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29/04/2026

The Supreme Court today held that a Judicial Magistrate does not require prior sanction under Section 196/197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for directing the registration of FIR under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

"The requirement of prior sanction under Section 196 and 197 CrPC (or corresponding provisions in the BNSS) operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage of registration of FIR or investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC/Section 175(3) BNSS", the Court said.

The observation came in a plea filed by CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat, challenging the Delhi High Court's rejection of her petition seeking FIR against BJP leader Kapil Sharma, Anurag Thakur, etc., for alleged hate speeches ahead of the 2020 Delhi riots. The Magistrate had refused to direct registration of FIR on the ground that prior sanction was required, a view later upheld by the High Court.

Section 196 CrPC (S.217 BNSS) mandates that for taking cognizance of offences under Sections 295A, 153A and 153B IPC, prior sanction from the Government is required. Section 197 CrPC (S.218 BNSS) mandates prior sanction for takign cognizance of offences against public servants.

Today, the Supreme Court partly allowed Brinda Karat's petition to the extent of setting aside the High Court's observation that under Section 156(3) CrPC a Magistrate cannot direct registration of FIR without prior sanction.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgment in a batch of cases seeking directions against hate speeches/hate crimes. Observing that the existing law adequately addresses hate speech offences, the Court refrained from passing directions to create hate speech offences. While the bench declined to pass directions of the nature sought, it left it upon the legislative authorities to consider in their wisdom of any policy or legislative measures are required.

The Court further said that the duty of the police to register an FIR on disclosure of a cognizable offense is mandatory (as held in Lalita Kumari case). In case of non-registration of FIR, the CrPC/BNSS provide efficacious remedies. Such as, an aggrieved person can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC/Section 173(4) BNSS and thereafter invoke jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC/Section 175 BNSS, or proceed by way of complaint under Section 200 CrPC/Section 223 BNSS.

"These remedies constitute a complete statutory architecture. The availability of such remedies, coupled with the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional courts under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, demonstrates that no legislative vacuum exists warranting the intervention sought. The appropriate course lies in faithful and even-handed enforcement of the existing law."

Case Title: Brinda Karat v.State of NCT of Delhi and others SLP(Crl) 5107/2023 (and connected cases)

19/03/2026

The Supreme Court on Thursday (March 19) observed that if the service Rules/regulations permit, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against an officer/employee before retirement can be continued even after attaining the age of superannuation, and penalties such as reduction in pay can be enforced by recalculating pensionary benefits.

“…what is settled is that if the extant service Rules/Regulations permit continuance of the disciplinary proceedings, initiated against an officer/ employee before he had attained the age of superannuation, those can be continued and brought to its logical conclusion even after he had attained the age of superannuation.”, observed a bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra.

The case arose from disciplinary proceedings initiated against a bank officer on the very date of his retirement, September 30, 2011. The proceedings continued thereafter, culminating in a penalty of permanent reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay.

The appellant challenged the action, contending that once he had retired, the employer-employee relationship ceased, and therefore, no penalty under the Service Regulations could be imposed. He argued that only action under Pension Regulations, such as withholding pension or recovery from gratuity, was permissible post-retirement.

While a Single Judge of the High Court accepted this contention, the Division Bench reversed the ruling, upholding the penalty, leading to filing of an appeal before the Supreme Court by the bank employee.

Affirming the Division bench ruling, the judgment authored by Justice Misra observed that since the 1979 Service Regulations of the Respondent-bank permit continuation of the disciplinary proceedings after the age of superannuation, the post-retirement imposition of a penalty of reduction in the time scale of pay was justified, which can be implemented upon adjustment in the pensionary benefits.

Since pension is calculated based on the last drawn pay, a reduction in pay scale can be factored into the computation of pensionary benefits. Thus, the punishment is not rendered meaningless merely because the employee has retired, the court added, while rejecting the Appellant's argument that there cannot be a post-retirement reduction in the pay scale.

Further, the Court said that even the pensionary benefits and other retirement benefits can be forfeited if the disciplinary proceedings resulted into a dismissal of the employee after his retirement.

“…And where, pursuant to such proceedings, the ultimate penalty imposed is of dismissal, there may be no technical difficulty in its implementation as it may result in forfeiture of pension and other retiral dues. Therefore, in such an event, the question of entitlement to pensionary benefits may not arise.”, the court observed.

“However, where the punishment imposed is such which may, instead of forfeiture of pension in its entirety, result in mere reduction or adjustment of pension, or recovery from post retiral dues, the Court may have to consider whether such punishment is implementable or not, postretirement”, the court added.

Resultantly, the appeal was dismissed, while affirming the validity of the penalty imposed on the appellant.

Cause Title: VIRINDER PAL SINGH VERSUS PUNJAB AND SIND BANK & ORS.

