Lawhitestone & Labelle Attorneys [La&La Attorneys], Block 51, Flat 1, O. A. Utca Quarters, Off Kashim Ibrahim Way, Maitama, Abuja (2026)

25/11/2025

Daniel Alagor wrote:

"Instead, it treats separatism as inherently terroristic, an approach no criminal court should adopt without incontrovertible evidence. -DA"

"I have read the 144-page judgment delivered by Hon. Justice Omotosho in FRN v Kanu, and with respect, the decision does not come as a surprise. His Lordship has, over time, developed a reputation for highly contentious judicial outcomes, and this judgment appears to follow that pattern. The reasoning employed suggests that undue weight was placed on the defendant’s perceived conduct and demeanour during trial, rather than on the strict application of the law and evidence properly before the court.

I have the following few comments:

The judgment relied heavily on radio and video broadcasts, statements made by the defendant, and IPOB activities, rather than on empirical proof that the defendant committed an enumerated terrorist act. For terrorism-related charges under the Terrorism (Prevention & Prohibition) Act, the prosecution must prove a specific proscribed act, not merely agitation, extreme agitation, or controversial speech.

With respect, none of these, in themselves, satisfy the actus reus of terrorism without corroborated evidence of violence, participation in violence, or direction of violence. A criminal court cannot convict on assumptions, public sentiment, or general insecurity in the South-East. It must link a specific act, committed by the defendant personally, to a statutorily defined offence. The judgment fails to draw that link with the clarity demanded by Section 131 of the Evidence Act and several Supreme Court precedents requiring “clear, direct and positive evidence” in terrorism cases. This alone is a fatal flaw in the judgment.

The judgment treated “broadcasts” as if they were self-proving criminal acts. Even assuming the broadcasts contained inflammatory statements, the court is legally required to determine whether the words amount to a true threat, not just ideological agitation, and whether the threats were intended to be carried out. The judgment never performs this mandatory analytical test; instead, it collapses speech into criminal conduct. Speech becomes criminal only when accompanied by overt acts. The prosecution did not prove an executed plot, a plan capable of ex*****on, or even a direct instruction that led to violence. None of the actual victims testified in evidence. The court cannot legally treat broadcasts as constitutive of terrorism.

Even if IPOB is lawfully proscribed, the prosecution must prove that Kanu himself committed terrorist acts or deliberately encouraged specific violent operations. But the evidence relied upon in the judgment shows, at best, agitation, secessionist rhetoric, and cultural or regional grievance-based declarations. These may be controversial or offensive, but they are not automatically proof of intent to commit terrorism. The court relied heavily on inferences drawn from public chaos, the reputation of IPOB, and the general unrest in the South-East, without expressly linking cause and effect to the defendant. The judgment did not establish that any violent act in the South-East occurred because of a directive from Kanu. This decisive failure to prove mens rea makes the conviction unsafe.

The fact that IPOB is proscribed and Kanu is the leader of IPOB cannot make Kanu guilty of terrorism. Heavy reliance on IPOB’s proscription cannot be a substitute for criminal proof. Proscription affects organisations, not individuals. Criminal liability of an individual requires personal involvement, personal intent, and evidence connecting the defendant to a violent act. Merely being the leader of a proscribed body does not automatically make the leader a terrorist.

The court cannot possibly reason that because IPOB members committed violent acts, and because Kanu is the leader, then those acts are attributable to him. This is vicarious criminal liability, which does not exist in Nigerian criminal law except where the statute expressly provides (and the Terrorism Act does not).

Kanu repeatedly raised jurisdictional objections, including challenges to the competence of the terrorism charge and whether the law applies, and asked for a stay/referral to the Court of Appeal. Omotosho invoked Section 306 ACJA and refused to entertain a stay. While Section 306 ACJA (on stays) is intended to limit dilatory interlocutory tactics, it cannot be used to extinguish a bona fide question of jurisdiction which, if decided, would render further trial proceedings null and void.

The prosecution tendered certified true copies and gazetted/prior judicial orders declaring IPOB illegal/terrorist as part of the evidence, and Omotosho relied on them. Reliance on such to prove the facts underlying criminal elements (i.e., that the defendant’s organisation is terrorist and that broadcasts were part of a terrorist design) risks circularity unless properly contextualised.

The prosecution must still prove each criminal element against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Tendering a separate judicial finding that a group is proscribed may be admissible to show legal status, but it is not a substitute for proof that the accused personally had the requisite mens rea or that his acts caused the criminal consequences alleged.

