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24/03/2026

OKAFOR & ORS v. EZEATU
(2018) LPELR-44208(CA)

ISSUE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
- Whether an appellant can raise a preliminary objection against his own appeal

PRINCIPLE
"The Appellants incredibly raised a preliminary objection to their own appeal in the Appellants' Brief thus: * The originating process filed by the respondent is incompetent and that the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal. * The Respondent shall, with the leave of the Court, contend that the originating process filed by the Respondent is incompetent and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this Appeal. The learned counsel for the Appellants made a very lengthy argument regarding the preliminary objection. With no much ado, the Court will not allow such an unthinkable somersault where an Appellant shoots himself by attacking his own appeal. For the avoidance of doubt Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 provides thus: "A Respondent intending to rely upon a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal, shall give the appellant three clear days notice thereof before the hearing, setting out the grounds of the objection, and shall file such notice together with twenty copies thereof with the registry within the same time." This provision does not envisage filing of preliminary objection by the Appellants. Be it as it may, the Respondent has replied to Appellants' objection to which the Appellants did not file a reply brief. The Preliminary Objection apart from its awkwardness is utterly lacking in substance. It is accordingly dismissed." Per HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, JCA (Pp 8 - 9 Paras A - A)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
24/03/26

24/03/2026

MADU v. HERITAGE BANK LTD & ANOR
(2024) LPELR-61935(CA)

ISSUE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - COURT PROCESS(ES)
- Relevant date of a Court process

PRINCIPLE
"The starting point is the consideration of technical issues raised against the Motion on Notice. Firstly, the Appellant argued that the Application was defective because the Motion was dated 29/9/2020 whereas the application was filed on 28/9/2020. Without much ado, in any application of this nature, what is important is the date of filing of the Court Process. The date on the process is not of significant importance unlike the date of filing. A date put on the process which is beyond the date of the filing will not vitiate the validity of the process once it was filed in accordance with the procedure and rules of Court. The Appellant/Respondent argument in this regard holds no water." Per ADEMOLA SAMUEL BOLA, JCA (Pp 4 - 5 Paras D - A)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
24/03/26

25/02/2026

OYERINDE v. BAMIGBEGBIN & ANOR
(2017) LPELR-42378(CA)

ISSUE
EVIDENCE - TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE/HISTORY
- Application of the rule in Kojo v. Bonsie

PRINCIPLE
"In the resolution of the issue of title claimed by both sides, it would appear that the learned trial Judge relied on the principle established in Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 W.L.R. p.1223 where it was held per Denning, L. J as follows: "Where there is a conflict of traditional history... the best way to test the traditional history is by reference to the facts of recent years established by evidence and by seeing which of the two competing histories is the more probable." For the Rule to apply therefore, there must be two traditional histories from each of the competing parties, and the traditional histories must be such that the Court is unable to decide which of the stories is more probable. It therefore means that where the trial Judge is able to believe one of the traditional histories against that of the other, the rule will not apply. In the case of Eze v. Atasie (2000) 10 NWLR (pt.676) p. 470 at 482, Ufaifo, JSC expatiated the principle in these words: "It is now clearly established that for the rule to apply, there must exist side by side, two stories of tradition, one by each party, which are themselves credible or plausible but are in conflict, one with the other such that the Court is unable to realistically and justifiably prefer one to the other. In that case, either of the two stories may rightly be regarded as likely to be true, or that they are probable." This principle has been followed and applied by the Supreme Court and this Court in several cases, such as Okonkwo v. Okonkwo (2010) LPELR-9357 (SC). Taiwo & Ors v. Ogundele & Ors (2012) LPELR -7803 (SC); Iheanacho v. Chigere (2004) 17 NWLR (pt. 901) p. 130; Salawu v. Yusuf (2007) All FWLR (pt.384) p.230 at 249 - 251 paragraphs B - B; Ayorinde & Ors v. Sogunro & Ors (2012) LPELR-7808 (SC) and Ibenye & Ors v. Agwu & Anor (1998) 9 - 10 S.C. p.18." Per HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, JCA (Pp 46 - 48 Paras D - B)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
25/02/26

25/02/2026

KUWAKANU & ORS v. OGABI & ORS
(2017) LPELR-42375(CA)

ISSUE
EVIDENCE - TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE/HISTORY
- Application of the rule in Kojo v. Bonsie

