Basil.C.Nwogu & Co.

Basil.C.Nwogu & Co. Opening the mind to league intrigues and offering legal research to ease the work load.

11/12/2025

Research has revealed that numerous women, regardless of socio-economic status, cultural background, and educational level, utilize s*x as a means to exert emotional control over their partners. This behavior becomes increasingly egregious when they are admonished for misconduct. Consequently, many men remain silent and acquiesce to their partners' demands, fearing deprivation of intimacy, which is detrimental to the well-being of numerous households and a contributing factor to premature mortality among men.

15/11/2025

DANGOTE INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANOR. vs. OCEAN BEAN GOLF AND LEISURE RESORTS LTD. & ORS.(2021)LCN/15134(CA)

ISSUE: APPEAL AGAINST INTERLOCUTORY DECISION-Whether an appeal against an interlocutory decision staked on lack of jurisdiction of the Court requires leave where it is outside the time bracket donated by Section 24(2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004(Issue is mine)

PRINCIPLE:
"Now, the gravamen of the objector’s chief grievance, indeed its trump card on the terminal issue, is that the appellants’ appeal against the lower Court’s interlocutory decision was in violation of the time allowed by law. It staked its objection on the provision of Section 24(2) of the Court of Appeal Act, Cap. C36, LFN, 2004. Being the cynosure of the issue, it is imperative to pluck it out, from where it is domiciled in the statute book, ipsissimaverba, as follows:
(2) The periods for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are -
(a) in an appeal in a civil cause or matter, fourteen days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision and three months where the appeal is against a final decision;
(b) in an appeal in a criminal cause or matter, ninety days from the date of the decision appealed against.
The provision does not harbour any ambiguity. On this score, the law compels the Court to accord it its ordinary grammatical meanings without any interpolation. See Bakare v. NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606; PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205; Kawawu v. PDP (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 420; Setraco (Nig) Ltd. v. Kpaji (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1558) 280; Adeokin Records v. MCSCN (2018) NWLR (Pt. 1643); Ecobank v Honeywell Flour (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55. The provision has fallen for interpretation and the case-law has recognised it in a galaxy of authorities. See Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374; Assams v. Ararume (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1493) 368; BB Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Ngige v. Disu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 1; Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218; Fapohunda v. R.C.C.N. Ltd. (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 163; Dankofa v. FRN(2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 468; C.G.G. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Eronini (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 219.
The foremost/premier point to determine is the nature of the lower Court’s decision being appealed against, id est, whether it is interlocutory or final decision. For a long time, it has been a thorny exercise for the Courts to determine whether a decision of a Court is final or interlocutory. In this wise, two tests, propounded in the English Courts, had competed for the attention of the Nigerian Courts. The first one is the nature of the proceedings test invented by Fry. L.J. in the case of Salaman v. Warner (1891) 1 QB 734 at 736. The other is the nature of the order test evolved by Lord Alverstone, C.J. in the case of Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council (1963) 1 KB 547 at 548 – 549, wherein, the law Lord stated: "It seems to me that the real test for determining this question ought to be this. Does the judgment or order as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties? If it does, then I think it ought to be treated as a final order, but if it does not, it is then, in my opinion, an interlocutory order."
The Nigerian Courts have accepted and followed the later test, id est, that where an order made by a Court finally determines the rights of the parties to an action, then it is final and where it does not, it is interlocutory. See Igunbor v. Afolabi (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 148; Ogolo v. Ogolo (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 113; Owoh v. Asuk (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 173; Gomez v. C. & S.S. (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 223; General Electric Co. v. Akande (2010) 18 (Pt. 1225) NWLR 596; N.A.O.C. Ltd. v. Nkweke (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1512) 588; Ngige v. Disu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 1; C.G.G. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Odurusam (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 476; Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218; Boko v. Nungwa (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1654) 395; Fapohunda v. R.C.C.N. Ltd. (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 163.
​The lower Court’s order, which parented the appeal, is wrapped in page 364 of the record. Since it is pivotal to the stubborn point, it is germane to extract it out, verbatim ac literatim, thus:
Accordingly, parties are directed to maintain the status quo ante bellum pending the determination of the notice of preliminary objection filed by the 1st and 2nd defendants and the motion for interlocutory injunction filed by the claimant on the subject matter of this suit.