No witnesses testified to direct involvement, no victims were brought, no co-conspirator testified, and there is no evidence in the judgment linking the defendant to the actual operations. Without this corroboration, the court should have invoked the principle that “any doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.” Instead, the court resolved ambiguities in favour of the prosecution.

Kanu’s defence has nothing to do with the burden of proof. It is not for the defendant to establish his innocence. The burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must eliminate all reasonable doubt, not merely present a plausible narrative. But several unresolved doubts remain in the judgment.

The judgment blurs the line between agitation and terrorism. Even if Kanu’s rhetoric were provocative or separatist, the law distinguishes agitation, even extreme agitation, from terrorism, a specific class of violent crime requiring proof of acts intended to cause fear, death, or serious harm. The judgment does not maintain this distinction. Instead, it treats separatism as inherently terroristic, an approach no criminal court should adopt without incontrovertible evidence. -DA"

17/11/2025

ACCESS BANK PLC vs. OKPU(2020)LCN/14392(CA)

ISSUE: JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT-Whether loan facility is within the slim perimeter of simple contract which the Federal High Court is not endowed with the jurisdiction to try matters germinating from it(Issue is mine)

PRINCIPLE:
"The facts of this matter cannot be classified in the ranks of opacity. The facts are simple and straightforward. They are not convoluted and there is no contest on the facts. The disceptation borders on interpretation to be placed on the relationship between the parties and how two settled principles of law would apply to the said relationship. On the one hand, it is now settled law that by virtue of the proviso to Section 251 (1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended), the lower Court, the Federal High Court, and the State High Courts have concurrent jurisdictions in respect of banker/customer relationships involving transactions between an individual customer and his bank: NDIC vs. OKEM ENTERPRISES LTD. (supra). The said Section 251 (1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended) provides:
“251 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters-
(d) connected with or pertaining to banking, banks, other financial institutions, including any action between one bank and another, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bills of exchange, letters of credit, promissory notes and other fiscal measures:
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank;”
It seems to me that what the above provision seeks to achieve by the proviso thereof is to allow State High Courts share the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the Federal High Court in banking matters, but only as it relates to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank. So with respect to such disputes arising from transactions between the individual customer and the bank, both the Federal High Court and the State High Court would have jurisdiction. See UBA PLC vs. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD. (2006) LPELR (3404) 1 at 77-80 and FMBN vs. NDIC (1999) 2 NWLR (PT. 591) 333. In this regard therefore, the only controversy is whether the dispute between the parties is one between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions which fall within a banker/customer relationship. It seems that I have stated the dispute too widely. It is a lot narrower. It is not confuted that the Respondent is a customer of the Appellant, just as it is not confuted that the Appellant is a banker. The very narrow area of disagreement is whether the transaction between the parties as individual customer and bank is one which falls within the purview of a banker/customer relationship. The Appellant asserts that it is not while the Respondent asserts that it is. We will find out in a trice who is right and who is wrong since the parties cannot both be right in their disparate and geometrically parallel contentions.
The other settled principle of law jostling for attention in the submissions of learned counsel is the trite law that in disputes arising from simple contracts, the Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction since disputes arising from simple contracts cannot be pitch forked into any item in the enumerated jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended). See ONUORAH vs. KRPC (2005) LPELR (2707) 1 at 11; SOCIO-POLITICAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT vs. MINISTRY OF FCT (2018) LPELR (45708) 1 at 55; ROE vs. UNN (2018) LPELR (43855) 1 at 9-19; ADELEKAN vs. ECU-LINE NV (supra) and DEC OIL & GAS LTD. vs. SHELL NIGERIA GAS LTD. (2019) LPELR (49347) 1 at 10-14. The Appellant’s assertion is that the relationship between the parties was not a banker/customer relationship but one based on a simple contract. Not unexpectedly, the Respondent contends the contrary. So, there you have the very narrow dispute in this matter. Was the transaction a simple contract, or was it a transaction arising from the banker/customer relationship between the parties?
