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16/10/2022

S. C. : Supreme Court Dismisses Plea Seeking Guidelines To Address Overlapping Jurisdictions 7nder 125 CrPC, Domestic Violence, HMA.

16.10.2022

Amarjeet Singh v. Union of India WP(C) No. 860/2022

The Supreme Court on Friday dismissed a petition seeking guidelines to prevent misuse of maintenance laws by means of conflicting orders and overlapping jurisdictions. The matter was heard by bench comprising Chief Justice UU Lalit and Justice Hemant Gupta. The bench remarked that the issue raised in the petition had already been dealt with by the Supreme Court. The hearings took place in Hindi and have been translated for the purposes of this article.

As per the petition, the amount for maintenance could be granted under various provisions of law including Section 125 of CrPC, Domestic Violence Act, Hindu Marriage Act etc. This resulted in a multi-pronged situation causing severe inconvenience to parties that were required to pay maintenance. The writ petition sought for all forms of maintenance to be granted under the same umbrella.

At the outset, CJI Lalit stated that there had been a judgement by Justice Indu Malhotra(Rajnesh v Neha) providing that if a woman has been granted maintenance under a specific provision of law, she would not be granted additional maintenance by any other forum. He stated–

"For instance, if a woman has been granted maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC and later approaches the court under the Domestic Violence Act, or Hindu Marriage Act for that matter, the maintenance granted as per the previous award would be duly considered. Only after such due consideration, will new orders be passed."

However, the petitioner continued arguing saying that many persons approached different forums seeking for maintenance despite there existing a single ground. He submitted an example of a case, where based on one ground, two different proceedings in two different courts had been going on. He stated–

"If there is a case in two places on the same ground and two different judges pass two different orders, then it is hundred percent sure that one of the two judges must have given a wrong decision, which is against justice. If both the judges pass the same order, then what is the point of wasting the time of two different judges on the same issue?"

CJI Lalit reiterated that the issue had already been dealt with in the case of Rajnesh v. Neha (2021 Vol 2 SCC 324). For context, the said judgement provides guidelines to overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings and thus ensuring uniformity in the practice followed by the Family Courts/District Courts/Magistrate Courts. The guidelines read as follows–

a) Where successive claims for maintenance are made by a party under different statutes, the Court would consider an adjustment or set- off, of the amount awarded in the previous proceeding/s, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceeding;

b) It is made mandatory for the applicant to disclose the previous proceeding and the orders passed therein, in the subsequent proceeding;

c) If the order passed in the previous proceeding/s requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceeding.

Accordingly, while stating that "every fact had already been considered", CJI Lalit dismissed the petition.

***** BLA ******

20/07/2022

Karnataka H. C. : Courts should not raise objections Regarding Residential Proof of Child/Wife, Must Accept Duly Sworn Affidavit Under Section 125 Cr. P. C.

19.07.2022

SANGEETA W/O BAPU LAMANI & Others Versus BAPU S/O SOMAPPA LAMANI

The Karnataka High Court has held that family courts shall accept the affidavit by aggrieved parties (wife and children) indicating their place of residence away from matrimonial home and not raise issue of jurisdiction while hearing an application seeking maintenance from the husband under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

A single judge bench of Justice E.S.Indiresh, sitting at Dharwad, made the observation while allowing a petition filed by Sangeeta and her minor children and setting aside an order passed by the family court, raising an objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the address shown in the cause title and the documents produced by the petitioners do not tally.

The bench relied on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Jagir Kaur & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 and said,

" Since Section 125 of Cr.P.C is a social measure providing immediate relief to the destitute wife and children, prima-facie, accepting the duly sworn affidavit by aggrieved parties (wife and children) that they are residing away from the matrimonial home and the address shown in the affidavit is to be accepted. Indeed the Family Court ought to have accepted the address provided in the petition supported by an affidavit by the petitioners and should have issued notice to the respondent."
It added, "Raising objection with regard to residential proof of the petitioners at that juncture itself would defeat the very purpose of scope of Section 125 of Cr.P.C."

Further the bench opined, "May be, the jurisdictional aspect is required with regard to the competency of the Court, however, such a requirement may be an exception to the provisions under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. for the reasons mentioned above."

Accordingly it held, "If the applicant/petitioner filed a petition along with an affidavit disclosing their residential address in the duly sworn affidavit, that itself is sufficient to continue the proceedings to provide immediate relief to the destitute wife/children."