It cannot be gainsaid that the lower Court’s declaration is a classic exemplification of an order. An order denotes “a mandate; precept; command or direction authoritatively given, rule or regulation, direction of a Court or Judge made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment”. See Maideribe v. FRN (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1399) 68 at 91 per Mohammed, JSC, (later CJN). An order falls within the wide perimeter of a Court decision.
A decision of a Court means “in relation to a Court, any determination of that Court and includes judgment, decrees, order conviction, sentence or recommendation”. See Section 318 of the Constitution, as amended; Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 293, Kubor v. Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534; Omisore v. Aregbesola (supra); CPC v. INEC (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 260; Madurere v. Okwara (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 303; Salik v. Idris (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1429) 36; Otti v. Ogah (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563); FRN v. Atuche (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1674) 338.
Interlocutory connotes an occurrence/happening which is provisional, temporary, interim and not a final resolution of the whole controversy. It intervenes between the commencement and the end of the suit. See N.A.O.C Ltd. v. Nkweke (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1512) 588; Agwu v. Julius Berger (Nig) Plc (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 165; C.G.C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Eronini (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 219.
It is decipherable from the phraseology and tenor of the order, that it is a quintessence of an interlocutory decision. It has, propriovigore, consigned the appellants’ notice of preliminary objection and the first respondent’s application for interlocutory injunction into the province of abeyance while its operation/effervescence lasts throughout the period of their pendency in the suit. The order itself, amply and clearly, disclosed that the feuding parties will return to the lower Court to have their applications determined one way or the other. Put simply and differently, the order, to all intents and purposes, never disposed/terminated the rights of the parties in the suit before the lower Court. The lower Court had not become functus officio on the footing of the order to maintain status quo ante bellum by the contending parties. The parties, must, as a matter of legal command, return to the lower Court to ventilate their pending applications and harness their rights in the main suit if need be.
I have, in due loyalty to the expectation of the law, married the interlocutory order with the provision of Section 24 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act which is displayed at the cradle of this consideration. The raison d’eter for the juxtaposition is plain. It is to discover if the appeal flouted or respect the provision vis-a-vis the time prescribed to filing it. By virtue of the provision of Section 15 (2) (a) of the Interpretation Act, Cap. I 23, LFN, 2004, where a period is reckoned from a particular event, the day on which the event occurred/happened would be excluded. The provision has received the imprimatur of the case-law. See Akeredolu v. Akinremi (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 787; Ezeigwe v. Nwawulu (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 159; Etsako West, L.G.C. v. Christopher (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 73; Petgas Resources Ltd. v. Mbanefo (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1601) 442.
​As discernible from the record, the touchstone of the appeal, the order was made on 23rd July, 2018. In total fidelity to the above provision, the 23rd July, 2018, the birthday of the order has to be excluded from the fourteen (14) days ordained in Section 24 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act. The appellants’ notice of appeal, which colonises pages 365-368 of the record, was filed on 10th August, 2018 as manifest therefrom. I have, in keeping with the commandment of the law, situated the two dates: the 24th July, 2018, when the appellants’ right of appeal of ripened, and the 10th August, 2018, when they approached this Court. It is a common knowledge that Nigeria is a user of the Gregorian calendar - a calendar of general application. By the Gregorian calendar computation, from 24th July, 2018 to 10th August, 2018 is a period of eighteen (18) days indisputably, the period of eighteen (18) days is far in excess of the fourteen (14) days time-frame decreed by the sacred provision of Section 24 (a) of the Court of Appeal Act for appealing against an interlocutory decision of the lower Court. In other words, the appellants’ notice of appeal was filed in flagrant defilement of then limitation period in the provision of Section 24 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act. I am, therefore, compelled by law to hold that the first respondent’s right of appeal against the interlocutory order, which matured on 24th July, 2018, had become stale/soured before it was ignited on 10th August, 2018. Alas, their right of appeal against the interlocutory decision does not enure to them ad infinitium as it must be exercised within the perimeter of the time bracket donated to them by Section 24 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act.