It is rudimentary law that the jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the plaintiff’s claim as endorsed in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim: TUKUR vs. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517; OHMB vs. GARBA (2002) 14 NWLR (PT. 788) 538 at 563; IZENKWE vs. NNADOZIE (1953) 14 WACA 361 at 363; ONUORAH vs. KRPC (supra) at 10 and 16 and WESTERN STEEL WORKS LTD. vs. IRON & STEEL WORKERS UNION (supra). It is effulgent from the Statement of Claim that the facts which spawned the dispute between the parties is the term loan facility granted to the Respondent by the Appellant, and the Appellant’s insistence that the Respondent was still indebted to it on the facility. (See paragraphs 4-33 of the Statement of Claim on pages 5-12 of the Records). It is predicated on this state of affairs that the Respondent commenced the action at the lower Court, claiming the reliefs which I have already set out in this judgment.
The Appellant has zeroed in on the relief claimed in paragraph 34 (l) of the Statement of Claim wherein the Respondent claimed damages for breach of contract to anchor its contention that the Respondent’s action was based on a simple contract. The Respondent has submitted that the said relief (l) is an ancillary relief and that not only is it severable from the other reliefs, but that being an ancillary relief, a Court with jurisdiction to entertain the principal reliefs can also entertain the ancillary relief. The Appellant supplied the authority for this principle of law in its Reply Brief. It is the case of KAKIH vs. PDP (supra) at 41 and TUKUR vs. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (supra). So, without necessarily deciding that lower Court has no jurisdiction; if relief (l) is an ancillary relief then the lower Court would still have jurisdiction to entertain the same, provided that it has jurisdiction in respect of the principal reliefs. For ease of reference, I will reproduce relief (l) once again. It reads:
“l. An order compelling the Defendant to pay general damages of N1,000,000,000.00 (One Billion Naira) to the Plaintiff for flagrant breach of the contract of loan between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.”
(See page 14 of the Records)
I will next set out, for ease of reference again, reliefs (e) and (f). They read:
“e. A declaration that the Defendant’s restructure of term loan offer letter dated 19 January, 2009 is null, void and unenforceable against the Plaintiff and ought to be set aside in the circumstances of this suit.
f. A declaration that the Plaintiff does not owe the Defendant the sum of N1,259,796,249.40 or any other sum of money arising from the aforesaid term loan facility which the Defendant purported to have assigned to the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria as stated in the Defendant’s notice of assignment of debt dated 9th February, 2011 and addressed to the Plaintiff.”
(See page 13 of the Records)
Apposing reliefs (e) and (f) alongside relief (l), it is translucent that the said relief (l) is like a leech and its success depends on a declaration being made in terms of reliefs (e) and (f). It is therefore an ancillary relief which the lower Court will have jurisdiction to entertain if it has jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and the reliefs claimed. But does the lower Court have the requisite jurisdiction which it decided that it had? This will next captivate our attention.
It is limpid from the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim that pervading the relationship between the parties on which the Respondent founded his action is the term loan facility granted to him and the contention that by the sale of his various units of shares by the Appellant, the term loan facility had been amortized such that he was no longer indebted to the Appellant. The Respondent averred as follows in paragraphs 12-15 of the Statement of Claim:
“12. The Plaintiff avers that Plaintiff’s Intercontinental Bank shares which the Defendant had valued as worth N856,841,007.44 in the offer letter of 19th January, 2009 as well as the divided warrants and bonuses generated in favour of the Plaintiff from the pledged shares sufficed to repay the outstanding balance on the term loan which the Defendant alleged to be N875,759,598.84 as (sic) the date of the restructure offer letter.