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19/03/2026

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On the auspicious occasion of Holi, *_May God paint the canvas of Your Life with the Colours of Joy, Happiness, Success ...
04/03/2026

On the auspicious occasion of Holi,

*_May God paint the canvas of Your Life with the Colours of Joy, Happiness, Success & Prosperity._*

Wishing You & Your Family
*H A P P Y H O L I !*


Regards,
Shilpi rai 🙏

25/01/2026

The Kerala High Court has held that the title 'doctor' does not belong exclusively to medical professionals and that physiotherapists and occupational therapists can use the 'Dr.' prefix.

Justice V.G. Arun pronounced the judgment dismissing the pleas preferred by Indian Medical Association, Indian Association Of Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation (IAPMR) and its Secretary.

The Court had earlier passed an interim order against the usage of "Dr." prefix by physiotherapists and occupational therapists who do not possess recognised medical qualification.

While dismissing the petitions, the Court held that the National Medical Commission (NMC) Act does not contain any provision that confers the title 'doctor' to medical professionals. Noting also that the term 'doctor' is meant for persons who have achieved the highest level of learning, the Court observed:

"The challenge against the use of prefix 'Dr' by Physiotherapists will not also hold good since the NMC or the allied statutes does not provide for the use of the prefix 'Dr' by qualified medical professionals...Therefore the contention that the title 'Doctor' exclusively belongs to medical professionals is a misconception since even now, like in the olden times, persons with higher educational qualifications like PhD are entitled to use the title 'Doctor'."

It also rejected the contention of the petitioners that the word 'title' used in Section 40 of the Kerala State Medical Practitioners Act statutorily entitles them to use 'Dr' prefix to their names to the exclusion of others.

"the NMC Act does not contain any provision for conferring the title Doctor on qualified medical professionals. The expression title used in Section 40 of the Kerala State Medical Practitioners Act cannot therefore be understood as statutorily entitling the qualified medical professionals to prefix 'Dr' to their names. In the absence of such provision, the petitioners cannot claim exclusive right to use the prefix 'Dr'," the Court observed.

The petitioners in this case were qualified medical professionals and they were aggrieved by the status and powers conferred to Physiotherapists and Occupational Therapists by the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Profession Act, 2021 (NCAHP Act) as well as the Competency-Based Curriculum for Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy.

They had sought reading down of certain provisions of the NCAHP Act and the Curriculum to be contrary to the NMC Act. Further, it was contended that physiotherapists and occupational therapists only extend supporting service while specialist medical professionals alone can give first hand healthcare.

They were also aggrieved that the Curriculum permits physiotherapists and occupational therapists to use 'Dr. prefix along with "PT" and "OT" as suffixes, equating them with modern medical practitioners.

Reliance was placed on various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court to contend that the use of 'Dr.' prefix by physiotherapists would mislead the general public into assuming them to be qualified allopathic doctors, leading to disastrous consequences.

On behalf of the respondents, a challenge to the maintainability of the petitions, initiated at the instance of a few doctors, was made out. It was contended that the National Medical Commission had not made any objection to the Curriculum or use the use of 'Dr.' prefix.

The physiotherapists argued that it was an independent and district branch of health science, falling with Allied Health and Rehabilitation Services. Moreover, the Curriculum also recognises them as first contact health providers within their domain. Further, it was contended the Court cannot exercise writ jurisdiction to read down provisions of law contrary to legislative intent and policy.

On behalf of the occupational therapists, arguments were raised regarding the overriding effect of the NCAHP Act, which would prevail over the NMC Act as the former is a subsequent enactment.

The Court, at the inception, looked into the circumstances that led to the enactment of the NCAHP Act:

"Till recently, the health force in the Indian scenario had focused mainly on a few cadres such as qualified modern medicine practitioners, nurses and front-line workers, while the professionals belonging to the healthcare sector were generally termed as para-medical professionals. The advancement in the health sector and the changing preferences of consumers and service providers warranted a fresh vision of healthcare delivery with a patient-centric approach and focus on moving to a multi-disciplinary team based care."

It also looked into the definitions of 'allied and health professional' and 'healthcare professional' under the Act and remarked that a healthcare professional is entitled to provide preventive, curative, rehabilitative, therapeutic and promotional health services.

The Court then observed that in the absence of any specific challenge to the provisions, it cannot normally read them down. It found no compelling reason to do the same either and felt it would be inappropriate for it to intervene with the policy of the government, especially at the instance of only a few medical professionals.

The Bench also took note of the overriding effect of the NCAHP Act, the fact that the National Medical Commission was also heard before the Parliamentary Committee made its recommendation.

Taking all these into consideration, the Court dismissed the petitions.