It is trite elementary law that where an intending appellant runs out of time in appealing against an interlocutory decision of any of the Courts subordinate to this Court, the law grants him the unbridled licence to seek for an enlargement of that time from the Court by dint of an application which usually warehouses trinity prayers. The Court, in such application for an extension of time, always favours him with an indulgence of extension of time. See Malari v. Leigh (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1659) 332; C.G.G (Nig.) Ltd. v. Eronini (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 219. Curiously, the appellants, in their infinite wisdom, failed/neglected to harvest their right under the sanctuary of an application for extension of time when their time to appeal against the lower Court’s interlocutory order expired by effluxion of time. The failure is a costly one as it inflicts caustic consequences on their appeal. The notice of appeal, which was filed beyond the period, fourteen (14) days, allocated to them by the provision of Section 24 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, was infested and mired in the nest of incompetence.
It admits of no argument that the lower Court’s interlocutory order, to maintain status quo ante bellum, was weaved on an exercise of its judicial discretion. In the eyes of the law, discretion signifies: the right or power of a Judex to act according to the dictates of his personal judgment and conscience uninfluenced by the judgment or conscience of other persons. See Suleiman v. C.O.P., Plateau State (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 298; Ajuwa v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 797; NJC v. Dakwang (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 532; Nzekwe v. Anaekwenegbu (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1674) 235; Adeniyi v. Tina George Ind. Ltd. (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 560; Akinyemi v. Odu’a Inv. Co. Ltd. (2012) NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209.
The crux of the appellants’ grounds of appeal is submissive to easy appreciation. They probe into the correctness of the lower Court’s exercise of its discretion in dishing out the order of status quo ante bellum. In the mind of the law, where a ground of appeal quarrels with an interlocutory decision of a lower Court which is anchored on exercise of discretion, then it is not a ground of law, but, at best, a ground of mixed law and fact. See Williams v. Mokwe (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 249; FBN Plc v. Abraham (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 172; Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1267) 145; Destra Inv. Ltd. V. FRN (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1621) 335; Honeywell Flour Mills Plc v. Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd. (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 35; Chief of Air Staff v. Edward (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1691) 183; Bestman v. Whyte (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1719) 136.
It is settled rudimentary law, beyond any peradventure of doubt, that right of appeal is statutory-donated to citizens by the Constitution and other Legislation, see Garuba v. Omokhodion (supra). The Constitution, as amended, the fons et origo of our laws, creates categories of rights of appeal from the trial superior Courts of record to the Court of Appeal. While Section 241 of the Constitution, as amended, consecrates appeal as of a right from trial superior Courts of record to the Court of Appeal, Section 242 thereof ordains rights of appeal with the leave of those Courts or Court of Appeal. See Tukur v. Govt., of Gongola State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 39; FRN v. Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 141; Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374; Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218; Sh*ttu v. P.A.N. Ltd. (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 195; Boko v. Nungwa (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1654) 395; Dankofa v. FRN (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 468.
Flowing from the above legal expositions, the lower Court’s decision, which is in the heat of decimation/expunction, falls outside the province of Section 241 (1) (a) of the Constitution, as amended, in that it is not a final decision of the lower Court. Nor are the appellants’ grounds of appeal, which are chastising it, accommodated by Section 241 (1) (b) thereof since they do not involve questions of law alone. Contrariwise, the grounds, as already anatomised, query the lower Court’s interlocutory decision which was, deeply, rooted in exercise of discretion, and ipso facto and de jure, turn on mixed law and fact come within the four walls of Section 242 of the Constitution, as amended. Indubitably, a ground of appeal which questions a decision on mixed law and fact requires leave of the lower or this Court in order to be competent. See Akinyemi v. Odu’a Inv. Co. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209; A & S.B. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. V. FCMB Ltd. (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1363) 501; Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. L.G.C. Ltd. (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598) 431; Fasuyi v. PDP (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 426; Nikagbate v. Opaye (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1623) 85; Sh*ttu v. P.A.N. Ltd. (supra); Eneh v. NDIC (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1645) 353; Ozomgbachi v. Amadi (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1647) 171; Pali v. Abdu (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1605) 320; Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd. V. G.I. & S Ltd. (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1674) 213; Okolonwamu v. Okolonwamu (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676)1; Chief of Air Staff v. Edward (supra); Bestman v. Whyte (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1719) 136. In the sight of the law, leave, in this context, signifies permission. See S.U. Ojemen v. Momodu (1983) 1 SCNLR 188; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987)4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 7181(1987) 2 NSCC, Vol. 18, 1219; Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1269) 145; Otu v. ACB Int’l Ltd. (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 179.
