that the husband’s emotional detachment stemmed from a strict and emotionally distant upbringing. While he could provide for his family financially, he struggled to meet his wife’s emotional needs, including basic companionship.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/2zjba472.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/8e67mcme.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://tinyurl.com/56e9rs43.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

04/06/2025

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