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DRS Chambers Advocates Lawyers Lucknow Uttar Pradesh | Court Writ Service Employment Civil Consumer Property Trade Custom Excise Family Divorce Maintenance 498A

Established in 1975, DRS Chambers is a full service Law Office that has carved a niche for itself in Litigation Services in the jurisdiction of Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench and its Subordinate Courts in Uttar Pradesh, India. Our Practice Areas include Advisory, Arbitration and Litigation services in a wide spectrum of law. Expert lawyers, subject matter consultants and efficient paralegals

in our offices help us in providing professional legal services to our clients with utmost diligence and proficiency. We represent our clients before District Courts, Session Courts, Tribunals, Commissions in the State of Uttar Pradesh in 12+ Districts and the Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad, Lucknow, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Our Primary Practice Areas include:-

Administrative Law & Writs
Service & Employment
Consumer Protection
Contracts
Company Matters
Civil Litigation
Property Matters
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Income Tax
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Criminal Law
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1. Case DetailsCourt: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow BenchCase Title: Kamal Prasad vs State of U.P.Case ...
26/04/2026

1. Case Details
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Case Title: Kamal Prasad vs State of U.P.
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 694 of 2016
Bench: Hon’ble Rajnish Kumar, J. & Hon’ble Zafeer Ahmad, J.

Trial Court Judgment:
Conviction by Trial Court: Section 302 IPC (Life Imprisonment + Fine ₹10,000)

2. Facts of the Case

The prosecution case arose from an incident dated 19.04.2012 wherein the accused-appellant allegedly assaulted his wife, Indravati, with an axe inside their house, resulting in her death. The FIR was lodged by the son of the deceased, who stated that upon hearing cries, he rushed to the house and saw the accused fleeing while his mother was found dead inside.
The investigation led to recovery of a blood-stained axe from the place of occurrence, and after completion of investigation, a charge sheet under Section 302 IPC was filed. The trial court convicted the accused for murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The accused denied the allegations, claiming false implication due to enmity and property disputes.

3. Submissions by Counsel for the Appellant

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the conviction was unsustainable as the prosecution case suffered from material contradictions between the FIR and the testimonies of key witnesses. It was argued that neither of the witnesses had actually seen the assault, making the case purely circumstantial, and the chain of circumstances was incomplete.

It was further submitted that the medical evidence did not fully corroborate the prosecution story, thereby creating doubt. The witnesses were interested and related, and no independent corroboration was available. It was also argued that important links were missing, making false implication a plausible possibility. On these grounds, acquittal on benefit of doubt was sought.

4. Submissions by Counsel for the State

The learned A.G.A. supported the trial court judgment and argued that the prosecution had successfully proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. It was contended that the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 were natural, consistent and trustworthy, and minor discrepancies did not affect the core of the case.
It was further submitted that the ocular evidence was corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of the weapon. The conduct of the accused in fleeing from the spot and failing to explain circumstances under Section 313 Cr.P.C. constituted strong incriminating evidence. The prosecution had established a complete chain of circumstances pointing towards guilt, and hence the appeal deserved dismissal.

5. Order of the Court

The Hon’ble High Court upheld the finding that the accused was responsible for causing the death of the deceased based on a complete chain of circumstantial evidence, including presence at the scene, quarrel, recovery of weapon, and subsequent conduct.
However, the Court observed that the incident occurred in the course of a sudden quarrel without premeditation, and the prosecution failed to establish intention to cause death. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was altered to Section 304 Part II IPC.
Considering that the accused had already undergone more than 15 years of incarceration, exceeding the maximum punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC, the Court held the period already undergone as sufficient sentence. The appeal was partly allowed, and the accused was directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

6. Case Laws Relied Upon
M.C. Ali vs State of Kerala (2010) 4 SCC 573
State of U.P. vs Anil Singh (1988) 3 SCC 686
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State of Maharashtra
Pundalik vs State of Maharashtra
Surinder Kumar vs UT Chandigarh
Rambir vs State (NCT Delhi)
Kesar Singh vs State of Haryana

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court Lucknow

1. Case Details  Ankit Kumar vs State of U.P. through Additional Chief Secretary Health and Family and others. Coram:Hon...
25/04/2026

1. Case Details
Ankit Kumar vs State of U.P. through Additional Chief Secretary Health and Family and others.
Coram:Hon'ble Justice Karunesh Singh Pawar

2. Facts of the Case

The petitioner sought compassionate appointment after the death of his adoptive mother, Smt. Sharda Devi, who worked as a Basic Health Worker. The adoption ceremony took place on the eve of Basant Panchami in 1997 when the petitioner was about six years old. The adoption deed was registered on 15.05 2014.