PRINCIPLE
"It is thus obvious that the rule in KOJO V BONSIE (SUPRA) cannot apply under the circumstances. The Rule applies where the evidence of both sides on traditional history is conflicting or inconclusive; the Court will then fall back on acts of ownership exercised within living memory in verification of evidence of tradition and history. See EBOADE V. ATOMESIN (1997) 5 NWLR (PT. 506) 490; OKOCHI V ANIMKWOI (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 851) 1; IHEANACHO V CHIGERE (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 901) 130; OKONKWO V OKONKWO (2010) LPELR-9357(SC)." Per CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, JCA (Pp 29 - 29 Paras B - E)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
25/02/26

OKORO-MGBEBO & ORS v. LUGU & ANOR(2024) LPELR-62892(CA)ISSUEEVIDENCE - TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE/HISTORY- Application of the ...
25/02/2026

OKORO-MGBEBO & ORS v. LUGU & ANOR
(2024) LPELR-62892(CA)

ISSUE
EVIDENCE - TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE/HISTORY
- Application of the rule in Kojo v. Bonsie

PRINCIPLE
"Moreso the trial Court went further to attempt to apply the Rule in KOJO II VS. BONSIE [1957] 1 WLR 1223. The Rule is that where traditional evidence proffered by the parties is inconclusive, the Court is enjoined to take into consideration facts in recent times given by parties in order to determine which of the traditional evidence is more probable." Per ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA, JCA (Pp 16 - 16 Paras B - D)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
25/02/26

OKONKWO & ORS. V. OKONKWO & ORS.(2010) LPELR-9357(SC)ISSUETHE RULE IN KOJO V. BONSIE: The principle in Kojo v. BonsiePRI...
25/02/2026

OKONKWO & ORS. V. OKONKWO & ORS.
(2010) LPELR-9357(SC)

ISSUE
THE RULE IN KOJO V. BONSIE: The principle in Kojo v. Bonsie

PRINCIPLE
"In the case Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223 a Privy Council decision Lord Denning outlined the principle which is that witnesses of the utmost veracity may speak honestly but erroneously as to what took place a hundred years or more ago. Where there is a conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their belief. In such a case, demeanour is of little guide to the truth. The best way is to test the traditional history by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of the two competing histories is the more probable. The principle in Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223 relates to facts which the court should advert to in coming to a conclusion on the probability of evidence of tradition. Whereas in this case the plaintiffs/respondents rely on acquisition of title by inheritance, proof of such grant by traditional history arises only where the fact of inheritance was so ancient as to be beyond the memory of living witnesses. Facts which are within living memory are properly to be proved by evidence of living witnesses to the event and not by evidence of tradition permitted by Section 45 of the Evidence Act." PER ADEKEYE, J.S.C (Pp. 35-36, paras. B-A)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company

11/12/2025

Etti’s Notes
When it is not foolhardy to rely on the view expressed in
Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Fin. (Nig.) Ltd…
Is F.H.A. v Oyedeji (2025) an aberration?

‘The originating process to which all other processes were attached was signed by Dele Falana Esq., and the signatures appearing on all the other documents, even though presented as Dele Falana & Co were signed with the same signature identical to that affixed to Dele Falana Esq. I do not think this discrepancy is material enough to vitiate the Writ of Summons on which the suit was grounded. I also agree that Dele Falana, Esq., is a registered legal practitioner whose name is on the roll of the Supreme Court and is entitled to practice as such under the Legal Practitioner’s Act, LFN, 2004 and his identity as the person who signed the writ of summons, the statement of claim and particulars of claim is not in doubt. See Cole v. Martins (1968) 1 All NLR 16, (1968) SCNLR215; Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 and Adeneye v. Yaro (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1342) 625.
‘The Supreme Court in a similar contention in Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Fin. (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 420 held that whether an irregularity renders a process void or merely voidable depends on the type of irregularity. An irregularity affecting an originating process is a fundamental irregularity that goes to the roots. The statement of claim is not such an originating process. {Emphasis mine).
The learned Law Lord, Eko, JSC at pages 434-435, paras. H-B of the judgment said:
“The facts of this case, particularly on this objection,are that in spite of the fact that the statement of claim was allegedly not signed by a known legally qualified Legal Practitioner, but by a firm of Legal Practitioners,the appellant, as the defendant, condoned the defective process. They participated in the proceedings and evidence arising from the statement of claim was called after the statement of defence joining issues with the defective statement of claim was filed. Judgment of the trial court, based on the evidence elicited from the statement of claim, was delivered without objection.
Even at the Court of Appeal no issue was made of the alleged defective statement of claim. The appellant,as the defendant, had clearly condoned the defective statement of claim and waived his right to object to this defective process.”

