J Lex Legal Aid & Drafting Services

J Lex Legal Aid & Drafting Services We provide Legal Aid and Legal Drafting Services. Contact:- 8218106966
email:- [email protected]

17/02/2019

PIL SEEKING BAN ON PUBG: BOMBAY HIGH COURT SEEKS CENTRE, MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

The Bombay High Court has asked the Centre and the Maharashtra government to file their replies in a PIL filed by an 11-year-old boy seeking a ban on the online game PUBG at all schools in the state.

A division bench of Chief Justice Naresh Patil and Justice NM Jamdar sought suggestions from both the state and the Centre with regard to the averments made in the PIL. The PIL stated that PUBG promotes immoral conduct such as violence, murder, aggression, looting, gaming addiction and cyberbullying, thus, should be banned. PUBG is one of the most popular online games in the world as almost 400 million players play the game worldwide.

Advocate Tanvir Nizam appeared on behalf of his son, the petitioner Ahad Nizam. Apart from directions to the State Education Department to ban PUBG in schools, the PIL also seeks directions to the Ministry of Electronics and IT, Government of India, to form an Online Ethics Review Committee to monitor such violating content from time to time.

PUBG has been banned in Gujarat and Karnataka, the PIL stated. Learning this, the petitioner's mother, Advocate Mariam Nizam wrote to the State Education Minister and Chief Minister seeking some action in the matter. Subsequently, the present PIL was filed.

The court has now kept March 8 as the next date of hearing.

16/02/2019

AMU MINORITY STATUS: WHY AND WHAT DID SUPREME COURT REFER TO SEVEN JUDGE BENCH?

The Supreme Court, on Tuesday, referred to seven-judge bench the issue of determining the correctness of minority status granted to Aligarh Muslim University. The three judge bench headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi made this reference in an appeal against a 2006 Allahabad High Court judgment that had held that the University is not minority institution.

The Question (Re-) Referred To 7 Judge Bench
It would be more apt to say that the question has been 're-referred' to seven judge bench, because in 1981, doubting the correctness of Basha Judgment, a supreme court bench had referred this question to seven judge bench. But, as will be revealed in this article, this question got never answered. The said question reads as follows:

"What are the indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority educational institution? Would an institution be regarded as a minority educational institution because it was established by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority or its being administered by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority?"
This article attempts to give brief idea about the Basha Judgment of 1967, Allahabad High Court judgment impugned in the present appeals before SC, and some other intervening orders and judgment which has now prompted the court to re-refer the matter to seven judge bench?

1967: Basha Judgment
S. Azeez Basha vs. Union Of India

Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered validity of certain amendments made to the Act in the years 1951 and 1965 to Aligarh Muslim University Act of 1920. The bench headed by the then CJI KN Wanchoo held that Aligarh Muslim University was neither established nor administered by Muslim minority, hence the challenge to the aforesaid 1951 and 1965 Acts as ultra vires to Article 30 is unfounded. It also held that Aligarh Muslim University is not a minority institution.

2006: Allahabad HC Judgment
AMU vs. Malay Shukla

The Allahabad High Court were considering the challenge against the Muslim quota, by way of a 50% reservation of post-graduate course seats meant for qualified MBBS doctors, introduced by the University. It was contended on behalf of the University that Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment Act 1981), changed the basis of Basha Judgment. The Single bench held that the University is not a minority institution.

Upholding the Single bench judgment, the division bench of Allahabad High Court held that, even though established by minority, but was never administered on claimed to be administered cannot be clothed as minority Institution. To hold thus, the bench comprising Justice Ajoy Nath Ray (the then CJ of the High Court) and Justice Ashok Bhushan (he was then Allahabad HC judge) extensively relied on Basha judgment and said:

"Whenever a member of the minority community establishes an institution the same shall be necessarily a minority institution irrespective of the fact as to whether it was contemplated to be a minority institution or an institution for the benefit of all sections of the society. This can be further illustrated by giving an illustration. A member of the minority community establishes an institution which is open to all sections of the society without reserving any right of administration in the persons founding the society. The institution is administered as a normal institution following the rules and regulations applicable to normal institution. The selection of teachers is made by selection board established under the Act. Can after lapse of several decades suddenly the institution claim to the benefit of minority character on the ground that it was established by minority member and claim right of administration of the institution as a minority. The answer will be obviously no because the character of the institution which came into existence was not a minority nor it was administered by minority."
Justice AN Ray held as follows, to which Justice Bhushan concurred.

The Aligarh Muslim University is declared to have always been and is a free institution and not a minority institution within the meaning of Article 30 of the Constitution and that the ruling in Basha is in no way touched.
Sections 2 (l) and 5 (2) (c) introduced in the Aligarh Muslim University Act of 1920 by the said 1981 Amendment Act are invalid and those insertions are struck out.
The removal of the words ''establish and' from the preamble of the 1920 Act by the 1981 Act is invalid and those words are restored to the preamble.
The claim of 50% Mohammdan quota for the post graduate medical courses by the University is declared as unconstitutional and impermissible and they shall make no claim of minority quota in like or other manner in future.
The Union's communication dated 25.2.2005 vetting the purported minority status of the Aligarh Muslim University by permitting their claim of Muslim reservation is quashed and set aside.
Justice Ashok Bhushan in his concurring judgment, said: "Declaring the Aligarh Muslim University as minority institution by parliament enactment is not in the competence of parliament in view of the judgment of the Apex Court and if the parliament declares by the legislative enactment that Aligarh Muslim University is minority institution the said declaration shall contravene Article 30 since Article 30 provides that only institutions administered and established by minority are entitled for protection under Article 30. The parliament thus could not have directly declared by parliamentary enactment that Aligarh Muslim University is a minority institution. The amendments which has been brought by 1981 Amendment Act has not been able to change the basis of Azeez Basha's case (supra) and thus tend to overrule a judicial decision which is not in competence of the parliament."