It then allowed the petition and remanded the matter back to the family court for fresh consideration after providing opportunity to the petitioners to prove their residential status. In the event that such satisfactory proof is provided by the petitioners, the Family Court is requested to dispose of the petition at the earliest, within an outer limit of eight months.

****** BLA ******

S. C. :Supreme Court Criticises High Court For Posting Anticipatory Bail After Two Months For Hearing.June 22, 2022 BLAS...
22/06/2022

S. C. :

Supreme Court Criticises High Court For Posting Anticipatory Bail After Two Months For Hearing.

June 22, 2022 BLA

Sanjay versus NCT of Delhi & Another

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No.: 5675 of 2022

After observing that the instant case involves personal liberty and the court is expected to pass orders one way or the other after considering the merits of the case at the earliest, the Apex Court granted interim protection from arrest to the petitioner.

The Top Court further observed that posting of anticipatory bail after a couple of months can’t be appreciated.

These observations were made by the Bench of Justices CT Ravikumar and Sudhanshu Dhulia while hearing an SLP filed against a June 2 decision of the High Court.

As per the Apex Court, the petitioner’s grievance is that his application seeking anticipatory bail was posted to August 31 without granting any interim protection. The said anticipatory bail plea was moved on May 24 2022.

After noting the same, the bench asserted that as per them in a matter involving personal liberty, the courts are expected to pass orders one way or the other by considering the merits of the matter at the earliest.

The Bench also opined that posting of anticipatory bail application after a couple of months can’t be appreciated.

Therefore, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to take up the petitioner’s anticipatory bail plea and merits and decide the same expeditiously.

The court further added that in case the main application can’t be disposed of within stipulated time then the High Court should consider the interim reliefs sought on its own merits.

The court disposed of the instant SLP but granted the petitioner interim protection from arrest.

******** BLA ********

22/06/2022

Bombay H. C.

Father Cannot Deny Maintenance to Daughter on the Basis of Glossy Pictures Posted by Daughter on Instagram

June 22, 2022 BLA

The Bombay High Court observed that glossy pictures on social media don’t always show the truth. The court made this observation while directing a father to pay maintenance to his daughter who has attained majority
The court made this observation after the
father submitted that his daughter was a model who made Rs 72-80 lakh per month and the same was evident from her social media profile.

However, the Bench of Justice Bharti Dangre did not agree with the submission and agreed with the Family Court’s opinion that photos on Instagram/ social media are not enough to prove that the girl is independent and had sufficient income.

The court said that it’s a well-known fact that today’s youth post glossy pictures on social media but such portrayal might not always be true.

In this case, the marriage between a couple had broken down and the court had allowed the wife’s plea for interim maintenance and the husband was directed to pay Rs 25,000 as maintenance towards the daughter.

The husband had challenged the same by stating that his daughter was making a lot of money which is apparent from her social media profile.

However, the court rejected the husband’s submission after opining that in the absence of evidence showing that the daughter was making money, the court cannot disallow the application seeking maintenance.

****** BLA ******

02/03/2021

SC : Section 138 N. I. Act is Quashi Criminal In Nature.

01.03.2021

The Supreme Court has observed that criminal proceedings for the dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, are "quasi-criminal" in nature.

The Court also made an interesting comment that Section 138 proceedings can be called a "civil sheep" in a "criminal wolf's clothing".

A bench comprising Justices RF Nariman, Navin Sinha and KM Joseph made these observations while deciding the issue whether the moratorium declared under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code will bar Section 138 NI Act proceedings against the corporate debtor.

Referring to the judgment in CIT v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, (1966) 1 SCR 190, the judgment observed that "a civil proceeding is not necessarily a proceeding which begins with the filing of a suit and culminates in ex*****on of a decree".

The Court held that Section 138 proceedings against the corporate debtor will come under the ambit of Section 14 IBC.

**** BLA ****

28/02/2021

S C: Wife Leveling Allegations Affecting Career And Reputation Of Husband Amounts To Mental Cruelty Against Him For Seeking Divorce.