Case No: W.P.(C) No.41064 of 2025 and connected cases

Case Title: Indian Association Of Physical Medicine And Rehabilitation (IAPMR) v. Union of India and Ors. and connected cases

25/01/2026

Chief Justice of India Surya Kant on Saturday said that the future of High Courts lies in their ability to act as proactive custodians of the Constitution, remain alert to systemic failures of governance and work towards transforming access to justice from a mere right into a State-guaranteed service.

“The future of the High Court depends on its ability to act as a pro-active custodian of Constitution. It must not only wait for a knock on the its door but it also must remain alert to systemic failures to the rule of law. The goal must be to transfer the access to justice from a right to a State guaranteed service”, he said.

The CJI further said Article 226 of the Constitution is the lifeline of constitutional justice and affirms that the State remains subject to the rule of law. He identified the power to grant interim relief as one of the most critical yet often overlooked aspects of Article 226. Emphasising that justice delayed is justice destroyed, he said the ability of High Courts to stay executive action at the very first hearing is often the only real protection available to citizens.

"Justice delayed is not justice denied it is justice destroyed. The HCs ability to stay an executive action in the very first hearing is often the only real access the citizens ever experiences. It is the hallmark of the constitutional courts protective jurisdiction u/a 226 to intervene at the threshold and ensuring status quo is preserved."

The Chief Justice was delivering the Fali Nariman Lecture organised by the Bombay Bar Association in Mumbai. His address was on the theme “Role of High Courts and Wide Discretionary Powers under Article 226.”

He said the Constitution does not merely distribute power but also distributes remedies against misuse of power. Article 226, he said, was conceived to ensure that citizens are never left defenceless against the State and that the majesty of law is never far from the common person.

Highlighting the distinction between Articles 32 and 226, he said while Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, Article 226 derives its expansive reach from the phrase “for any other purpose”.

He described this inclusion as a deliberate constitutional choice that empowers High Courts to correct legal injuries, enforce statutory duties and restrain arbitrary administrative action.

“There is a subtle and profound distinction which makes High Courts the first constitutional court for the citizens. While Article 32 is a fundamental right in itself, Article 226 by contrast is a journalist with a power of a titan, the inclusion of the phrase "For any other purpose" in Art 226 was a masterstroke by the makers of the Constitution. It ensures that the High Court's reach is not confined but it extends to correction of any legal injury, the enforcement of statutory duties and the containment of administrative caprice”, he said.

Describing High Courts as the primary sentinels of constitutional governance, the Chief Justice said they ensure that the rule of law is not a distant, Delhi-centric concept.

This role, he said, is reflected in how High Courts apply the doctrine of alternate remedy. While the law generally expects litigants to exhaust other remedies, the discretion of the High Court operates as a safety valve, he highlighted.

The Chief Justice highlighted the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 allows High Courts to hear the first grievance of a citizen. This decentralised constitutional power, he said, preserves the federal balance.

“This extraordinary jurisdiction is what makes the High Courts the sentinel, the court which hears the first cry of the child, whether it is an illegal detention, right to live a dignified life, mandate to the administration. Article 226 ensures that the majesty of law is never more than a few miles away from the common man. It is this decentralised strength that maintains the federal balance of our republic. And it proves that while the Supreme Court may have a final word but the High Court often has the most vital one.”

On matters filed directly before the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice said he often questions why litigants bypass High Courts despite the availability of an effective constitutional remedy under Article 226. He cautioned against creating the impression that only those who are affluent can enforce their perceived rights under Article 32.

“I had to sometimes observe that let's not give an impression that those who are affluent and can afford can have the privilege of enforcement of their perceived rights through Article 32. If Article 226 is armour of the citizens then access to justice is a promise that this armour available to all not to some privileged and luxurious few. It is a substantive assurance that law will speak to your grievance with empathy and effectiveness”, he emphasised, adding that High Courts are central to the democratisation of justice.

He also pointed out that the geographical and procedural distance of the Supreme Court can be intimidating for ordinary citizens. In this context, he said, High Courts play a crucial role in bridging the gap between the letter of the law and the lived realities of people.

Highlighting other facets of Article 226, the Chief Justice said the power of High Courts to take suo motu cognisance enables them to respond to injustice even in the absence of formal petitions.

He highlighted that High Courts have also used Article 226 to address legislative vacuums by issuing temporary directions to protect the environment, ensure the dignity of prisoners and secure the rights of migrant workers during national crises.

The Chief Justice said High Courts must also evolve their practices to remain effective. He stressed the need for procedural innovation, including streamlined adjudication for clear-cut writ matters.

Referring to the concept of continuing mandamus, he said this judicial innovation allows courts to monitor compliance over time instead of issuing one-time directions. He recalled using this approach during his tenure at the Punjab and Haryana High Court while dealing with the issue of creating a drug-free Punjab.

He also spoke about the challenges posed by technology-driven governance and automated decision-making. He said technology must be harnessed to ensure equality and access to justice, and that digital reforms must focus on accessibility and affordability rather than remain limited to virtual hearings as an emergency measure.

