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25/01/2026

The Kerala High Court has held that the title 'doctor' does not belong exclusively to medical professionals and that physiotherapists and occupational therapists can use the 'Dr.' prefix.

Justice V.G. Arun pronounced the judgment dismissing the pleas preferred by Indian Medical Association, Indian Association Of Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation (IAPMR) and its Secretary.

The Court had earlier passed an interim order against the usage of "Dr." prefix by physiotherapists and occupational therapists who do not possess recognised medical qualification.

While dismissing the petitions, the Court held that the National Medical Commission (NMC) Act does not contain any provision that confers the title 'doctor' to medical professionals. Noting also that the term 'doctor' is meant for persons who have achieved the highest level of learning, the Court observed:

"The challenge against the use of prefix 'Dr' by Physiotherapists will not also hold good since the NMC or the allied statutes does not provide for the use of the prefix 'Dr' by qualified medical professionals...Therefore the contention that the title 'Doctor' exclusively belongs to medical professionals is a misconception since even now, like in the olden times, persons with higher educational qualifications like PhD are entitled to use the title 'Doctor'."

It also rejected the contention of the petitioners that the word 'title' used in Section 40 of the Kerala State Medical Practitioners Act statutorily entitles them to use 'Dr' prefix to their names to the exclusion of others.

"the NMC Act does not contain any provision for conferring the title Doctor on qualified medical professionals. The expression title used in Section 40 of the Kerala State Medical Practitioners Act cannot therefore be understood as statutorily entitling the qualified medical professionals to prefix 'Dr' to their names. In the absence of such provision, the petitioners cannot claim exclusive right to use the prefix 'Dr'," the Court observed.

The petitioners in this case were qualified medical professionals and they were aggrieved by the status and powers conferred to Physiotherapists and Occupational Therapists by the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Profession Act, 2021 (NCAHP Act) as well as the Competency-Based Curriculum for Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy.

They had sought reading down of certain provisions of the NCAHP Act and the Curriculum to be contrary to the NMC Act. Further, it was contended that physiotherapists and occupational therapists only extend supporting service while specialist medical professionals alone can give first hand healthcare.

They were also aggrieved that the Curriculum permits physiotherapists and occupational therapists to use 'Dr. prefix along with "PT" and "OT" as suffixes, equating them with modern medical practitioners.

Reliance was placed on various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court to contend that the use of 'Dr.' prefix by physiotherapists would mislead the general public into assuming them to be qualified allopathic doctors, leading to disastrous consequences.

On behalf of the respondents, a challenge to the maintainability of the petitions, initiated at the instance of a few doctors, was made out. It was contended that the National Medical Commission had not made any objection to the Curriculum or use the use of 'Dr.' prefix.

The physiotherapists argued that it was an independent and district branch of health science, falling with Allied Health and Rehabilitation Services. Moreover, the Curriculum also recognises them as first contact health providers within their domain. Further, it was contended the Court cannot exercise writ jurisdiction to read down provisions of law contrary to legislative intent and policy.

On behalf of the occupational therapists, arguments were raised regarding the overriding effect of the NCAHP Act, which would prevail over the NMC Act as the former is a subsequent enactment.

The Court, at the inception, looked into the circumstances that led to the enactment of the NCAHP Act:

"Till recently, the health force in the Indian scenario had focused mainly on a few cadres such as qualified modern medicine practitioners, nurses and front-line workers, while the professionals belonging to the healthcare sector were generally termed as para-medical professionals. The advancement in the health sector and the changing preferences of consumers and service providers warranted a fresh vision of healthcare delivery with a patient-centric approach and focus on moving to a multi-disciplinary team based care."

It also looked into the definitions of 'allied and health professional' and 'healthcare professional' under the Act and remarked that a healthcare professional is entitled to provide preventive, curative, rehabilitative, ther**eutic and promotional health services.

The Court then observed that in the absence of any specific challenge to the provisions, it cannot normally read them down. It found no compelling reason to do the same either and felt it would be inappropriate for it to intervene with the policy of the government, especially at the instance of only a few medical professionals.

The Bench also took note of the overriding effect of the NCAHP Act, the fact that the National Medical Commission was also heard before the Parliamentary Committee made its recommendation.

