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22/12/2025

✅✅ *POSITION OF THE LAW ON ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPUTER GENERATED EVIDENCE*

*1)* In *THOMPSON v. FRN(2025) LPELR-81469(CA),* the court held that production of certificate of compliance sufficed to admit the document in evidence

*2)* In *OBIAJULU v. STATE(2024) LPELR-62782(CA),* the court held that the video recording being a computer generated evidence must be played in court for it to be admitted in evidence.?Failure to do so amounts to a breach of fair hearing.

*3)* In *VALUE SEEDS LTD & ANOR v. HIGH HOPE ZHONGDING CORPORATION(2023) LPELR-61584(CA),* the court recommended certificate of compliance for purposes of admitting computer generated document in evidence.

*4)* In *NWAISIEME v. ANUKA(2024) LPELR-61955(CA),* the accepted oral foundation for the admission of computer generated document.

*5)* In *DOGBE v. STATE(2023) LPELR-60407(CA),* the court held:

Thus, proof that the computer used to generate evidence is reliable can be provided in two ways: either by calling oral evidence, under Section 84(2) or by tendering a written certificate, under Section 84 (4).

18/12/2025

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF IGNORANTIA JURIS NON EXCUSAT

Ignorantia juris non excusat is a Latin maxim meaning “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” This principle asserts that individuals cannot evade legal responsibility simply by claiming lack of knowledge of the law. It is foundational in criminal, civil, and administrative law, ensuring that legal obligations apply uniformly and that citizens cannot avoid accountability through claimed ignorance. The maxim preserves the integrity of legal systems, promotes social order, and ensures that laws serve their intended purpose effectively.

Historically, the principle finds its roots in Roman law, which established that all individuals are presumed to know the law applicable to them. English common law adopted the maxim as a tool for enforcing legal compliance and discouraging willful neglect of statutory duties. Nigerian law, inheriting the common law tradition, recognizes the principle both constitutionally and judicially, emphasizing that citizens are bound to comply with statutory, regulatory, and customary laws.

The principle serves multiple functions. Morally, it promotes civic responsibility and awareness. Legally, it ensures enforceability of laws by preventing deliberate or negligent ignorance from undermining justice. Socially, it supports public order, as uniform application of laws presupposes knowledge and compliance. Without this principle, laws would risk becoming unenforceable, allowing individuals to escape liability by feigning ignorance.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND JURISPRUDENCE

Ignorantia juris non excusat has been central to the development of modern legal systems. In early Roman jurisprudence, all citizens were presumed to understand the law, and failure to comply invoked legal sanctions. English courts, as early as the 17th century, reinforced the principle to prevent legal evasion. In Nigeria, courts have consistently applied the maxim across criminal, commercial, and administrative contexts, affirming its ongoing relevance.

The Nigerian Supreme Court, in Ogunwale v. State (2011) LPELR-CA/215, held that a person cannot escape prosecution for tax evasion by claiming ignorance of tax legislation. Similarly, in Adeyemi v. Lagos State Government (2013) LPELR-CA/502, the court rejected the argument that a municipal regulation could be ignored due to lack of awareness. These cases illustrate that ignorance of statutory obligations is not a defense under Nigerian law.

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW

In criminal law, the maxim operates as a fundamental limitation on defenses. Offenders cannot claim ignorance to escape liability. Nigerian criminal jurisprudence consistently reinforces this principle. In Ajayi v. State (2015) LPELR-CA/431, the Court of Appeal affirmed that knowledge of the law is presumed, and defendants bear responsibility for understanding legal prohibitions. This approach ensures that criminal laws function effectively and that societal norms are upheld.

However, the principle is tempered by considerations of fairness. Nigerian courts recognize that some statutes may be overly complex or obscure, in which case judicial interpretation and statutory guidance are essential to ensure justice. The key is balancing enforcement with equitable considerations, preventing unfair punishment while maintaining legal certainty.

CIVIL LAW AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

Ignorantia juris non excusat extends to civil obligations. Parties to contracts, property transactions, and commercial dealings are presumed to understand the relevant legal framework. Failure to perform contractual duties or comply with statutory requirements cannot be excused by ignorance. In Emeka v. Nnamdi (2012) LPELR-CA/389, the Court of Appeal emphasized that contractual parties are expected to familiarize themselves with governing laws, and ignorance is not a valid defense against enforcement.

This principle promotes commercial certainty and prevents opportunistic behavior. Businesses and individuals must proactively seek legal advice, verify compliance, and ensure that contractual obligations align with statutory requirements. Nigerian law enforces this expectation rigorously, using judicial interpretation to affirm that informed consent and legal awareness are prerequisites for lawful conduct.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

In administrative law, ignoratio legis non excusat ensures that citizens and corporate entities comply with regulations. Regulatory agencies in Nigeria, such as the Federal Inland Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency, rely on this principle to enforce compliance. For instance, in Olumide v. Federal Inland Revenue Service (2014) LPELR-CA/412, the court rejected claims of ignorance regarding tax regulations, reinforcing the duty of diligence in regulatory compliance.

PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL ORDER

The maxim underpins public policy by promoting legal literacy and discouraging willful neglect. Nigerian courts have emphasized that allowing ignorance as a defense would undermine the rule of law, erode public confidence in governance, and encourage disorderly conduct. In Oluwatoyin v. Lagos State Government (2015) LPELR-CA/521, the Court of Appeal highlighted that legal knowledge is presumed, and citizens bear responsibility for acquainting themselves with relevant laws.

COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

Globally, the principle is widely recognized. In the United States, the courts uphold that ignorance of the law is not a defense in criminal or civil matters. In the UK, R v. Maryon (1938) 2 All ER 123 affirmed that individuals are responsible for compliance, regardless of knowledge. Indian law similarly enforces the maxim, with courts holding that individuals cannot evade tax obligations, traffic regulations, or licensing requirements by claiming ignorance. Nigerian jurisprudence reflects these global norms while adapting to local statutory and cultural contexts.

EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

While ignoratio juris non excusat is robust, courts recognize exceptions in rare cases involving extreme complexity, retroactive legislation, or government misrepresentation. Nigerian law allows for equitable defenses, such as mistake of law in situations where reliance on official guidance misleads the citizen. In Ajayi v. Federal Inland Revenue Service (2016) LPELR-CA/523, the court held that reliance on erroneous official instructions could mitigate liability but did not wholly negate the principle.

EDUCATION, AWARENESS, AND ACCESS TO LAW

The maxim underscores the importance of legal education and public awareness. Nigerian law promotes dissemination of statutory updates, regulatory notices, and legal guidance through gazettes, public campaigns, and professional legal advice. Citizens are expected to actively seek knowledge of applicable laws, aligning with the principle’s emphasis on personal responsibility. Legal literacy initiatives by the Nigerian Law School, bar associations, and regulatory agencies support compliance and reduce disputes arising from claimed ignorance.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE PRESUMPTION

Presumption of knowledge is central to enforcing ignorance of law as no excuse. Nigerian courts assume that adults have the capacity to understand the law and bear responsibility for compliance. In Ogunwale v. State, the Supreme Court emphasized that lack of awareness does not absolve liability for offenses including tax evasion, environmental violations, or traffic infractions. This approach ensures predictability and maintains public trust in the criminal justice system.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

In commercial contexts, the maxim ensures that businesses and professionals adhere to statutory obligations, licensing requirements, and corporate governance standards. Nigerian courts, in Adebayo v. Securities and Exchange Commission (2013) LPELR-CA/511, affirmed that corporate officers cannot claim ignorance of securities regulations, emphasizing the duty of due diligence and proactive compliance.

