IYEDE, IYEDE & CO

16/09/2023

19/11/2022

In CHIDOKA V FIRST FINANCIAL CITY FINANCE COY. LTD (2013) 5 NWLR (PT 1346) PP 162 – 163, the Supreme Court per M. S. Muntaka – Coommassie JSC stated: “I am not always comfortable with the practice where a party after seeking and obtaining money from a friend for the resuscitation of his ailing or dwindling business will turn around to rely on technicalities or loopholes in the law as a cover to absolve himself from contractual obligations by putting up a defence under the Money Lenders Law as done by the appellants in this case. This is pes-simi exempli of business relations and this Court will not lend support for such a party to bite the finger that fed him and deprive him of his hard earned money. A man who, with his eyes open and without the other party committing any fraud against him, enters into an agreement with another should be prepared to abide by the terms of the agreement, illegal or otherwise un – enforceable at law. I cannot allow the appellants, after collecting money from the respondent to do business to now turn around to plead the Money Lenders Law in order to escape the refund of the said money.” See also MAX BLOSSOM LTD V VICTOR & ORS (2019) LPELR – 47090 (CA) and LUBCON LTD V CLASSMATE TECHNOLOGIES (2019) LPELR – 47414 (CA).

25/11/2021

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14/05/2021

In *Umeadi vs.Chibunze (2020)10NWLR(PT.1733)405@' 412,ratio 7*,the Supreme Court held, *Where parties who believe in the efficacy of a juju resort to Oath- taking to settle a dispute,they are bound by the result and so the common law principles in respect of proof of title to land no longer applies since the proof of ownership of title to land will be based on the rules set out by the traditional arbitration resulting to Oath- taking*.
The Court went further to conclude @ p.413,ratio 9 thus, *Where customary arbitration is pleaded and proved,it is binding on the parties and capable of constituting estoppels*
The message therefore is that the five ways of proving title to land in Nigeria as established by the Supreme Court in *idundun vs.Okumagba* and a battalion of subsequent decisions, shall not apply where it is established to the satisfaction of the court that title has been proved by the rules of traditional arbitration with the consent of the parties.This recent position is a Lee way for traditionalists who believe more in their native gods than in the courts to settle their land matters according to their belief patterns. Further, it is a tacit recognition and an implied elevation of our customary law in the face of the domination of common law principles.
The advantage I can see is that it will help in decongesting our courts of land matters,especially lands in rural communities. We shall agree that land matters drag on in court for so many years and often times the parties die and substitutions are made.
The calamity of the matter is that as long as there is a pending appeal,the party in whose favour judgement went remains caught by the doctrine of *Lis pendens* and is therefore estopped from full,unhindered enjoyment of his victory.That is the latest position of the law per Supreme Court decision in *Tina George Ind.ltd vs.Adeniyi* it is a 2019 decision.

03/08/2020

The law is trite that where a landlord issues a tenant with a notice to quit and thereafter accepts rent from such a tenant, such acceptance of rent has no effect on the notice to quit. It may, at best, be evidence of Intention by the parties to create a new tenancy.

See UDIH v. IZEDONMWEN (1990) 2NWLR (PT.123) @ 360

28/07/2020

DOCTORS YOU CAN TAKE STEPS TO TRANSFUSE BLOOD TO A CHILD OR ADMINISTER ANY MEDICATION TO SAVE THE CHILD'S LIFE DESPITE THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF THE PARENTS, WHO MAY OPPOSE SAME.

The Supreme Court in TEGA ESABUNOR & ANOR. VS. DR. TUNDE FAWEYA & 4 ORS (2019) 7 N. W. L. R, PART. 1671, P. 316 @ PP. 340, PARAS. C-G, 344, PARA. C, 347, PARAS. D-E laid this quagmire to rest.

In the aforementioned case, the 2nd Appellant who is a member of JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES CHRISTIAN sect gave birth to little Tega on the 19th April, 1997, at the Chevron Clinic, Lekki Peninsula, Lagos State.