Taking all these into consideration, the Court dismissed the petitions.

Case No: W.P.(C) No.41064 of 2025 and connected cases

Case Title: Indian Association Of Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation (IAPMR) v. Union of India and Ors. and connected cases

25/01/2026

Chief Justice of India Surya Kant on Saturday said that the future of High Courts lies in their ability to act as proactive custodians of the Constitution, remain alert to systemic failures of governance and work towards transforming access to justice from a mere right into a State-guaranteed service.

“The future of the High Court depends on its ability to act as a pro-active custodian of Constitution. It must not only wait for a knock on the its door but it also must remain alert to systemic failures to the rule of law. The goal must be to transfer the access to justice from a right to a State guaranteed service”, he said.

The CJI further said Article 226 of the Constitution is the lifeline of constitutional justice and affirms that the State remains subject to the rule of law. He identified the power to grant interim relief as one of the most critical yet often overlooked aspects of Article 226. Emphasising that justice delayed is justice destroyed, he said the ability of High Courts to stay executive action at the very first hearing is often the only real protection available to citizens.

"Justice delayed is not justice denied it is justice destroyed. The HCs ability to stay an executive action in the very first hearing is often the only real access the citizens ever experiences. It is the hallmark of the constitutional courts protective jurisdiction u/a 226 to intervene at the threshold and ensuring status quo is preserved."

The Chief Justice was delivering the Fali Nariman Lecture organised by the Bombay Bar Association in Mumbai. His address was on the theme “Role of High Courts and Wide Discretionary Powers under Article 226.”

He said the Constitution does not merely distribute power but also distributes remedies against misuse of power. Article 226, he said, was conceived to ensure that citizens are never left defenceless against the State and that the majesty of law is never far from the common person.

Highlighting the distinction between Articles 32 and 226, he said while Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, Article 226 derives its expansive reach from the phrase “for any other purpose”.

He described this inclusion as a deliberate constitutional choice that empowers High Courts to correct legal injuries, enforce statutory duties and restrain arbitrary administrative action.

“There is a subtle and profound distinction which makes High Courts the first constitutional court for the citizens. While Article 32 is a fundamental right in itself, Article 226 by contrast is a journalist with a power of a titan, the inclusion of the phrase "For any other purpose" in Art 226 was a masterstroke by the makers of the Constitution. It ensures that the High Court's reach is not confined but it extends to correction of any legal injury, the enforcement of statutory duties and the containment of administrative caprice”, he said.

Describing High Courts as the primary sentinels of constitutional governance, the Chief Justice said they ensure that the rule of law is not a distant, Delhi-centric concept.

This role, he said, is reflected in how High Courts apply the doctrine of alternate remedy. While the law generally expects litigants to exhaust other remedies, the discretion of the High Court operates as a safety valve, he highlighted.

The Chief Justice highlighted the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 allows High Courts to hear the first grievance of a citizen. This decentralised constitutional power, he said, preserves the federal balance.

“This extraordinary jurisdiction is what makes the High Courts the sentinel, the court which hears the first cry of the child, whether it is an illegal detention, right to live a dignified life, mandate to the administration. Article 226 ensures that the majesty of law is never more than a few miles away from the common man. It is this decentralised strength that maintains the federal balance of our republic. And it proves that while the Supreme Court may have a final word but the High Court often has the most vital one.”

On matters filed directly before the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice said he often questions why litigants bypass High Courts despite the availability of an effective constitutional remedy under Article 226. He cautioned against creating the impression that only those who are affluent can enforce their perceived rights under Article 32.

“I had to sometimes observe that let's not give an impression that those who are affluent and can afford can have the privilege of enforcement of their perceived rights through Article 32. If Article 226 is armour of the citizens then access to justice is a promise that this armour available to all not to some privileged and luxurious few. It is a substantive assurance that law will speak to your grievance with empathy and effectiveness”, he emphasised, adding that High Courts are central to the democratisation of justice.

He also pointed out that the geographical and procedural distance of the Supreme Court can be intimidating for ordinary citizens. In this context, he said, High Courts play a crucial role in bridging the gap between the letter of the law and the lived realities of people.

Highlighting other facets of Article 226, the Chief Justice said the power of High Courts to take suo motu cognisance enables them to respond to injustice even in the absence of formal petitions.