1981: The Unanswered Reference in Between
Between this 1967 Supreme Court judgment and 2006 Allahabad High court judgment, there lies a Supreme Court order in 1981 (in Anjuman-e-Rahmania Vs. District Inspector of School) referred the issue arising in Basha Judgment to a Seven Judges Bench. The question referred was as follows:

"What are the indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority educational institution? Would an institution be regarded as a minority educational institution because it was established by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority or its being administered by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority?"

Though the said reference was heard by an 11 judge bench along with T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka, the Bench did not answer the question stating that it will be dealt with by the Regular Bench. Later, the regular bench also did not answer the said question in its order dated 11th March 2003. The said order reads: ""These matters are covered by the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.317/1993- T.M.A. Pai Foundation & ors. Etc. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. Etc. and connected batch decided on 31st October, 2002. All statutory enactments, orders, scheme, regulations will have to be brought in conformity with the decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation's case decided on 31.10.2002. As and when any problem arises the same can be dealt with by an appropriate Forum in an appropriate proceeding. The Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly."

This intervening development was brought to the notice of Allahabad High Court bench. But the bench rejected the said argument observing thus: "It has thus been submitted that present dispute requires consideration in the light of the judgment in T.M.A. Pai's case (supra). It is submitted that this case has again reiterated that there can be regulatory control over the minority institution and regulatory control itself does not amount in any manner destructive of the minority character of an institution. It is submitted that control and supervision in 1920 Act is only regulatory in nature and in the light of T.M.A. Pai's case the minority character of Aligarh Muslim University has to be declared. The answer to the above submissions are twofold. Firstly the judgment in Azeez Basha's case has considered all the provisions of 1920 Act and the Statutes framed thereunder and considering the scheme of the Act the Azeez Basha's judgment held that minority community has not been administering the institution. As observed above, the basis of the judgment of Azeez Basha's case regarding administration by minority has not even touched by 1981 Amendment Act, it is no more open for us to consider the submission that minority is administering the Aligarh Muslim University and it be declared as a minority institution. Secondly even if we look the question of administration in the light of judgment in T.M.A. Pai's case (supra), the result will be the same."

2019: SC reference to 7 Judge Bench
Taking note of all these, now the three judge bench of the Supreme Court observed that the question which arose in 1981 order in Anjuman-e-Rahmania (doubting correctness of Basha Judgment) has remained undetermined. "That apart, the decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others and the amendment of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 made in the year 2010 would also require an authoritative pronouncement on the aforesaid question formulated, as set out above, besides the correctness of the view expressed in the judgment of this Court in S. Azeez Basha (supra) which has been extracted above.", the bench said.

The court justifying its order referring to seven judge bench further added: "When the precise question was already referred to a Seven Judges Bench and was, however, not answered, we are of the view that the present question, set out above, should be referred to a Bench of Hon'ble Seven Judges."

15/02/2019

SUPREME COURT RELIEF TO A LITIGANT WHO SUFFERED EX-PARTE DECREE DUE TO BAR ASSOCIATION'S CALL FOR COURT BOYCOTT

"It is unprofessional as well as unbecoming for a lawyer who has accepted a brief to refuse to attend Court even in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott by the Bar Association or the Bar Council.", the Supreme Court said in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs Union Of India, in the year 2002. But calls for court boycott/strike still continue unabated and obviously it is the litigant who suffers.

Recently, the Supreme Court set aside an ex-parte decree passed by Sub-court, Chidambaram, in 2009, providing relief to the defendant who suffered the ex-parte decree because of a court-boycott call by Bar Association.

Murugesan was a defendant in a specific performance suit. This case was listed for hearing on 16.03.2009. Unfortunately, on the very same day, there was a boycott of all the courts on the call of Bar Association. All the advocates boycotted the courts in the District of Cuddalore including Chidambaram District. As a result, his lawyer could not appear in the case.

But the Trial Court called the case and as there was no representation on his behalf, proceeded ex-parte and decreed the suit filed by plaintiff.

He filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure, for setting aside the ex-parte decree. But the Trial court rejected this application. The Additional District Court and the High Court upheld the dismissal. One of the reason for rejecting the application was long pendency of the suit.

Before the Apex Court, Murugesan's lawyer contended that all the courts rejected the application by looking at the past events. Relying on G.P. Srivastava vs. R.K. Raizada, it was contended that when the application is filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, the relevant consideration should have been confined to whether he has shown any sufficient cause or not for not appearing in the matter when it was called on 16.03.2009. The counsel for the plaintiff objected to this contention, highlighting that though the suit was of the year 1997, the defendant tried his best to prolong the litigation on one pretext or the other.

The bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice R. Subhash Reddy noted that in GP Srivastava case, it was held that, if "sufficient cause" is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex pate proceedings were initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. The bench said:

"The aforesaid view taken by this Court in the judgment referred above supports the case of the appellant. It is further brought to our notice that on the aforesaid date, i.e., 16.03.2009, on which date the suit was listed for trial, in view of the boycott of the courts by the advocates, all other cases were adjourned and only this case was proceeded and ex-parte decree was passed."
Taking into account the reasons cited in the application for setting aside ex-parte decree, the bench said that it is satisfied that the defendant has shown sufficient cause for not appearing in the matter when the matter was called on 16.03.2009. While setting aside the order of all the three courts, the bench said: "All the courts below committed error in rejecting the application on the grounds which are not relevant to consider the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC. 14. We are conscious of the fact that all the three courts have held against the appellant, but if we allow the impugned orders to stand, it will result in miscarriage of justice."

14/02/2019

THE ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

We've all grown up watching Perry Mason style cross examinations where, under the testing fires of a psychologically exhausting interrogation, the witness finally gives up his defence, throws his hands up in despair, and concedes having killed his girlfriend and having hidden the bloodstained knife under the big oak tree in his backyard. As a cross-examiner in a commercial arbitration, there is a good chance that you'll never have the pleasure of making this happen; having the witness cry on the stand, or having blood on the floor (no pun intended!) by the time you're done with a witness. But that doesn't stop us from trying, does it? Most of us keep trying and following cross-examination strategies that are more suited to a Criminal Sessions court, than a document-intensive Commercial Arbitration.

A good cross-examination requires deep engagement with the following questions, amongst others:

Who should be examined as a witness, and for what fact?
Drafting a witness deposition.
How to prepare for cross-examination?
How to structure questions?
Are loaded questions permissible?
What are leading questions?
How to prove a document through a witness?
When to seek a 'documents-only' arbitration, and skip oral evidence altogether?
How to confront a witness with a previous statement?
Is confrontation with documents (as opposed to previous statements) permissible?
The need and importance of suggestions in commercial arbitrations (or lack thereof)?
Tackling peculiar witnesses such as an enterprising witness, or a witness suffering from selective (and self-serving) amnesia;
Importance of timely objections, as the cross-examining counsel, and as counsel for the witness;
Whether to re-examine, or not (putting humpty dumpty back together again!)
These are good questions, but have no easy answers. But since we never stop trying, this column is an attempt to share a few thoughts on these issues and the first principles of cross-examination. So, without further ado, let's start at the start:

Does the Indian Evidence Act ("IEA") apply to Arbitrations?
"Relevancy by law, or logic?"

Much like any legal dilemma abstracted to a principle, there is a short and a long answer to this one. The short answer is a 'No'. Section 1 of IEA provides that it does not apply to arbitrations. Section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act") frees an Arbitral Tribunal ("Tribunal") from the shackles of the notoriously slow Code of Civil Procedure ("CPC") and the IEA. However, in the absence of a specific rule/provision guiding an issue, the Tribunal is not prohibited from drawing inspiration from the CPC or IEA, and that is what happens, especially with a tribunal comprising judges who have a practiced affiliation to the CPC and IEA.

A Tribunal, therefore, is not bound by the strict rules of admissibility laid down in IEA. A Tribunal can, for instance, look into an output of an electronic record, even without the strictest compliance of Section 65B of the IEA (dealing with conditions that are required to be satisfied before output of an electronic record is received into evidence), if it is otherwise sure of its creditworthiness.

Having said that, this is not to mean that the cautions of IEA can be thrown to the wind in Arbitrations. Precedent shows that courts have drawn a distinction between a mere provision in the IEA, and a fundamental principle of evidence law. For instance, a Tribunal may not be bound by the strict language of Section 23 of the IEA (which deals with exclusion of privileged/no-prejudice communications from evidence, on satisfaction of certain considerations) but the broad underlying principle of 'privileged communication' may still be held to apply. In Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Aarti Steel Ltd. (Steel & Power)
[1], the Court held that although the Tribunal is not bound by the provisions of the IEA, the issue to be examined was whether the 'substratal rational' of Section 23 of the Evidence Act had been disregarded by the Tribunal.
Therefore, to sum up, IEA is a guide, and not a master. With that elephant in the room having been addressed, let us proceed to examine:

2. Choice and number of witnesses – The 'What', 'Who' and 'How' of proving your case.

"Evidence is to be weighed, and not counted"

Any fact can be proved either through oral or documentary evidence. Broadly, the following persons can be made witnesses:

•An individual who has personal knowledge of facts and events pertaining to the case can testify as to things they have personally observed, sensed or witnessed. These witnesses depose on facts (as opposed to opinions);
Expert witnesses, who give their (informed) opinions on specific niche areas,which require subject matter/domain knowledge.
Very few commercial arbitration have an oral evidence component, and are largely driven and provable through documents. And wherever a fact is reduced into writing (or required by law to be reduced into writing) the same is provable only through the document alone and oral evidence stands excluded. The best evidence rule further tells us that a document has to be proved through its author, executing or, in some cases, the attesting witnesses.