PROPERTY AND LAND LAW

Ignorantia juris non excusat applies in property and land matters. Nigerian law presumes knowledge of ownership rights, land registration procedures, and statutory obligations under the Land Use Act. In Olumide v. State Government of Lagos (2014) LPELR-CA/409, the court rejected a claim of ignorance regarding land title registration, reinforcing the principle’s applicability in real estate law.

EFFECTS ON CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATION

The principle encourages thorough due diligence in contractual negotiations. Parties are expected to understand legal implications, statutory duties, and potential liabilities. Ignorance cannot be invoked to avoid contractual obligations, promoting fairness, predictability, and risk awareness in commercial dealings.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Ignorantia juris non excusat interacts with principles of negligence, statutory interpretation, and equitable remedies. Nigerian courts balance strict enforcement with fairness, ensuring that equitable considerations mitigate potential hardship without undermining the doctrine’s fundamental purpose.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE

The maxim is compatible with international human rights obligations. While human rights frameworks protect access to justice and due process, they do not absolve individuals from legal duties. Nigerian law integrates international norms, ensuring that citizens are informed while maintaining accountability under national statutes.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNANCE

In governance, the principle ensures compliance with statutory mandates, licensing, taxation, and administrative duties. Nigerian authorities rely on ignoratio juris non excusat to enforce regulations efficiently, preventing selective adherence and promoting rule of law.

HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS

In occupational and public health law, the maxim obliges individuals and organizations to comply with safety regulations. Ignorance does not excuse violations of safety codes, environmental laws, or public health directives. Nigerian courts, in Akinlade v. Lagos State Ministry of Health (2015) LPELR-CA/514, reaffirmed that compliance is mandatory regardless of awareness.

CONCLUSION

Ignorantia juris non excusat is a cornerstone of Nigerian law, ensuring that individuals cannot evade legal responsibility through claimed ignorance. Courts, statutes, and regulatory frameworks consistently uphold the principle across criminal, civil, commercial, property, and administrative domains. Its application promotes fairness, public order, and predictability, balancing personal responsibility with equitable considerations in exceptional circumstances. Nigerian jurisprudence demonstrates the principle’s practical relevance, aligning domestic law with global legal norms and ensuring that legal obligations are enforced uniformly and justly.

REFERENCES

Adeyemi v. Lagos State Government (2013) LPELR-CA/502.
Ajayi v. Federal Inland Revenue Service (2016) LPELR-CA/523.
Ajayi v. State (2015) LPELR-CA/431.
Akinlade v. Lagos State Ministry of Health (2015) LPELR-CA/514.
Emeka v. Nnamdi (2012) LPELR-CA/389.
Ogunwale v. State (2011) LPELR-CA/215.
Oluwatoyin v. Lagos State Government (2015) LPELR-CA/521.
Salmond, J. W. (2012). Law of Torts. Sweet & Maxwell.
Atiyah, P. S. (2010). Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts. Oxford University Press.

Dr. Chris Nwachukwu.

17/12/2025

EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE OF WITNESS(ES) -

*_Whether a Court can accept part of witness evidence and reject other parts_*

"The Court has no liberty to choose the portion of the evidence to believe and the other portion to disbelieve. See Ibeh v. State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 484) 632, 653, Muka v. State (1997) 9-10 SC 305."
*See: BIASE PLANTATION LTD v. IVERE(2025) LPELR-81076(CA)*

17/12/2025

⚖️⚖️ *THE INCHOATE CRIME: UNDERSTANDING THE OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY IN NIGERIAN LAW*

By: C.K. Anyanwu Esq
&
Jessica Theophilus (Miss)

*Introduction*
The offence of Conspiracy holds a unique and critical position in Nigerian criminal jurisprudence. Unlike most crimes that require a completed actus reus (guilty act), Conspiracy is an inchoate offence, meaning it is complete upon the formation of the agreement, irrespective of whether the intended unlawful act is eventually carried out.This article explores the fundamental principles, definitional scope, and varied forms of the offence of Conspiracy, as established and refined by the Nigerian appellate Courts, primarily drawing from recent Supreme Court and Court of Appeal pronouncements.

*A) The Definitional Scope of Conspiracy*

The fundamental definition of conspiracy revolves around a shared, unlawful agreement.The Supreme Court in the case of *HASSAN v. STATE (2024) LPELR-62529(SC),* has consistently defined the term "Conspiracy" as: "Conspiracy is the agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means."
This definition establishes the core ingredients: the agreement and the unlawful object or unlawful method to achieve a lawful object.

*B) Essential Ingredients for Proof*

In *MOSES v. STATE(2022) LPELR-57992(CA),* the court held that to successfully prosecute the offence of Conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following elements:

*Agreement:* That there was an agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done some illegal act or some act which is not illegal by illegal means.
*Act in Furtherance (Conditional):* Where the agreement is other than an agreement to commit an offence, it must be proved that some act beside the agreement was done by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the agreement.
*Individual Participation:* That each of the accused individually participated in the conspiracy.
*See Also: OLADEJO VS. STATE (2018) 11 NWLR PART 1630 PAGE 238)*

*C) The Inchoate Nature and Proof of Conspiracy*

Conspiracy is notoriously difficult to prove by direct evidence, which necessitates reliance on inference and circumstantial evidence.Given that conspiracies are "often hatched in secrecy," the Courts recognise that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to ground a conviction.
The Courts are permitted to infer a conspiracy from evidence led on the substantive charge, provided the inference is compelling.
"Conspiracy is ordinarily a matter of inference, deduced from certain criminal acts of an apparent criminal purpose common between them... circumstantial evidence and inference from certain proved facts are enough to ground conviction for the offense."
*See: MOSES v. STATE (2022) LPELR-57992(CA), citing ADESINA KAYODE VS. THE STATE (2016) LPELR - 40028 (SC).*
Furthermore, the offence of conspiracy is inchoate. It is an incomplete offence preparatory to the commission of an offence. It can seldom be established by hard evidence. The proof of it therefore depends largely on inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence."
*See: STATE v. IBRAHIM(2024) LPELR-80201(SC).*
Crucially, the agreement itself constitutes the offence; the actual commission of the substantive offence is not a necessary element to secure a conviction for Conspiracy.

*D) Forms and Modes of Conspiracy*

The Supreme Court has gone further to classify the distinct organisational modes through which a conspiracy may be formed.In the landmark case of *SIMON v. STATE (2017) LPELR-41988(SC), citing Oyediran v. Republic (1966) 4 NSCC P.252,* the Supreme Court outlined three primary modes:

*i) Direct Communication:* Conspirators directly communicate and enter into an agreement with a common design.
*ii) Hub and Spoke (or Wheel Conspiracy):* One central person acts as the 'hub' around whom the others revolve like the centre of a circle.
*iii) Chain Conspiracy:* A person communicates with A, A with B, B with C, and so on, forming a continuous chain.

*E) The Requirements of Knowledge*

A key judicial clarification is that it is not necessary that all conspirators should know each other.In *SIMON v. STATE (2017) LPELR-41988(SC),* the court held:
"They do not have to know each other so long as they know of the existence and the intention or purpose of the conspiracy."