26.02.2021

The Supreme Court observed that wife levelling allegations which affects career and reputation of husband is mental cruelty against him for the purpose of seeking divorce.
The degree of tolerance will vary from one couple to another and the Court will have to bear in mind the background, the level of education and also the status of the parties, in order to determine whether the cruelty alleged is sufficient to justify dissolution of marriage, at the instance of the wronged party, the bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Dinesh Maheshwari and Hrishikesh Roy said.
In this case, the husband, an army officer, in his divorce petition, alleged that he was subjected to numerous malicious complaints by the wife which have affected his career and loss of reputation, resulting in mental cruelty. The Family Court granted him divorce, but the High Court reversed it.
In appeal before the Apex Court, the husband submitted that the wife filed a series of complaints against him before the superior officers in the Army upto the level of the Chief of Army Staff and to other authorities and these complaints have irreparably damaged his reputation and mental peace.
"For considering dissolution of marriage at the instance of a spouse who allege mental cruelty, the result of such mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to continue with the matrimonial relationship. In other words, the wronged party cannot be expected to condone such conduct and continue to live with his/her spouse. The degree of tolerance will vary from one couple to another and the Court will have to bear in mind the background, the level of education and also the status of the parties, in order to determine whether the cruelty alleged is sufficient to justify dissolution of marriage, at the instance of the wronged party.", the bench noted.

**** BLA ***

09/11/2020

S.C. : The Maintenance Amount Awarded Must Be Reasonable And Realistic, Objective Of Alimony Is Not To Punish Other Spouse.

08.11.2020

RAJNESH Vs. NEHA
[Cr. A No. 730 OF 2020 ]
Coram :
Justices Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy

The Supreme Court has observed that the objective of granting interim / permanent alimony/maintenance is to ensure that the dependant spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse.

The maintenance amount awarded must be reasonable and realistic, and avoid either of the two extremes i.e. maintenance awarded to the wife should neither be so extravagant which becomes oppressive and unbearable for the respondent, nor should it be so meagre that it drives the wife to penury.

*** BLA *****

04/11/2020

SC : Maintenance In All Cases To Be Awarded From The Date Of Filing Application.

04.11 2020

RAJNESH vs. NEHA [Cr. A No. 730 OF 2020 ]

The S. C. has held that It would be appropriate to grant maintenance from the date of application in all cases, including Section 125 Cr.P.C., the bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy observed in a judgment [Rajnesh vs. Neha] in which it issued exhaustive guidelines on payment of maintenance in matrimonial matters.

It also noticed that there is no provision in the Hindu Marriage Act or the Domestic Violence Act which provides the date from which the maintenance is to be awarded. The Court observed that divergent views have been taken by the Family Courts as follows : first, from the date on which the application for maintenance was filed; second, the date of the order granting maintenance; third, the date on which the summons was served upon the respondent. Referring to many such judgement of the High Court, the bench said:"we find that there is significant delay in disposal of the applications for interim maintenance for years on end. It would therefore be in the interests of justice & fair play that maintenance is awarded from the date of the application."
The court said that rationale of granting maintenance from the date of application is to enable the wife to overcome the financial crunch which occurs on separation from the husband. The court said:
Therefore the bench directed thus:

"It has therefore become necessary to issue directions to bring about uniformity and consistency in the Orders passed by all Courts."

The bench also observed that
'If maintenance is not paid in a timely manner, it defeats the very object of the social welfare legislation. Ex*****on petitions usually remain pending for months, if not years, which completely nullifies the object of the law.",

***** BLA *****

23/08/2020

Bombay H. C.: Tablighi Jamat Foreigners Were Made "Scapegoats", Quashes FIR's Against Them, Criticizes Media Propaganda.

22.08.2020

In a strongly-worded judgment, the Bombay High Court on Friday quashed the FIRs filed against a total of 29 foreign nationals who were booked under various provisions of IPC, Epidemic Diseases Act, Maharashtra Police Act, Disaster Management Act and Foreigner's Act for allegedly violating their Tourist Visa conditions by attending the Tablighi Jamaat congregation at Nizamuddin in Delhi.

Apart from the foreign nationals, police also booked six Indian nationals and trustees of the Masjids for giving shelter to the petitioners.

A Division Bench of Justice TV Nalawade and Justice MG Sewlikar of the Aurangabad bench heard the three separate petitions filed by petitioners who belong to countries like Ivory Coast, Ghana, Tanzania, Djibouti, Benin and Indonesia. All the petitioners were booked after police claimed to have received secret information about them residing at the respective masjids in different areas and offering prayers in violation of lockdown orders.