In an earlier writ petition numbered 19158 of 2017, the court dismissed the compassionate claim due to irregular adoption but directed the Inspector General of Stamp and Registration to investigate the delayed registration. The Inspector General upheld the deed's validity in the order dated 04 July 2018.

A Coordinate Bench recalled its earlier order dated 11.3.24 on 21.8.25 and treated the current petition as a fresh cause of action.

3. Submissions by Petitioner's Counsel
The counsel for the petitioner prayed for a writ of mandamus directing Respondent No. 2 to consider the case for appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules as per the Inspector General's order dated 04 July 2018. It further highlighted compliance with the prior writ judgment dated 18 September 2017.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Prema Gopal versus Central Adoption Resource Authority and others, Special Leave to Appeal 14886 of 2024 decided on 29.1.2025, for the principle that adoption deeds relate back to the ceremony date.
Further reliance was on the Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment in Union of India and another versus Sukhpreet Kaur and another, upholding Section 16 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act presumption for registered deeds.

4. Submissions by Respondent's Counsel
The learned Standing Counsel for the State opposed the claim. He submitted that the petitioner was a major on the date of registration of the adoption deed, which is 15 May 2014. Therefore, the adoption does not qualify under the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956.

5. Order of the Court and Case Laws Relied
The court issued a writ of mandamus directing Respondent No. 2 to consider the petitioner's case for appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules. The petitioner was instructed to submit a fresh representation within two weeks, and Respondent No. 2 shall decide within a further four weeks in accordance with law. The petition was thus disposed of

The case laws relied on
1. Daryao versus State of Delhi
2. Prema Gopal versus Central Adoption Resource Authority

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court Lucknow

1. Case Title: Braham Singh v. State of U.P. & AnotherCase Number: Writ - A No. 7257 of 2025Court: High Court of Judicat...
24/04/2026

1. Case Title: Braham Singh v. State of U.P. & Another
Case Number: Writ - A No. 7257 of 2025
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Bench: Hon’ble Shree Prakash Singh, J.
Date of Decision: 20 April 2026
Citation Reference: WRIT-A No. 7257 of 2025

2. Facts of the Case

The petitioner was initially appointed as Assistant Manager (Civil) in Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority in 2002 and was later promoted to Manager Grade II in 2008 and Manager Grade I in 2014. A complaint was made against him in 2014, leading to departmental proceedings.
In the first inquiry, the petitioner was exonerated. However, after the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Authorities Centralized Services Rules, 2018 came into force, another proceeding was initiated on the same allegations. In the meantime, the Departmental Promotion Committee DPC met on 24.12.2020 for considering promotion to the post of Senior Manager (Civil), but the petitioner’s case was kept in sealed cover.
Later, a punishment of censure was imposed on 25.1.2022, but the same was subsequently cancelled on 11.4.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner sought promotion by way of representation dated 16.4.2025, which came to be rejected by the impugned order dated 12.6.2025.

3. Submissions by Counsel of Petitioner
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had an unblemished service record and had already been promoted on earlier occasions. It was argued that the sealed cover procedure was wrongly applied because, on the date of the DPC, no disciplinary proceeding was legally pending against the petitioner in a manner that could justify withholding promotion.
It was further submitted that the inquiry report had already exonerated the petitioner, and therefore the DPC ought not to have kept his result in sealed cover. Counsel also argued that the subsequent show-cause notice and punishment proceedings could not retrospectively validate the sealed cover procedure adopted in 2020.
Reliance was placed on the judgment in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman and on Union of India v. Doly Loyi, to contend that sealed cover can be adopted only after issuance of a charge-sheet in disciplinary proceedings or filing of a charge-sheet in a criminal case.