‘The court distinguished between procedural jurisdiction of a court and substantive jurisdiction. It held that “procedural jurisdiction is secondary to substantive jurisdiction. The distinction between the two lies in the fact that while procedural jurisdiction can be waived, substantive jurisdiction cannot be waived.”
‘It is on the foregoing premise that this court will affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal upholding the judgment of the trial Federal High Court dated 13th May, 2010.
This appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.’

- F.H.A. v Oyedeji (2025) 19 NWLR (Part 2021) 473, 495-6 (Nwosu-Iheme JSC).

When a decision is an aberration

‘It is correct that in the cases of Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Benthworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 420 and Bakari v.Ogundipe (2020) LPELR 49571 (SC), (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768)1 this court expressed a different view and held that where it is only the statement of claim that is signed in the name of a law firm, and not the writ of summons, it is a matter of procedural irregularity and not a matter of substantive jurisdiction. This court proceeded that where the anomaly in such a signing of the statement of claim is not raised in the trial court and the trial is conducted and judgment entered on the basis thereof, the party will be deemed to have waived and acquiesced in the irregularity in the signing and it is not an issue that can be raised on appeal.
‘This view expressed in these two cases, unfortunately, represents the minority view of this court and goes against a deluge of case law authorities that were decided by this court before, in between and after the two cases. The decision in the two cases are aberrations and do not constitute the correct position of this court on the subject.
‘It is thus foolhardy for counsel to continue to seek to rely on the view expressed in the cases of Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Benthworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (supra), Bakari v. Ogundipe (supra) in the light of the avalanche of case law authorities that say otherwise, as counsel to the first respondent did in this appeal. Applying ordinary jurisprudential principles, these decisions should have been declared as having been made per incuriam.’
- Yegede v Othman (2025) 18 NWLR (Part 2017) 369, 413 (concurring judgt) (Abiru JSC).

NB - Yegede v Othman and F.H.A. v Oyedeji were rendered on 11 April 2025.

26/11/2025

NYIANAKA v. ANYIKA
(2021) LPELR-52817(CA)

ISSUE
WILLS AND PROBATE - RESEALING
- Position of the law as regards resealing of probate/letters of administration; whether letters of administration granted in one State and sought to be used in another state must be resealed in order to give jurisdiction to the High Court of the State where the property is situate