On 11th May, 1997, within a month of his birth, her son fell gravely ill and was taken back to Chevron Clinic. Dr. Tunde Faweya immediately commenced treatment and after administering several medications, the child had poor colour, was convulsing and having difficulty in breathing. Upon proper diagnosis, it was discovered that the child urgently needed BLOOD TRANSFUSION to stay alive.

Surprisingly, the mother and father of the dying child objected to the blood transfusion because their religious belief required them to abstain from blood transfusion.

The Doctor however, did not agree with the parents. He promptly incidented the matter to the Nigeria Police Force on the strength of which the Police filed a Motion ex-parte before the Magistrate Court pursuant to sections 27(1) and 30 of the Children and Young Persons Law, Cap. 25, Laws of Lagos State, 1994, for an order that the Hospital be allowed to do all and anything necessary for the protection of the life and health of the Child and same was granted.

Armed with the Order, the Child was taken away from the parents and the blood transfusion was carried out. After he became well, he was handed over to the parents.

Being irked by the decision of the doctor to carryout the blood transfusion against their wish, the mother filed an action in Court against the doctor, hospital, Commissioner of Police and even the Magistrate that granted the order was made a party. The matter was dismissed both at the High Court and Court of Appeal.

In further dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held thus :

"All adult persons have the inalienable right to make any choice they may decide to make and assume the consequences. Accordingly, an adult person who is conscious and in full control of his mental capacity, and is of sound mind has the right to either accept or refuse medical treatment, including blood transfusion. In such case, the hospital has no choice but to respect the person's wishes. However, different considerations apply to a child because a child is incapable of making decisions for himself and the law is duty bound to protect such a child from abuse of his rights even by the child's parents. So, when a competent parent or person in loco parentis refuses medical treatment or blood transfusion for a child on religious grounds, the Court should step in.... These considerations outweigh whatever religious belief the parent of the child may have about any form of medical treatment because the child may grow up to reject his parent's religious beliefs............. "

So many innocent children have lost their lives because of the decisions of their parents hinged on religious beliefs.

Please save the lives of millions of children who are being deprived of medical treatment by their parents on the basis of their religious beliefs, by sharing this post to help enlighten our Doctors and Police.

10/06/2020

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Daily Law Tips With Onyekachi Umah, Esq
Can A Landlord Increase Rent Without Consent Of His Tenant?
By Unini Chioma -June 9, 2020
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Daily Law Tips (Tip 585) by Onyekachi Umah, Esq., LLM. ACIArb(UK)

CAN A LANDLORD INCREASE RENT WITHOUT CONSENT OF HIS TENANT?

Often, Landlords unilaterally (without consulting tenants) increase rent and thereafter send “Notice of Rent Increment” to tenants. Such landlords consider tenants as mere inferior parties and as such, they (the landlords) do not need consent of tenants to increase rent. Tenants are dismissed by landlords with comments like; “… if he cannot pay, let him pack out….” or “… it is my house and I decide how much to charge as rent.”


Well, below are the words of the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal on this issue;

“The issue of rent between the landlord and tenant is a matter of agreement. The Agreement may be express or implied. The relationship between them too is a contractual one. And being a matter of contract its term cannot be altered by either party without the agreement of the other. See Udih v. Izedonmwem (supra). Unless the landlord and the tenant are ad idem a landlord’s unilateral decision to increase the amount of rent payable will be ineffective. A unilateral increase of rent is an offer or a proposal made by the landlord. Where as in this case the tenant refuses to pay the landlord the proposed rent, it is left for the landlord who stands to gain where the new rent is accepted by the tenant, to promptly take necessary steps as required by law to terminate the tenancy. Appellant’s (Tenant’s) refusal to pay increased rent is not in anyway tantamount to an obligation to pay the increased rent. Consequently where there is no agreement on an increase in rent the status quo ought to be maintained and this means that the agreed rent should therefore subsist. See Are v. Ipaye (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 132) P.298 at 313 G-H; Mba- Ezev-Okufo (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.135) P.787 at 795 F-G.”Per GALADIMA ,J.S.C ( Pp. 18-20, para. B). Quotation is from the case of COBRA LTD & ORS v. OMOLE ESTATES & INVESTMENT LTD (2000) LPELR-6809(CA)