He highlighted that High Courts have also used Article 226 to address legislative vacuums by issuing temporary directions to protect the environment, ensure the dignity of prisoners and secure the rights of migrant workers during national crises.

The Chief Justice said High Courts must also evolve their practices to remain effective. He stressed the need for procedural innovation, including streamlined adjudication for clear-cut writ matters.

Referring to the concept of continuing mandamus, he said this judicial innovation allows courts to monitor compliance over time instead of issuing one-time directions. He recalled using this approach during his tenure at the Punjab and Haryana High Court while dealing with the issue of creating a drug-free Punjab.

He also spoke about the challenges posed by technology-driven governance and automated decision-making. He said technology must be harnessed to ensure equality and access to justice, and that digital reforms must focus on accessibility and affordability rather than remain limited to virtual hearings as an emergency measure.

Concluding, the Chief Justice likened the Constitution to a river born from hope, sacrifice and vision. He said that over seven decades, this river has deepened and widened, continuing to nourish India's democratic framework as it flows through challenges and progress.

“India's Constitution is like a mighty river, bore from the confidence of hope, sacrifice and vision. It begins as a pure spring in the mountains of freedom, weaving its way through valleys of challenges and plains of progress. In the early years, the river of our Constitution was still finding its course, cutting through the fresh soil of a young democracy. Over seven decades, the river of our Constitution has deepened, widened and nourished the land of India”, the CJI said.

07/12/2025

Addressing the environmental impact of religious ceremonies during festivals in India, former Supreme Court judge Justice Abhay Oka recently said that an act that damages the environment in the name of religion shall not be protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.

"while performing so called religious ceremonies, we damage our rivers, seas and lakes and we pollute water. Article 25 protects right to worship and to perform essential religious ceremonies, since it is subject to other articles of part III, the act of damaging environment in the name of religion is not protected. We can avoid this only when we have a scientific temper" the former judge said.

Justice Oka stressed on the use of loudspeakers and pollution of rivers during festivals and other religious ceremonies to highlight that use of technology does not necessarily mean existence of scientific temper.

He questioned, "Can we claim that we did not damage and pollute our rivers? Can we say that our rivers will remain holy with all the pollution we have caused to our rivers?"

Further, lamenting the superstitions prevailing in India, Justice Oka commented that anyone who proposes religious reforms gets targeted by religious groups and it is projected as if the reforms are interfering with the rights under Article 25 of the Constitution. He also highlighted how the political class, which seeks to appease voters in the name of religion, does not care about reforms.

On the State's duties under Article 51A and its failure to perform them, Justice Oka further said, "recently I read in the newspaper that there is a proposal to cut hundred years old trees for the Kumbh Mela in Nashik which is to take place in 2027. Apart from the failure of individual citizens to develop scientific temper, why does it happen? It happens because of the failure of the collective fundamental duty of the State to abide by Article 51A."

He added that if we had perfectly performed our duty of developing scientific temper and state of reforms, we would not have allowed killing and sacrificing of animals or the indiscriminate use of loudspeakers during festivals.

07/12/2025

In a significant step toward strengthening the rights and dignity of prisoners with disabilities, the Supreme Court has directed all States and Union Territories to implement a comprehensive, disability-inclusive framework across their prison systems. A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta issued the directions while hearing a PIL filed by Sathyan Naravoor seeking adequate facilities and a proper legal regime for inmates with disabilities.

The Court noted that many of the concerns raised in the petition had already been addressed in L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu, where extensive guidelines were framed for Tamil Nadu prisons. Observing that these safeguards must apply nationwide, the Bench formally extended the Muruganantham directives to all States and UTs.

Nationwide Compliance With Disability-Rights Standards

The Court held that prison conditions across the country were “deficient” in addressing the needs of prisoners with disabilities and that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 was not being adequately implemented. It recorded submissions that several prison manuals lack mandatory accessibility provisions such as ramps, assistive devices, accessible toilets, and ther**eutic facilities.

Directing uniform adoption of the Muruganantham framework, the Court mandated that all prisons must maintain wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible infrastructure, dedicated therapy rooms, trained medical staff, appropriate diets, regular physiotherapy, and disability-sensitive procedures.