Where leave of Court, trial or appellate, is required for filing an action/process and a party ignores seeking and obtaining the requisite leave before filing same, the action/process is rendered incompetent. See UBA Plc v. Sogunro (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 504; Garuba v. Omokhodion (supra); Thor Ltd. v. FCMB Ltd. (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 427; Ugboaja v. Akitoye-Sowemimo (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 278; Akinyemi v. Odu’a mv. Co. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209; Okwuagbala v. lkwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 54; Nwaolisah v. Nwabufoh (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 600; Njemanze v. Njemanze (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 376; Imegwu v. Okolocha (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 347; Ugwu v. State (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1374) 257; Ngere v. Okuruket ‘xiv’ (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1417) 147; Ekunola v. CBN (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224; Allanah v. Kpolokwu (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1507) 1; Anachebe v. Ijeoma (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 168; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 6; Obasi v. Mikson Est. Ind. Ltd. (2016) NWLR (Pt.1539) 335; Otti v. Ogah (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 1; Sogunro v. Yeku (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1570) 290; Mato v. Hember (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 258; Otu v. ACB Int’l Ltd. (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 179; Fasuyi v. PDP (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 426; Nikagbate v. Opaye (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1623) 85; Okolonwamu v. Okolonwamu (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676) 1; Garuba v. Omokhodion (supra).
There is no gainsaying the fact that the appellants, on their own volition, starved this Court of any concrete evidence of their procurement of leave of the lower Court or this Court before filing their notice of appeal. Put bluntly, the appellants neither sought for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal out of time nor obtained the permission of this Court to appeal against the lower Court’s interlocutory decision, which was predicated on exercise of judicial discretion, which questioned mixed law and fact. The appellants’ failure to satisfy these twin conditions inflicted their notice of appeal with far-reaching consequences. The net effect is obvious. The notice of appeal, which houses three grounds, is plagued by indelible incompetence.
In an avowed bid to amputate the long arm of the law, on want of leave, the appellants invented the defence that the appeal was staked on lack of jurisdiction of the lower Court which required no leave of Court. The position of the law is that a ground of appeal which involves a question of jurisdiction is a ground of law. See Ugo v. Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218. A ground of law requires no leave of Court. See Eneh v. NDIC (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1645) 355. The reason is simple. Such a ground takes shelter under the provision of Section 241(1) (b) of the Constitution, as amended, which comes under the canopy of appeals as of right.
​However, the appellants have only scored barren victory on this hallowed principle of law being in their favour. It fetched nothing for them. The reason is not far-fetched. A clinical examination of the appellants’ three grounds in the notice of appeal, clearly, showcases their target. Their mission is to puncture the viability/validity of the lower Court’s interlocutory decision which was grounded on exercise of judicial discretion. They seek to emasculate the lower Court’s order to maintain status quo ante bellum in the first respondent’s suit pending its determination of the applications of the parties. The term, status quo ante bellum, means the state/situation of things/affairs that existed before the something else, the case/controversy, occurred. See Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 247); Falomo v. Banigbe (1998) 6 SC 141 (1998) 6 SCNJ 42; Oronti v. Onigbanjo (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1313) 23. It is a commonplace expression in the firmament of injunction. To my mind, the status quo order, wears/bears all the hallmarks of a preservatory order: an order intended to conserve the subject matter from dissipation until the determination of the suit. In other words, a preservatory order oxygenates the res in a suit and puts it in the incubation throughout the gestation period of a matter. A preservative order lubricates and enlivens the res so that a Court is not confronted with a state of complete helplessness nor its order rendered nugatory at the end of the proceedings. It prevents the Court from being foisted with a fait accompli which will diminish its integrity and sanctity and expose it to vain order. It is a Court’s armor of integrity that is domiciled in its inherent power.
Thus, the interlocutory decision, which the appellants seek to impugn and ostracise, and their arsenal, the notice of appeal, are, totally, divorced from issue of jurisdiction which is numero uno in our corpus juris. In the interest of ex abundanti cautela, the appellants' notice of preliminary, which is challenging the lower Court’s jurisdiction, is yet to be heard; a fortiori being determined to warrant an appeal against it. To appeal against undetermined objection will sound in the echo of speculation. In effect, the defence of jurisdictional issue, erected by the appellants to castrate the issue/objection, is, wholly, indefeasible and disabled from its birth. It cannot fly." Per OGBUINYA, JCA.