But before that, the first question that needs to be asked is 'What' are the facts that are required to be proved in order to succeed in a case. Discerning the 'Facts in Issue', therefore, is the first and the most important task, followed by an analysis of 'Relevant Facts'. Picture 'Facts in issue' as the core facts without proof of which you can't succeed. All 'Facts in issue' are relevant facts, however, all relevant facts are not 'Facts in issue'. Think of them as concentric circles. A Relevant Fact, in the sense that it is used in evidence law, is a surrounding fact (and not the core fact itself) that helps you prove or disprove a 'fact in issue'. For instance, in a case for damages on account of breach of contract, the facts in issue would be:

* Existence of a contractual obligation;

* Breach of obligation;

* Consequent damages.

Facts in issue, therefore, are the core constituents of the litigated claim, right or liability; facts which the party MUST absolutely prove in order to make out a case. Relevant facts, on the other hand, are certain surrounding facts that help the Tribunal understand the case better. For instance, to prove the fact in issue of 'existence of a contractual obligation', the party may rely on surrounding factors, which raise an inference of an existing contractual obligation. This may include : correspondence in the run-up to the contract, subsequent conduct of the parties, which shows assumption of responsibilities, et al.

The next enquiry is to examine as to whether the opposite party has admitted/denied the above. In case there is an admission on any of the above, whether in pleadings or otherwise, the same may act as waiver of proof and the party may be dispensed with the need of formally proving those facts. For instance, if the contract is proved, or receipt of a particularly damning email is admitted, no evidence needs to be led on that count. However, for instance, if a contract is denied, the existence of a contract can be proved through correspondence/letters/emails from which it appears that the parties took themselves to be a bound by a contract by their conduct.

With respect to the 'Who' part of leading evidence, in a case where oral evidence is needed, the executants and witnesses of a contractual obligation can be called into the witness box to prove the existence of a contract, and its breach.

Imagine a well-crafted witness deposition as a wall made of bricks of facts-in-issue, held together by the sinew of relevant facts, and the task of a cross examining counsel is to break holes into that wall.

How many witnesses?

"Two many witnesses spoil the broth, or is it?"

The jury is still out on whether multiple witnesses should be introduced to prove a single fact, or not. Traditional wisdom says that it is suicidal to do so. Too many witnesses on a single fact may be like sitting ducks for a shrewd cross-examining counsel, who may be able to punch holes in their testimony by exposing contradictions inter se witnesses; this is for the simple reason that no two people would have the same perception or recollection of an event. This is also known as the Rashomon effect.( The effect is named after Akira Kurosawa's legendary 1950 film 'Rashomon', in which a murder is described in four mutually contradictory ways by its four witnesses). Although it may also be argued that having multiple witnesses on the stand to prove a single fact may allow a witness coming subsequently to fill-in the lacunae left in the testimony of the earlier witness, however, the disadvantages of such a course of action somewhat outweigh the perceived advantages. All in all, if you're the cross examining counsel, multiple witnesses constitute an opportunity as well as a challenge.

3. Proving a case through Authorized Representative ("AR")

In most contractual cases involving companies, no single individual has personal knowledge of the entire set of facts; in such cases, the company files and pursues its case through its AR. However, many a times, the power to institute a case and the power to depose are confused. It needs to be kept in mind that the power to depose or be a witness of a fact can never be outsourced. The witness has to be the person who perceived the fact/event sought to be proved. ARs also, while deposing, should clearly set out what facts they testify on the basis of personal knowledge, and which facts are based on documents, else they run the risk of their testimony being eschewed from consideration on the ground of 'hearsay'. It is important to discern the facts which the AR has no personal knowledge of, and to arrange for better proof of those facts through the direct source, whether through ex-employees, or otherwise. The witness who heard, saw, or otherwise perceived that fact ought to be brought to the witness box. Many a cases have been lost on best evidence in a case not being brought forth, and the Tribunal drawing an adverse inference against the party not getting the real McCoy.

4. Rule of Best Evidence -

"The good, bad and the best (evidence)..."

This goes to the 'Who' question of leading evidence. The rule of 'best evidence' equally applies to Arbitration. This rule commands the parties to bring the best evidence possible in every case. This includes, but is not limited to, the rule of exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence, or the rule of conclusivity of documentary evidence, as laid down in Sections 91-92 of IEA. These provisions mandate that when parties have put down their engagement in the form of a written contract, the document, being the sole repository of the rights, obligations and intent of the parties cannot be departed from, and oral evidence to prove, modify, add or depart from that document cannot be allowed, unless exceptional reasons exist
[1]. This principle is mostly reinforced by a contractual stipulation called the 'Entire Agreement' clause. This oft forgotten rule greatly minimizes the role of oral evidence in a document intensive commercial matter. Also to be remembered is that: it is the agency of the court to interpret a contract based on the objective intent of the parties; what a witness subjectively feels or thinks is the intent is quite immaterial, of course, unless the document itself is ambiguous, which opens the document to contrary interpretations, and oral evidence assumes some significance.
5. Documents only Arbitration

"Men often lie, and so do documents"

Since most arbitration are document-centric, it is a good time saving exercise for the parties to agree on a 'documents only' arbitration wherein the Tribunal decides the case on the basis of documents and no oral evidence is led. For instance, if both the parties accept the ex*****on of the contract, but place different interpretations on it, the Tribunal may dispense with evidence of either party, and hold that it is the obligation of Tribunal to interpret the contract and decide the case on the basis of its reading of the contract. However, a 'documents-only' arbitration may not be suitable for all sorts of disputes. For instance, multi-party arbitrations or complex cases, such as those arising from some niche industry, may require detailed technical evidence, and are not really suitable for this form of arbitration. Also, many written contracts, even though extremely sophisticated in their design and level of detail, may still leave out room for implied terms being read into the contract, which may give some window for oral evidence to be brought forth. As an illustration, an ostensibly absolute and unqualified right of 'drag-along' granted to the majority shareholder/investor, may still be qualified by the implied obligation to act in good faith, and an implied obligation not to bring about a situation in which rights of the minority are undermined and the value of the company is eroded. In those situations, the Tribunal may be inclined to hold evidentiary hearings and not decide the matter solely on the basis of 'documents-only'.