Additional Directions Issued

Apart from extending the earlier directions nationwide, the Court added several fresh mandates:

Independent grievance redressal mechanism: Every State and UT must create a robust, accessible complaints system specifically for prisoners with disabilities to protect them from abuse and neglect.
Inclusive education: No prisoner should be denied educational opportunities due to disability. Prisons must provide suitable adjustments to enable their participation.
Section 89 of RPwD Act to apply: The penal consequences for contravention of disability-rights obligations,fines up to ₹5 lakh,must apply mutatis mutandis to prison establishments. Authorities are required to spread awareness of this provision among prison staff and related stakeholders.
Assistive devices: While noting security concerns, the Court sought a detailed plan from each State and UT on providing and maintaining mobility aids and other assistive equipment within prisons.
Enhanced visitation rights: Inmates with benchmark disabilities must receive improved visitation arrangements to ensure emotional support and monitoring of their needs. States must frame specific modalities balancing security and accessibility.
Compliance Reports Due By April 2026

The Bench directed all States and UTs to file comprehensive compliance reports within four months. These must outline steps taken to implement both the Muruganantham guidelines and the additional directives issued in this order, along with proposed mechanisms for assistive aid provision and other measures.

The petition will next be taken up on April 7, 2026, for review of the compliance reports.

Case : SATHYAN NARAVOOR v. UNION OF INDIA | Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 182/2025

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07/12/2025

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22/10/2025

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22/10/2025

The Madras High Court recently said that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act would prevail over the muslim personal laws, and an adopted child will have the same status as that of a biological child.

“ A combined reading of Section 1(4) and 63 of the JJ Act, 2015 in the light of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India leads me to conclude that it will prevail over Muslim Personal Law and an adopted child will have the same status of a biological child in all matters and an adopted child cannot be given a second class status,” the court said.
Justice GR Swaminathan also highlighted administrative delays in adoption procedures and said that such delays deprive the child of the formative experiences and opportunities that could alter their life's trajectory. The court thus highlighted that the authorities under the Juvenile Justice Act are obliged to speed up the adoption process.

“ Some reports indicate that as many as 13 prospective parents are waiting for every single child declared legally free for adoption. This imbalance along with procedural delays means that many children spend their crucial early years in institutional care rather than in stable, loving homes. Such delays risk denying them the timely access to a nurturing environment essential for their overall well-being, development, and equitable life opportunities,” the court highlighted.
The court was hearing a petition filed by a Muslim man against the registering authority's refusal to register an adoption deed presented by him. It was submitted that he and his wife did not have any children of their own, and when his brother passed away, leaving behind his wife and three children, his wife came forward to give one child in adoption to the petitioner and his wife. The adoption deed dated September 13, 2025, was executed and presented for adoption, but the authorities refused to register it. Against this, the petition was filed.

The court noted that though the Islamic religion does not recognise adoption, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, both the 2000 and the 2015 ones, allowed adoption by willing parents de hors their religious background.

The court also noted that as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Shabnam Hasmi v Union of India, the Juvenile Justice Act gave a choice to the persons to either adopt by following the provisions of the Act or by following the dictates of the personal law applicable to them. This meant that even though Islam and Christianity did not recognise adoption, a person belonging to these religions was free to adopt as per the statutory scheme.

However, the court added that the provisions of the Act would not apply to the adoption of Hindus since it had been specifically excluded under Section 56(3) of the Juvenile Justice Act 2015.

In the present case, the court noted that since the parties were Muslims, they had to follow the procedure laid down un the JJ Act 2015 and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. The court noted that as per the Adoption Regulations 2022, the parties had to approach the District Child Protection Unit and the District Magistrate. The court added that the parties could not seek the easy option of executing an adoption deed and getting it registered.

The court also highlighted that the term “consent of child” provided under the Regulations should be understood holistically and the District Magistrate should satisfy itself that the adoption is for the welfare of the child and must give due consideration to the child's wishes.

Thus, though the court was not inclined to grant the relief sought for, the court directed the parties to proceed under the procedure laid down in the Adoption Regulations 2022. The court also directed the Child Protection Unit to complete the verification process within 3 weeks after the application is uploaded in the portal and also directed the District Magistrate to dispose of the application within 3 weeks.

