Studio Legale Pezzuti

Studio Legale Pezzuti 52 anni, avvocato del Foro di Napoli, cassazionista. Diritto penale Minorile Immigrazione 47 anni, è nato e vive a Napoli.

Abilitato al patrocinio innanzi alle Giurisdizioni Superiori dal 2013
Ha perfezionato i suoi studi in ambito penalistico e criminologico, si occupa di tutela dei diritti civili e reati connessi alla emarginazione sociale. Dal 2001 è Vice Procuratore Onorario, occupandosi di reati edilizi e ambientali in Ischia e Capri e, dal 2014, svolge le medesime funzioni presso il Tribunale di Napoli Nord in

Aversa. Ha coadiuvato realtà associative per il supporto dei minori a rischio devianza e per il contrasto alla violenza endofamiliare. Ha svolto esperienze di volontariato e di cooperazione umanitaria in Italia e all’estero, in particolare in Guatemala, Cuba, Slovenia, Serbia Nel 2000 ha partecipato al 2° corso Nazionale per "Operatori di emergenza umanitaria" organizzato dall' ASI in collaborazione con A.C.N.U.R. e il Dipartimento della Protezione Civile. E' stato relatore in numerosi incontri sui temi del pacifismo, della legalità, dell'emarginazione sociale, del disagio giovanile, dell'immigrazione e di educazione alla legalità Ha svolto attività didattiche presso centri di formazione e istituti di istruzione superiore. Dal 2011 è membro dell’American Society of Criminology ed è stato ammesso alla National Italian American Bar Association. E' docente presso la Scuola di Formazione Forense FEst. Parla correntemente la lingua inglese e la lingua sp****la. E’ tra i legali fiduciari dei consolati Usa, Uk, South-Korea, Ecuador, Thailand

15/05/2026

CITIZENSHIP: CASSATION COURT vs. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Ruling 13818/26

The Supreme Court stated
"Regarding the legal action to verify the status of an Italian citizen, the 'interest to act' (standing) exists not only in the case of a denial or delay in the recognition of such status, but also in instances where 'impediments, difficulties, or excessive delays' occur that prevent even the submission of the relative application to the designated Administration, as such a situation generates 'uncertainty regarding the status' and the associated rights and prerogatives of the holder."
Key Points of this Ruling:
Access to Courts:
You don't have to wait for a "No" from a consulate to go to court.
The "Queue" Problem:
If the consulate's wait times or technical hurdles (like the difficulty of getting an appointment) make it impossible to even apply you have the legal right to bypass the administration and ask a judge to recognize your citizenship directly.
Legal Certainty:
The court views the inability to apply as a violation of your rights, as it leaves your legal status in a state of limbo.

The Court of Cassation (Italy's highest court of appeal for civil matters) has firmly pushed back against recent restrictive trends, sparking a direct contrast with the Constitutional Court
At the heart of the matter is whether the right to Italian citizenship can fade over time or be severed by historical foreign laws.
An Unexpirable Right:
The Court of Cassation has reaffirmed that 'iure sanguinis' citizenship is a permanent and imprescriptible right.
In short, it does not expire. As long as the lineage is unbroken, the right automatically passes from generation to generation, regardless of how many decades have passed.
The "Grande Naturalizzazione Battle:
A major point of contention involves the late 19th-century Brazilian law, which automatically granted Brazilian citizenship to all foreign residents unless they explicitly opted out.
Voluntary vs. Imposed:
Lower courts and the Constitutional Court have recently leaned toward a restrictive view, suggesting this mass naturalization severed the Italian bloodline. However, the Cassation Court has vigorously protected descendants, ruling that an utomatic, collective, or forced naturalization by a foreign state cannot strip someone of their Italian citizenship. To lose it, the ancestor must have made a conscious, voluntary choice to renounce it.
Why This Matters for Applicants
This clash between Italy’s top judicial bodies creates a paradox
The Legal Divide
While the Cassation Court provides a powerful shield for applicants by defending the absolute permanence of bloodline rights, the Constitutional Court's differing philosophy keeps the door open for legal uncertainty and stricter interpretations by individual judges or consulate officials.