As regards the institution framework of Documents-only arbitrations, the ICC, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) all have amended their rules to include fast track arbitration. The scope for application of expedited procedures may either be elective or automatic. Under the ICC's Expedited Procedure Provisions, it is at the arbitrator's discretion, after consulting with the parties, to conduct 'documents only' arbitration. In addition, there will be no terms of reference and the arbitrator may limit the number, length and scope of written submissions and written witness evidence. In the ICDR, if no party's claim or counterclaim exceeds US$100,000, the dispute shall be resolved by written submissions only, unless the arbitrator determines that an oral hearing is necessary. The HKIAC Rules provide for default 'documents only' arbitration, unless the HKIAC decides that it is appropriate to hold one or more hearings. In the SIAC, the arbitral tribunal will hold a hearing to examine witnesses and to hear legal arguments, although the parties can agree that the dispute should be decided on a 'documents only' basis. Under the SCC Rules for Expedited Arbitrations, a hearing shall only be held if requested by a party and if deemed necessary by the arbitrator.
[1]Therefore, no straightjacket formula can be followed to decide whether or not to opt for expedited procedures/ 'documents only' arbitrations and this call needs to be taken after carefully weighing the facts and circumstances of a case.
Drafting an affidavit in lieu of examination in chief/witness statement/deposition.
'Less is more'

Ideally, the witness' story should be told in his own words, and the lawyers' work should be invisible. Many a witnesses have been destroyed to shreds on the witness stand, because of a shoddy 'cut copy paste' job by the Counsel, who lifts the statement of claim, adds a dash of rejoinder, and voila!...there is your affidavit in evidence. This not only exposes the witness to embarrassing questions in the cross-examination, but also shows poor legal craftsmanship. When the witness stands in the box, clueless about a certain animal called 'constructive res judicata' which appears at Para 6 of his affidavit, it is the counsel who prepared the affidavit who is in the 'box'. These errors should be avoided; only things that the witness has personal knowledge of should be included in the witness deposition, and largely it should be crafted from the perspective of the witness herself. It can be said of a good witness statement that: 'it is the witness who carries the tune, while the good advocate acts merely as sound engineer.'
[2]

The counsel needs to carefully sift disputed/admitted facts and lead evidence only on the disputed facts; lead evidence only on those facts the burden of proving which lies on him. The witness statement must not be too complicated or lengthy; for if it is too lengthy, it leads to an even lengthier and meandering cross-examination. Also, wherever departure is made from this rule, the same should be conspicuously mentioned; this helps preserve the credibility of a witness, who does not pretend to have first-hand knowledge of all the facts
[3]. This also protects the witness from being taken on a roving and fishing enquiry and ring-fences the scope of cross-examination to a certain extent.
Whether to cross-examine a particular witness or not?
It is perfectly okay not to cross-examine a witness, if the witness' testimony, even if allowed to go unchallenged, does not materially harm one's case. Do this thought experiment : take the witness testimony, take each fact therein to be proved, if that doesn't materially hamper your case, don't cross-examine. Please remember, as many cases are lost on cross-examination, as won.

Broad approach of cross-examination.

Witness that has some relevant connection to the matter can depose as fact witness. Start by thinking what facts you need to prove to make your case. Assess which of those facts the witnesses for the opposing side are likely to know about and might admit. Always be prepared to produce a contrary email, document, minutes of meetings, or something or the other. If you do not have the confrontation material, don't hazard the question, the witness will answer in the negative and end up having the last word, and that ultimate question and answer would look pretty bad on the transcript when the judge reads it. There is nothing worse than your own cross-examination transcript being used against you. Thus, if you need to prove, for example, that the parties agreed to a specific shipment schedule, see if you can get someone from the other side of the case to admit that, and be armed with any documents/previous statements/correspondence where such an admission is made or indicated. Please remember that, with the voluminous documentary evidence of a modern international arbitration, the information function of witness questioning might be reduced to putting the documents in context, as well as providing a 'flesh and blood' embodiment of the participants in correspondence, negotiations and meetings, and assisting the tribunal to understand the role of personalities in the dynamics of a dispute.
[4]
How to frame questions.
"Leading them, to the edge of the cliff, and beyond.."

Leading questions- In common law systems that rely on testimony by witnesses, a leading question or suggestive interrogation is a question that suggests the particular answer or contains the information the examiner is looking to have confirmed. A Leading question, as per S.143 of the IEA, is any question suggesting the answer, which the person putting it wishes or expects to receive.