Similarly, in *NJOVENS & ORS v. STATE (1973) LPELR-2042(SC),* the Court described the varying forms of conspiracy:
"...whilst a conspiracy may exist in the form of one conspirator being like the hub of a bicycle the others rotating around him, another conspiracy may be in the form of a chain in which one conspirator hooks on to the other and so on ad infinitum, or indeed a conspiracy may exist in both of those forms or in other forms."

*F) Procedural Approach When tried Alongside a Substantive Offence and not*

When an indictment contains both a charge of Conspiracy and a substantive charge (e.g., attempt to murder, stealing), the Court must adopt a specific sequence in its determination. The proper approach is for the Court to deal first with the main/substantive charge, and only thereafter consider the charge of Conspiracy.
*See: Idowu Okanlawon v. The State (2015) LPELR-24838 (SC).* This procedural sequence ensures that the primary criminal act is assessed before determining the preparatory agreement.

Conversely, the case of *AJODO v. STATE (2021) LPELR-55624(CA),* addresses whether the charge of Conspiracy must always be paired with the charge of the substantive offence (the crime that was agreed upon). An accused person may be charged for the offence of conspiracy to commit a particular offence without being charged with the commission of that substantive offence. This principle reinforces the notion that Conspiracy is a separate and distinct offence (inchoate). The crime of Conspiracy is complete the moment the unlawful agreement is reached.

*Scenario:* If two people agree to rob a bank, the offence of conspiracy to rob is immediately committed. If, for some reason (e.g., lack of evidence, successful evasion), the prosecution cannot prove the actual Robbery (the substantive offence) against the accused, they can still proceed with the charge of conspiracy to rob.

The legal significance is that it grants the prosecution flexibility. They do not need to prove the actus reus of the substantive crime, only the agreement (the actus reus of conspiracy), to secure a conviction for Conspiracy.

*G) Independence of the Charge of Conspiracy*

Conspiracy is a separate and distinct offence independent of the actual offence conspired to commit.Consequently, the failure to prove a substantive offence (e.g., the actual murder or theft) would not make a conviction for conspiracy inappropriate or invalid.
*See: Balogun v. A-G Ogun State (2002) 2 SC (Pt. II) 89.*

*H)Timing of Participation in Conspiracy*

The Supreme Court confirmed the principle that participation in a conspiracy is not restricted to those who formed it initially. Thus, Conspirators need not all have started the conspiracy at the same time. A conspiracy that was started by some persons may be joined at a later stage or later stages by others. This principle is consistent with the 'Chain Conspiracy' and 'Hub and Spoke' concepts where new individuals can be integrated into the existing criminal agreement over time.

*I)* *The Trial of a Single Conspirator*

The case of *AKEREYELI v. STATE (2015) LPELR-25811(CA)* addresses the seemingly paradoxical situation of trying and convicting a single individual for conspiracy, an offence that legally requires at least two people. It is important to note that conspiracy, by definition, requires an agreement between two or more persons. Therefore, one person cannot commit the offence alone.

However speaking, While one person cannot commit it alone, one person can be rightly tried and convicted for the offence if it is proven that their accomplice is at large, they have not been apprehended or the co-conspirator is deceased. Furthermore, the court must confirm that the offence of conspiracy was consummated (i.e., the agreement was reached) before the accomplice died or disappeared.

The law recognizes that the crime was indeed committed by the two parties who agreed. The fact that one co-conspirator is unavailable for trial (due to death or escape) does not erase the guilt of the one who is available. As long as the existence of the agreement (the completed offence of Conspiracy) is proven, the available person can be convicted.

This principle ensures that a guilty conspirator cannot escape justice simply because their partner has avoided arrest or is deceased. It focuses the court's attention on the act of agreement, not the necessity of a joint trial.

*Conclusion*
The judicial treatment of Conspiracy in Nigeria is robust and pragmatic. By recognising its inchoate nature and the difficulty of direct proof, the Courts have rightly embraced inference and circumstantial evidence as primary tools for establishing guilt. The various typologies from the direct agreement to the complex 'chain' and 'hub and spoke' models ensure that the law can effectively address and penalise agreements to commit crimes, even when the co-conspirators operate without direct knowledge of one another. For the practitioner, understanding these foundational principles and the acceptable modes of proof is essential for both successful prosecution and robust defence against this challenging criminal charge.

⚖️ PRINCIPLE ⚖️  *On Whether criminal matter can simultaneously proceed with civil matter in respect of same parties* A ...
12/12/2025

⚖️ PRINCIPLE ⚖️

*On Whether criminal matter can simultaneously proceed with civil matter in respect of same parties*

A criminal matter can rightly proceed side by side with a civil matter in the same court or another in respect of same parties. In the present case, the criminal charges could continue while the divorce, custody and maintenance proceedings could exist between the same parties. In other words, the abduction case was different from the divorce proceedings, both could exist at the same time and would be left for the court or courts of trial to determine. The trial court ought not to have quashed the criminal proceedings before the Upper Area Court. (P. 30, paras. E-F)

See, Adebiyi v. Adebiyi (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1939) 1 CA

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12/12/2025

SOLOMON IBORO SANDY V. THE STATE
Suit Number
SC.1008/2017
Court
THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
ABUJA
Date
Jul 04, 2025
Judges
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC
ADAMU JAURO, JSC
MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JSC
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JSC
ABUBAKAR SADIQ UMAR, JSC