Ultimately, while the Cassation’s stance is a massive victory for descendants (particularly in South America), the ongoing friction between the two courts means the definitive future of *iure sanguinis* laws in Italy is still being written.

15/05/2026

GUIDA IN STATO DI EBBREZZA: AVVISO DI FARSI ASSISTERE NON E' SEMPRE OBBLIGATORIO
La Corte di Cassazione, con la sentenza n. 36048/2022, ha stabilito che l'obbligo di avvisare il conducente della facoltà di farsi assistere da un difensore durante l'alcoltest può ve**re meno se il soggetto non è in grado di comprenderne il significato.
Il caso: Un conducente, condannato per guida in stato di ebbrezza con l'aggravante di aver causato un incidente, lamentava l'inutilizzabilità dell'accertamento alcolemico per mancato avviso ex art. 114 disp. att. c.p.p.
La decisione: La Suprema Corte ha dichiarato inammissibile il ricorso, osservando che:
1. L'avviso mira a garantire il diritto di difesa, presupponendo però la capacità d'intendere del destinatario.
2. L'alcoltest è un atto urgente e indifferibile: attendere che il soggetto torni lucido ne comprometterebbe l'esito.
3. In presenza di una "acclarata assenza di lucidità", l'obbligo di avviso è pretermesso, poiché l'atto perderebbe la sua funzione di garanzia.

12/05/2026

GUIDA IN STATO DI EBBREZZA: REATO ANCHE PER CHI GUIDA MONOPATTINO
La Corte di Cassazione ha stabilito (sentenza n. 37391 del 17 novembre 2025) che le norme del Codice della Strada relative alla guida in stato di ebbrezza (art. 186) si applicano anche ai conducenti di monopattini elettrici.

Il Caso
Un uomo era stato condannato dai giudici di merito per aver guidato un monopattino elettrico sotto l'influenza di alcol, provocando un incidente stradale.
L'imputato ha presentato ricorso in Cassazione sostenendo che:

Il monopattino non dovrebbe essere considerato un "veicolo".

Applicare l'art. 186 ai monopattini costituirebbe un'analogia in malam partem (vietata in diritto penale), poiché il mezzo era destinato a un uso ludico.

Le Motivazioni della Cassazione
La Suprema Corte ha rigettato il ricorso, dichiarandolo infondato sulla base di tre punti chiave:

Equiparazione ai velocipedi: Per legge (art. 1, comma 75-quinquies, l. 160/2019), i monopattini elettrici sono espressamente equiparati ai velocipedi (biciclette).

Nozione di "Veicolo": Secondo l'art. 46 del Codice della Strada, rientrano nella categoria dei veicoli tutte le macchine di qualsiasi specie guidate dall'uomo che circolano sulle strade. Poiché i velocipedi sono veicoli (art. 47), lo sono di conseguenza anche i monopattini.

Sicurezza Stradale: La Corte ha richiamato l'orientamento già consolidato per le biciclette: il reato di guida in stato di ebbrezza sussiste ogni volta che il mezzo utilizzato è concretamente idoneo a interferire con la sicurezza e la regolarità della circolazione stradale.

Conclusione
Chi guida un monopattino elettrico è soggetto alle stesse sanzioni penali previste per gli automobilisti in caso di superamento dei tassi alcolemici consentiti, poiché il mezzo è a tutti gli effetti un veicolo inserito nel traffico cittadino

11/05/2026

OMESSA COMUNICAZIONE DATI CONDUCENTE
In materia di illeciti stradali, la violazione prevista dall’art. 126-bis, secondo comma, c.d.s. – consistente nella mancata comunicazione, nei sessanta giorni dalla data di notifica del verbale di contestazione, dei dati personali e della patente di guida del conducente al momento della commessa violazione presupposta – si configura soltanto quando siano definiti i procedimenti giurisdizionali o amministrativi proposti avverso il verbale relativo alla precedente infrazione di riferimento, non insorgendo prima di allora alcun obbligo nei termini siffatti. Di conseguenza, la Cassazione (ordinanza 32988 2025) ha statuito che si delineano due scenari alternativi: 1. Esito favorevole al ricorrente: Se l'opposizione al verbale presupposto viene accolta e il verbale annullato, viene meno il presupposto stesso della richiesta di comunicazione dei dati e, pertanto, nessuna sanzione per l'omessa comunicazione può essere irrogata. 2. Esito sfavorevole al ricorrente: Se l'opposizione viene rigettata, l'obbligo di comunicazione rivive.
Tuttavia, l'amministrazione non può procedere automaticamente a sanzionare l'omissione. È tenuta, invece, a emettere un nuovo invito all'obbligato, e solo dalla notifica di questo nuovo atto decorrerà un nuovo termine di sessanta giorni per adempiere.