15/11/2025

DEC OIL AND GAS LTD. vs. SHELL NIGERIA GAS LTD. & ANOR.(2021)LCN/15130(CA)

ISSUE: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE-Whether a defendant’s failure to adduce evidence in support of his pleadings has a corrosive effect on his case to the advantage of the plaintiff's evidence(Issue is mine)

PRINCIPLE:
"Having dispensed with the jurisdictional issue two, I retreat to settle issue one. The kernel of the issue is simple. It chastises the lower Court’s evaluation of evidence. Put bluntly, the appellant accused the lower Court of improper evaluation of evidence because the judgment was against the weight of evidence. A castigation of a decision on the premise that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, invariably couched as an omnibus ground, connotes that the decision of the trial Court cannot be supported by the weight of evidence advanced by the successful party which the Court either wrongly accepted or that the inference it drew or conclusion it reached, based on the accepted evidence, is unjustifiable in law. Also, it implies that there is no evidence, which if accepted, will buttress the finding of the trial Court. Furthermore, it denotes that when the evidence adduced by the complaining appellant is weighed against that given by the respondent, the judgment rendered to the respondent is against the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court. In ascertaining the weight of evidence, the trial Court is enjoined by law to consider whether the evidence is admissible relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that given by the other party. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC 91; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 2 NSCC Vol. 17, 799 at 806, (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731; Nwokidu v. Okanu (supra) (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 42 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60; Gov., Lagos State v. Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291; Oyewole v. Akande (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 011; Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 412.
The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC 91; Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 11; Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 311; Okoro v. Okoro (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 506; D.M.V. (Nig) Ltd. v. NPA (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1652) 1635; Oguntade v. Oyelakin (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1719) 41. I have matched the decision of the lower Court with the positions of law x-rayed above with a view to identifying infractions or compliance.
The appellant’s grudge here is canalised within a narrow compass. It quarrels with lower Court’s grant of the first respondent’s reliefs without proof.
To begin with, it is decipherable from the record, the spinal cord of the appeal, that the appellant, in its infinite wisdom, through the counsel of its choice, rested his case on that of the first respondent. A party’s (defendant’s) decision not to call evidence has always been regarded as a legal strategy, not a mistake, which enhances/strengthens his case if it succeeds. See Akanbi v. Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 118. In the sight of the law, a defendant resting his case on that of the claimant signifies any of these: (a) that the defendant is stating that the plaintiff has not made out any case for the defendant to respond to; or (b) that he admits the facts of the case as stated by the plaintiff, or (c) that he has a complete defence in answer to the plaintiff's case. See Newbreed Org. Ltd. v. Erhomosele (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 499; Admin/Exec., Estate, Abacha v. Eke-spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; Mezu v. C.C.B. (Nig.) Plc (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 188; Ojigho v. NBA (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 399.
In domain of procedural law, issues are joined in the pleading. In the mind of the law, an issue is joined on a particular fact, necessitating its proof, when its assertion is disputed by an opposing party. See Galadima v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636) 357. The appellant, even though it filed pleading, amended statement of defence, it called no witness to adduce evidence in proof of it. Unarguably, the appellants acted in due obedience to the law. However, it took a big risk and gamble. By that procedural strategy, it accepted hook, line and sinker, the evidence proffered by the first respondent in proof of the case. In effect, it abandoned its pleading and did not join issue with the respondent on all the allegations against it in the case. The appellant shut itself out of evidence and owns the blame. It has to sink with the evidence of its adversary, the respondent which goes one way without any corresponding evidence from it. See Durosaro v. Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 407; Adekunle v. State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 719; Admin/Exec., Estate Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (supra); Oduwole v. West (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 598; Mezu v. C.C.B. (Nig.) Plc (supra); Ahmed v. Regd. Trustees AKRCC (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 300; Ojigho v. NBA (supra).
