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DAVID LAW OFFICE “Let justice be done though the heavens fall.”

27/08/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.”

The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor.

The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible.

Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned.

The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns.

The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner.

The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Read the full text of the SC’s April 25, 2025 Decision in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

27/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22.

The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed.

The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it.

The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor.

The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service.

To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor.

𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.

The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court.

If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents.

The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer.

Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts.

The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service.

In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served.

The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171528.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171527.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

19/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

17/08/2026

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

12/08/2026

The Oral Arguments in the present case of Baluyot vs. Baluyot (GR No. 257575) pending before the Supreme Court En Banc are over. The issue is whether or not it is time to abandon the rule that foreign divorce of two Filipinos abroad is not recognizable in the Philippines. I advocated for its abandonment.

As amicus curiae, I am satisfied with my arguments and, modesty aside, I believe that, after four hearings, I responded to the queries of the Justices appropriately.

The present "public policy" rule is this: Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, only mixed-marriage ( Filipino and Foreigner) is entitled to obtain a foreign divorce filed by either the Filipino or the Foreigner. The divorce can be recognized in the Philippines via a petition fo recognition of foreign judgment. However, foreign divorce obtained where the parties are both Filipinos are not recognizable in the Philippines and any petition for recognition of foreign judgment filed in the Philippines will be automatically dismissed.

These are some of my strongest points which I articulated during the oral arguments:

FIRST. The Present "Public Policy" borders on racism against Filipinos. . It is racist because it makes our national identity a legal liability. It suggests that the law and public policy treat the foreigner as a superior race and the Filipino the inferior one BECAUSE our very law and public policy make the foreigner the bestower of rights of Filipinos. In Tagalog, I illustrated this to the SC by saying something like this , "kung banyaga ako at may ka-rival akong pilipinong nangliligaw sa Filipina, kaya kong sabihin sa Filipina: ako ang saguitn mo kasi binigyan ako ng kapangyarihan ng batas ng Pilipinas na bigyan ka ng karapatan divorce ako. Kung yung Pilipino ang sasagutin mo, walang ganyang karapatan ang mabibigay sa iyo."

SECOND. The law and present public policy are xenocentric because they give importance to the foreigner. Simply, to be given the right to file divorce, the key for the Filipino is to be married to a foreigner. Why is it that the magic formula to get a divorce in order to be liberated from an abusive spouse is to marry a foreigner?

THIRD. At the very least, present public policy mirrors a colonial-mentality because for a Filipino to be given greater rights, he/she must associate himself/herself with a foreigner just like during the time when we were colonized by Spain.

FOURTH. They are against the equal protection of the constitution.They effectively create a legal caste system. One set of Filipinos are benefited by the law and the other not so. One is permitted and one is barred. And the distinction simply depends on the nationality/race of who the Filipino married. When nationality creates a substantial distinction, that is undue discrimination.

FIFTH. To maintain the present so-called public policy suggests that , on this particular issue, marriage in the Philippines is not based on the sanctity of marriage but on race or nationality. If you are married to a foreigner and you get a divorce, it is moral. If you are a Filipino and you get a divorce from a Filipino spouse, it is immoral.

SIXTH. To maintain the present public policy is to say that , in the Philippines, marriage is the only institution that the law allows abuse and cruelty against another in the name of permanence.

SEVENTH. The outmoded public policy enunciated in 1939 and 1964 is anachronistic. I specifically stated in the arguments: "If public policy is to be frozen in its first articulation (1939 and 1964) and still applied in the 21st century, we will then be governed by norms of a society that no longer exist. Public policy is ratio temporis. It must also evolve."

There are other strong arguments ( such as misapplication of Article 15 of the Civil Code on the nationality rule) I made which I am very satisfied. I will talk about the others at some other time.

I hope the present Supreme Court will abandon the outmoded public policy presently being implemented lest ,by maintaing the rule, this particular Supreme Court might be perceptively known as a racist and xenocentric Supreme Court.

07/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified that a Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO) may be issued only in cases involving crimes punishable by a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment, or when the respondent is a foreigner, regardless of the penalty.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that a PHDO cannot be maintained when the crime under investigation does not meet these requirements.

The case arose from a complaint for 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 and violation of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 22 (BP 22) filed against petitioner Faustine Feliz Abad (Abad) in connection with her purchase of airline tickets from respondent GHT Travel and Tours (GHT).

The City Prosecutor found probable cause to charge Abad with two counts of violation of BP 22, but found insufficient evidence to charge her with 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢. Two Informations for BP 22 were then filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

The prosecution also sought a PHDO against Abad with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that she was a flight risk. The RTC granted the request.

Abad later sought to have the PHDO lifted. The RTC denied her request, noting, among others, that GHT had appealed the dismissal of the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge to the Secretary of Justice and that Abad was a permanent resident of the United States.

Ruling that the PHDO should have been lifted, the SC cited the Rule on PHDO that it issued on August 7, 2018, which provides that a PHDO may be issued while a criminal complaint is undergoing preliminary investigation when the crime involved carries a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment. It may also be issued against a foreigner regardless of the penalty.

The SC explained that the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge, which could have carried a penalty exceeding six years and one day, was dismissed for lack of probable cause. The only charges filed against Abad were two counts of BP 22 violations, each punishable by imprisonment of 30 days to one year.

Thus, the BP 22 charges did not meet the penalty requirement for the issuance of a PHDO.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170320.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165691.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/08/2026

The (SC) En Banc, during its session today, August 5, 2026, dismissed the consolidated petitions questioning the proceedings before the House of Representatives and its Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaints against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte.

The SC ruled that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. No. E-05546 (Atty. Israelito P. Torreon, et al. v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, represented by Hon. Gerville Luistro, and House of Representatives, represented by House Speaker Faustino Dy III) and G.R. No. E-05667 (Sara Z. Duterte, in her capacity as the Vice President of the Philippines v. House of Representatives et al.) had become moot, or no longer required resolution, because the House had already approved and transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In its Resolution, the SC dismissed the separate petitions filed by Atty. Israelito P. Torreon, et al., and by Vice President Duterte. The petitioners argued that the House Committee on Justice exceeded its constitutional authority by gathering evidence and compelling witnesses to appear during its initial review of the impeachment complaints. They also questioned the Committee’s findings that the complaints were sufficient in form, substance, and grounds.

The SC explained that the House’s transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment marked the end of the House’s role in the impeachment process and the initiation of the impeachment case. As a result, the actions the petitioner sought to stop had already been completed.

The SC further held that the impeachment process had already moved to the Senate, which had convened as an impeachment court and had begun proceedings.

Any ruling on the validity of the actions taken by the House and its Committee on Justice would no longer affect the controversy.

While the SC recognized that it may, in exceptional cases, decide issues that have become moot, it found that none of the recognized exceptions applied in this case.

Read the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170190.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

24/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

19/07/2026

SC Upholds Validity of Unwritten Sale of Land

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