09/05/2026

Maltrattamenti in famiglia e separazione: il vincolo coniugale prevale sullo stalking
La Corte di Cassazione (sentenza n. 7357/2026 del 24 febbraio 2026 )ha chiarito che le condotte vessatorie ai danni del coniuge, nate durante la convivenza e proseguite dopo la separazione (di fatto o legale), configurano esclusivamente il reato di maltrattamenti in famiglia (art. 572 c.p.) e non quello di atti persecutori (stalking, art. 612-bis c.p.).

I Principi di Diritto stabiliti:
Permanenza dello status di "familiare": Il coniuge mantiene la qualifica di "persona della famiglia" fino alla cessazione definitiva degli effetti civili del matrimonio (divorzio). Pertanto, il vincolo di solidarietà e protezione previsto dall'art. 572 c.p. non viene meno con la semplice interruzione della convivenza.

Effetti della separazione: La separazione legale o di fatto sospende gli obblighi di convivenza e fedeltà, ma lascia intatti i doveri di reciproco rispetto, assistenza morale e materiale, e collaborazione (art. 143 c.c.). La violazione sistematica di tali doveri attraverso condotte vessatorie rientra nel perimetro dei maltrattamenti.

Unicità del reato: Se i soprusi iniziano sotto lo stesso tetto e continuano dopo che i coniugi hanno smesso di coabitare, non si configurano due reati separati (concorso tra maltrattamenti e stalking), ma un unico reato di maltrattamenti consumato in un arco temporale più esteso.

Il Caso di specie:
Nel caso analizzato, la Corte d'Appello aveva erroneamente suddiviso le condotte di "Tizio" in due capi d'imputazione distinti: maltrattamenti fino alla fine della convivenza e stalking per il periodo successivo. La Cassazione ha annullato tale decisione, stabilendo che il criterio cronologico della coabitazione non è sufficiente a mutare il titolo del reato.

Conclusione della Corte:
La sentenza è stata annullata con rinvio affinché i giudici di merito valutino l'intera condotta (inclusi gli episodi post-separazione) sotto l'unica fattispecie dei maltrattamenti, apprezzando la gravità complessiva di tutti gli episodi occorsi per una corretta determinazione della pena.

30/04/2026

CIUDADANIA ITALIANA
La **sentencia n.º 63 de 2026** de la Corte Constitucional representa un punto de inflexión fundamental en materia de ciudadanía *iure sanguinis*, al confirmar la legitimidad constitucional de las restricciones introducidas en 2025.

A continuación, se presenta una síntesis de los puntos principales de la decisión:

# # # 1. Objeto del juicio
La Corte fue llamada a pronunciarse sobre la legitimidad del **artículo 3-bis de la Ley n.º 91 de 1992** (introducido por el decreto-ley n.º 36/2025). Esta norma establece que quienes hayan nacido en el extranjero y posean otra ciudadanía se consideran como **si nunca hubieran adquirido la ciudadanía italiana**, a menos que se cumplan condiciones específicas de vinculación con Italia.

# # # 2. El contenido de la norma
La ley opera con una **retroactividad propia**, aplicándose también a quienes nacieron antes de su entrada en vigor. Las excepciones que permiten mantener la ciudadanía incluyen:
* Haber presentado una solicitud de reconocimiento (administrativa o judicial) antes de las 23:59 del **27 de marzo de 2025**.
* Tener un progenitor o abuelo que posea, o poseyera al momento de morir, **exclusivamente la ciudadanía italiana**.
* Tener un progenitor que haya **residido en Italia durante al menos dos años** continuativos antes del nacimiento del hijo.