Examples of leading questions are:

Is not your name John Adams?
Do you reside at 1, Park Street?
You are into the business of betting, aren't you?
You wear glasses, right?
You can't see objects in the distance clearly without your glasses, right?
It was raining that night, wasn't it?
However, a question such as "When did you Murder A, B?" is an assumed/loaded question and may not be allowed, though questions such as this are sometimes very effective way of obtaining admissions. For instance, in an action relating to breach of contract by an employee, one may confront the employee denying the receipt of an email with a document (otherwise denied at the admission and denial stage), and ask him "What was the reason for not escalating this damning email to the management?" Now this question is framed to assume the receipt of the email; though traditionally looked-at as unacceptable, but such questions may allow the cross examining counsel to somehow get the witness to admit to an email or a document, which he may otherwise be tutored to deny, if asked about in a straight forward manner. By framing the question correctly, the cross examiner can shift the focus from receipt of the email, to the sufficiency of reasons for non-escalation of this issue; if the witness falls into this trap, the witness would quickly become self-justificatory and start ascribing reasons for non-escalation of the email to the board of directors, but in the process - end up conceding the receipt of this email, which is all that one would normally require in such circumstances.

Impeachment of credit and the art of confrontation with documents/previous statements.

To impeach the credit of a witness is to call into question her veracity by means of evidence adduced for that purpose, or the adducing of proof that a witness is otherwise unworthy of belief. Some of the common techniques of impeachment of witnesses are:

observation (perception); �
memory; �
narration; �
bias, interest or corruption; �
prior conviction; �
prior bad acts (bad character); �
prior inconsistent statements (self- contradiction); �
specific error (contradiction); �
reputation for veracity.
[5]Confrontation with prior inconsistent statements is one of the most effective ways of discrediting a witness. This is also a legal requirement as some cases suggest that a witness ought to be given an opportunity to explain away a discrepancy and any contradiction not put to a party in cross examination cannot be used against that party.

[6] This principle underlying section 145 of the IEA is known as the 'Brown v. Dunn' rule under the Common Law System.[7]

Though the legality of confrontation with previous statements is expressly made clear by Section 145 IEA, previous statements are not the only things that a witness can be confronted with, during cross examination. Contrary to popular misconception, a witness can be confronted with other documents also, as long as they have a connection with his testimony or throw it under grave challenge. For instance, an architect opining on the structure of a building can be confronted with another architect's report relating to the same premises. Confrontation of such nature almost always leads to an objection from the opposite side, which can easily be overcome by placing reliance on Surinder Kumar Bajaj vs Sheela Rani Pasricha
[8] where the High Court of Delhi has specifically recognized the legality of such a course of action.
Coming back to cases where a witness is confronted with a previous statement, If the witness disowns the previous inconsistent statement as having been made under mistake, recorded incorrectly, or given under wrong legal advice (as such witnesses are wont to do); in such cases, the cross-examining counsel should ask the witness whether he ever disowned the previous statement, or applied for its rectification or correction, or filed any complaint against the wrong legal advice given. If the answer to these questions is in the negative, the cross-examining counsel successfully drives home the point that the witness is unworthy of credit and has adopted vacillating, self-serving and mutually inconsistent stands at different times, and is now trying to cover up the lacunae in her case.

"I Object...." Dealing with objections during cross-examination.
Objections during cross-examination are usually to preserve one's record for appeal and to ensure that hearsay, inadmissible, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence is not allowed to be tendered in a case. Objections relating to mode of proof, for instance, objections relating to secondary evidence (photocopies) being led in evidence, when the original is clearly available, must be taken at the very first instance; otherwise, they are taken to have been waived and cannot be taken up at the final arguments or appellate stage, for the first time leading to loss of an important challenge.
[9] Recently, the Supreme Court has categorized the objections relating to non-compliance of Section 65B of the IEA (dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence), as objections relating to 'mode of proof' which is capable of being waived, if not taken promptly[10]. Such objections therefore ought to be taken at the first opportunity and soon after the witness has adopted his witness deposition, that is to say, soon after the examination in chief.
These are the common objections raised by the cross-examining counsel vis-à-vis parts of testimony and documents sought to be tendered in evidence by witness in his examination in chief (or direct examination). However, objections are not the sole privilege of a cross-examining counsel. The tenor and line of questioning by a cross-examining counsel may be objected to by the counsel for the witness on the following grounds, amongst others:

General or unspecific questions: such questions call for lengthy answers and may possibly lead to uncontrolled and unresponsive testimony from the witness.
Unintelligible Questions: Misleading, vague, ambiguous questions that do not call for or permit a specific answer.
Duplicitous Questions
Argumentative questions: Questions that call for arguments in place of answers from the witness must be objected to.
Erroneous questions: A question that contains misstatement or distortion of evidence or is an incorrect repetition of the witness evidence must be immediately objected to.
Speculative question: Such questions call for witness' personal knowledge or opinion.
[11]
Tackling the enterprising - Volunteering Witness:

We know by now - Cross-examination is all about asking tightly knit leading questions and giving little room to the witness to wriggle away or spin a narrative; leading questions, as we've seen above, are questions which admit of no other answer except a simple 'yes' or 'no'; however, there are some questions which do not admit of a mere 'yes' or 'no' answer and require explanation. A classic example is: "Have you stopped beating your wife?"; now is a question that can't be answered in a yes or no. Because if a witness says yes, he accepts that he was beating his wife earlier, and if he says no, he still is. These are the kind of questions, where the witness is perfectly entitled to refuse to answer in a simple 'yes' or 'no' and volunteer information and say – "I don't have a wife" or "I have never beaten her", therefore, neither 'yes' nor 'no'. However, this is just one of the very rare situations where the witness should be allowed to volunteer information and travel beyond the negative or the affirmative. The general rule, therefore, remains that the witness ought to answer in a yes or no, and should not be allowed to volunteer information. A witness may not foist into his answer, in any examination, statements not in answer to questions put to him. This is called 'Volunteering evidence', and the counsel of the opposite party should be on his guard to check its introduction by raising emphatic objections. Though in practice it is extremely hard to convince the Tribunal to do this, but the Tribunal is fully empowered to strike out answers which are not responsive to the questions or which introduce opinion, when the same is not sought. Some witnesses go overboard with their responses and end up harming your case. For example:

Q: You recognized the driver in the car, didn't you?