It stems from the foregoing that the appellant’s failure to adduce evidence in support of its pleading occasioned a corrosive effect on its case to the advantage of the first respondent’s evidence. By that singular act, a costly failure at that the appellant played into the hands of the first respondent vis-a-vis the evidence it offered in proof of its case. The net effect of the first respondent’s evidence was obvious. It acquired/gained the enviable status of incontrovertible evidence. The law grants the Court the unbridled licence to act on unchallenged evidence to reach a decision. See Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (supra); Tanko v. Echendu (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 253; Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P., Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225; Nwakonobi v. Udeorah (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 499; lghreriniovo v. S.C.C. (Nig.) Ltd. (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1361) 138; C.B.N. v. Okojie (2015) NWLR (Pt. 1479) 231; Interdrill (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBA Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1581) 52; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; Chiadi v. Aggo (2018) 2 NWLR (1603) 175; Ugwuegede v. Asadu (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 460; Aderonpe v. Eleran (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1661) 141. The lower Court acted ex debito justitiae when it relied on the unrefuted evidence of the first respondent in arriving at its decision. In sum, the appellant’s voluntary employment of the adjectival style of resting its case on that of the first respondent’s constitutes a serious coup de grace in its stance on the issue.
In keeping with the dictate of the law, I have again visited the record, the bible of the appeal, particularly at the abode of the lower Court’s 23-page succinct judgment which is in the heat of expunction. It monopolises pages 1055-1078, volume III of the elephantine record. It is comprehension-friendly. The lower Court dedicated pages 1063-1077 thereof to the appraisal of the evidence, both parol and documentary evidence, presented by the contending parties before it. The lower Court, to my mind, carried out a meticulous and thorough analyses of the evidence, viva voce and documentary, proffered by the warring parties after assigning them to their respective pans in the imaginary scale of justice. It attached deserving probative weight to the respective evidence offered by the parties. It found that the first respondent’s pan in the imaginary scale of justice hosted more admissible, credible and conclusive evidence. A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief. See Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A.J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-lkeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result. See Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474. The lower Court found rightly in my view that the evidence of the first respondent, based on their qualitative nature, preponderated over those of the appellant’s. Remarkably, owing to the appellant’s strategy, resting its case on that of the first respondent, there was no evidence to put on its own side of the proverbial scale of balance as against its opponent’s evidence.
Thus, the onus probandi on the first respondent was naturally discharged on minimal proof. See Admin/Exec., Estate Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (supra). The net effect is that the first respondent proved its case.
Proof, in law, is a process by which the existence of facts is established to the satisfaction of the Court. See Section 121 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Olufosoye v. Fakorede (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 747; Awuse v. Odili (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 416; Salau v. State (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 399, (Pt. 1372) 474; APC v. Karfi (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 479; Ojobo v. Moro (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1700) 166.