4. Submissions by State

Counsel appearing for the State opposed the writ petition and submitted that serious allegations had been made against the petitioner regarding possession of assets and cash not disclosed to the department. It was contended that the petitioner had violated the Conduct Rules and that the matter was not fit for promotion consideration in the normal course.
The State further argued that prosecution sanction had been granted on 18.11.2022 and a criminal charge-sheet was filed on 10.10.2023 before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Meerut. On that basis, it was submitted that the sealed cover procedure was justified and the impugned order rejecting promotion did not call for interference.

5. Order of the Court
The Hon'ble Court held that the sealed cover procedure was wrongly sustained in the facts of the case. It observed that on the date when the DPC met on 24.12.2020, no criminal charge-sheet had been filed and the prosecution sanction came much later.
The Court further held that mere pendency of a sanction request or a preliminary stage of inquiry is not sufficient to attract sealed cover procedure.

Referring to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the order dated 12.6.2025 was unsustainable and accordingly quashed it.

The competent authority was directed to take a fresh decision regarding the petitioner’s promotion to the post of Senior Manager (Civil) within eight weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of the order.

6. Case Laws Relied

Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010.
Union of India v. Doly Loyi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2613.

The Court also referred to the Government Order dated 28.5.1997 governing sealed cover procedure in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Edited by Adv. Swati Sinha
High Court
Lucknow

16/04/2026
Case detailsCase: CRLA No. 452 of 1998Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow BenchBench: Hon’ble Subhash ...
13/04/2026

Case details
Case: CRLA No. 452 of 1998
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Bench: Hon’ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.
Date: April 2, 2026

Facts of the case

The offense was committed more than 50 years ago, with appellants convicted and sentenced for one year of RI and Rs 20000 fine under 120 B IPC and Section 5(2)read with Section 5(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act.

Appellant Nos. 3 and 5 were now aged 90 and 88 years respectively, with no subsequent offenses during the intervening period. The trial court omitted to consider the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, leading to the current appeal challenging conviction and seeking probation on grounds of advanced age and time elapsed.

Submission by Counsel of appellant

Counsel for the appellants Abhinav Srivastava argued that the lower courts failed to mandatorily consider Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, as per Supreme Court precedents, occasioning a failure of justice. He submitted that incarcerating 90-year-old and 88-year-old appellants after over half a century serves no reformative, preventive, or deterrent purpose. With a clean record for nearly four decades post-sentencing, full probation benefit should be extended without further supervision or fine recovery.

Order of the Court

The Hon'ble Bench disposed of the appeal by upholding the conviction of Appellant Nos. 3 and 5 but granting them the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. No incarceration or fine recovery was ordered , and no further probation period was imposed as nearly four decades have elapsed since sentencing with no other offenses committed. The court held this aligns with the reformative intent of the Act for such aged offenders.

Case laws relied

Keshav Sitaram Sali v. State of Maharashtra (1968)
Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971)
R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration

Edited by
Adv. Swati Sinha
DRS Chambers
High Court, Lucknow

Case detailsCase: Nirmal Kumar v. State of U.P.Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2019Court: High Court of Judicature ...
09/04/2026

Case details
Case: Nirmal Kumar v. State of U.P.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2019
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Bench: Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J. and Hon’ble Brij Raj Singh, J.

Facts of the case
The prosecution story alleged that the victim, a 14-year-old mentally challenged girl, was left alone at home while her father was away, and the appellant, a neighbour, enticed her to his house and r***d her on 20 September 2010. It was further alleged that she later informed her father and relatives including mother and sister about the incident. She died on 23 September 2010 before the FIR was lodged three days after the incident.

The FIR was registered under Sections 376, 302 and 506 IPC. The trial court held the appellant guilty of 376 IPC.

Submission by Counsel of appellant

The trial judgment records that there was no direct evidence against the appellant and no one had actually seen him enticing the victim away or committing r**e. The defence also relied on the delay of three days in filing FIR , the absence of the victim’s recorded statement before police or Magistrate, the lack of medical proof linking the semen to the appellant, and the incomplete chain of circumstances. The appellant’s side also argued that criminal history alone could not prove guilt though the appellant had a history of 7 criminal cases.

