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SC grants 1.8 crore to Chennai girl in Medical negligence case.The Supreme Court of India yesterday ordered one of the h...
08/02/2016

SC grants 1.8 crore to Chennai girl in Medical negligence case.

The Supreme Court of India yesterday ordered one of the highest compensations so far in the country in a case of medical negligence to the tune of 1.8 crore. The Tamil Nadu government has to pay the sum to an 18-year-old girl who lost her vision at birth due to medical negligence at a government-run hospital. A bench of justices J S Khehar and S A Bobde considered inflation and escalating cost of treatment required by her in future while deciding the quantum of compensation.. The girl was born prematurely at the government hospital in Chennai’s Egmore. But she was discharged from the hospital without a retinopathy test, mandatory for preemies, babies born prematurely. The father of the girl approached only after discovering that the girl had lost her vision. The Forum had awarded Rs 5 lakhs as compensation. Dissatisfied with the compensation, the family then approached the Supreme Court. Notably, the Supreme Court reviewed the literature available on Retinopathy of Prematurity (ROP) guidelines and came to the conclusion that the principle of awarding compensation that can be safely relied on is restitutio in integrum. The honourable bench cited Malay Kumar Ganguly vs. Sukumar Mukherjee, (2009) 9 SCC 221 while applying the principle. This principle says that the aggrieved person should get that sum of money, which would put him in the same position if he had not sustained the wrong. Similarly, the court unequivocally held the that the state would be vicariously liable for the damages which may become payable on account of negligence of its doctors or other employees. The Tamil Nadu government also had challenged the order of the consumer forum. The court dismissed the state government’s appeal and directed it to pay the higher compensation. After 18 years of legal fight, justice has prevailed.

Court can’t test validity of Personal Law: Muslim group to Supreme Court.The Supreme Court today allowed the Jamiat Ulam...
08/02/2016

Court can’t test validity of Personal Law: Muslim group to Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court today allowed the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind to become a party in a suo motu PIL instituted to consider gender discrimination suffered by Muslim women owing to “arbitrary divorce and second marriage of their husbands during the currency of their first marriage”. The organisation contended that the court cannot test the validity of personal law. The court also issued notices to the Attorney General and National Legal Services Authority on the PIL and asked them to respond on the issue within six weeks. In its plea, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind has contended that the apex court cannot examine the constitutional validity of the practices of marriage, divorce and maintenance in Muslim personal law on the ground that provisions of personal laws cannot be challenged by the reason of fundamental rights. “Personal laws do not derive their validity on the ground that they have been passed or made by a legislature or other competent authority. The foundational sources of personal law are their respective scriptural texts. The Mohammedan Law is founded essentially on the Holy Koran and thus it cannot fall within the purview of the expression ‘laws in force’ as mentioned in Article 13 of the Constitution of India, and hence its validity cannot be tested on a challenge based on Part III of the Constitution”,it said. The verdict, dated October 16 in which the SC raised the issue refers to dozens of its own judgments since the 1990s in order to record the Supreme Court’s growing realisation that gender discrimination is a violation of the constitutional rights of women. Considering the strong pitch made by the SC recently for a common civil code, this judgment is significant as this is the first time that the court itself has shed its self-imposed restraint by suo motu ordering the registration of a PIL. Even in the 1985 Shah Bano case, SC had only reminded the government of the lack of “evidence of any official activity for framing a common civil code for the country.” It had said a “common civil code will help in the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies.” The bench had said the decision to “consider” the rights of Muslim women came up during discussions with lawyers on gender discrimination at the hearing of a batch of civil appeals on the issue of a daughter’s right to equal shares in ancestral property under the Hindu succession law. “An important issue of gender discrimination which, though not directly involved in this appeal, has been raised by some of the learned counsel for the parties which concerns rights to Muslim women. Discussions on gender discrimination led to this issue also. It was pointed out that in spite of guarantee of the Constitution, Muslim women are subjected to discrimination. There is no safeguard against arbitrary divorce and second marriage by her husband during the currency of the first marriage, resulting in denial of dignity and security to her,” it had said.

Supreme Court upholds constitution of fresh Medical Board to verify and assess the disability of the candidates.The Supr...
08/02/2016

Supreme Court upholds constitution of fresh Medical Board to verify and assess the disability of the candidates.