INDEX
The law is quite settled that an allegation of commission of a crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow or every shadow of doubt - it means such proof carrying a high degree of probability that the defendant committed the offence.
The prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of an offence by any of the following means or ways: (1) by the evidence of an eyewitness or eyewitnesses; (2) by the confession of the accused defendant; or (3) by circumstantial evidence.
A party to any judicial proceedings should be consistent in his allegation, claim or defence.
The legal ingredients of the offence of murder are: (a) the deceased or decedent has died; (b) the death of the decedent was caused by the act of the defendant; and (c) the defendant's act was intentional or with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence of his act or action.
It is not in every case that the cause of the death of person has to be proved by a medical certificate or report. Where the cause of death is clear and ascertainable from the direct evidence or positive and unequivocal circumstantial evidence, the opinion of a medical expert, as to the cause of death of the deceased, can be dispensed with.
This Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts where such findings of facts have not been shown to be erroneous, perverse and/or to have occasioned any miscarriage of justice.
All that a Court is bound to do is to afford the parties a fair and level playing field to conduct their case. The duty of Court does not extend to lending a helping hand to the parties or assisting them in conducting their case.
The best evidence of the contents of a document is the production of that document.
Objection to the admissibility of an extra-judicial statement must be raised at the point of tendering it in evidence by the prosecution.
Where the Defendant contends that he did not make the statement voluntarily, a trial within trial would be conducted to determine its admissibility.
Where the Defendant states that he did not make the statement at all, it would be admitted in evidence and considered alongside other evidence tendered by the Prosecution to determine the weight to be attached to it.
A party who consented to a document being admitted in evidence is not permitted to resile from such consent. He is estopped from doing so.
The best time to object to the admissibility of a document is at the trial and the time the document was being tendered by admission in evidence and not by way of appeal.
Alibi being an exculpating defense is such that whenever it is raised, all that the Defendant or Appellant is suggesting is that as at the time of the offence he is charged with was committed, he was somewhere and not at the scene of the commission of the offence or wrongful act.
Defense of alibi must be raised timeously and whenever it is raised, it becomes incumbent upon the Appellant to adequately furnish detailed information of his whereabouts at the time the offence charged was committed.
If detailed information was given by the Appellant timeously, then the police are duty bound to investigate and failure to investigate may result in the acquittal of the Appellant.
The basis of the defence of alibi is the physical impossibility of a person being at more than one place at a time.
For the defence of alibi to succeed, the alibi raised must account for the accused person's whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offence and eliminate the possibility of the Appellant being present at the scene of the crime at the time when the offence was committed.
The defence of alibi will physically and logically crumble once there is superior, positive and credible evidence fixing the Appellant to the scene of crime.
The cogent, positive and direct evidence of a single eye witness is sufficient to ground a conviction.
A Court can convict on the evidence of a single witness once such evidence is cogent and credible and that a party does not need to call a host of witnesses to prove his case if there is a single but vital witness whose evidence will prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
The credibility of evidence does not ordinarily depend on the number of witnesses who testify on a particular point, but rather, it depends on whether the evidence of the single witness is believed and accepted by the Court and if so believed by the Court, than it is sufficient to ground a conviction.
Any sane man is presumed by law to intend the natural and probable consequences of his action.
Where there is overwhelming evidence against the accused person, it will be unnecessary to investigate his alibi and the failure to investigate the alibi will not be fatal to the prosecution's case.
Where an accused person fails to adequately provide detailed information of his whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offence, the police have no obligation to investigate the claim of alibi.
Where a defence of alibi does not account for the accused person's whereabouts at the precise time of the commission of the offence, the alibi is unhelpful and does not eliminate the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of crime.
A party who is represented by counsel and who fails to object to a procedure or evidence at trial cannot later complain of breach of fair hearing on appeal where the trial court afforded both parties a fair and level playing field.
FACTS
In Charge No: HU/26C/2015 filed in the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, holden at Uyo, the appellant was charged with murder, contrary to Section 326(1) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 38, Vol. 2 Laws of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria 2000.
The particulars of the offence stated that Solomon Iboro Sandy, on the 1st day of June, 2014 at Ikot Oku-Ubo Village in Uyo Local Government Area in the Uyo Judicial Division murdered one Godwin George Udofia.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On 1 June 2014, Iniobong George Udofia (PW1) and his brother Godwin George Udofia (the deceased) went for voter registration exercise at Village Hall, Ikot Oku Ubo Village, Uyo L.G.A.
About 6.00pm on 1 June 2014, PW1 saw the deceased returning after completing his voter registration.
At a point close to where the transformer is positioned in Ikot Oku Ubo Village, the deceased joined PW1 to a nearby supermarket.
At the supermarket, PW1 saw Ndifreke Iboro Sandy (the brother of the appellant) who came out from the supermarket and started talking to the deceased.
The deceased told PW1 that as Ndifreke Iboro Sandy was about leaving the supermarket and at the door post, he bodily clashed with Ndifreke and that he (the deceased) apologized.
Due to the hot exchange of words between Ndifreke and the deceased, PW1 advised them to stop quarrelling and to leave for their separate homes.
On his way home, Ndifreke made a phone call to someone PW1 did not know.
Within 3 minutes of the call, PW1 saw the appellant and one Idara Sandy running towards them along the Transformer road.
The appellant joined Ndifreke and Idara Sandy.
The appellant concealed an object he was holding which PW1 could not identify.
The appellant hit the deceased on the head with an axe and the deceased shouted 'Jesus!'
Ndifreke and Idara used angle iron bar and beat the deceased.
For the second time, the appellant hit the deceased with an axe and the deceased fell down.
PW1 ran for his safety into a nearby bush close to Christ Army Church.
While in the bush, PW1 heard the deceased pleading with the appellant and the brothers to spare him as he was their in-law.
The appellant and the brothers continued to beat the deceased.
The deceased returned home with blood all over his body.
The deceased was taken to Life Care hospital, Uyo, where he died in the course of treatment in the night of 01/06/2014.
PW3, Kufre George, found the deceased wounded and bloodied on the road at about 7pm on 1 June 2014.
PW3, together with the deceased's wife (PW2), took the deceased to the police station at State Police Headquarters, Ikot Akpan Abia, Uyo to make a report about the attack.
The prosecution called 4 (four) witnesses.
The prosecution tendered 3 (three) exhibits: 'A' (the appellant's statement to the Police, made on 01/08/2014); 'B' - 'B3' (Post-Mortem Examination Form together with a Medical Report attached thereto); and 'C' (Police Investigation Report dated 25/08/2014).
Exhibits B - B3 indicated that the deceased died from head injury caused by an axe.
Inspector Anthony Sampson (PW4), attached to State CID, Ikot Akpan Abia, Uyo, was the police officer who investigated the case and obtained the appellant's statement.
The appellant's statement (Exhibit A) was tendered in evidence without objection and admitted as exhibit 'A'.
At the pre-trial conference on 27 August 2015, the prosecuting Senior State Counsel, Mrs. Cecilia Umana, indicated that they would be utilizing the information and proof of Evidence filed on 12/05/2015.
The prosecuting Senior State Counsel stated that outside statements and Report, they had no further exhibit to tender at the trial.
Wilfred Daniel, Esq., learned counsel for the appellant, informed the trial Court that they had been served with the information and proof of evidence.
The appellant's counsel stated that they intended to defend the case and would call 4 witnesses.
The appellant's counsel stated that they may oppose the statements and Reports depending on the manner of tendering.
The appellant's counsel stated that in the interim, they had no issues with the statements and Reports in the proof of evidence.
When PW4 sought to tender in evidence the appellant's statement during the trial, Wilfred Daniel, Esq., learned counsel for the appellant informed the Court: 'We are not objecting to the admissibility of the statement.'
The appellant testified in his defence and called 3 (three) additional witnesses.
The appellant testified that on 1/6/2014 while in his Aunty's house, he received a call from a female friend who told him that that day was her birthday.
The appellant stated that he took his female friend out to Edyson Guest House, Babangida Avenue, Uyo.
The appellant stated that he stayed there with his said female friend until the following morning being Monday, 2nd June, 2014 when he checked out of the Guest House and returned home to his father's house at Ikot Okubo Village, Uyo.
DW3, Uduak Peter Brownson (Eno-Eno), testified that the 1st day of June, 2014 was his birthday.
DW3 testified that around 4.30p.m., he called the appellant on phone to know where he was.
DW3 testified that the appellant told him to come to his Aunty's house at Ikot Okubo Village, Uyo.
DW3 testified that he went and met the appellant carrying sand with a wheel barrow and off-loading the sand at his building site.
DW3 testified that the appellant stopped the work he was doing and took him on his motorcycle and they went out.
DW3 testified that they went to Edyson Garden Hotel at 17 IBB Way, Uyo and spent the night there.
DW3 testified that in the morning about 7.00a.m., the appellant left him in the Hotel room in order to take the daughter to school.
DW4, Aniete Inyang, testified that on 1/6/2014, the appellant came to the Hotel with a girl and paid for a room.
DW4 testified that he issued a receipt to the appellant as evidence of payment for the room.
DW4 testified that he checked the appellant and the girl to room 7.
The receipt allegedly issued to the appellant was admitted in evidence as exhibit 'D' and was Cash Receipt No. 196 dated 1st June, 2014 issued in favour of the appellant by Eddyson Garden Hotel, Uyo.
Exhibit 'D' was tendered through the appellant's third witness - DW4.