Submissions by the Counsel of Respondent

The State represented by AAG Vimal Kumar Srivastava assisted by Raj Deep Singh AGA 1 argued that the victim’s statements to her father, sister and villagers amounted to relevant evidence and that the forensic report showing human semen on the vaginal swab of the victim supported the prosecution case. Reliance was placed on Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and judgments including State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat, Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Shyam Singh Hada v. State, and Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor.

The State contended that even if murder was not proved, the victim’s statement could still be relied as dying declaration to establish r**e .

Order of the Court
The Hon'ble High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction under Section 376 IPC, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that the forensic evidence only showed sexual in*******se, not that the semen belonged to the appellant, and the oral statements relied upon were not legally sufficient in the facts of the case.

The statement of the girl was never recorded nor her mother was produced as a witness. The case was of circumstantial evidence and the chain of event was not complete so as to establish the guilt of the accused.

The appellant was directed to be released forthwith, subject to compliance with bond requirements under Section 437-A CrPC / Section 481 BNSS.

Case laws relied
The State relied upon these authorities: State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat
Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh Shyam Singh Hada and Ors. v. State
Pakala Narayana Swami v.
Emperor

Edited by
Adv. Swati Sinha
High Court, Lucknow

1. Details of the Case Case: Km. Rukaiya Bano vs State of U.P. & OthersCourt: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Luc...
25/03/2026

1. Details of the Case
Case: Km. Rukaiya Bano vs State of U.P. & Others
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Case No.: Writ - A No. 2765 of 2026
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Manish Mathur
Date of Judgment: 13 March 2026

2. Facts of the Case

The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction to the concerned authorities to consider her medical reimbursement claim for expenses incurred during treatment.
The claim was rejected by the State authorities solely on the ground that it had not been submitted within a period of 30 days from the commencement of treatment as required under Paragraph 11(Kha) of the Government Order dated 27.12.2016. It is pertinent to note that apart from this delay, no other deficiency or ground for rejection of the petitioner’s claim was indicated in the written instructions produced before the Court.

3. Submissions by Counsel for the Petitioner

counsel for the petitioner submitted that the rejection of the claim merely on account of delay was arbitrary and unsustainable in law. It was contended that the requirement of submitting intimation within 30 days is not mandatory but directory in nature, particularly in light of the expression “यथासंभव” (as far as possible) used in the provision. It was further argued that medical reimbursement provisions are beneficial in nature and intended to secure reimbursement of genuine medical expenses incurred by employees, and therefore such provisions must be interpreted liberally so as to advance their object rather than defeat legitimate claims on technical grounds.

4. Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent
Respondent State Counsel, on the basis of written instructions, submitted that the petitioner’s claim had been rightly rejected in accordance with Paragraph 11 of the Government Order dated 27.12.2016, as the intimation was not provided within 30 days from the commencement of treatment. It was contended that compliance with the prescribed timeline was necessary for processing such claims.
However, it was not disputed that no other ground for rejection of the claim existed on record.

5. Order of the Court
The Hon’ble Court, upon consideration of the rival submissions and the relevant Government Order, held that the requirement of submitting intimation within 30 days cannot be treated as mandatory in nature. The Court observed that the use of the expression “as far as possible” clearly indicates that the provision is directory and intended to ensure timely information to the authorities rather than to defeat genuine claims. The Court further emphasized that provisions relating to medical reimbursement are beneficial and partake the character of social welfare legislation, which must be interpreted in a liberal and purposive manner.
It was thus held that rejection of the petitioner’s claim solely on the ground of delay was erroneous.

Accordingly, the Court directed the competent authority to reconsider the petitioner’s claim expeditiously, with a direction to verify the medical bills within six weeks and to ensure payment within two weeks thereafter if the claim is found admissible. With these directions, the writ petition was allowed.