# # # 3. La decisión de la Corte: Cuestiones no fundadas
La Corte rechazó las quejas de inconstitucionalidad relativas a la violación del principio de igualdad, la protección de la confianza legítima y los derechos adquiridos (Arts. 2 y 3 de la Constitución), además de aquellas relativas a la ciudadanía europea.

# # # 4. Las motivaciones principales
* **El principio de efectividad (*genuine link*):** La Corte estableció que la ciudadanía debe basarse en un vínculo real entre el individuo y la comunidad nacional. Una legislación que permitía la transmisión ilimitada del estatus a personas sin ningún vínculo efectivo con Italia fue juzgada como "disarmónica" respecto al marco constitucional.
* **Restablecimiento del nexo pueblo-territorio-soberanía:** El legislador intervino legítimamente para evitar que el concepto de "pueblo" se convirtiera en una entidad indeterminable, compuesta por millones de personas desconectadas del territorio nacional.
* **Confianza no consolidada:** Para los destinatarios de la norma, el estatus de ciudadanos italianos no era "jurídicamente cierto" sino solo virtual, requiriendo una verificación que nunca se solicitó antes de 2025. La inercia de quien no se activó durante décadas debilita la protección de su confianza en comparación con quienes ya obtuvieron el reconocimiento.
* **Compatibilidad con el derecho de la UE:** La Corte aclaró que la jurisprudencia europea sobre la pérdida de la ciudadanía (que requiere un examen individual de proporcionalidad) se aplica solo a quienes pierden un estatus ya **comprobado y disfrutado**, no a quienes nunca fueron reconocidos oficialmente como ciudadanos.

# # # 5. Naturaleza "correctiva" de la ley
La Corte reconoció que el art. 3-bis tiene un carácter correctivo destinado a "desactivar" una situación crítica derivada de una disciplina anterior considerada desequilibrada, que perpetuaba al infinito un vínculo que se había vuelto ficticio con el paso de las generaciones.

En conclusión, la sentencia confirma que **el legislador goza de una amplia discrecionalidad** para limitar la transmisión de la ciudadanía por descendencia, especialmente cuando el objetivo es garantizar que esta sea expresión de un vínculo efectivo de solidaridad y lealtad con la República.

IMPORTANTE
1. Una cuestión "imprejuzgada" (Abierta)
La Corte Constitucional, en el punto 9.1 de su motivación, utilizó la fórmula técnica "queda imprejuzgada". En el derecho constitucional italiano, esto significa que la Corte ha decidido conscientemente no decidir aún sobre este tema específico, dejando el terreno preparado para que sea examinado en un futuro proceso judicial.

2. La disparidad del "Turno"
La normativa actual protege a quienes recibieron una cita consular antes de la medianoche del 27 de marzo de 2025. Sin embargo, miles de personas (especialmente en Argentina, Brasil, EE. UU. y Venezuela) se encuentran en una situación de injusticia:

Ya habían iniciado el trámite mucho antes (registro en Prenot@mi, envío de expedientes, pago de tasas).

No recibieron el turno físico por causas ajenas a ellos, sino únicamente por los retrasos y la ineficiencia de la administración consular.

3. El fundamento jurídico de la apertura
El argumento central es que el derecho a la ciudadanía no puede depender de un factor que el interesado no puede controlar (la rapidez del consulado). La jurisprudencia italiana (como la sentencia n. 195/2022) sostiene que la pérdida de un derecho no puede derivar de un hecho no imputable al ciudadano. Dado que estas personas no fueron "inactivas", tratarlas de forma diferente a quienes sí obtuvieron el turno viola el Artículo 3 de la Constitución (principio de igualdad).

4. Qué deben hacer los afectados
Aquellos que tengan pruebas documentales de haber iniciado el proceso antes del 28 de marzo de 2025 (capturas de Prenot@mi, correos electrónicos, recibos de pago o envíos postales) pueden emprender acciones judiciales. El objetivo es que un juez solicite a la Corte Constitucional que declare la ilegitimidad de esta distinción, basándose en que el "silencio" o la demora de la administración no debe perjudicar al solicitante.