According to the petitioners, they came to India on a valid visa issued by the Government of India and they have come to experience Indian culture, tradition, hospitality and Indian food. It is their contention that on their arrival at the airport, they were screened and tested for Covid-19 virus and only when they were found negative for the virus, they were allowed to leave the airport.

Moreover, they had informed the District Superintendent of Police about their arrival in Ahmednagar district. Due to the lockdown imposed since March 23, vehicular movement was stopped, hotels and lodges were closed and consequently the Masjid had given shelter to them. They were not involved in illegal activity including the breach of order of the District Collector, petitioners argued.

In fact, they contended that even at Markaz, they had observed norms of physical distancing. It is their contention that while being granted a visa, they were not asked to inform local authorities about their visit to those places, but they had informed local officers. Also, under the conditions of visa, there was no prohibition to visit religious places like Masjids, petitioners argued.

On the other hand, the District Superintendent of Police, Ahmednagar, filed a reply contending that the petitioners were found visiting places for preaching Islam religion and so, crimes are registered against them. He also contended that five foreign nationals from three different cases were found infected by the virus. It is contended that after the quarantine period was over all the petitioners were shown to be formally arrested.

The DSP submitted that the District Magistrate had issued prohibitory orders and directions were given to close all public places. However, in spite of prohibitory orders and conditions of visa, the petitioners indulged in Tabligh activity. Moreover, announcements were made at public places to ask the persons who had attended Markaz Masjid to come forward voluntarily for testing them in respect of the virus, but they did not come forward voluntarily and they had created a threat of spreading Covid-19 virus.

Petitioners were booked for offences punishable under sections 188, 269, 270, 290 of Indian Penal Code, sections 37 (1)(3) r/w. 135 of Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 and section 11 of Maharashtra Covid-19 Measures and Rules, 2020, sections 2, 3 and 4 of Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, section 14 (b) of Foreigners Act, 1946 and section 51(b) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

After going through the visa conditions that petitioners are governed by, Justice Nalawade, who authored the judgment, noted-

"The aforesaid material produced on the record shows that even under recent updated Manual of Visa, there is no restriction on foreigners for visiting religious places and attending normal religious activities like attending religious discourses. Ordinarily, a tourist is not expected to follow the procedure laid down in para No. 19.8 if he does not want to preach the religious ideologies etc."

APP MM Nerlikar contended that a writ petition is pending before the Supreme Court and in that matter relief is claimed by some similar foreigners to declare that blacklisting of 950 foreigners by the Central Government via decision dated April 2 as unconstitutional and void as due process of law was not followed before making such declaration by the Central Government. Thus, it is not desirable to decide the present proceeding as the Supreme Court is yet to decide the issue. However, Court refused to accept the said contention.

Justice Nalawade observed-

"The material on the record shows that Tabligh Jamamat is not a separate sect of Muslim, but it is only movement for reformation of religion. Every religion has evolved over the years due to reformation as reformation is always necessary due to the changes in the society and the development achieved in the material world. In any case, even from the record, it cannot be inferred that the foreigners were spreading Islam religion by converting persons of other religion to Islam. The record shows that the foreigners were not talking Indian languages like Hindi or Urdu and they were talking languages like Arabian, French etc. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can be said that the foreigners may have intention to know the ideas of Tabligh Jamamat about the reformation.

The allegations are very vague in nature and from these allegations inference is not possible at any stage that they were spreading Islam religion and there was intention of conversion. It is also not the case that there was an element of persuasion on any point from these foreigners."

Criticising the media's portrayal of foreign nationals who attended Tablighi Jamaat, Justice Nalawade specified-

"There was big propaganda in print media and electronic media against the foreigners who had come to Markaz Delhi and an attempt was made to create a picture that these foreigners were responsible for spreading COVID-19 virus in India. There was virtually persecution against these foreigners.

A political Government tries to find the scapegoat when there is pandemic or calamity and the circumstances show that there is probability that these foreigners were chosen to make them scapegoats. The aforesaid circumstances and the latest figures of infection in India show that such action against present petitioners should not have been taken. It is now high time for the concerned to repent about this action taken against the foreigners and to take some positive steps to repair the damage done by such action."