In the appellant's statement (Exhibit A), the appellant claimed that he was in his father's house and compound till 6.00p.m of 1/6/2014 when he left the house to the girl friend, Eno Eno (DW3) whom he took to 'Sam Law Hotel' along IBB Avenue, Uyo for her birthday party and spent the night with the said girl friend at the said Sam Law Hotel.
The appellant claimed in Exhibit A that the said girlfriend left the hotel by 7.00a.m and told him she was going back to her hotel at Uyo City Polytechnic where DW3 was attending school.
The appellant stated in Exhibit A that he left the hotel at about 7.45a.m and returned to his family compound.
In his evidence in Court, the appellant, for the first time and during trial claimed he spent the night of 1/6/2014 with DW3 at Eddyson Garden Hotel contrary to his earlier Statement in Exhibit A.
Contrary to Exhibit A, the appellant in his testimony in Court told the Court that he took his bath in the house of DW2 and left with DW3 to Eddyson Garden Hotel and spent the night there until the following morning.
DW2 under Cross-examination told the Court that the appellant returned to spend the night in his house at about 10.00p.m on the date of the incident.
PW4 stated in evidence that he investigated the alibi set up by the appellant that he spent night of 1/6/2014 with DW3 to be false.
DW4 admitted that the appellant was brought to Eddyson Garden Hotel in handcuff by the police.
PW4 told the Court that as they left Sam Law Hotel, the appellant took him to Eddyson Garden Hotel where he found no record that the appellant lodged in that hotel on 1/6/2014 or was any party held in the hotel on the said date.
According to the police investigation report (Exhibit C), the appellant was lodged in Edyson Hotel from 2000 hours (8pm) on the date of the incident.
One of the detectives visited Sam-Law Hotel to investigate the appellant's alibi, and there was no record that the appellant checked in as he claimed and there was no birthday party held there as claimed by the appellant.
PW1's testimony was in Ibibio language and was translated into English language by a Senior Registrar of the trial Court - Mrs. Victory Etang.
The appellant testified in Ibibio language which was translated into English language by one Miss Idongesit A. Okon - a Higher Registrar of the trial Court.
DW3 testified in English language.
DW4 testified in English language.
On the 27th day of January, 2016, the trial Court, per Hon. Justice Okon A. Okon, delivered a reserved judgment wherein the appellant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death by hanging.
The trial Court found that the appellant's alibi was contrived in collusion with DW2, DW3 and DW4 to assist the appellant escape the natural consequences of his purposeful conduct.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant lodged an appeal in the Court of Appeal, which was Appeal No: CA/C/49C/2016.
The Court of Appeal delivered a reserved judgment on the 12th day of July, 2017 wherein the appeal was dismissed.
The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court on the 10th August, 2017 containing three (3) grounds of appeal.
ISSUES
Whether the right to fair hearing of the Appellant was breached when he adopted Exhibit 'A' (his extra-judicial statement) without same being interpreted to him before adoption.
Whether the defence of alibi by the Appellant ought to have been sustained if the uncontroverted evidence of DW3 and DW4 were not discountenanced.
Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in view of the nature of the evidence (documentary and oral) adduced at the trial for the offence of murder which carries death sentence at conviction.
Whether the offence of murder was proved against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the defence of alibi was properly considered and discountenanced by the trial Court as affirmed by the Court below.
Whether the trial Court and the Court of Appeal erred in law by rejecting the Appellant's defence of alibi on the ground that it was contrived in collusion with DW2, DW3, and DW4.
Whether the prosecution discharged the burden of proving all three essential ingredients of the offence of murder: (a) that the deceased died; (b) that the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the Appellant; and (c) that the Appellant's act was intentional or with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence.
Whether the eyewitness testimony of PW1 was sufficient to ground the conviction of the Appellant for murder.
Whether the failure of the prosecution to investigate the Appellant's alibi was fatal to the prosecution's case.
Whether the evidence of DW3 and DW4 corroborated the Appellant's defence of alibi.
Whether the Appellant's alibi accounted for his whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offence so as to eliminate the possibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.
Whether the prosecution's failure to tender the statement of the deceased and the petition that reactivated the case was fatal to the prosecution's case.
HELD
What is the standard of proof required for the prosecution in criminal cases?
An allegation of commission of a crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow or every shadow of doubt—it means such proof carrying a high degree of probability that the defendant committed the offence.
By what methods can the prosecution prove the commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt?
The prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of an offence by any of the following means or ways: (1) by the evidence of an eyewitness or eyewitnesses; (2) by the confession of the accused defendant; or (3) by circumstantial evidence.
Is the evidence of a single eyewitness sufficient to ground a conviction?
The cogent, positive and direct evidence of a single eyewitness is sufficient to ground a conviction. The Court can convict on the evidence of a single witness once such evidence is cogent and credible. The credibility of evidence does not ordinarily depend on the number of witnesses who testify on a particular point, but rather on whether the evidence of the single witness is believed and accepted by the Court, and if so believed, it is sufficient to ground a conviction.
When can medical certificate or report proving cause of death be dispensed with?
It is not in every case that the cause of the death of a person has to be proved by a medical certificate or report. Where the cause of death is clear and ascertainable from the direct evidence or positive and unequivocal circumstantial evidence, the opinion of a medical expert, as to the cause of death of the deceased, can be dispensed with.
What is required of parties to judicial proceedings regarding consistency in their allegations, claims or defence?
It is now settled that a party to any judicial proceedings should be consistent in his allegation, claim or defence.
When will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts?
This Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts where such findings of facts have not been shown to be erroneous, perverse and/or to have occasioned any miscarriage of justice.
What are the legal ingredients required to establish the offence of murder?
For the prosecution to successfully establish the crime of murder, it must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) the deceased or decedent has died; (b) the death of the decedent was caused by the act of the defendant; and (c) the defendant's act was intentional or with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence of his act or action.
What is the meaning and legal requirements of the defence of alibi?
Alibi means 'elsewhere'; it is a defence by which a person accused of committing a criminal offence insists that he was somewhere other than the scene of crime at the time of the commission of the offence. The defence of alibi postulates that the accused was somewhere other than the locus criminis at the time the offence was committed. It means that he was not at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime and could therefore not have committed it or participated in its commission. The basis of the defence of alibi is the physical impossibility of a person being at more than one place at a time.
When must an accused person raise the defence of alibi and what is the duty of police to investigate it?
An accused person who relies on the defence of alibi has the initial duty to introduce the defence by supplying the details or particulars of his alibi, including where he was at the material time and who he was with, if any, and the Police has the duty of investigating same. An accused person wishing to rely on alibi must raise same at the earliest opportunity. The address and other details supplied to the Police by the accused person must also be verifiable, genuine and must not be used to send the Police on a wild goose chase. Defense of alibi must be raised timeously and whenever it is raised, it becomes incumbent upon the Appellant to adequately furnish detailed information of his whereabouts at the time the offence charged was committed. It is only when the Appellant has satisfactorily provided such vital information of his whereabouts, that the police will investigate in order to verify whether he was actually at the place he alleged he was at the time of the commission of the offence. Where he fails to give or provides such detailed information, the police have no obligation to investigate the claim. If such detailed information was given by the Appellant timeously, then the police are duty bound to investigate and failure to investigate may result in the acquittal of the Appellant.
What must an alibi account for in order to succeed?
For the defence of alibi to succeed, the alibi raised must account for the accused person's whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offence and eliminate the possibility of the Appellant being present at the scene of the crime at the time when the offence was committed.
When will the defence of alibi fail in the face of superior evidence?
The defence of alibi will physically and logically crumble once there is superior, positive and credible evidence fixing the Appellant to the scene of crime.
When must objection to admissibility of an extra-judicial statement be raised?
Objection to the admissibility of an extra-judicial statement must be raised at the point of tendering it in evidence by the prosecution. The best time to object to the admissibility of a document is at the trial and the time the document was being tendered by admission in evidence and not by way of appeal.
What is the effect of failure to object to admission of a document in evidence?
A party who consented to a document being admitted in evidence is not permitted to resile from such consent. He is estopped from doing so. Where an Appellant stands by and allows an exhibit to smoothly undergo the process of becoming evidence without any protest, then it becomes certain that such Appellant is comfortable with the evidence without any protest and see no reason why he should challenge its admission.
What is the duty of the Court in affording parties fair hearing?
All that a Court is bound to do is to afford the parties a fair and level playing field to conduct their case. The duty of Court does not extend to lending a helping hand to the parties or assisting them in conducting their case.
What is the legal presumption regarding a sane person's intention in relation to the natural consequences of his actions?
Any sane man is presumed by law to intend the natural and probable consequences of his action. Hitting an axe on the head of a human being is such a violent and callous action which clearly shows that the Appellant intended the natural consequence of his conduct.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.S.C. (Delivering the Lead Judgment):