30/04/2026

ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP
RULING 63/2026 - FULL DECISION
1. Subject of the Judgment
The Court was asked to rule on the legitimacy of Article 3-bis of Law No. 91 of 1992 (introduced by Decree-Law No. 36/2025) This provision establishes that individuals born abroad who possess another citizenship are considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship, unless specific conditions connecting them to Italy are met

2. Content of the Rule
The law operates with proper retroactivity, meaning it applies even to those born before it came into effect The exceptions allowing one to maintain citizenship include:
Having submitted a recognition application (administrative or judicial) by March 27, 2025
Having a parent or grandparent who holds, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship
Having a parent who resided in Italy for at least two years before the child's birth
3. The Court’s Decision: Unfounded Issues
The Court rejected the claims of unconstitutionality regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the protection of legitimate expectations, and acquired rights (Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution), as well as those related to European citizenship
4. Main Motivations
The Principle of Effectiveness (Genuine Link): The Court established that citizenship must be based on a real connection between the individual and the national community Previous legislation allowing for the unlimited transmission of status to people without any effective link to Italy was judged to be "disharmonious" with the constitutional framework
Restoring the People-Territory-Sovereignty Link: The legislator legitimately intervened to prevent the concept of "the people" from becoming an indeterminable entity composed of millions of people detached from the national territory
Unconsolidated Expectations: For those targeted by the rule, the status of Italian citizens was not "legally certain" but only virtual, requiring a verification process that was never requested before 2025 The lack of action by those who did not seek recognition for decades weakens the protection of their expectations compared to those who had already obtained it
Compatibility with EU Law: The Court clarified that European case law on the loss of citizenship (which requires an individual proportionality test) applies only to those losing a status that has already been verified and enjoyed, not to those who were never officially recognized as citizens
5. "Corrective" Nature of the Law
The Court recognized that Article 3-bis has a corrective character aimed at "defusing" a critical situation resulting from a previous regulatory framework deemed unbalanced, which perpetuated a link that had become fictitious over passing generations
In conclusion, the judgment confirms that the legislator enjoys wide discretion in limiting the transmission of citizenship by descent, especially when the goal is to ensure it remains an expression of an effective bond of solidarity and loyalty with the Republic
IMPORTANT
The Italian Constitutional Court has left the door open for individuals who were excluded from citizenship recognition because they did not have a formal consular appointment by the March 27, 2025 deadline, even though they had already initiated the application process.

1. The "Unprejudiced" Question
In its ruling (point 9.1), the Court used the technical phrase "remains unprejudiced." In legal terms, this means the Court consciously chose not to decide on this specific issue yet. This signals that the disparity between those with an appointment and those waiting for one is a valid legal question that can be challenged in future cases.

2. The Core Disparity
The current law protects those who received a consular appointment by the deadline. However, thousands of applicants (particularly in North and South America) find themselves in a "limbo" where:

They did everything right (registered on Prenot@mi, submitted dossiers, paid fees).

They failed to get an appointment only because of consular delays and administrative inefficiency.

3. The Legal Argument
The text argues that losing a right due to circumstances beyond one's control (the efficiency of the Consulate) is unconstitutional. Italian case law (such as Judgment 195/2022) established that a citizen's rights should not be penalized by administrative delays or third-party factors. Since these applicants were not "inactive" but were actively pursuing their rights, the current distinction is seen as discriminatory and a violation of Article 3 of the Italian Constitution (Equality).

4. Operational Advice
Applicants who have documentary evidence that they started their application before March 28, 2025 (emails, portal registrations, fee receipts) are encouraged to take judicial action. By doing so, they can ask a judge to refer this specific disparity back to the Constitutional Court for a definitive ruling.

12/03/2026

LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DESESTIMA LAS CUESTIONES
DE LEGITIMIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL RELATIVAS AL
DECRETO-LEY 36/2025 EN MATERIA DE CIUDADANÍA
A la espera del depósito de la sentencia, la Oficina de Comunicación y Prensa informa que la Corte Constitucional ha declarado en parte infundadas y en parte inadmisibles las cuestiones de legitimidad constitucional, planteadas por el Tribunal de Turín, relativas al artículo 1 del Decreto-Ley número 36 de 2025, convertido en la Ley número 74 de 2025, que contiene «Disposiciones urgentes en materia de ciudadanía».