Concluding, the Chief Justice likened the Constitution to a river born from hope, sacrifice and vision. He said that over seven decades, this river has deepened and widened, continuing to nourish India's democratic framework as it flows through challenges and progress.

“India's Constitution is like a mighty river, bore from the confidence of hope, sacrifice and vision. It begins as a pure spring in the mountains of freedom, weaving its way through valleys of challenges and plains of progress. In the early years, the river of our Constitution was still finding its course, cutting through the fresh soil of a young democracy. Over seven decades, the river of our Constitution has deepened, widened and nourished the land of India”, the CJI said.

07/12/2025

Addressing the environmental impact of religious ceremonies during festivals in India, former Supreme Court judge Justice Abhay Oka recently said that an act that damages the environment in the name of religion shall not be protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.

"while performing so called religious ceremonies, we damage our rivers, seas and lakes and we pollute water. Article 25 protects right to worship and to perform essential religious ceremonies, since it is subject to other articles of part III, the act of damaging environment in the name of religion is not protected. We can avoid this only when we have a scientific temper" the former judge said.

Justice Oka stressed on the use of loudspeakers and pollution of rivers during festivals and other religious ceremonies to highlight that use of technology does not necessarily mean existence of scientific temper.

He questioned, "Can we claim that we did not damage and pollute our rivers? Can we say that our rivers will remain holy with all the pollution we have caused to our rivers?"

Further, lamenting the superstitions prevailing in India, Justice Oka commented that anyone who proposes religious reforms gets targeted by religious groups and it is projected as if the reforms are interfering with the rights under Article 25 of the Constitution. He also highlighted how the political class, which seeks to appease voters in the name of religion, does not care about reforms.

On the State's duties under Article 51A and its failure to perform them, Justice Oka further said, "recently I read in the newspaper that there is a proposal to cut hundred years old trees for the Kumbh Mela in Nashik which is to take place in 2027. Apart from the failure of individual citizens to develop scientific temper, why does it happen? It happens because of the failure of the collective fundamental duty of the State to abide by Article 51A."

He added that if we had perfectly performed our duty of developing scientific temper and state of reforms, we would not have allowed killing and sacrificing of animals or the indiscriminate use of loudspeakers during festivals.

07/12/2025

In a significant step toward strengthening the rights and dignity of prisoners with disabilities, the Supreme Court has directed all States and Union Territories to implement a comprehensive, disability-inclusive framework across their prison systems. A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta issued the directions while hearing a PIL filed by Sathyan Naravoor seeking adequate facilities and a proper legal regime for inmates with disabilities.

The Court noted that many of the concerns raised in the petition had already been addressed in L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu, where extensive guidelines were framed for Tamil Nadu prisons. Observing that these safeguards must apply nationwide, the Bench formally extended the Muruganantham directives to all States and UTs.

Nationwide Compliance With Disability-Rights Standards

The Court held that prison conditions across the country were “deficient” in addressing the needs of prisoners with disabilities and that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 was not being adequately implemented. It recorded submissions that several prison manuals lack mandatory accessibility provisions such as ramps, assistive devices, accessible toilets, and therapeutic facilities.

Directing uniform adoption of the Muruganantham framework, the Court mandated that all prisons must maintain wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible infrastructure, dedicated therapy rooms, trained medical staff, appropriate diets, regular physiotherapy, and disability-sensitive procedures.

Additional Directions Issued

Apart from extending the earlier directions nationwide, the Court added several fresh mandates:

Independent grievance redressal mechanism: Every State and UT must create a robust, accessible complaints system specifically for prisoners with disabilities to protect them from abuse and neglect.
Inclusive education: No prisoner should be denied educational opportunities due to disability. Prisons must provide suitable adjustments to enable their participation.
Section 89 of RPwD Act to apply: The penal consequences for contravention of disability-rights obligations,fines up to ₹5 lakh,must apply mutatis mutandis to prison establishments. Authorities are required to spread awareness of this provision among prison staff and related stakeholders.
Assistive devices: While noting security concerns, the Court sought a detailed plan from each State and UT on providing and maintaining mobility aids and other assistive equipment within prisons.
Enhanced visitation rights: Inmates with benchmark disabilities must receive improved visitation arrangements to ensure emotional support and monitoring of their needs. States must frame specific modalities balancing security and accessibility.
Compliance Reports Due By April 2026

The Bench directed all States and UTs to file comprehensive compliance reports within four months. These must outline steps taken to implement both the Muruganantham guidelines and the additional directives issued in this order, along with proposed mechanisms for assistive aid provision and other measures.

The petition will next be taken up on April 7, 2026, for review of the compliance reports.

Case : SATHYAN NARAVOOR v. UNION OF INDIA | Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 182/2025

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