ARJUN SAI Krishnan

ARJUN SAI Krishnan Myself Adv Arjun Sai Krishnan hailing from Pampady, Kottayam District.

As a lawyer I'm committed to doing justice in good conscience and faith at courts by not violating any conditions as set by Bar Council of Kerala and High Court.

01/03/2026

System is Law ⚖️⚖️⚖️⚖️❗❗

28/02/2026

You must have faith in the Constitution

28/02/2026

What the Lawyers Do

28/02/2026

J RF Nariman speaking on Young Lawyers.

28/02/2026
28/02/2026

AM Singhvi's visions

26/02/2026

Contract Law case law ⚖️ 📖

*The Madras High Court recently observed that every prisoner has a right to periodical medical check-ups and the same fo...
26/02/2026

*The Madras High Court recently observed that every prisoner has a right to periodical medical check-ups and the same forms part of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.*

*“We hold that every prisoner has a right to have a periodical medical check up which would fall within the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Such check ups alone will indicate who is suffering from what condition,” the court said.*

The bench of Justice GR Swaminathan and Justice R Kalaimathi observed that the prisoners are also persons whose care and custody is with the prison authorities and the State. The court noted that the State has a duty to care for the needs of persons with special disabilities.

“ A prisoner is also a person. He is entirely in the care, custody and control of the prison authorities. They therefore have to assume the duty to be reasonably accommodative towards the special needs of prisoners with disability,” the court observed.
The court thus directed the Superintendent of Prison, Palayamkottai, to holda master health check-up for all prisoners in the prison once in two years. The court took note of the Supreme Court's observation in Muruganantham's case, which emphasised that reasonable accommodation was not option but integral for any humane and just carceral system.

The court was hearing a petition filed by Kalaiselvi seeking 28 days' ordinary leave for her father, who was undergoing life imprisonment in Palayamkottai Central Prison. The daughter had sought 28 days' leave for her father since he had suffered a recent amputation due to diabetes.

The court noted that if the prisoner's condition had been diagnosed earlier, and suitable medical treatment had been given along with an appropriate diet, his leg would not have been amputated. Taking note of books and news articles that emphasise on the sorry state of prisons in the state and the dilapidated conditions of the buildings, the court noted that arrangements had to be made for the prisoner's condition.

The court directed that the petitioner's father be given a cot, a table to keep his essential items and a western toilet. The court also directed that the petitioner's father be given counselling and rehabilitation activities. The court also directed that he be given periodical medical checkups, as there were chances of ulcers after amputation.

Noting that there was a rise in cases of diabetes among general public, the court directed the Dean of Government Medical College and Hospital, Tirunelveli to conduct medical camps and find out the number of prisoners requiring intervention for diabetes. The court also noted that special facilities be arranged for the diabetes patients, including appropriate diet.

The court also remarked that the Superintendent of Palayamkottai Prison could take the example of Kiran Bedi and Tihar Jail and ensure that the prison is a model for respecting the rights of persons with disabilities.

Allowing the plea, the court also granted 28 days ordinary leave for the prisoner without es**rt. While on leave, the court directed the prisoner to report before the Inspector of Police every Thursday and abide by the conditions prescribed in the Jail Manual.

*Case Title: M Kalaiselvi v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Others*

*Citation: 2026 Live Law (Mad) 91*

*Case No: W.P.Crl.(MD)No.993 of 2026*

*Date : 23.2.2026*

*The Chhattisgarh High Court has observed that school premises can be construed as a 'place for custody of property' whe...
24/02/2026

*The Chhattisgarh High Court has observed that school premises can be construed as a 'place for custody of property' where school furniture and educational assets are kept in custody, and can consequently attract the offence of house trespass under Indian Penal Code.*

Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal referred to *Sections 452* (House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint); *Section 442* (Definition of House-Trespass); and Section 441 (Criminal Trespass) of IPC and explained,

“From the conjoint reading of these three Sections it would clearly demonstrate that whoever criminally trespassed by entering into any building, tent or vessels used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place of worship or as a place for custody of the property, said to commit house trespass. There are three separate ingredients for house trespass i.e. (i) any building used as a human dwelling (ii) any building used as a place of worship (iii) any building used as a place for custody of the property. The school building would definitely cannot be a human dwelling house or place of worship but it can be considered to be a place for custody of the property where school furniture and other educational assets are being kept in safe custody.”

The observations were propounded in a case where an NSUI member (petitioner), along with his associates, allegedly entered the premises of Krishna Kids Academy and protested by hurling abuses and misbehaving with the female staff. This prompted the Administrator of the school (complainant) to lodge an official complaint. Consequently, the Trial Court framed charges against the petitioner under Sections of 452, 294 (Obscene acts) r/w 34 (common intention) of IPC. When the petitioner challenged the order before the revisional court, the same was dismissed. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court.

In his challenge, the petitioner argued that he was protesting against the illegal running of the school in contravention to the government circulars and guidelines. Arguing against the charge under Section 452, he submitted that school does not come under the definition of “dwelling house” and therefore the charge cannot be framed against him.