6. Case Laws Relied Upon

Mohinder Singh Gill & Others vs Chief Election Commissioner

May George vs Special Tahsildar

K.H. Nazar vs Mathew K. Jacob

Urmila Dixit vs Sunil Sharan Dixit

Brahampal @ Sammay vs National Insurance Company

Adv Swati Sinha
High Court, Lucknow

1. Details of the CaseMagghu Ram vs State of U.P. & OthersWrit - C No. 1779 of 2026Before the High Court of Judicature a...
23/03/2026

1. Details of the Case
Magghu Ram vs State of U.P. & Others
Writ - C No. 1779 of 2026
Before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Subhash Vidyarthi

2. Facts of the Case
The petitioner, Magghu Ram, claimed ownership and possession over a portion of land bearing Plot No. 102 Ka situated in Ayodhya, which he had purchased along with his wife through a registered sale deed in 2005. However, the sale deed was executed only by some co-tenure holders and not all, despite the land being jointly recorded.

Subsequently, the petitioner sold a part of the land in 2013 and retained a smaller portion. A dispute arose when respondent no. 6 allegedly attempted to encroach upon the remaining land in possession of the petitioner.

The petitioner approached authorities and ultimately invoked Article 227 of the Constitution seeking directions to the District Magistrate under Section 22 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 for protection of life and property, along with police protection.

Meanwhile, it was brought on record that partition proceedings under the U.P. Revenue Code were already underway, and a revision was pending before the Additional Commissioner.

3. Submissions by Counsel for the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel argued that:
The District Magistrate is duty-bound under Section 22 of the Maintenance Act to ensure protection of life and property of the petitioner.
Authorities should intervene and provide police protection to prevent unlawful dispossession.

Reliance was placed on a prior order of the High Court in Gulab Kali vs State of U.P., to support the claim for intervention by the State authorities.

4. Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent
The State, relying on instructions from the Sub-Divisional Officer, contended that:
The land in question is part of a joint holding (Gata No. 102 Ka) with multiple recorded tenure holders.
Partition proceedings have already been initiated and are pending before the competent authority.
The dispute is essentially one of title and possession between private parties, and thus falls outside the purview of the Maintenance Act.

5. Order of the Court
The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that:
The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is intended to provide maintenance and welfare to senior citizens, particularly against children or relatives, and not to adjudicate property disputes between unrelated parties.

It was further held that authorities under the Act, including the District Magistrate, do not have jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to title or possession of immovable property.

Such disputes require detailed adjudication involving pleadings, evidence, and trial, which can only be undertaken by competent civil or revenue courts.

Since partition proceedings were already pending before the revisional authority, no parallel remedy under the Maintenance Act could be invoked.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with liberty that the pending revision be decided on merits, uninfluenced by the dismissal of the present petition.

6. Case Laws Relied Upon
Gulab Kali vs State of U.P. & Others

Edited by
Adv. Swati Sinha
High Court
Lucknow

21/03/2026

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗡𝗲𝘄 𝗦𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲 𝗜𝘀 𝗥𝗲𝘄𝗿𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗛𝗥 𝗥𝘂𝗹𝗲𝘀. 🚨

𝘞𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘪𝘴 𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘏𝘙 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘍𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘶𝘱 𝘢𝘵 𝘯𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘳𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘸𝘰𝘳𝘬 𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘳.

𝐖𝐞 𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝐛𝐫𝐨𝐤𝐞𝐧 𝐝𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐩𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐦𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐡𝐞𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐛𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐰.