Dicho decreto establece que, como excepción a las normas anteriores que prevén la transmisión ilimitada iure sanguinis de la ciudadanía, «se considera que nunca ha adquirido la ciudadanía italiana quien haya nacido en el extranjero, incluso antes de la fecha de entrada en vigor del presente artículo, y posea otra nacionalidad», a menos que se cumpla una de las siguientes condiciones:

a) El estado de ciudadano haya sido reconocido (por vía administrativa o judicial) a raíz de una solicitud presentada antes de las 23:59 horas del 27 de marzo de 2025;

b) Un progenitor o un abuelo posea, o poseyera en el momento de su fallecimiento, exclusivamente la ciudadanía italiana;

c) Un progenitor o adoptante haya sido residente en Italia durante al menos dos años continuos después de la adquisición de la ciudadanía italiana y antes de la fecha de nacimiento o de adopción del hijo.

La Corte ha declarado infundadas las impugnaciones con las que el Tribunal de Turín, invocando el artículo 3 de la Constitución, denunciaba, por un lado, la arbitrariedad de la distinción entre quienes solicitaron la verificación de la ciudadanía antes del 28 de marzo de 2025 y quienes la solicitaron después; y, por otro, la lesión de los derechos adquiridos, al considerar que la norma en examen determinaría una «revocación implícita de la ciudadanía con efectos retroactivos y sin ninguna disposición de derecho transitorio».

La Corte también ha declarado infundada la cuestión planteada por violación del artículo 9 del Tratado de la Unión Europea (TUE) y del artículo 20 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE), que atribuyen la ciudadanía de la Unión a toda persona que tenga la nacionalidad de un Estado miembro.

Asimismo, la Corte ha declarado inadmisible la cuestión planteada por violación del artículo 15, párrafo 2, de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948, según el cual «a nadie se privará arbitrariamente de su nacionalidad ni del derecho a cambiar de nacionalidad».

Por último, se ha declarado inadmisible la cuestión planteada por violación del artículo 3, párrafo 2, del Protocolo núm. 4 al Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH), según el cual «nadie podrá ser privado del derecho a entrar en el territorio del Estado del que sea nacional».

12/03/2026

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DISMISSES CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DECREE-LAW 36/2025 CONCERNING CITIZENSHIP
Pending the filing of the full judgment, the Communications and Press Office announces that the Constitutional Court has declared the questions of constitutional legitimacy raised by the Court of Turin—regarding Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, converted into Law No. 74 of 2025, containing "Urgent provisions regarding citizenship"—to be partially unfounded and partially inadmissible.
This decree establishes that, by way of derogation from previous regulations providing for the unlimited transmission of citizenship iure sanguinis, "any person born abroad, even before the date of entry into force of this article, who possesses another citizenship, is considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship," unless one of the following conditions is met:
a) Citizenship status was recognized (administratively or judicially) following an application submitted by 11:59 PM on March 27, 2025;
b) A parent or grandparent holds, or held at the time of their death, exclusive Italian citizenship;
c) A parent or adopter was resident in Italy for at least two continuous years following the acquisition of Italian citizenship and prior to the date of birth or adoption of the child.
The Court declared unfounded the complaints through which the Court of Turin, invoking Article 3 of the Constitution, denounced, on one hand, the arbitrariness of the distinction between those who applied for citizenship verification before March 28, 2025, and those who applied after and, on the other, the violation of vested rights (diritti quesiti). The lower court argued that the provision would result in an "implicit revocation of citizenship with retroactive effect and without any transitional law provisions."
The Court also declared unfounded the challenge raised regarding the violation of Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which grant EU citizenship to anyone holding the citizenship of a Member State.
Furthermore, the Court declared inadmissible the challenge regarding the violation of Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."
Finally, the challenge regarding the violation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which stipulates that "no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national," was also declared inadmissible.