Case Title: K Heerajohn v. The District Registrar and Another

Case No: W.P(MD)No.27615 of 2025

01/09/2025

Supreme Court Bar Association flags low representation of women in higher judiciary
The resolution notes no woman judge elevated in latest Supreme Court appointments; several High Courts have none

The Hindu Bureau

The association said senior advocate Vikas Singh had written to Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai in May and July urging that proportional representation for women judges be ensured both in the top court and in the High Courts.

The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) on Saturday (August 30, 2025) passed a resolution expressing grave concern over the “disproportionately low” representation of women judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts.

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The resolution was adopted by the lawyers’ body headed by its president, senior advocate Vikas Singh, and secretary, advocate Priya Baghel, a day after Justices Alok Aradhe and Vipul M. Pancholi were sworn in as Supreme Court judges.

Also read: Justice Nagarathna raises questions in dissent to Justice Pancholi’s Supreme Court elevation

The appointment of Justice Pancholi, who is in line to be the Chief Justice of India for over 1.7 years in 2031, came despite the solitary dissent of Supreme Court Collegium member and lone woman top court judge, Justice B.V. Nagarathna.

The recommendation of Justice Pancholi, who was ranked 57 in the seniority list of High Court judges across the country, came under criticism among prominent women lawyers. Senior advocate Indira Jaising had pointed out that he had superseded three women High Court judges senior to him. The previous appointment of women judges to the Supreme Court was in 2021.

The Supreme Court gender gap: Women judges, fewer in number, have shorter tenures

“The SCBA expresses its strong disappointment that in the recent round of appointments to the Supreme Court, no woman judge from the Bar or the Bench was elevated,” the resolution said.

The association said Mr. Singh had written to Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai in May and July urging that proportional representation for women judges be ensured both in the top court and in the High Courts.

“Several High Courts like Uttarakhand, Tripura, Meghalaya and Manipur presently have no women judges. Across the country there are about 1,100 sanctioned posts of High Court judges, out of which nearly 670 are occupied by men and only 103 by women,” the SCBA pointed out.

Related Topics
Supreme Court / court administration / judiciary (system of justice) / judge

The Hindu

20/08/2025

The 130th Constitution (Amendment) Bill, which proposes to remove a Central or State Minister (including the Prime Minister and Chief Minister) from office if they are arrested and detained for 30 days in relation to an offence punishable with 5 years (or more) imprisonment, has been referred by the Lok Sabha to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.

The Bill was introduced today by Home Minister Amit Shah alongwith two other Bills for corresponding amendments in Union Territories' laws, that is, the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019.

While the motion to introduce the Bills was met with heavy opposition by political leaders including Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM), Manish Tewari (INC), NK Premchandran (RSP), KC Venugopal (INC) and Dharmendra Yadav (SP), the Bill was eventually allowed to be introduced as a result of the voting process. A separate motion to refer the Bills to a Joint Committee was also similarly allowed.

Cumulatively, the 3 Bills propose to empower the President/Governor/Lieutenant Governor to remove a Central/State/Union Territory Minister from office if they are jailed for 30 days on allegations of involvement in a serious offense. They were referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee, consisting of 21 Lok Sabha members and 10 Rajya Sabha members.

The 130th Constitution (Amendment) Bill seeks to introduce a new clause in Article 75 of the Constitution (dealing with Central Ministers), which shall provide:

"A Minister, who for any period of thirty consecutive days during holding the office as such, is arrested and detained in custody, on allegation of committing an offence under any law for the time being in force, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or more, shall be removed from his office by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister to be tendered by the thirty-first day, after being taken in such custody".

If the Prime Minister does not render such advice to the President by the 31st day, the Minister concerned shall automatically cease to hold office from the following day. The provision however shall not bar the Minister from being appointed to the office by the President after release from custody.

Similar clauses are sought to be inserted in Article 164 of the Constitution (with respect to State Ministers) and Article 239AA (with respect to NCT of Delhi). Likewise, amendments to the Government of UT Act and the J&K Reorganization Act are sought to be carried out to apply the proposed law to Union Territories.