PRINCIPLE
"By Section 2 of the Probate (Re-sealing) Act Cap. P31, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the law provides that: "Where the High Court of a State has either before or after the commencement of this Act, granted probate or letters of administration in respect of the estate of a deceased person, the probate or letters so granted may, subject to the provisions of this Act, on being produced to, and a copy thereof deposited with the High Court of any other State, be resealed with the seal of that Court." While Section 3 provides for conditions to be fulfilled of resealing thus: "The High Court of a State shall, before re-sealing a probate or letters of administration under this Act, be satisfied - (a) that probate duty has been paid in respect of so much, if any, of the estate as is liable to probate duty in that State; and (b) in the case of letters of administration, that security has been given in a sum sufficient in amount to cover the property, if any, in that State to which the letters of administration relate, and may require such evidence, if any, as it thinks fit as to the domicile of the deceased person." ?The provision for resealing is regulated by the various High Court Laws and Rules. In the FCT, it is regulated by Order 49, Rule 55 of the FCT High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 now Order 64 Rule 45 of the FCT High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018. The Order provides that: "1. An application for the resealing of probate or administration with the Will attached granted by the Court of a place not within the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, shall be made by the person to whom the grant was made or by any person authorized in writing to apply on his behalf. 2. On any such application - (a) an Inland Revenue affidavit shall be lodged as if the application were one for a grant in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; (b) the application shall be advertised in such manner as a Registrar may direct and shall be supported by an oath sworn by the person making the application. 3. On an application for the resealing of such a grant - (a) a Registrar shall not require sureties except where it appears to him that the grant is made to a person or for a purpose mentioned in Rule 54(1) (a) to (f), or except where he considers that there are special circumstances making it desirable to require sureties... The effect of re-sealing a letter of administration in a State High Court granted by another State High Court is to make it seem as if the seal of Court is granted by the High Court of that State. That is, re-sealing enables a grant made in one State to be effective within another State. The trial judge in his judgment on page 240 of the record of appeal held that: "I have carefully perused the processes filed in this case by the Plaintiff as well as the counter affidavit by the Plaintiff to the Preliminary Objection and I have failed to see any paragraph wherein the Plaintiff states that he has resealed the letter of administration aforesaid. To my mind therefore, the said letter of administration is valid to the extent only that it can be used to administer any property forming part of the estate of the deceased in Benue State until it is resealed by the FCT before such power can be exercise on property within the FCT which forms part of the said estate... the Plaintiff has evoke the jurisdictional power of this Court based on the said letter of administration issued by the Benue State High Court without first resealing in the FCT High Court as required by law." I agree with the trial judge that the omission of the Appellant to reseal the letters of administration in the FCT High Court resulted in their lack of locus standi to institute the action in the FCT High Court. Indeed, from the statement of claim, the Appellant lacks the locus to institute an action given that he has not resealed the letters of Administration. To have the locus to institute an action in relation to properties in the FCT High Court, the letters of Administration must be resealed. The Appellant's counsel also submitted that by ADMINISTRATOR/EXE. ESTATE ABACHA VS. EKE-SPIFF (SUPRA), a party without grant of letters of administration lacks the locus standi to sue or be sued in the name of the deceased and that the Respondent did not file a defence to show that letters of administration was granted to him to give a right to him to acquire the property from the mistress of the deceased and by resting his case on that of the plaintiff's case the Respondent left the evidence uncontroverted. By invoking the issue of jurisdiction, the Court need not look into the statement of defence of the Respondent. All the Court must do is to look at the originating processes and the affidavits filed. The Appellant's arguments on these two points are therefore of no moment. ?Additionally, the Appellant argued that the Respondent did not depose to an affidavit as to his legal right over the property but had the mistress of the deceased depose to it. However, the law is settled that any competent witness is qualified to swear to an affidavit as to facts within his knowledge or on information as stipulated in the Evidence Act. Having found that the Appellant has no locus standi, it delimits the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain his compliant. I will state again that the resealing of letters of administration is done so the High Court of one State can be vested with the power to act upon the estate of the deceased which was granted in another State. It has the effect as if it is a fresh grant in respect of the estate and administrators or executors as such they become entitled to exercise authority on properties in the new jurisdiction. The law above was upheld in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATOR -GENERAL VS. ARIGBABU (1964) NMLR 135. Similarly, in LIJADU VS. FRANKLIN (1965) LPELR - 25214 (SC), the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether probate admitted in the High Court of Western Nigeria must be resealed in the High Court of Lagos it held that: "...A grant of administration or other authority to represent a deceased person under the law of a foreign country" (i.e. any country which is not England) has no operation in England. Its effect was explained by Scrutton, J., in Haas v. Atlas Assurance Company Limited (19131 2 K.B. 209, in these terms: - An executor could not assert or rely on his right in any Court without showing that he had previously established it in the Probate Division either by suit, by probate in solemn form, or in the ordinary form. The usual way in which he proved it was by the production of a copy of the will certified under the seal of the Court. That state of the law was described by Jervis in Johnson v. Warwick 17 C.B. 516, as being that the Court had not the legal optics through which to look at the will until the will was proved in the form provided by English law... The passage cited from Haas v. Atlas Assurance Company Limited refers to some of the methods by which an executor may establish his right. In addition, probate granted in Northern Ireland, Scotland, or specified parts of the Commonwealth will be recognized by the English Coutts if the grant has been resealed in England; See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition Volume 16 pages 256 - 263. In Nigeria the Probates (Resealing) Act, Cap, 161, makes similar provision, and enables probate granted in any part of the Commonwealth to be resealed in the High Court of Lagos." See also OGBUEHI VS. NNAJI & ORS (2015) LPELR - 25992 (CA). From the cases above, it is indeed the law as rightly stated by the trial judge that resealing of the letters of administration is a requirement in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to hear the matter. This essentially means that when letters of administration granted in one State is sought to be used in another state it must be resealed in order to give jurisdiction to the High Court of the State where the property is situate." Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JCA (Pp 16 - 23 Paras E - D)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
26/11/25

AJIBADE & ANOR v. PEDRO & ANOR(1992) LPELR-297(SC)ISSUEACTION - COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION- Effect of commencing a suit in a...
26/11/2025

AJIBADE & ANOR v. PEDRO & ANOR
(1992) LPELR-297(SC)

ISSUE
ACTION - COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
- Effect of commencing a suit in a wrong judicial division

PRINCIPLE
"...Order 1A of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules 1972, considered by the Court of Appeal allows an action like the present, which may be said at the worst to have been commenced in the wrong Judicial Division, to be heard and completed in that Division, unless special objection to the hearing is taken and I would add, persisted with." Per UCHE OMO, JSC (Pp 17 - 18 Paras G - A)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
26/11/25