➤ Here are the 𝟔 𝐦𝐚𝐣𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐟𝐭𝐬 you need to prepare for right now:
❶. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝟓𝟎% 𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐑𝐮𝐥𝐞 ⚖️
Under Section 2(88), the definition of "wages" is standardized. If excluded allowances (like HRA, conveyance) exceed 50% of an employee's total remuneration, the excess is automatically added back to "wages." Employers must restructure salaries so Basic + DA forms at least 50% of the gross salary, directly increasing your statutory PF and Gratuity liabilities.
❷. 𝐀𝐧𝐭𝐢-𝐄𝐯𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐚𝐟𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐬 🛡️
Anticipating that companies might try to reduce an employee's in-hand pay to offset the increased statutory costs, Section 124 strictly prohibits employers from reducing current wages—directly or indirectly. You cannot pass the burden of new PF/Gratuity liabilities onto the worker to keep their CTC neutral.
❸. 𝐏𝐫𝐨-𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐚 𝐆𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐅𝐓𝐄𝐬 💰
Under Section 53, the traditional 5-year continuous service rule is disrupted. Fixed-Term Employees (FTEs) are now entitled to gratuity on a pro-rata basis based on their contract term—even if it is just for one year. This closes the massive historical loophole of rolling 11-month contracts.
❹. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐆𝐢𝐠 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐲 𝐀𝐠𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫 𝐋𝐞𝐯𝐲 🛵
Sections 109 & 114 officially recognize the gig economy, mandating welfare schemes for these workers. Critically, tech "Aggregators" must now contribute 1% to 2% of their annual turnover (capped at 5% of the amount payable to gig workers) to a dedicated Social Security Fund. This creates a massive new financial vertical.
❺. 𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐌𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐁𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐟𝐢𝐭𝐬 🏥
The ESI framework (Section 45) is drastically expanded. ESI coverage can now be applied to any hazardous occupation establishment, even if it has just a single employee. Start-ups and micro-units that previously flew under the 10-employee radar must now register and manage monthly ESIC contributions.
❻. 𝐌𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐃𝐢𝐠𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐈𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐲 🆔
Under Section 142, 100% Aadhaar seeding is now a primary compliance lever. Employees and unorganised workers must establish their identity via Aadhaar to receive any social security benefits. Failure to link Aadhaar will prevent employers from depositing PF or ESI, leading to immediate compliance defaults.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐁𝐨𝐭𝐭𝐨𝐦 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐞:
The consolidation of these laws represents a structural shift toward greater transparency, safety, and long-term social security for India's modern workforce.


Post courtsey
Labour Law Reporter

Case DetailsWRIT - C No. - 1000273 of 2005Sahab Das (Objection Filed) ..PetitionersVersusAdditional Commissioner Judicia...
20/03/2026

Case Details
WRIT - C No. - 1000273 of 2005
Sahab Das (Objection Filed) ..Petitioners
Versus
Additional Commissioner Judicial Lucknow Division and another ..Respondents
Bench :Hon'ble Justice Irshad Ali Counsel for Petitioner:Govind Saran Nigam, Abhisht Saran

Facts of the Case

The petitioner, Sahab Das ,a landless Scheduled Caste agricultural laborer from the SC community possessed Plot area measuring 0.400 hectares, in Tehsil Hasanganj, District Unnao, since before 03.06.1995. The Pargana Adhikari granted him Bhumidhar rights with non-transferable rights under Section 122-B(4-F) on 09.01.1998, following a Tehsil inquiry confirming possession. Respondent No. 2 who was ex-Pradhan secured an ex-parte recall on 18.07.1998. The petitioner recalled it on 25.09.2003 as the petitioner did not get opportunity of hearing.
After hearing both sides. Respondent No. 1 allowed the revision against this on 10.08.2004, prompting the writ.

Submissions of Petitioner's Counsel

The counsel submitted that the revisional authority exceeded jurisdiction by setting aside the lawful 25.09.2003 order, which merely recalled the ex-parte 18.07.1998 order to restore a hearing opportunity, without addressing merits. The petitioner qualified under Section 122-B(4-F) with verified pre-1995 possession as a landless SC laborer. Respondent No. 2 lacked locus standi over Gaon Sabha land. Restoration of the ex-parte order violated natural justice, rendering it void. It was also argued that balance of convenience favored the petitioner to prevent dispossession.

Submissions of Respondent's Counsel

The Additional CSC from the state side argued that regularization relied on a forged 1998 Lekhpal report without pre-03.06.1995 evidence or inquiry. It was submitted 09.01.1998 order was rightly cancelled on 18.07.1998 post-probe Lekhpal faced departmental action.
The plot was reserved for Jwala Devi Bal Vidya Mandir on 17.05.1995. There was no Khasra/Khatauni possession entry in record and the petitioner's 1999 restoration was time-barred without delay condonation. The writ was maintainable only via Board of Revenue revision under Section 333.

Order of the Court

The court allowed the writ petition and quashed the 10.08.2004 revisional order as illegal and without jurisdiction, since Section 122-B(4-F) orders (and related recalls) are non-revisable, and it allowed an ex-parte violation of natural justice. It restored the 25.09.2003 order, directing the Pargana Adhikari to rehear the recall application on merits after affording opportunities to both parties.