Finally, referring to the old Indian saying 'Atithi Devo Bhava' meaning 'Our Guest Is Our God', Justice Nalawade said-

"The circumstances of the present matter create a question as to whether we are really acting as per our great tradition and culture. During the situation created by covid-19 pandemic, we need to show more tolerance and we need to be more sensitive towards our guests particularly like the present petitioners. The allegations made show that instead of helping them we lodged them in jails by making allegations that they are responsible for violation of travel documents, they are responsible for spreading of virus etc."

*Background Of Malice*
----------------------------------------

Importantly, the Court referred to CAA and NRC protest all over the country and said-

"There were protests by taking processions, holding Dharna at many places in India from atleast from prior to January 2020. Most of the persons participating in the protest were Muslims. It is their contention that the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is discriminatory against the Muslims. They believe that Indian citizenship will not be granted to Muslim refugees and migrants. They were protesting against National Registration of Citizenship (NRC).

It can be said that due to the present action taken fear was created in the minds of those Muslims. This action indirectly gave warning to Indian Muslims that action in any form and for any thing can be taken against Muslims. It was indicated that even for keeping contact with Muslims of other countries, action will be taken against them. Thus, there is smell of malice to the action taken against these foreigners and Muslim for their alleged activities. The circumstances like malice is important consideration when relief is claimed of quashing of F.I.R. and the case itself."

Thus, the Court concluded that the state government acted under political compulsion and action against the foreign nationals can be inferred as malice. Thus, all petitions were allowed and FIRs were quashed.

Justice Sewlikar concurred with the operative part of the judgment but noted that the State's request to grant a stay cannot be allowed.

Notably, the same bench had in February 2020 quashed Sec 144 orders after observing that ant-CAA protesters cannot be called "anti-nationals or traitors".

In June, the Madras HC had quashed the FIRs against Tablighi Jamaat foreigners after observing that they have "suffered enough" and urged the Centre to consider their request to return to their native places.

***** BLA *****

11/08/2020

SC : Daughters Have Coparcenary Rights Even If Their Father Was Not Alive When Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 Came Into Force.

11.08.2020

VINEETA SHARMA
Versus
RAKESH SHARMA

CIVIL APPEAL No. 32601 OF 2018

Justices Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer and MR Shah

In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court has held that, a daughter will have a share after Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, irrespective of whether her father was alive or not at the time of the amendment.

Justice Arun Mishra today pronounced the judgment in a batch of appeals that raised an important legal issue whether the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which gave equal right to daughters in ancestral property, has a retrospective effect?

"Daughters must be given equal rights as sons, Daughter remains a loving daughter throughout life. The daughter shall remain a coparcener throughout life, irrespective of whether her father is alive or not", Justice Mishra said while pronouncing the judgment today. The bench also comprising of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and MR Shah, overruled the contrary observations made in in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju. The court held as follows:

The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities.

The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004.

Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.

The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class ­I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.

In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.

Background

These cases were heard by a three judge bench as one of them arose out of a judgment delivered by Delhi High Court which had also granted certificate to appeal. The High Court has noticed that there is a conflict of opinion between Prakash vs. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36 and Danamma @ Suman Surpur vs. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343 with regard to interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005. However, the High Court followed the judgment in Prakash V. Phulavati and held, in facts of this case, that, the amendments of 2005 do not benefit the plaintiff as her father passed away on 11th December 1999.

Section 6 provides that, on and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right the same manner as the son (b) have the same rights in the coparcenery property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenery property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener. The proviso to Section 6 clarifies that it shall not affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.

In Prakash V. Phulavati (2015), the Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Anil R. Dave and A.K. Goel had held that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9-9-2005, irrespective of when such daughters are born. It was held that, there is neither any express provision for giving retrospective effect to the amended provision nor necessary intendment to that effect. This position was reiterated by the bench of Justices R.K. Agrawal and A.M. Sapre in Mangammal vs. T.B. Raju (2018).

In the case of Danamma @ Suman Surpur vs. Amar (2018), the bench comprising Justices A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan had held that the share of the father who died in 2001 would also devolve upon his two daughters who would be entitled to share in the property. "Section 6, as amended, stipulates that on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth. The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth. The section uses the words in the same manner as the son. It should therefore be apparent that both the sons and the daughters of a coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth. It is the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth. Devolution of coparcenary property is the later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first stage of a coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and as is well recognized.", it was observed in the said judgment.

***** BLA *****

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