In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 130th Constitution (Amendment) Bill, it is stated that a Minister holding office should be beyond "any ray of suspicion" and act only for welfare of the people. It is further stated that a Minister who is detained over allegation of serious criminal offences "may thwart or hinder the canons of constitutional morality and principles of good governance and eventually diminish the constitutional trust reposed by people in him".

The Bills comes in the backdrop of certain recent instances of Ministers, including Chief Ministers, being arrested and detained for serious offenses. For instance, former Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal (accused in the Delhi Liquor Policy 'Scam'), former Tamil Nadu Minister V Senthil Balaji (accused in TN Cash-for-Jobs scam), Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren (accused in a land 'scam'), former West Bengal Education Minister Partha Chhatterjee (accused in WB recruitment scam), etc. faced jailtime over money laundering charges, corruption, etc.

Though most of the Ministers were enlarged on bail, the cases are pending. Senthil Balaji, in particular, was removed from his post by the TN Governor. However, following grant of bail, he was reinstated. Subsequently, when his bail was sought to be cancelled, the Supreme Court expressed dismay at Balaji's reinstatement and called on him to choose between his post and liberty. Following this, Balaji resigned and the Court refused to cancel his bail.

Click Here To Read THE CONSTITUTION (ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH AMENDMENT) BILL, 2025

Click Here To Read THE GOVERNMENT OF UNION TERRITORIES (AMENDMENT) BILL

Click Here To Read THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR REORGANISATION (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2025

*नमस्ते सदा वत्सले मातृभूमे, त्वया हिन्दुभूमे सुखं वर्धितोहम् ।**पुण्यभूमे त्वदर्थे, पतत्वेष कायो नमस्ते नमस्ते।।* 🙏 ...
15/08/2025

*नमस्ते सदा वत्सले मातृभूमे, त्वया हिन्दुभूमे सुखं वर्धितोहम् ।*
*पुण्यभूमे त्वदर्थे, पतत्वेष कायो नमस्ते नमस्ते।।* 🙏



*79वें स्वतन्त्रता दिवस पर हार्दिक शुभकामनाएं ।*

*🙏🇮🇳 वन्दे मातरम्* 🇮🇳

Regards
Shilpi rai

04/08/2025

Reiterating that a consensual relationship based on a promise to marriage will not amount to the offence of r**e, the Supreme Court recently quashed a case under the POCSO ACt against a man.

"This Court has held in several decisions that promise to marriage and the subsequent physical relationship between the two with consent would not amount to r**e and the reasons therein have been assigned (See: Prithivirajan v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10 SCC 108)," the Court observed.

Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Aravind Kumar quashed the case against a youth, after noting that the complaint was belatedly filed after three years when she became a major, and no forensic evidence suggested that r**e was committed upon the prosecutrix.

“In our considered opinion, as regarding the r**e being committed by the appellant when the prosecutrix was a minor, there is absolutely no evidence, and definitely no forensic evidence with the prosecution. It is only an allegation in the FIR after more than 03 years, in order to make out a case under the POCSO Act, that such an act of r**e was committed three years back when she was a minor. She also categorically states that she consented to the act as there was a promise of marriage by the appellant.”, the court observed.

As per the allegations, the prosecutrix was a minor (aged 15) when she entered into a consensual s*xual relationship with the appellant on the promise of marriage. Upon attaining majority, the appellant refused to marry her, and she was allegedly humiliated by his family, prompting the FIR in 2022 against the Appellant, and his family members under Sections 417 (cheating), 376 (r**e), 506 (criminal intimidation) read with Section 34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act (aggravated penetrative s*xual assault on a child).

Aggrieved by the High Court's decision not to quash the FIR, the accused appealed to the Supreme Court.

Setting aside the impugned finding, the Court observed that although consensual s*x with a minor is technically r**e under POCSO, courts can quash cases if no medical evidence supports the claim.

Further, the Court cast doubt over the genuineness of the allegations under POCSO, noting that consensual s*x occurred with a minor, but the complaint surfaced only after the relationship broke down post-majority.

The Court also relied on the recent decision in Prithivirajan v. State (2025) to reject the prosecutrix's claim that the appellant committed r**e under a false promise of marriage, holding that the relationship was consensual and there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant never intended to marry her from the outset.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the pending FIR against the Appellant stands quashed.

Cause Title: KUNAL CHATTERJEE VERSUS THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

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