Case Laws Relied Upon

Petitioner relied on:
Manorey Manohar v. Board of Revenue (2003)
Sushila v. State of UP (2015) Ganga Raman Sharma v. State of UP (2016)
Brahmanand v. State of UP (2019) Bhola v. State of UP (2022)

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court
Lucknow

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABADLUCKNOWCRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 9 of 2016Ajay Kumar Versus State of U.P.Delivered on 2...
08/03/2026

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 9 of 2016
Ajay Kumar
Versus
State of U.P.

Delivered on 20.02.2026
Court
HON'BLE JUSTICE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN
HON'BLE JUSTICE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY

Per: Hon'ble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.

Facts of the Case

On 22.04.2011, watchman Omchand Yadav reported discovering two dead bodies in Rakhuna Chiloki forest. A woman later identified as Shubhangi in a 5-foot pit with a gamcha around her neck, and an 8-9 year old girl 50 meters away in a drain with cloth tied around her neck, while scattered clothes and items were found nearby. Post-mortem confirmed death by ante-mortem strangulation for both. FIR under Section 302 IPC was registered against unknown persons, and investigation linked appellant Ajay Kumar via a notary affidavit recovered from the spot allegedly documenting his court marriage with Shubhangi, leading to charges and trial court conviction for life imprisonment plus fine based on circumstantial evidence.

Submissions by Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was not named in the FIR and the conviction relies on an incomplete chain of circumstantial evidence, including no recovery of articles from the appellant's possession, absence of proven motive since the appellant was not a beneficiary of the deaths unlike PW-6 Ganesh, unproven marriage as the notary affidavit was neither produced nor proved by witnesses, and unreliable last-seen witnesses who were interested parties with major contradictions. It was also argued that delayed statements recorded over 75 days post-incident by the Investigating Officer provided inconsistent testimony of witnesses.

Counsel further contended that the incident likely occurred around 21.04.2011 based on post-mortem timing, yet no evidence placed the appellant with the deceased near the crime spot, and the 300 km distance from the victims' home village remained unexplained. These circumstances warranting acquittal under principles of criminal jurisprudence favoring doubt.

Submissions by Counsel for Respondent

Counsel for the respondent, A.G.A., supported the trial court's conviction by asserting that it meticulously analyzed the evidence on record and that the contradictions highlighted by the appellant's counsel were minor human errors without material impact on witness veracity.

It was also stressed that the last-seen evidence reliably established the appellant with the deceased shortly before the murders, properly invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act due to the appellant's failure to explain the deaths, thereby completing the chain of circumstances proving guilt.

Order of the Court

The Hon'ble Court allowed the appeal, reversed and set aside the trial court's judgment dated 05.10.2015 convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and acquitted Ajay Kumar, directing his release .

In detailed analysis, the court found the prosecution failed to establish a complete unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence: discovery of bodies and homicidal strangulation were proved, but the notary affidavit linking marriage vanished without proof or witnesses, rendering the relationship unreliable amid contradictory village testimonies from interested witnesses unaware of basic details like the child's name or appellant's occupation and origin.

Motive was also unproved as PW-6 Ganesh's sole claim of threats lacked prior complaint or police statement and on the contrary benefited Ganesh via inheritance.

Critically, the court laid heavy stress on Section 106 Evidence Act, holding it inapplicable as last-seen theory lacked proximity with a 3-4 day gap before bodies found 300 km away, delayed witness statements over 75 days causing memory fade, and internal contradictions among PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-6 who provided vague, inconsistent timings and admissions of not seeing them together or omitting details to police.

Relying on Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer (AIR 1956 SC 404) that Section 106 IEA only applies to facts especially within accused's knowledge after prosecution proves foundational facts, and precedents like Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra (2012 10 SCC 373), Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar (2021 10 SCC 725), and Anees v. State NCT of Delhi (2024 15 SCC 48) emphasizing that there is no shift of onus without complete prosecution case.

The court stressed failure to invoke Section 106 validly by State as prosecution hadn't established basic facts for inference, rendering appellant's non-explanation irrelevant under Section 106 IEA.

Case Laws Relied
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
Nandu Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh
Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer
Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra
Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar
Anees v. State NCT of Delhi

Edited by
Adv Swati Sinha
High Court
Lucknow

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