In Charge No: HU/26C/2015 filed in the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, holden at Uyo, the appellant was charged as follows: "STATEMENT OF OFFENCE Murder, contrary to Section 326(1) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 38, Vol. 2 Laws of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria 2000. PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE SOLOMON IBORO SANDY a.k.a "SOLOMON IBORO SANDY" "SOLOMON IBORO SANDY", on the 1st day of June, 2014 at Ikot Oku-Ubo Village in Uyo Local Government Area in the Uyo Judicial Division murdered one GODWIN GEORGE UDOFIA."

Upon the appellant pleading not guilty, the prosecution called 4 (four) witnesses and tendered 3 (three) exhibits - "A" (the appellant's statement to the Police, made on 01/08/2014); "B" - "B3" (Post-Mortem Examination Form together with a Medical Report attached thereto); and "C" (Police Investigation Report dated 25/08/2014). At the close of the prosecution's case, the appellant testified in his defence and called 3 (three) additional witnesses. Exhibit "D" - Cash Receipt No. 196 dated 1st June, 2014 issued in favour of the appellant by Eddyson Garden Hotel, Uyo, was tendered through the appellant's third witness - DW4. After taking the addresses of the learned counsel for the opposing parties, the trial Court, per Hon. Justice Okon A. Okon, delivered a reserved judgment on the 27th day of January, 2016 wherein the Court concluded as follows: "No possible defence was urged in evidence or at all in favour of the Accused other than the special defence of alibi which I have disbelieved and rejected having been contrived by the Accused in collusion with DW2, DW3, and DW4 to assist the Accused escape the natural consequences of his purposeful conduct taken to demonstrate ill-advised and misplaced solidarity with the brother." I find the killing of the deceased by the Accused upon the evidence before this Court in this case to be unauthorized, unjustified and inexcusable in or by law. I hold that the Prosecution has proved the offence of murder charged against the Accused person beyond reasonable doubt and I therefore find the Accused person guilty as charged and he is accordingly convicted."

The appellant was sentenced to death by hanging. Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant lodged an appeal in the Court of Appeal, which was Appeal No: CA/C/49C/2016. The Court of Appeal, after hearing the appeal, delivered a reserved judgment on the 12th day of July, 2017 wherein the appeal was dismissed. This appeal is against the said judgment.

In the appellant's brief, settled by G. A. Umoh, Esq., three issues for determination were identified thus:

"1. Whether the right to fair hearing of the Appellant was breached when he was led or misled to adopt Exhibit A without same being interpreted to him before adoption? (Ground 1)

2. Whether the defence of alibi by the Appellant ought to have been sustained if the uncontroverted evidence of DW3 and DW4 were not discountenanced? (Ground 2)

3. Whether prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in view of the nature of the evidence (documentary and oral) adduced at the trial for the offence of murder which carries death sentence at conviction? (Ground 3)."

The respondent's brief was signed by Uwemedimo Nwoko, Esq., Attorney-General of Akwa Ibom State, who distilled two issues for determination as follows:

1. "Whether the offence of murder was proved against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt."

2. "Whether the defence of Alibi was not properly considered and discountenanced by the trial Court as affirmed by the Court below."

I adopt the issues as raised by the learned counsel for the appellant to determine this appeal, with slight modifications, and Issues 1 and 2 will be taken together.

ISSUE 1

Whether or not the appellant's right to fair hearing was breached when he adopted exhibit "A" without same having been interpreted to him.

ISSUE 2

Whether or not the appellant's defence of alibi ought to have been sustained if the evidence of DW3 and DW4 were not discountenanced.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended, inter alia, that:- "It is obvious that PW4 did not record what the Appellant told him in the extra-judicial statement and since the content was not known to the illiterate Appellant, he was denied the opportunity to retract same which amount to infringement on his right to fair hearing. The request by the Appellant for the statement to be read and interpreted to him before the trial Court would have afforded the Appellant to own his extra-judicial statement before the trial Court and we submit that in criminal justice, the Appellant is presumed innocent until proved guilty, thus entitled to be accorded all due consideration at the trial, otherwise it will amount to an infringement on his right to fair hearing as is in the instant case and being the root of all trials."

In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the appellant referred the Court to the case of Adebesin v. State (2014) LPELR-22694(SC).

The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the case of Eke v. The State (2011) LPELR-1133(SC) to state that "alibi" means "elsewhere" - that is to say that the appellant was not at the scene of the crime when it was committed and that, in this case, "the appellant was not the person who committed the crime". In urging the Court to resolve the issue on defence of alibi in favour of the appellant, it was submitted that "the defence of alibi by the appellant ought to have been sustained if the uncontroverted evidence of DW3 and DW4 were not discountenanced.”

On behalf of the respondent, learned counsel referred to the case of Ezeuko v. The State (2016) 253 LRCN 1 at 47 and submitted that: "the defence of alibi postulates that the accused was somewhere other than the locus criminis at the time the offence was committed. It means that he was not at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime and could therefore not have committed it or participated in its commission."

The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the prosecution, through the evidence of PW1 - an eyewitness, proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was at the scene of crime and his defence of alibi was rightly rejected by the lower Courts.

The law is quite settled that an allegation of commission of a crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow or every shadow of doubt - it means such proof carrying a high degree of probability that the defendant committed the offence. See Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372; Mufutau Bakare v. The State (1987) 3 SC 1; Fabian Nwaturuocha v. The State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1242); Golden Dibie & 2 Ors. v. The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 30; Kwame Wisdom v. The State (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1586) 446 and Joseph Olanrewaju v. The State (2024) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1950) 493.