The appellant stigmatised the finding/decision of the lower Court as perverse. Since perversion is the cynosure of the point, it is germane to x-ray its purports for easy appreciation. A verdict of Court is perverse when: it runs counter to the pleadings and evidence before it, a Court takes into account matters it ought not to take into consideration, a Court shuts its eyes to the evidence, a Court takes irrelevant matters into account or it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Udengwu v. Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 136; Nnorodim v. Ezeani (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 378) 448; Lagga v. Sarhuna NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427; Onykwelu v. Elf Pet (Nig.) Ltd. (2009) 5 BWKR (Pt. 1133) 181; Momoh v. Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 217; lhunwo v. lhunwo (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1357) 550; Olaniyan v. Fatoki (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 477; Udom v. Umanah (No. 1) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179; Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N. (Ltd)/GTE) (supra); Mamonu v. Dikat (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 495; MTN (Nig.) Comm. Ltd. v. Corporate Comm. Inv. Ltd. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 427; Offodile v. Offodile (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 189; Bi-Courtney Ltd. v. A-G, Fed. (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1679) 112; Fredrick v. Ibekwe (2019), 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467; Uzodinma v. lhedioha (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1718) 529.
I have, in total allegiance to the desire of the law, situated the judgment, sought to be decimated with the elements of perverse decision adumbrated above. The raison d’etre behind the juxtaposition is simple. It is to discover if the judgment is mired in the intractable web of the elements of perversion chronicled above. The judgment of the lower Court, which harbours no ambiguity, is not antithetical to the pleadings and evidence presented before it by the contending parties. At the same time, the lower Court did not import alien/foreign matters into the Judgment. It utilised the evidence the parties presented before it as displayed above. The finding does not, in the least, smell of any charge of perversity levelled against it by the appellant. In effect, the decision of the lower Court is not marooned in the murky ocean of perversion to magnet the intervention of this Court.
In the twilight of the dexterous and judgment, at pages 1076 and 1077, volume III of the windy record, the lower Court found:
It is my respectful opinion that every step that the 1st Defendant took with respect to the Plaintiff in this matter was wrongful, hence unlawful and unconstitutional. All such actions of the 1st Defendant are encapsulated in the evidence of PW1 and PW2, these actions caused them and by extension the Plaintiff a lot of trepidation. The bitterly complained of having been detained, constantly subjected to harassment and intimidation and made to appear with their Lawyers before, the Shell panel, and also made to pay for the services of an expert when they were not privy to that arrangement. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of this case, it is my respectful view that as the 1st and 2nd Defendants did not adduce any evidence to refute that of the Plaintiff which I regard as credible, they have failed to discharge the burden of proof that rested on them. I therefore hold that the Plaintiff’s case against the Defendants must succeed.
Flowing from the above juridical survey, done in due consultation with the law, the lower Court’s ultimate and solemn finding is an immaculate one. It did, in the least, fracture the law to render its faultless finding guilty of the accusation of perfunctory evaluation of evidence hurled against it by the appellant. In fact, the allegation is a pseudo-one as well as uncharitable and unsustainable. On this premise, l, with due respect, dishonour the learned appellant’s counsel’s salivating invitation to sacrifice the finding, on the proof of the claim, on the underserved altar of improper evidential evaluation. As a result, I resolve the issue one against the appellant and in favour of the respondent." Per OGBUINYA, JCA.

Address

First Floor, Flat F1, Lagos City Mall, Onikan, Lagos Island
Lagos

Opening Hours

Monday 09:00 - 17:00
Tuesday 09:00 - 17:00
Wednesday 09:00 - 17:00
Thursday 09:00 - 17:00
Friday 09:00 - 17:00
18:00 - 19:00

Telephone

08069432087

Website

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Basil.C.Nwogu & Co. posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Contact The Practice

Send a message to Basil.C.Nwogu & Co.:

Shortcuts

Share

Category