28/02/2026

AGAINST THE WALL OF DECREE 36/2025!
A cry of hope rises from the Court of Palermo, shaking the very foundations of the new regulatory framework designed by the so-called "Tajani Decree." At a crucial moment in the history of our citizenship, the Sicilian Court has performed an act of unprecedented legal courage, challenging the shadows of the controversial Decree 36/2025 (Law 74/2025).
A Verdict That Breathes History
This is not merely a sentence; it is an act of pure justice. Despite the heavy chains imposed by the new law—which aims to suffocate the blood bond between Italy and its children abroad—the judges of Palermo have raised the shield of the Law. They have recognized that Italian Citizenship is not a gift from the government of the day, but a sacred, inalienable, and indefeasible right that flows through the veins of descendants from the very moment of their birth!
The Tajani Decree seeks to sever the branches of a centuries-old tree, imposing time limits and bureaucratic obstacles to erase the past. But the Court of Palermo has said NO!
* Against Unjust Retroactivity: The law cannot erase what history has already enshrined.
* Against Discrimination: Every child of Italy, wherever they may be, deserves the same respect and the same recognition.
This decision does not remain confined within the walls of a Sicilian courtroom.
The Message to Descendants: DO NOT GIVE UP!
The Court of Palermo (ruling 13 feb 2026) did not simply set aside the new rules; rather, it recognized the objective impossibility for the applicant to secure an appointment at the consulate before the deadline abruptly established by the Tajani Decree.
Having attempted to claim one's right, only to be met with a bureaucratic wall, demonstrates sufficient diligence to fall within the exceptional cases provided for by the decree itself.

14/01/2026

JURE SANGUINIS CITIZENSHIP REFORM: APPLICATIONS TO ROME
As of today, January 14, 2026, the legislative process for the reform of citizenship by descent applications has reached a decisive turning point with final approval from the Senate. The measure, previously passed by the Chamber of Deputies in 2025, is now nearing promulgation: it will officially take effect in early February, following the President’s signature and the standard 15-day period after its publication in the Official Gazette.

The Three Pillars of the New Legislation
The reform introduces structural changes that will radically alter the management of applications:

Centralization in Rome (Starting 2029): Until December 31, 2028, jurisdiction will remain with the consulates. However, from January 1, 2029, all applications must be sent by mail to a central office in Rome, including original paper documents and the receipt of the application fee payment. Communication with the applicant will be exclusively digital (via email), and the costs for returning documents in the event of a rejection will be the responsibility of the applicant.

Introduction of a "Cap" (Quota): A maximum annual limit for applications has been established.

Consulates: The cap will be based on the volume of applications fully processed by each individual office during the year 2025.

Central Office: For its first two years of operation (2029–2030), it may only accept a number of applications equal to the total fees collected globally by all consulates in 2025.

Processing Times: A maximum timeframe of three years has been set for both the consulates and the new central office to reach a final evaluation for each individual application.

What Remains Unchanged (Certainties)
It is important to emphasize that the new law does not impact the following in any way:

Judicial proceedings related to the so-called "1948 Cases."

"Against-the-queue" (ATQ) appeals (at least through the end of 2028).

The legal dispute regarding the "minor issue."

Ongoing challenges regarding constitutional legitimacy.

Furthermore, it is guaranteed that applications already filed with consulates before the opening of the central office will be completed by the consulates themselves, even after 2028.

Open Questions
Although the framework of the law is defined, numerous questions remain that will only be resolved by subsequent implementing decrees or ministerial circulars:

Procedural Workflow: It is unclear whether "supplementary documentation requests" (soccorso istruttorio) will be permitted (the ability to integrate documents or correct discrepancies) or if a dedicated portal will be created to monitor application status.

Payment Management: The operational procedures for paying the application fee are not yet known.

Management of Lists and Limits: Uncertainty remains regarding how surpluses exceeding the annual caps will be handled (both in consulates for the 2026–2028 triennium and in the new central office), the fate of appointments already scheduled beyond 2028, and current waiting lists.

Logistics of the Annual Cap: The criteria for allocating available slots at the central office is unknown (for example, whether prior authorization will be required before mailing the application).

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Naples
80142

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