13. In light of the above, the Plaintiff believed that the Defendant had sold the pledged shares and cashed the Plaintiff’s divided warrants and bonuses and had applied the total proceeds realized from the sale of all the pledged security to liquidate the alleged outstanding balance of N875,759,598.84. And in that belief, the Plaintiff moved on with his life treating that chapter of his life as closed.
14. Therefore, it was a very rude shock for the Plaintiff when, several years after he believed he had fully settled all his financial obligations to the Defendant on account of the said term loan, straight out of the blues, the Plaintiff received a notice of assignment dated 9th February, 2011 from Intercontinental Bank Plc (as the Defendant was then known). In the notice, the Defendant purported that the term loan facility granted to the Plaintiff had an outstanding balance of N1,259,796,249.20 and that by virtue of a Loan Purchase Agreement dated 31st December, 2010 between the Defendant and the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (‘AMCON’), the Defendant had assigned the said balance/debt to AMCON.
15. As a result of the purported assignment of the alleged but non-existent debt of N1,259,796,249.20 to AMCON by the Defendant, AMCON wrote demand notices dated 28th February 2012, 6th March 2012, 14th March 2012 and 27th March requesting the Plaintiff to settle the aforesaid alleged debt that the Defendant purportedly assigned to AMCON.”
(See pages 6-7 of the Records)
Now, the pith of the contest remains whether the term loan facility which the Appellant granted to the Respondent, its customer, is based on banking business arising from a banker/customer relationship, or if as submitted by the Appellant, it is a simple contract outside the banker/customer relationship. For clarity, I will reproduce verbatim ac literatim, the Appellant’s submission in paragraph 3.2.5 of the Appellant’s Brief and paragraphs 3.1.3 and 3.1.7 of the Appellant’s Reply Brief. This is what the Appellant submitted:
“3.2.5. A consideration of the authorities cited above discloses that a Banker-Customer relationship is said to exist when an individual or an entity (including a bank) opens an account with a bank and the bank provides services which essentially includes but are not limited to collection of cheques and bills, payment of third party cheques and bills, purchase of property or stock and shares, effecting of insurance cover etc. Instructively, even where the services that qualify as that of a banker and its customer are listed, issue of a loan advancement or transaction is not contemplated as stated in the authority above and therefore is not judicially recognized as services to be render (sic) in a Banker-Customer Relationship.”
“3.1.3 We also rely on the contents on paragraphs 3.2.4 -3.2.6 of our ABOA and the dictum of the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal in FCMB v. CP-Tech Construction Company (2015) LPELR-25006 (CA) pages 84-86, paragraphs G-C, which requires no repeating here at, and deem it fit to boldly state that the fact that a person enters into a loan transaction with a bank doesn’t make such a person a customer of the bank. It is important to state that the RBOA has failed to show any dicta of the Court which captures Loan Transactions as part of Banker-Customer relationship.”
“3.1.7. From the above, it is clear that a banker-customer relationship does not have anything to do with granting of loans and credit but is limited to storage of money via bank accounts and other relative transactions. Therefore, the Federal High Court cannot and does not have the inherent jurisdiction to determine the Suit at the lower as that would be contrary to the intentions of the lawmakers who deemed it fit to vest the State High Court with exclusive jurisdiction on disputes relating to simple contracts.”
With respect to the above reproduced paragraph 3.1.3 of the Appellant’s Reply Brief wherein the Appellant stated, inter alia, “… the fact that a person enters into a loan transaction with a bank doesn’t make such a person a customer of the bank”; I would ask the converse question. Would the fact that a customer of a bank entered into a loan transaction with the bank make the customer to cease being a customer, such that the loan transaction will not be part of the existing banker/customer relationship between them? This is the purport of the Appellant’s contention.