A: Yes.

Q: It was Frank Jones, wasn't it?

A: Yes. "He was weaving and looked drunk."
[12]
In such a scenario, the ideal step would be to appeal to the Tribunal to instruct the witness to stick to the answer to the question asked. Therefore, where the witness is unresponsive and the answer is inadmissible, one must object and move to strike. However, in case of an admissible response, appealing might expose your weakness to the tribunal and to the opposite counsel, giving her a chance to milk your weakness, which stands exposed.

From a defender's perspective, a volunteering witness may unsettle an otherwise potentially successful case, and this is not an uncommon disaster during an examination. This is where witness preparation assumes importance. The first and foremost step must be to educate the witness about the dangers of volunteering information. The witness must be made aware of the purpose of cross-examination, which is fact-finding opportunity for the opposite counsel. The witness must also be educated about strategies that maybe employed by the opposite counsel in eliciting answers from the witness. During your witness' examination, interrupting the witness must be avoided in order to keep the trust and the confidence of the witness intact. However, if the witness is going absolutely astray, then interjecting can save you from a potentially prejudicial testimony.

Effect of giving up a witness who was in the list of witnesses filed earlier:
A witness deposition, or in other words, an affidavit of a witness is evidence as soon as it is affirmed and hence, cannot be allowed to be 'withdrawn'. Where an evidence affidavit is filed and the witness or deponent, though otherwise available, is not made available for cross-examination, the opposite party will be entitled to submit that an adverse inference be drawn against such a witness or the party who fails to produce that witness for cross- examination; and, further, should that evidence (the witness deposition) contain any admissions, the same may be used by the other party. Needless to state, where the evidence is against the party entitled to cross-examination but which has gone untested for want of production of the witness, such evidence will be liable to be ignored.
[13] Some times such a decision (of dropping witnesses from the array of witnesses) is taken from a strategic stand-point, for instance, to protect a weak witness from damaging cross examination, or prevent needless duplication of evidence, or for cost and time efficiency; however, the benefits sought to be achieved from such an action should always be carefully balanced against the potential adverse inference.
Cross examination by co-respondents:
If there is an adverse interest inter-se respondents, in the sense that the case set up by the co-respondent is that he/she disputes the other co-respondent. In such a case, the co-respondent whose interest is adverse gets the right to cross-examine the co-respondent's witness. Where a co-respondent has made certain admissions that would be sufficient proof in order to fix liability on the other respondents, such other respondents can claim a right to question/cross examine such testimony, lest the admissions be used by the tribunal to make a decision/award against them.
[14]
'To suggest, or not to suggest?' The importance of suggestions.
The practice of giving suggestions in cross-examination to witnesses primarily belongs to the realm of criminal trials where there are no pleadings and the defence is built up by giving such suggestions. However, unfortunately, the said practice of criminal trials has crept into the civil trials. The purport of cross-examination is to challenge the testimony and / or to falsify the witness or his credit worthiness and not to give suggestions to the effect that each and every deposition in examination-in-chief is false. In Sher Mohammad vs Mohan Magotra
[15], the High Court of Delhi observed that in a civil trial based on pleadings, there is no need for such suggestions to be given.
Re-Examination "Putting Humpty Dumpty back together again…."