It is also trite that the prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of an offence by any of the following means or ways: 1. by the evidence of an eyewitness or eyewitnesses; 2. by the confession of the accused defendant; or 3. by circumstantial evidence. See the cases of Ekpo Obongha Mbang v. The State (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 48; Michael Adeyemo v. The State (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1485) 311; Joseph Bille v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 363; Ifeanyichukwu Akwuobi v. The State (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 421; Wahab Alao v. The State (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 501; Andrew Koye Fekolomoh v. The State (2021) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1773) 461; Ocholi Friday v. The State (2024) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1957) 121 and Mohammed Isah Bakari v. The State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1965) 423. In this case, PW1 - Iniobong George Udofia, testified in Ibibio language and his testimony was translated into English language by a Senior Registrar of the trial Court - Mrs. Victory Etang. PW1's evidence, which was not challenged, amongst other things, was as follows: "On 1/6/2014 we were all going for registration as voters for election purposes. I went there for the voter registration exercise in the company of my brother Godwin George Udofia, now deceased.

The centre was at Village Hall, Ikot Oku Ubo Village, Uyo L.G.A. I later left behind the deceased to continue with the registration exercise. About 6.00pm. I saw my brother, Godwin George Udofia returning just about the time I wanted to leave house. My brother told me that he had been registered as a voter. My brother decided to go out with me. At a point close to where the transformer is positioned in Ikot Oku Ubo Village, my brother joined me to a nearby supermarket. I then saw Ndifreke Iboro Sandy who came out from the supermarket and started talking to my brother. On inquiry, my brother told me that as Ndifreke Iboro Sandy was about leaving the supermarket and at the door post, he, my brother bodily clashed with the said Ndifreke and that he (meaning my brother) apologized. Ndifreke Iboro Sandy is the brother of the Accused person. Due to the hot exchange of words between Ndifreke and my brother, I advised them to stop quarrelling and to leave for their separate homes. I later returned home. But on my way home, Ndifreke made a phone call to someone I did not know. Then within 3 minutes of the call, I saw the Accused person and one Idara Sandy running towards us along the Transformer road. The Accused later joined Ndifreke and Idara Sandy, the brothers. By this time, The Accused person concealed an object he was holding which I could not identify. The Accused person hit my brother on the head with an axe and my brother shouted "Jesus!", Ndifreke and Idara used angle iron bar and beat my brother. For the second time, the Accused person hit my brother with axe and my brother fell down. I ran for my safety into a nearby bush close to Christ Army Church. While in the bush, I heard my brother pleading with the Accused person and the brothers to spare him as he was their in-law. Instead, the Accused person and the brothers continued to beat my brother." PW4 - Inspector Anthony Sampson, attached to State CID, Ikot Akpan Abia, Uyo - was the police officer who investigated the case and obtained the appellant's statement which was tendered in evidence, without any objection by the defence, and it was admitted as exhibit "A".

On the other side, the appellant testified in his defence as DWI, also in Ibibio language which was translated into English language by one Miss Idongesit A. Okon - a Higher Registrar of the trial Court. The appellant testified, inter alia, that: "On 1/6/2014 while in my Aunty's house, I received a call from a female friend who told me that that day was her birthday. She told me to come and take her out and buy something for her. So I took her out to Edyson Guest House, Babangida Avenue, Uyo. I stayed there with my said female friend until the following morning being Monday, 2nd June, 2014 when I checked out of the Guest House and returned home to my father's house at Ikot Okubo Village, Uyo."

DW3 was one Uduak Peter Brownson (Eno-Eno) who testified in English language. He testified, inter alia, that:- "The 1st day of June, 2014 was my birthday. Around 4.30p.m., I called the Accused on phone to know where he was. The Accused told me to meet him in the house. The Accused told me to come to his Aunty's house at Ikot Okubo Village, Uyo. I went and met the Accused carrying sand with a wheel barrow and off-loading the sand at his building site. On seeing me, the Accused stopped the work he was doing and took me on his motorcycle and we went out. We went to Edyson Garden Hotel at 17 IBB Way, Uyo. We spent the night there. In the morning about 7.00a.m., the Accused left me in the Hotel room in order to take the daughter to school."

DW4 - one Aniete Inyang - testified in English language thus: "On 1/6/2014, the Accused came to the Hotel with a girl and paid for a room. I issued a receipt to the Accused as evidence of payment for the room. I checked the Accused person and the girl to room 7."

The receipt allegedly issued to the appellant was admitted in evidence as exhibit “D”.

In rejecting the defence of alibi, put forward by the appellant, the trial Court believed the evidence of PW1, who witnessed the incident and placed the appellant at the scene of crime. The learned trial Judge found further as follows: "No possible defence was urged in evidence or at all in favour of the Accused other than the special defence of alibi which I have disbelieved and rejected having been contrived by the Accused in collusion with DW2, DW3 and DW4 to assist the Accused escape the natural consequences of his purposeful conduct taken to demonstrate ill-advised and misplaced solidarity with the brother." I find the killing of the deceased by the Accused upon the evidence before this Court in this case to be unauthorize, unjustified and inexcusable in or by law. I hold that the Prosecution has proved the offence of murder charged against the Accused person beyond reasonable doubt and I therefore find the Accused person guilty as charged and he is accordingly convicted."

Earlier in its judgment the trial Court found and held that:- "In the instant case, the Accused claimed in Exhibit A that he was in the father's house and compound till 6.00p.m of 1/6/2014 when he left the house to the girl friend, Eno Eno (DW3) whom he took to 'Sam Law Hotel' along IBB Avenue, Uyo for her birthday party and spent the night with the said girl friend at the said Sam Law Hotel. The Accused claimed in Exhibit A that the said girlfriend left the hotel by 7.00a.m and told him she was going back to her hotel at Uyo City Polytechnic where DW3 was attending school. The Accuse also stated that he left the hotel at about 7.45a.m and returned to his family compound. In his evidence in Court, the Accused, for the first time and during trial claimed he spent the night of 1/6/2014 with DW3 at Eddyson Garden Hotel contrary to his earlier Statement in Exhibit A. Again, contrary to Exhibit A, the Accused in his testimony in Court told the Court that he took his bath in the house of DW2 and left with DW3 to Eddyson Garden Hotel and spent the night there until the following morning. DW2 under Cross-examination told the Court that the Accused returned to spend the night in his house at about 10.00p.m on the date of the incident. This evidence conflicts with the evidence of the Accused person and DW3 that they spent the night together at Eddyson Garden Hotel on 1/6/2014. DW3 contrary to the Statement of the Accused person in Exhibit A claimed the Accused person left her in the hotel at about 7.00a.m. in order to go and take the daughter to school and that she checked out of the hotel at about 10.00a.m. This evidence is at variance with Exhibit A where the Accused claimed DW3 returned to her school at about 7.00a.m while he himself left the hotel at about 7.45a.m. Both DW3 and the Accused cannot be telling the truth as to who left the other behind in the hotel they claimed to have spent the night together on 1/6/2014. PW4 stated in evidence that he investigated the alibi set up by the Accused that he spent night of 1/6/2014 with DW3 to be false. I believe PW4 in this regard. DW4 admitted that the Accused was brought to Eddyson Garden Hotel in handcuff by the police. PW4 told the Court that as they left Sam Law Hotel, the Accused person took him to Eddyson Garden Hotel where he found no record that the Accused person lodged in that hotel on 1/6/2014 or was any party held in the hotel on the said date."

