A&A Law Office

26/08/2026

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26/08/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence.

The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch.

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence.

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

26/08/2026

Nagpasya ang na hindi maaaring singilin ng bangko ang isang depositor sa perang na-withdraw nito kung ang pagkawala ng pera ay dulot ng mismong gross negligence o matinding kapabayaan ng bangko.

Sa isang Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, isinantabi ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang petisyon na inihain ng BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO) at sinabi na maituturing na matinding kapabayaan ang hindi pagsunod ng bangko sa sarili nitong patakaran.

Nag-ugat ang kaso sa pagdeposito ni Cristina Barcellano (Barcellano) ng isang regional check na nagkakahalaga ng PHP 151,200 mula sa sangay ng Landbank sa Albay sa kanyang savings account sa sangay ng BDO sa Lucena City.

Nagkamali ang teller ng BDO sa pag-validate ng tseke bilang local check sa halip na regional check. Dahil dito, na-credit ang halaga makalipas lamang ng tatlong banking days sa halip na pitong araw.

Sa paniniwalang maaari nang gamitin ang pera, nag-withdraw si Barcellano ng PHP 76,000. Di nagtagal, nakatanggap ang BDO ng stop payment order para sa tseke at hiniling kay Barcellano na isauli ang pera. Bagama’t pumayag siya, hindi niya naibalik ang nasabing halaga. Kalaunan, tumanggi ang BDO na ilabas ang natitirang balanse at nagsampa ng reklamong kriminal para sa estafa.

Kapwa pinawalang-sala ng Regional Trial Court at ng Court of Appeals si Barcellano matapos mapag-alamang walang pandaraya, panlilinlang, o pang-aabuso sa tiwala sa kanyang panig, at ang sariling kapabayaan ng BDO ang naging sanhi ng insidente.

Sa Korte Suprema, hiniling ng BDO na repasuhin ang aspekto ng pananagutang sibil ng kaso. Iginiit nitong sa kabila ng pagpapawalang-sala kay Barcellano, dapat pa rin siyang atasan na isauli ang pera. Ayon sa BDO, ang pagtanggi niyang isauli ito ay nagresulta sa unjust enrichment o hindi makatarungang pagpapayaman. Dagdag nito, dahil nailabas ang pondo dahil sa pagkakamali nito sa pagproseso ng tseke, obligado si Barcellano na isauli ang pera batay sa prinsipyo ng solutio indebiti na nag-aatas sa pagsasauli ng perang natanggap dahil sa pagkakamali.

Hindi sumang-ayon ng Korte Suprema. Walang unjust enrichment dahil nabigo ang BDO na patunayang tinanggap nito ang isang benepisyo na hindi para sa kanya.

Sa kasong ito, hindi ipinaliwanag ng bangko kung bakit naglabas ng stop payment order o ipinakita na alam ni Barcellano na hindi mababayaran ang tseke. Sa halip, ipinakita ng mga ebidensiya na nag-withdraw siya ng pera nang may mabuting loob matapos mismong gawing available ng BDO ang pondo sa kanyang account.

Dagdag pa nito, ang mismong gross negligence ng BDO ang naging sanhi ng pagkalugi nito. Napag-alaman na na-credit ng bangko ang tseke bago ito maayos na na-clear, napagkamalan nitong local check ang regional check, at hindi nito natukoy ang pagkakamali hanggang sa matanggap nito ang stop payment order. Ipinakita ng mga pagkukulang na ito na hindi nasunod ng bangko ang mga pangunahing pag-iingat na nilalayong protektahan ito laban sa mga panganib na dulot ng mga tsekeng hindi wasto o hindi mababayaran.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that Flying Risk Pay (FRP) under Republic Act No. (RA) 776, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘈𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, may be granted only to Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) personnel whose duties are directly related to flight operations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of FRP paid to certain CAAP officials and employees whose duties were primarily managerial, administrative, or financial.

Under Section 30 of RA 776, CAAP-licensed airmen and other authorized personnel who are required to make regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties may receive FRP equivalent to 50% of their salary, provided they complete at least four hours of flight time per month.

In 2011, CAAP granted FRP to officials and employees who met the four-hour monthly flight requirement. Some recipients, however, held managerial, administrative, and finance positions and traveled by air mainly to attend conferences, seminars, public hearings, inspections, and similar activities.

COA disallowed PHP 323,579.50 in FRP payments, finding that the benefit was intended for personnel whose duties involved aerial and flight operations.

The recipients argued that they were entitled to FRP because RA 776 covers not only “airmen” but also “other authorized personnel,” even if their duties were not directly related to flight operations.

The SC upheld the disallowance.

Citing RA 776, which defines an “airman” as a pilot, mechanic, flight radio operator, aircraft crew member, or a person responsible for inspecting, maintaining, or repairing aircraft,” the SC clarified that the phrase “other authorized personnel” refers to personnel who are required to perform regular and frequent aerial flights as part of their official duties.

The SC also cited the 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘭, which limits FRP to personnel whose duties are inherent in flight operations and excludes those who fly merely as passengers.

In this case, the recipient’s air travel was only incidental to their managerial, administrative, or financial duties. Their flights were for meetings, conferences, inspections, and other administrative activities, rather than for flight operations. As passengers, they were not entitled to FPR.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171845.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165944.

Read the full text of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa’s Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165939.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/08/2026

Nagpasya ang na maaari lamang ipagkaloob ang Flying Risk Pay (FRP), sa ilalim ng Republic Act No. (RA) 776 o Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines, sa mga kawani ng Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) na ang mga tungkulin ay direktang may kaugnayan sa mga operasyon ng paglipad.