I have ruminated and mulled over the Appellant’s contention, but I am not enthused by the same as it cannot represent the correct legal position. First and foremost, it is abecedarian that the relationship of a bank customer and a banker is contractual: UBN PLC vs. CHIMAEZE (2014) LPELR (22699) 1 at 42 and UBN PLC vs. AJABULE (2011) LPELR (8239) 1 at 39. What is the nature and scope of this contractual relationship? Is the nature and scope of the contractual relationship such that accommodates the facts of this matter within a banker/customer relationship? In BANK OF THE NORTH LTD. vs. YAU (2001) LPELR (746) 1 at 45-46, Ayoola, JSC, provided the answer in the following words:
“In the course of carrying on business of banking, a bank enters into several contractual relationships and performs various roles. It is important in an action between bank and customer to be clear which of the several contractual relationships forms or form the basis of the action. In this case, it is pertinent to note only four of these possible relationships, namely:
(i) the relationship of creditor and debtor that arises in regard to the customer’s funds in the hands of the bank;
(ii) the relationship of creditor and debtor that arises when the bank loans money to the customer or allows him to overdraw on his account;
(iii) the relationship that arises from the role of the bank as a collecting bank of cheques drawn on other banks or branches of the same bank by a third person, and
(iv) the possible role of the bank as a holder for value of a negotiable instrument.”
(Emphasis supplied)
See also ECOBANK vs. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LTD. (2018) LPELR (45125) 1 at 28-31.
The above dictum settles the disceptation in this matter. It equally supplies the dictum which the Appellant pines and craves for, the Appellant having contended in the pericope from Paragraph 3.1.3 of the Appellant’s Reply Brief that: “It is important to state that the RBOA has failed to show any dicta of the Court which captures Loan Transactions as part of Banker-Customer relationship.” The dictum has come from the apex Court and based on the doctrine of stare decisis all other Courts must kowtow: NIGERIA-ARAB BANK LTD. vs. BARRI ENGINEERING (NIG.) LTD. (1995) LPELR (2007) 1 at 47-48; OYEWUNMI vs. OGUNESAN (1990) LPELR (2880) 1 at 61 and PDP vs. ORANEZI (2017) LPELR (4347) 1 at 9-10. The uncontroverted and unchallenged cause of action in this matter is the term loan facility granted to the Respondent by the Appellant. It is one of the several contractual relationships which a bank enters into in the course of carrying on the business of banking; “the relationship of a creditor and debtor that arises when the bank loans money to the customer.” The Appellant as banker gave a term loan to the Respondent as its customer. The Respondent contending that it is no longer indebted to the Appellant on the term loan sued claiming sundry reliefs. This is undoubtedly a clear case of a transactional dispute arising from a banker customer relationship vide BANK OF THE NORTH LTD vs. YAU (supra); ECOBANK vs. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LTD. (supra) and STANDARD TRUST BANK LTD. vs. INTERDRILL LTD. (2006) LPELR (9848) 1 at 28. It is, most respectfully, ludicrous, preposterous and specious for the Appellant to contend that the loan facility it granted its customer in the course of carrying on banking business is a simple contract which does not arise from a banker/customer relationship. That cannot be the law and I vehemently refuse to learn such disingenuous legal sophistry!
The relationship between the parties from the averments in the Statement Claim is a banker customer relationship. There is nothing in the Statement of Claim to show a matter relating to a simple contract. The lower Court consequently had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the action: NDIC vs. OKEM ENTERPRISES LTD. (supra); MERILL GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOANS LTD. vs. WORLDGATE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD. (2013) 1 NWLR (PT. 1336) 581 and ECOBANK vs. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LTD. (supra) at 21-23 and 36-38. Inexorably the issue for determination must be resolved against the Appellant. From the facts in the Statement of Claim, the lower Court was right when it held that the subject matter of the suit did not border on a simple contract and that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
The conflating of the foregoing is that this appeal is devoid of merit. It fails and it is hereby dismissed. The decision of the lower Court delivered on 14th December 2018 is hereby affirmed. The Respondent is entitled to the costs of this appeal which I assess and fix at N250, 000.00. The proceedings in the substantive matter is to continue at the lower Court." Per OGAKWU, JCA.