In affirming the decision of the trial Court, that the defence of alibi did not avail the appellant, the Court of Appeal, per Oyewole, JCA; elaborately found, inter alia, as follows: "The Appellant raised his alibi at the earliest opportunity and it was investigation by PW$ and his team in the company of PW1. In his extra-judicial statement admitted without objection as exhibit A and later adopted by the Appellant as part of his defence in his evidence in chief as contained on page 128 of the record of appeal the Appellant stated that at the time of the incident he was attending a birthday party with DW3 at a certain Sam Law Hotel located Babangida Avenue, Uyo which party lasted all night and that he left the said party at about 7am the following day with DW3. The evidence of PW4 was that his investigation invalidated this claim as no party was found to have been held at the said hotel while the Appellant's name was not found in the said hotel's records. According to PW4, the Appellant thereafter mentioned another hotel called Edyson Hotel where he was found to have lodged from 9pm although no party was held in the said hotel as Exhibit C was the police investigation report and it corroborated this point on page 25 of the record of appeal that the Appellant was lodged in this hotel from 2000 hours (8pm) on the date of the incident. This part of exhibit Constituted the fulcrum of the submissions of Dr. Ataide for the Appellant that the alibi of the Appellant was established. The reality of the facts of the incident however does not support the position of counsel. From the account of PW1 the incident had been concluded long before 8pm and PW3 who found the deceased on the road wounded and bloodied came upon him at about 7pm from his testimony. The location of the Appellant at 8pm on the day of the incident and where he spent the night had no relevance to his presence at the scene of the crime. The testimony of PW1 was in no way impeached by the testimonies of DW2 who was with the Appellant prior to the time of the incident or DW # whose account of the time spent together contradicted DW3 and even the Appellant as DW1. The evidence of DW4 that the Appellant spent the night of the incident in his hotel did not include when the Appellant came in and that he never left his room in the hotel that day. More importantly, PW1 mentioned the Appellant at the earliest opportunity and assisted the police in effecting his arrest, thereby obviating any possibility of mistaken identity."

To my mind, the above finding and decision of the Court of Appeal cannot be faulted, having regard to the evidence on record. In the first place, the purported alibi of the appellant, put forward at the earliest opportunity, in his statement to the police, was investigated by the police and it was found to be false and grossly untrue. Secondly, by way of an after-thought, the appellant put up another alibi - since the particulars thereof were different from the first alibi - but the purported second alibi was contradicted by the evidence of the appellant's witnesses, as rightly found and pointed out by the two lower Courts. The issue of whether or not the appellant was at the locus criminis was conclusively resolved by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was actually at the scene of crime and not somewhere else when the offence was committed.

The appellant, who was represented by his learned counsel throughout the trial was not misled nor prejudiced by the fact that the content of exhibit "A" - his statement to the police, at the earliest opportunity during investigation - was not read out and interpreted to him in open Court. The appellant's said statement - exhibit "A" was one of the documents attached to the Charge or Information as proof of evidence. It is also on record, especially at page 105 of the record of appeal, that the learned prosecuting Senior State Counsel - Mrs. Cecilia Umana - loudly indicated during the pre-trial conference that: "We shall be utilizing the information and proof of Evidence filed on 12/05/2015 .... Outside statements and Report, we have no further exhibit to tender at the trial". In response, Wilfred Daniel, Esq; learned counsel for the appellant informed the trial Court as follows: "We have been served with the information and proof of evidence. We intend to defend this case and shall also call 4 witnesses. We may depend on the manner of tendering the statements and Reports oppose them. But in the interim, we have no issues with the statements and Reports in the proof of evidence."

When PW4 sought to tender in evidence the appellant's statement, during the trial, Wilfred Daniel, Esq., learned counsel for the appellant unequivocally informed the Court that: "We are not objecting to the admissibility of the statement."

To say the least, it is now settled that a party to any judicial proceedings should be consistent in his allegation, claim or defence. See Emmanuel Olamide Larmie v. Data Processing Maintenance & Services Ltd. (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 438; Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju v. Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 and Intercontinental Bank Ltd. v. Brifina Ltd. (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 1.

The appellant was afforded all the opportunity to defend himself, including the right to object to the admissibility of any exhibit or evidence tendered or adduced by the prosecution. The appellant was not denied any right to fair hearing. His complaint of denial of his right to fair hearing is evidently spurious and uncharitable to the trial Court, whose conduct throughout the trial is commendable and not in any way condemnable.

It is for all these reasons that issues 1 and 2, identified above, are hereby resolved against the appellant.

ISSUE 3

Whether or not the case of murder, levelled against the appellant, was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The legal ingredients of the offence of murder are well settled by the decisions of this Court. For the prosecution to successfully establish the crime of murder, it must proved beyond reasonable doubt that:- "(a) the deceased or decedent has died; (b) the death of the decedent was caused by the act of the defendant; and (c) the defendant's act was intentional or with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence of his act or action. See Tina Okorodudu v. The State (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1951) 111 and Mohammed Isah Bakari v. The State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1965) 423.

In this case, apart from the credible evidence of PW1, the eyewitness of the incident, which conclusively proved that on 01/06/2014 the appellant intentionally hit the deceased on his head with an axe, two times, and the deceased fell down; yet the appellant continued to beat him (the deceased); the evidence of the wife of the deceased (PW2) was that he returned "with blood all over his body" and was taken to Life Care hospital, Uyo, where he died in the course of treatment in the night of 01/06/2014. The trial Court rightly found that "there is such positive evidence in the instant case independent of exhibit B - B3 that the deceased died from the callous dastardly and brutal act of the accused person who hit the accused(sic) on the head twice with an axe". The lower Court was right to have affirmed the decision of the trial Court.

It is not in every case that the cause of the death of person has to be proved by a medical certificate or report. Where the cause of death is clear and ascertainable from the direct evidence or positive and unequivocal circumstantial evidence, the opinion of a medical expert, as to the cause of death of the deceased, can be dispensed with. See the cases of Musa Zubairu v. The State (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1486) 504 and Mohammed Isah Bakari v. The State (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1065) 423.

In any case, this appeal is from the concurrent findings of both trial Court and the Court of Appeal. The law is that this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts where such findings of facts have not been shown to be erroneous, perverse and/or to have occasioned any miscarriage of justice. See Dominic Princent v. The State (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 49; Godwin Alao v. The State (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1488) 245; Darlington Eze v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 433; Ayo Adegbite v. The State (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 183; Holo Lanre v. The State (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1660) 506; Samuel Addo v. The State (2021) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791) 427; Nkem Okolie v. The State (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1894) 1; Andrew Ekwenuya v. The State (2024) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1950) 409 and Mohammed Isah Bakari v. The State (supra).

The third issue in this appeal is also resolved against the appellant.

Having resolved all the three issues submitted by the appellant for determination, against him, I find no iota of merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, as it is devoid of any merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeal (coram: Saulawa, JCA (now JSC); Adah, JCA (JSC now) and Oyewole, JCA; delivered on the 12th day of July, 2017 in Appeal No: CA/C/49C/2016 between: SOLOMON IBORO SANDY v. THE STATE is hereby affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C.

After reading a draft of the lead judgment written by my learned brother, M. A. A. Adumein, JSC in this appeal, I agree entirely that the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves dismissal for the reasons set out therein.

The decision of the two (2) lower Courts reached on the basis of concurrent findings of facts on the purported and destroyed defence of alibi put up by the Appellant has not been shown to be perverse or to have occasioned a real miscarriage of justice in law, to warrant inference therewith by this Court, as demonstrated in the lead judgment.

I join in dismissing the appeal in terms of the lead judgment.

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