Sa isang Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, pinagtibay ng En Banc ng Korte Suprema ang disallowance ng Commission on Audit (COA) sa FRP na ibinayad sa ilang opisyal at kawani ng CAAP na pangunahing gumaganap ng mga tungkuling managerial, administratibo, o pinansiyal.

Sa ilalim ng Section 30 ng RA 776, maaaring tumanggap ng FRP na katumbas ng 50% ng kanilang sahod ang mga airman na lisensyado ng CAAP at iba pang awtorisadong personnel na kinakailangang magsagawa ng regular at madalas na paglipad bilang bahagi ng kanilang mga tungkulin, basta’t nakukumpleto nila ang hindi bababa sa apat na oras na flight time bawat buwan.

Noong 2011, ipinagkaloob ng CAAP ang FRP sa mga opisyal at empleyadong nakatugon sa kinakailangang apat na oras na flight bawat buwan. Gayunman, ang ilan sa mga tumanggap nito ay may mga posisyong managerial, administratibo, at pinansiyal, at pangunahing sumasakay ng eroplano para dumalo sa mga seminar, pampublikong pagdinig, inspeksiyon, at iba pa.

Hindi pinahintulutan ng COA ang FRP na nagkakahalaga ng PHP 323,579.50, dahil napag-alamang ang benepisyo ay para sa mga kawani na ang mga tungkulin ay may kinalaman sa mga operasyon ng paglipad at panghimpapawid.

Depensa ng mga nakatanggap, karapat-dapat silang tumanggap ng FRP dahil saklaw ng RA 776 hindi lamang ang mga “airman” kundi pati ang “other authorized personnel” kahit hindi direktang may kaugnayan sa mga operasyon ng paglipad ang kanilang mga tungkulin.

Sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema sa COA disallowance. Sa ilalim ng RA 776, tumutukoy ang “airman” sa isang piloto, mekaniko, flight radio operator, miyembro ng aircraft crew, o taong responsable sa pag-iinspeksiyon, pagpapanatili, o pagkukumpuni ng sasakyang panghimpapawid. Nilinaw nito na ang pariralang “other authorized personnel” ay tumutukoy rin sa mga kawani na kinakailangang magsagawa ng regular at madalas na paglipad bilang bahagi ng kanilang mga opisyal na tungkulin.

Binanggit din ng Korte Suprema ang Government Accounting and Auditing Manual na naglilimita sa FRP sa mga kawani na ang mga tungkulin ay likas na bahagi ng mga operasyon ng paglipad. Hindi kabilang dito ang mga sumasakay ng eroplano bilang mga pasahero lamang.

Sa kasong ito, ang pagsakay sa eroplano ng mga tumanggap ng FRP ay nagkataon lamang sa kanilang mga tungkuling managerial, administratibo, o pinansiyal. Ang kanilang mga paglipad ay para sa mga pagpupulong, kumperensiya, inspeksiyon, at iba pang gawaing administratibo, at hindi para sa mga operasyon ng paglipad. Bilang mga pasahero lamang, hindi sila kwalipikadong tumanggap ng FRP.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171845.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165944.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/08/2026

24/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that courts may determine whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case when necessary to resolve who has the right to possess a property. However, this finding is only provisional and applies solely to the ejectment case.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division emphasized this ruling as it denied the appeal filed by Belinda E. Soriano and her relatives (collectively, Belinda and others) in an ejectment case filed against them by Antonio V. Estrella (Estrella).

Estrella claimed ownership of a property in Quezon City where Belinda and others lived with his permission. When they refused his demand in 2012 to vacate the property so he could renovate it, Estrella filed an unlawful detainer case.

Belinda and others argued that the case should be dismissed because Estrella supposedly lacked the legal capacity to sue, having died in 1990. They provided his death certificate as evidence.

Ruling in Estrella’s favor, the SC held that Estrella had successfully overcome the presumption created by his death certificate. The parties themselves acknowledged that the Estrella who filed the case was the same Estrella named in the property’s title. Belinda and others never claimed that he was an impostor or disputed his identity. This, along with Estrella’s living presence, confirmed his legal capacity to sue.

​The SC clarified that while the proper remedy to cancel a death certificate or correct a civil registry entry is to file a petition for cancellation, this does not prevent courts hearing ejectment cases from provisionally determining whether a party is alive or dead when necessary to resolve the issue of possession.

Accordingly, the SC held that a court’s finding on whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case is limited to determining that party’s legal capacity to sue and right to physical possession of the property.

The SC also ruled that the requirements for unlawful detainer were met. Belinda and others initially had lawful possession of the property; however, it became unlawful once Estrella demanded that they vacate and they refused, leading him to file the case within the one-year period required by law.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171407.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/236333-belinda-e-soriano-et-al-vs-antonio-v-estrella/.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

24/08/2026

Ang Filipino ay higit pa sa isang wika. Ito ay mahalagang bahagi ng ating kasaysayan, kultura, pagkakaisa, at pagkakakilanlan bilang mga Pilipino.

Sa paglipas ng panahon, patuloy na umunlad ang ating pambansang wika—mula sa mga hakbang tungo sa pagpili ng batayan ng wikang pambansa, pagkilala rito bilang opisyal na wika, hanggang sa patuloy na pagpapaunlad at pagpapalaganap nito alinsunod sa Saligang Batas at mga kaugnay na batas.

Ngayong Buwan ng Wika, ating balikan at pahalagahan ang kasaysayan at kahalagahan ng wikang Filipino sa paghubog ng ating pagkatao, kultura, at bayan.

Mahal natin ang ating wika. Gamitin, pangalagaan, at patuloy itong pagyamanin.

Para sa mga katanungan, makipag-ugnayan sa amin sa pamamagitan ng aming page o bisitahin ang aming opisina sa Unit 201 Alcema Building, No. 167 Upper Bonifacio St., Barangay Honeymoon, Baguio City.

19/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.