The Supreme Court has upheld a Government order which notified the constitution of fresh Medical Board in order to verify and assess the disability of the candidates. Apex Court bench of Justices M.Y. Eqbal and Arun Mishra held so in State of UP vs. Ravindra Kumar Sharma. Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad had held that while the certificate has been issued in accordance with the Rules of 1996, roving enquiry cannot be made until and unless fraud has been detected, it is not permissible to reopen medical certification carried out under the Rules of 1996. However the High Court has directed that a physical verification may be made and if the candidate has not been issued certificate of disability or otherwise or that he does not suffer from any disability so certified which entitles him to such a certificate, in that event the candidate can be subjected to fresh medical test not otherwise. State appealed to Supreme Court. The Court observed that there was a serious complaint lodged by Viklang Sangh of illegal usurpation of the quota reserved for specially abled by large number of persons who were not in fact specially abled and have procured certificates fraudulently from their districts under the Rules of 1996, and it is on that basis, Government has issued an order for the purpose of verification of such certificates issued by the Medical Board and certificates of 21% of selected candidates of handicapped category were found to be fraudulent. It is settled proposition of law that fraud vitiates and in such a case when large number of candidates have illegally usurped the reserved seats of the persons suffering from disability the action of State Government did not call for interference, the Bench said. The Court also observed that on mere physical verification it may not be possible to know various kinds of disabilities such as that of eyes, ear impairment etc. Setting aside the High Court order, the Court said that before taking any action against the individuals they shall be issued show cause in the matter and thereafter decision will be rendered in accordance with law, within a period of four months.

Breaking; Public Service Commission shall provide Information about answer sheets and Marks under RTI , need not provide...
08/02/2016

Breaking; Public Service Commission shall provide Information about answer sheets and Marks under RTI , need not provide the details of the Examiners ; SC
A two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court Today observed that the request of the information seeker about the information of his answer sheets and details of the interview marks can be and should be provided to him by Public Service Commission under Right to Information Act. It is also observed that since there is a fiduciary relationship between the PSC and the Examiners, any information about the examiners is not liable to be disclosed. Partly allowing the Kerala High Court Judgment in Kerala Public Service Commission vs State Information Commission the Bench comprising of Justices M Y Eqbal and Arun Mishra held as follows; “….the PSC has taken upon itself in appointing the examiners to evaluate the answer papers and as such, the PSC and examiners stand in a principal-agent relationship. Here the PSC in the shoes of a Principal has entrusted the task of evaluating the answer papers to the Examiners. Consequently, Examiners in the position of agents are bound to evaluate the answer papers as per the instructions given by the PSC. As a result, a fiduciary relationship is established between the PSC and the Examiners. Therefore, any information shared between them is not liable to be disclosed. Furthermore, the information seeker has no role to play in this and we don’t see any logical reason as to how this will benefit him or the public at large”. According to Justice Eqbal, disclosure of the identity of Examiners is in the least interest of the general public and also any attempt to reveal the examiner’s identity will give rise to dire consequences. Revealing examiner’s identity will only lead to confusion and public unrest. ‘If we allow disclosing name of the examiners in every exam, the unsuccessful candidates may try to take revenge from the examiners for doing their job properly. This may, further, create a situation where the potential candidates in the next similar exam, especially in the same state or in the same level will try to contact the disclosed examiners for any potential gain by illegal means in the potential exam. The Commission has reposed trust on the examiners that they will check the exam papers with utmost care, honesty and impartially and, similarly, the Examiners have faith that they will not be facing any unfortunate consequences for doing their job properly’, He added Regarding the information relating to answer sheets and marks received in Interview the Bench held as follows; “In the present case the request of the information seeker about the information of his answer sheets and details of the interview marks can be and should be provided to him. It is not something which a public authority keeps it under a fiduciary capacity. Even disclosing the marks and the answer sheets to the candidates will ensure that the candidates have been given marks according to their performance in the exam. This practice will ensure a fair play in this competitive environment, where candidate puts his time in preparing for the competitive exams, but, the request of the information seeker about the details of the person who had examined/checked the paper cannot and shall not be provided to the information seeker as the relationship between the public authority i.e. Service Commission and the Examiners is totally within fiduciary relationship”.