In contrast, the State argued that the statement/s of school's employees clearly demonstrated that the petitioner trespassed the school premises and hurled abuses. It further submitted that to frame charge against the accused persons, only prima facie ingredients are to be considered and trial court, after considering the entire material, framed the charge against the petitioner.

The Court observed that, "The School building was in exclusive possession of the complainant and the petitioner was not having any right to forceful enter into the premises under the possession of the complainant without their permission.”

Thus, noting that it did not find any infirmity with the framing of the charge under Section 452, the Court dismissed the petition.

Case Details:

*Case Number: CRMP No. 8 of 2026*

*Case Title: Vikas Tiwari v. State of Chhattisgarh*

*The Gujarat High Court has held that under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act that the mother is the natural guard...
24/02/2026

*The Gujarat High Court has held that under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act that the mother is the natural guardian of a girl aged below five years, and that the father cannot take care of such a girl child in a way the mother can.*

*It further ruled that father seeking custody based on disputed separation deed claiming mother voluntarily agreed to hand over custody would not be a bar to the maintainability of the mother's habeas corpus petition. The court was hearing a habeas corpus petition filed by a woman seeking custody of her four-year-old daughter, alleging that her estranged husband had unlawfully retained custody after fraudulently obtaining her signature on a separation deed.*

A Division Bench of Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda and Justice D.M. Vyas held:

_“ It cannot be in dispute that, as per the proviso to Section 6 (a) of Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a girl child who is just about 4 years and one month old, would be the mother. The law, basically, recognizes that a girl child who is yet to complete 5 years of age can effectively and practically be taken care of only by the mother and not by the father. It also stands to common sense that a father would not be able to take care of a child below 5 years in the manner that a mother can.”_
The father had argued that separation deed–as per which he claimed that the mother had voluntarily agreed to hand over custody of daughter to him, cannot be doubted and as a consequence the voluntary handing over the girl to him cannot also be doubted because of the affidavit led by the witnesses to the separation deed.

The court however said that while it was stated in the affidavit by the witnesses that the document was executed by the parties however it was only stated that the husband "had volunteered to take the custody" of the minor girl and had undertaken to bear all expenses of his daughter.

The court said that it was not forthcoming from this affidavit whether mother had agreed to this offer or even whether she was asked about her willingness to give up custody of daughter in favour of the husband.

"In the absence of the consent of Kinjal being sought and her consent having been obtained for handing over the custody...the affidavit cannot be accepted as proof of consent of Kinjal for voluntarily handing over custody..." the court said.

The petitioner wife argued that the separation deed dated July 11, 2025 was obtained by force and fraud on the false promise that custody would be returned to the mother. He contended that the mother had been the child's primary caregiver since May 2024 and the father had no lawful right to retain custody based on a disputed document.

On the other hand, the respondent husband argued that custody had been voluntarily handed over by the mother as mentioned in the separation deed. Since the custody was consensual, it could not be termed illegal, and therefore a writ of habeas corpus was not maintainable.

The Court noted that the separation deed relied upon by the husband to claim custody did not “inspire confidence” as there were discrepancies in the document's font size and line spacing which suggested possible insertion or alteration of pages. Given this, the Court prima facie concluded that the “document is suspicious and the possibility of the first page having been inserted or substituted cannot be ruled out.”

Further, the Court found that the letter relied on by the husband where the woman is said to have admitted her divorce and separation deed was also suspect. The letter admitting the divorce was dated July 10, 2025, when the separation deed itself was executed only on July 11, 2025.

The Bench noted that even as the husband claimed the validity of the separation deed, he had filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking a divorce decree and transfer of custody to him. The Court found that this contradicted his claim that he already had lawful custody through the separation deed and the marriage stood dissolved.

The Court rejected the objections to the maintainability of the habeas petition, reiterating that writ jurisdiction can be exercised in custody matters involving minors. The paramount consideration in such matters remains the welfare and best interests of the child.

Expanding on this, the Court noted “ for a period of almost 14 months, when she was extremely young i.e. about 3 years, she has spent 1 year and 2 months with her mother and a bond would have been created between the mother and child. Therefore, to separate the mother from her girl child, who is just about 4 years old, and who had been brought up only by the mother for about 1 year 2 months, would not be in the interest of the child and would cause trauma to the child. By transferring the custody to the father, we would be basically forcing an entirely new and strange ecosystem on the child and she would be forced to face people who are basically strangers to her she had not even seen as she has been living with her mother in May 2024 when she was only about 3 years old.”
Accordingly, the High Court allowed the mother's habeas corpus petition and directed that the mother shall retain custody of the minor daughter.

It granted visitation rights to the father on weekends, while clarifying that he was free to approach the Family Court to seek the appropriate orders regarding custody.

*Case Title: Kinjal v State of Gujarat & Anr.*

*Case Number: R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (HABEAS CORPUS) NO. 471 of 2026*

*2026 : GUHC : 12448: DB*

24/02/2026

Constitutional belief is the utmost as well the higher courts

21/02/2026

INC President, First Malayalee, Lawyer ❤️⚖️

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