Re-direct or re-examination allows the counsel to respond to the cross-examination. Therefore, re-examination can be used to allow the witness to throw light on the points explored during the cross-examination or to clarify any doubt or inconsistencies. If examination in chief is the er****on of the wall, and cross-examination – breaking holes into it, re-examination is the final act of repair. Though clarificatory re-examination is permissible, it is well settled that lacunae in evidence led cannot be allowed to be filled up under the guise of re-examination. Re-examination is only to clarify matters, which if allowed to stand, would be misleading.
[16] For instance, if in examination in chief, 'A' testifies that she saw 'B' shoot and kill 'X'. On cross, 'A' admits that she wasn't wearing her glasses at the time of the shooting. Now this statement, if allowed to stand, may be extremely damaging to the credibility of the witness, if the accident happened at a distance, and the witness is proved to be myopic. In such a case, in order to ensure that the court is not misled, on re-examination, the Counsel should ask the witness as to whether A was wearing contact lenses instead. Here re-examination fulfills the important function of setting the record straight. To further illustrate, in an arbitration against an automobile company accused of having manufactured a faulty model, which led to loss of life and property, the claimant may ask the company's witness: "Were your Cars compliant to AAC standards used to measure the chances of cars skidding off the road?" and the witness answers, "No." Now, as it happens, let's assume - AAC standard is an old standard which has been thoroughly debunked, and now the prevailing industry standard is modern - AAD standard, however, merely because the witness did not volunteer that information (which he should have), the matter may not be allowed to end there, as the answer, as it stands, may mislead the Tribunal into believing that the car is non-compliant and no standards were complied-with. In such a situation, it is important for the counsel to re-examine the witness and ask specific questions that bring to the fore the factum of compliance with the more advanced and superior AAD standard, with a view to provide the Tribunal with the full picture, and allow it to make a more informed decision.
Having said all of the above, it is important to understand that the scope for re-examination is mostly limited to the materials covered under the cross. Depending upon the leniency of the arbitrator, the counsel may or may not be allowed to introduce altogether new material during re-examination. Also, some amount of leading is necessary to bring the focus of the arbitrator on the area that the counsel wants the witness to explain or rebut.
[17] For instance, where doubts have been raised about the expert based on the number of years of experience, questions may be put during re-direct (re-examination in IEA parlance) to re-establish the expert's credit worthiness, such as, "Mr. X, you mentioned during the cross-examination that you have only 5 years of post qualification experience. Is it correct, that during the last 2 years, you have given expert testimony in over 30 contractual disputes?" By answering in the affirmative to such a question, the expert witness would re-establish credibility of her report which was somewhat shaken by the cross-examining counsel by raising an inference of relative inexperience of the witness.
Whether to cross-examine post a re-examination?
If on re-direct (or re-examination), a witness produces wholly new and harmful testimony, the counsel must insist on cross-examining such witness. However, the request for cross-examination must not be made unless the questions can alleviate the new harmful testimony, if not remedy it in toto. Another way of going about it is by seeking to reserve right to deal with the additional harmful testimony in submissions. The same may receive favour from the Tribunal insofar as it concludes the examination of the witness.

How to cross-examine witnesses with selective amnesia? "Blessed are the forgetful for they get the better even of their blunders."

A forgetful witness is one of the most frequently encountered category of difficult witnesses. Efforts should be made to elicit yes or no responses as much as possible. The Counsel must be ready with materials such as earlier depositions, documents, etc. to jog the memory of the witness. For instance:

Q: Mr. Contractor, when did the site engineer first inform you about cracks in the foundation?

A: I don't really remember.

Q: Didn't the site engineer raise this concern in the daily progress report dated January 23, 2011, forming a part of the documents filed along with your counter-claim?

A: I guess he did.

In case such materials are not available to be put to the witness in order to refresh her memory, the counsel must ask questions on related topics to refresh the witness' recollection. If the counsel expects that the witness, in order to evade answering questions with respect to a particular period, may claim amnesia, it may be a good strategy to anticipate such an feigned amnesia and start the cross examination with asking witnesses information on questions which are ostensibly self-serving (but cause little damage); the witness, in his keenness to build the case, would depose, in clear and precise terms, facts and incidents dating years back. Having established that the witness has no problems of memory and recollection, it would now be tougher for the witness to claim ignorance as to other facts (which are damaging to his case), which date back to the same time period.

Whether or not to prepare in advance?
Although writing-out questions may be a part of preparation for a cross examination, however, simply reading them out to the witness rather than engaging in a responsive question and answer interaction is not effective. The best way to go about this would be to prepare an outline of the cross-examination, so as to remind you of the points that you intend to enunciate during the examination. After preparing an outline, referencing the same would enable one to be prepared to refresh the recollection of a forgetful witness, or impeach or contradict the witness who gives evasive, unexpected or false answers.
[18] A broad outline gives the Counsel the necessary flexibility to think on her feet and change strategies quickly, should the witness throw a few surprises. Another way of preparing would be to think in terms of the transcript. Transcript is king. Such an approach would require the counsel to focus on the admissions to be secured and answers to be elicited from the witness. However, one must, almost at all times, avoid asking what are known as the "Journalist" questions, i.e., the 'how' and 'why' kind of questions, that may give the witness the opportunity to say more than what may be a reasonable answer and to spin a narrative (in favour of the party they are aligned with).
Strategizing the flow of cross-examination – parting thoughts:
The next question that arises is whether it is a good strategy to ask questions para-wise on the basis of affidavit in evidence of the witness, or should cross-examination be conducted thematically. The answer to this may be – a bit of both. Broadly, it is best if the cross-examination is issue/theme wise. For instance, if you have a case that deals with aspects of misrepresentation (pre-contract) as well as post ex*****on breach of contract, it would make for easier reading of the Tribunal to maintain this distinction. Having said this, there is, of course, no formula, which can be ritualistically adopted. A lot of thinking on one's feet goes into a cross examination and the counsel should constantly invent and reinvent his strategy, if he sees the witness is able to anticipate questions and answer them guardedly. An (ostensibly) unrelated question can throw the witness off balance, and disturb the rhythm. Every witness has an Achilles heel; some of the well-heeled, have more than one; in such cases, throwing in a mean one every now and then keeps the witness nervous and doesn't allow him to settle into a comfortable rhythm. These maneuvers are a paper by itself, but fortunately need no more training in books than in the behavior and psychology of men and women. University of life, as they say, is the best school for cross-examination.

Address

Banda Bahadur Marg
New Delhi
110009

Telephone

8218106966

Website

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when J Lex Legal Aid & Drafting Services posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Contact The Practice

Send a message to J Lex Legal Aid & Drafting Services:

Share

Category