“… I am of the humble view that the matter of rent increment must be supported by an agreement to that effect. The landlord-tenant relationship and issue of rent payable by a tenant to a landlord being one of a contract, the landlord cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the agreement, to increase the rent. In Cobra Ltd vs. Omole Estate and Investment Ltd (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 655) 1, this Court per Galadima JCA (as he then was) following the decision in Udih vs. Izedonmwen (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 132) 357 at 366 has held that unless the landlord and the tenant are ad idem a landlord’s unilateral decision to increase the amount of rent payable is ineffective.” Per, AMINA AUDI WAMBAI ,J.C.A ( Pp. 35-36, paras. E-A ) Quotation is from the case of JOVINCO NIGERIA LTD & ANOR v. IBEOZIMAKO (2014) LPELR-23599(CA)

In summary, a landlord must consult with his tenant in seeking to increase rent unless there is an earlier agreement between both, authorizing the landlord to increase rent without the input/consent of his tenant. Where a tenant does not vacate a property after a unilateral increase of rent by landlord, a continued stay on property by tenant is not an acceptance of the unilaterally increased rent. A landlord should seek consent of tenant before increasing in rent and where such is denied, landlord can continue with the normal agreed rent or seek to legally evict the tenant in order to engage new and willing tenants. Simply, rent is part of tenancy agreement, cannot be forced on a tenant but must be agreed on by both landlord and tenant at all times.

My authorities are:

1. The Court of Appeal’s judgement in the case of JOVINCO NIGERIA LTD & ANOR v. IBEOZIMAKO (2014) LPELR-23599(CA)
2. The Court of Appeal’s judgement in the case of COBRA LTD & ORS v. OMOLE ESTATES & INVESTMENT LTD (2000) LPELR-6809(CA) or Cobra Ltd vs. Omole Estate and Investment Ltd (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 655) 1.
3. Udih v. Izedonmwen (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 132) 357 at

“,”nextArrow”:”“,”autoplay”:true,”autoplaySpeed”:5000}’ dir=”ltr” data-typing=”1″> December 17, 2019 14 FACTS ABOUT COMPENSATION AND VICTIMOLOGY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA. * Daily Law Tips (Tip 480) by Onyekachi Umah, Esq., LLM. ACIArb(UK) December 16, 2019 HIGHEST P...

06/06/2020

ONI v. FAYEMI & ORS
(2019) LPELR-46622(CA)
Read Full Judgment
ISSUE
QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION : Whether a Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an employee in the Public Service who must resign before contesting an election
PRINCIPLE
"It is noteworthy to restate that the post of Minister is a political office, whose appointment is at the pleasure of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, hence not a person in the Public Service of the Federation. The cumulative interpretation of Section 182(1)(g) and Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as altered), is to the effect that the term public officer should only relate to the holder of offices/reflected in Section 318 being employees whose appointments enjoy statutory flavour because it is only them that have conditions of service and or letters of appointment stipulating how many years they are to spend in service, at what age they should retire, number of months to be given as notice etc. Hence even though a Civil Servant is a Public Servant, it is not every public servant that is a civil servant. A Minister is therefore not a public officer who should resign his position before contesting in an election within the contemplation of the aforementioned section of the Constitution. See Orji Vs Ugochukwu (2009) 14 NWLR (part 1161) 207 at 293, Dada vs Adeyeye (2005 6 NWLR (part 920) 1 at 19-20, Asogwa Vs Chukwu (2003) 4 NWLR (part 811) 540 at 546, Gov. Ebonyi State vs Isuama (2004) 6 NWLR (part 870) 511 at 528, Ojukwu v Yar'adua (2008) 4 NWLR (part 1078) 435." Per JAURO, J.C.A. (Pp. 39-40, Paras. A-A)