From Lawrence Udo Edet's Timeline

25/10/2025

UBA STOCKBROKERS LTD. & ANOR. vs. UGWU(2021)LCN/15714(CA)

ISSUE: JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT-Whether the jurisdictional gamut of the Federal High Court includes an action founded on tort of detinue between a customer of a Bank and the Bank's stockbroker arm(Issue is mine)

PRINCIPLE:
"In the deliberating on the issue of its jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Respondent, the lower Court stated in the judgment thus:
“It is not in doubt that the relationship of the party (sic) arose from the fact that the Plaintiff is a customer of the Defendant which entitled him to the facilities granted him upon which MOU were drawn by the parties. The issue now is where the Plaintiff has been unable to pay back the facilities granted him, would the Defendants have resulted to the tort of detinue to recover the facilities and apply the facts of this case to that of a simple contract. The facilities granted the Plaintiff were secured by the share certificate withheld by the Defendants as security for the loan facilities granted the Plaintiff. The issue of jurisdiction of this Court has been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of NDIC Vs. Okem Ent. Ltd … and to argue at this point that this Court has no jurisdiction on customer/banker relationship is a distraction. I hold that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case.”
Now, jurisdiction is the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. It is the power of the Court to decide a matter in controversy and presupposes the existence of a duly constituted Court with control over the subject matter and the parties. Jurisdiction defines the power of Courts to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions and declare judgment. It is the legal right by which Judges exercise their authority. It is trite that jurisdiction is a hard matter of law that can only be determined in the light of the enabling statute. A Court of law cannot add to or subtract from the provisions of a statute. As a matter of law, a Court must blindly follow and apply the jurisdictional limits and limitations as contained or provided in a statute. In this and other situations, the statute is the master and all that a Court of law can do is to interpret the provisions of a statute to obtain or achieve the clear intentions of the lawmaker. A Court cannot do more than this - Anibi Vs. Shotimehin (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 282) 461; Elelu-Habeeb Vs. Attorney General, Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423; Madumere Vs. Okwara (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 303; Opara Vs. Amadi (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1369) 512.
The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is donated by the Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The opening part of the section reads:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters”
The provision then proceeded to list eighteen specific areas in paragraphs (a) to (r) where exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal High Court and, it concluded in paragraph (s), and “such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly”. What this provision does is that it made the Federal High Court a Court of enumerated jurisdiction, and not one of general jurisdiction, and as such for the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction over a matter, the subject matter of action must fit into one of the enumerated areas of its jurisdiction - Anao Vs. Sun Publishing Ltd. (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1341) 399; Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd. Vs. WorldGate Building Society Ltd. (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1336) 581; Ahmed Vs. Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274. This point was succinctly made by Nweze, JCA, (as he then was) in Oladipo Vs. Nigerian Customs Service Board (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1156) 563 at page 585 thus: “… Before we return to this question, we must first return to the implication of the drafting technique in Section 251 (supra). The point must be noted that the draftsman of that section painstakingly itemized the subject matters that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In all, that section vested exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in eighteen major items…. The implication of this technique is that the said Court (Federal High Court) is actually a Court of enumerated jurisdiction, that is, a Court whose jurisdiction is not only delimited by statute but whose jurisdiction is delineated in relation only to the subject matter enumerated therein.
It would, therefore, amount to wrecking havoc on the express letters and intendment of the said Section 251 to construe it as granting the said Court a carte blanche to deal with every conceivable matter (that is, beyond those expressly enumerated …
The effect of the circumscription of the jurisdiction of the Court to those eighteen major items is that whenever the question of jurisdiction of the Court is canvassed, attention ought to be focused on the subject matter of the suit. If the subject matter of the suit cannot be pitch forked into any of those eighteen major items, then that Court is not the proper forum for the ventilation of the action …”
The Courts have held that it is the case of the plaintiff as endorsed on the writ of summons and elaborated in the statement of claim or any other originating process that determines the jurisdiction of the Court - Elelu-Habeeb Vs. Attorney General, Federation (supra); Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd. Vs. WorldGate Building Society Ltd. (supra); Uwazurike Vs. Nwachukwu (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1342) 503; Ahmed Vs. Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274. And that the Court does not look at the faces, designations or duties of the parties in a suit to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction - Dagazau Vs. Bokir International Company Ltd. (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1267) 261. Thus, where the cause of action of a plaintiff does not fit into one of the enumerated areas of jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as stated in Section 251 (1) of the Constitution, the fact that one of the parties to the action is the Federal Government or an agency of the Federal Government is irrelevant and it cannot give the Federal High Court jurisdiction over the subject matter - Onuorah Vs. Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393; Adeogun Vs. Fashogbon (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1115) 149; Adetayo Vs. Ademola (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1215) 169; Dingyadi Vs. Independent National Electoral Commission (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347; Salim Vs. Congress for Progressive Change (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 501; Ahmed Vs. Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274.