UZAMERE v. URHOGIDE & ORS(2009) LPELR-5082(CA)ISSUEEVIDENCE - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE*- Whether when a document bearing a d...
26/11/2025

UZAMERE v. URHOGIDE & ORS
(2009) LPELR-5082(CA)

ISSUE
EVIDENCE - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE*
- Whether when a document bearing a date has been proved, it is presumed to have been made on the date it bears

PRINCIPLE
"At this stage I think it is relevant to refer to the provisions of S.125 of the Evidence Act which raises a presumption as to the date of a document. This provision allows a Court the latitude to presume the fact on the date on a document to be the date it was made. Where several documents are dated on the same date, the determination of the time of ex*****on will be ascertained by reference to the order necessary to effect the object of the ex*****on of the document. Though evidence is admissible to show that the date on a document is wrong, this Court is handicapped to the extent that it cannot take any fresh evidence in order to determine this issue of jurisdiction one way or the other. See AWOJUGBAGBE LIGHT INDUSTRIES LTD V. CHINUKWE (1995) 1 NWLR (PT. 390) 379." Per ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, JCA (Pp 21 - 21 Paras B - F)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
25/11/25

BRITTANIA-U (NIG) LTD v. SEPLAT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD & ORS(2016) LPELR-40007(SC)ISSUEPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - P...
24/11/2025

BRITTANIA-U (NIG) LTD v. SEPLAT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD & ORS
(2016) LPELR-40007(SC)

ISSUE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - PRACTICE DIRECTION
- Whether rules of Court include practice direction

PRINCIPLE
"Now "Direction" in the context of practice direction connotes command or precept emanating from an authority. See Buhari v. INEC (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 459) 419 SC at 513 para F. Rules of Court include practice directions." Per NWALI SYLVESTER NGWUTA, JSC (Pp 58 - 58 Paras C - D)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
24/11/25

AUWALU v. FRN(2017) LPELR-43824(SC)ISSUEPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - PRACTICE DIRECTION- Position of the law where there is ...
24/11/2025

AUWALU v. FRN
(2017) LPELR-43824(SC)

ISSUE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - PRACTICE DIRECTION
- Position of the law where there is a conflict between a rule of Court and practice direction

PRINCIPLE
"The long and short of the grouse of the appellant is that the Court below should have discountenanced the brief of the respondent which was filed outside the 10 days prescribed by the Practice Direction. The respondent tackled that posture by stating that the appellant had not raised the issue at the hearing of the appeal at the Court below and so it is too late in the day now to raise it. Also that the Court below was not obligated to assist the appellant argue his brief. This matter of the incompetence of the respondent's brief at the Court below having not cropped up and taking cognisance of the fact that the Court of Appeal Rules precisely Order 18 Rules 4 provides for 30 days period for the respondent to file its brief and so with the superior standing of the Rules of Court to a Practice Direction, the matter of incompetence based on the limited 10 days period of the Practice Direction would take a second step below the Rules of Court especially in this case where the perceived irregularity was not raised by the appellant at the right time, See Jev & Anor. v Iyortyom & Ors. (2012) LPELR-9291, (CA); Akinbami v Oando Plc & Ors (2013) LPELR - 21843 (CA)." Per MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, JSC (Pp 31 - 32 Paras F - F)

PRINCIPLE
"Now, looking at the provisions of the Court of Appeal Rules 2013 particularly Order 18 Rule 4(1), it is clearly provided thus:- Order 18 4(1) The Respondent shall also within thirty days of service of the brief for the appellant on him, file the respondent's brief which shall be duly endorsed with an address or addresses for service" It is instructive to note that Rule 1 of Order 18 categorically stated that the Order (i.e. Order 18 of the Rules) shall apply to all appeals coming from any Court or from which an appeal lies to this Court (i.e. the lower Court herein). Apparently, the provisions of Order 9(b) of the Practice Direction 2013 which prescribed 10 days period within which a respondent should serve his brief of argument from the date he received the appellant's brief of argument, is in conflict with the provisions of Order 18 Rule 4(1) of Court of Appeal Rules. The correct proposition of the law is that the provisions of the Practice Direction cannot override the provisions of the substantive rules of Court from which the authority to promulgate the Practice Direction was derived." Per AMIRU SANUSI, JSC (Pp 7 - 8 Paras B - A)

Law Diary, and Sam Atoe & Company
24/11/25

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