It has been settled beyond per adventure by the Supreme Court that a dispute between an individual customer and his bank is one of the items over which the Federal High Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 251(1) (d) of the Constitution and that, by reason of the proviso to that provision, the jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is shared with the State High Court. In other words, the Federal High Court and the State High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters arising from disputes between individual customers and their banks - Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Vs. Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (1999) 2 SCNJ 57; Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Vs. Okem Enterprises Ltd. (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 880) 107; Integrated Timber & Plywood Producers Ltd. Vs. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 483; United Bank for Africa Plc Vs. BTL Industries Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 61; Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd. Vs. WorldGate Building Society Ltd. (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1336) 581; EcoBank Nigeria Ltd. Vs. Anchorage Leisures Ltd. (2018) LPELR-45125 (SC).
The question that arises is - what was the nature of the dispute submitted by the Respondent for adjudication before the lower Court? The case of the Respondent has been summarized in the earlier part of this judgment. The highlights of his case were that (i) the Respondent borrowed money from the second Appellant for the purpose of purchasing bank shares and it was agreed that the first Appellant would purchase the bank shares on behalf of the Respondent and would hold unto the shares as collateral for the loan until the Respondent repay the loan to the second Appellant; (ii) the second Appellant disbursed the loan and the first Appellant used the money to purchase the bank shares, including the shares of First Bank of Nigeria Plc, and the first Appellant held unto the First Bank of Nigeria Plc shares pending the liquidation of the loan; (iii) the Respondent repaid the entire loan plus interest to the second Appellant and it notified the first Appellant accordingly and requested for the release and return of the First Bank of Nigeria Plc shares to him; (iv) the second Appellant also addressed a letter to the first Appellant notifying it and confirming the fact that the Respondent has repaid the loan and directing that the First Bank of Nigeria Plc shares be released to the Respondent; and (v) the first Appellant failed, refused and/or neglected to release the First Bank of Nigeria shares to the Respondent despite repeated demands thereafter and after the Respondent filled all necessary forms and supplied all requested documents.
These are the facts upon which the Respondent predicated his claims before the lower Court. It is trite law that in determining the case made by a party, a Court must read all the paragraphs of the pleadings of the party together to get a flowing story of the party and not a few paragraphs in isolation and it is the totality of the pleadings that states the case of the party - Okochi Vs. Animkwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1; Mobil Oil Plc Vs. Drexel Energy and Natural Resources Ltd. (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt. 853) 142; Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation Vs. Zaria (2014) LPELR-22362 (CA). Reading the facts as a whole, it is obvious that there was no dispute between the Respondent and his bank, the second Appellant, in respect of the loan transaction; both of them were ad idem that the loan had been repaid and was a closed matter. The dispute submitted to the lower Court for adjudication centered on the refusal of the first Appellant to release to the Respondent the First Bank of Nigeria Plc shares purchased for and belonging to the Respondent, upon the liquidation of the loan, despite repeated demands. The claims of the Respondent were for the release of the First Bank of Nigeria Plc shares and damages for the detention of the shares.
Looking at the facts presented by the Respondent, it is without doubt that the cause of action exhibited on the pleadings of the Respondent before the lower Court was in detinue; tort of detinue. Detinue is a common-law action to recover personal property wrongfully taken or withheld by another. The essence of detinue is that the defendant holds on to property belonging to the plaintiff and fails to deliver the property to the plaintiff when a demand is made. The cause of action in detinue is the refusal of the defendant to return the goods to the plaintiff after the plaintiff must have made a demand for them - Kosile Vs. Folarin (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 1; Labode Vs. Otubu (2001) LPELR-1731 (SC); Enterprise Bank Ltd. Vs. Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1394) 256 at 298.
The reliefs available to a claimant in a claim in detinue are (i) the value of the chattel as assessed and also damages for its detention, or (ii) the return of the chattel or recovery of its value as assessed and also damages for its retention, or (iii) the return of the chattel and damages for its detention - J. E. Oshivire Ltd. Vs. Tripoli Motors (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 1; Julius Berger Ltd. Vs. Omogui (2001) 6 SCNJ, 214; Neka B.B.B. Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Africa Continental Bank Ltd. (2004) LPELR-1982 (SC); Nacenn Nigeria Ltd. Vs. Bewac Automotive Producers Ltd. (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1257) 193. The reliefs sought by the Respondent are also those suited for a case in detinue.
The facts presented by the Respondent on the pleadings and the reliefs sought made it clear that the second Appellant was not a needed or necessary party to the case presented for adjudication before the lower Court. Counsel to the Respondent only added the second Appellant as a party to disguise the essence of the case of the Respondent as a dispute between a customer and his bank so as to bring it within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. While this disguise appeared to have totally befuddled and confused the lower Court, as shown in its deliberations on the point as reproduced above, it does not have any effect on this Court. Counsel to the Respondent underestimated the sharp sense of perception and wisdom of this Court to sift the wheat from the chaff.
It is settled law that a claim in the tort of detinue, which is specie of trespass to goods, does not come within the items listed in Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution and over which the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction. It is a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State High Court - 7Up Bottling Co. Ltd. Vs. Abiola & Sons Ltd. (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 469; Trade Bank Plc Vs. Benilux (Nig) Ltd. (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 825) 416; Five Star Industry Ltd. Vs. Bank of Industry Ltd. (2017) LPELR-44029 (CA); Rahman Brothers Ltd. Vs. Nigeria Ports Authority (2017) LPELR-46415(SC); Ikpekpe Vs. Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Company Ltd. (2018) LPELR-44471 (SC); Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Vs. Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. (2019) LPELR-47324 (CA). The lower Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Respondent." Per ABIRU, JCA.

From Lawrence Udo Edet's Timeline

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