Salman’s acquittal ‘travesty of justice’; enough evidence against him: Maharashtra govt to SCAs the Supreme Court today ...
05/02/2016

Salman’s acquittal ‘travesty of justice’; enough evidence against him: Maharashtra govt to SC

As the Supreme Court today began hearing the appeal filed by Maharashtra Government against the acquittal of Bollywood star Salman Khan in the 2002 hit and run case, Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi representing the state termed the Bombay High Court judgment as a “travesty of justice”. “The judgment of the High Court is a travesty of justice. The statement of injured victims discarded, police witness discarded and a driver who surfaced after 13 years is believed by the honourable High Court”, Rohatgi submitted before a bench headed by Justice J S Khehar. During the half an hour hearing the AG explained the entire incident, trial in the lower court and the judgment of the High Court to the bench. Senior lawyer Kapil Sibal appeared for Salman. The bench said for the time being it will not issue notice and since “it is a matter of appeal against acquittal, it would like to hear the state further on the issue of what various witnesses said on who drove the Land Cruiser and if material prosecution witnesses had been dropped. “We are still making up our mind”, justice Khehar told the AG adjourning the matter to February 12. In its appeal, the Maharashtra government urged the apex court to set aside the acquittal order. It disputed the High Court’s observation that the investigation was conducted in a careless and faulty manner, claiming that there were many witnesses who corroborated the charges against Salman adequately. The appeal said evidence of complainant Ravindra Patil, who was with Salman in the Toyota Land Cruiser, was legally tenable and its rejection was wrong. Patil was the actor’s bodyguard who had said Salman was driving drunk and had ignored his warnings. Patil died of tuberculosis in 2007 and when the High Court examined his testimonies, it held the evidence was not admissible under law. It said HC had not concluded as to who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and said the evidence of all injured witnesses was important and had more probative value being victims of the incident. The petition also refuted the HC finding that the probe was conducted to weaken the prosecution’s case. Instead, “the HC has not appreciated the evidence on record in its proper perspective,” said the state police. They claimed a “hypothesis” was recorded while acquitting Salman of charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, grievous hurt, drunken driving etc. While acquitting Salman of all charges, Bombay High Court had on December 10 acquitted Observing that “strong suspicion of guilt cannot be used to hold a person guilty”, Overturning the order of a lower court, which had in May convicted the actor under charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and sentenced him to a jail term of five years, Justice A R Joshi said this was “not a case where prosecution has successfully established its case of all its charges”. Maharashtra government disputed the High Court’s observation that the investigation was conducted in a careless and faulty manner, claiming that there were many witnesses who corroborated the charges against Salman adequately.

Bhopal and Section 377 – Two Curative cases compared.On May 11, 2011, a five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Cou...
04/02/2016

Bhopal and Section 377 – Two Curative cases compared.

On May 11, 2011, a five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had given ruling on the curative petition filed by the CBI against the Court’s judgment in Keshub Mahindra v. State of Madhya Pradesh on 13 September 1996. The CBI’s plea was that in 1996, the Court had erroneously ignored material which would have made, prima facie, an offence chargeable under section 304 (Part II) IPC. But in 1996, the Court had quashed the charge under section 304 (Part II). Under section 304 (Part II) IPC, whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The accused in the Bhopal disaster criminal case were ultimately charged with section 304-A IPC, which deals with causing death by negligence, which could only result in maximum imprisonment for two years or with fine or with both. CBI’s argument in that case was that the judgment dated 13.9.1996 resulted in perpetuation of irremediable injustice necessitating filing of the curative petitions seeking recall of the judgment dated 13.9.1996. The CBI submitted that because of the Supreme Court’s judgment, the Magistrate was barred from eexecising the judicial power under section 323 of the CrPC, even though the Code vested the jurisdiction in him to alter the charge or commit the case to the Court of sessions as the case may be, on the basis of evidence that came on record during the trial. In its judgment dismissing the curative petition, the Supreme Court held that no decision by any court, this Court not excluded, can be read in a manner as to nullify the express provisions of an Act or the Code, and the 1996 judgment never intended to do so. All that the Court had done in 1996 was to base its findings on materials gathered in investigation and brought before the Court till that stage, it said. Therefore, the Court disagreed with the view that the 1996 judgment was a fetter against the proper exercise of powers by a court of competent jurisdiction under the relevant provisions of the Code. The Court had specifically asserted that there was no ground falling within the parameters of Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002 (4) SCC 388) was made out in the curative petitions. The Court also did not find satisfactory explanation to file such curative petitions after about 14 years from the 1996 judgment. The NAZ curative The Naz curative petition, referred to the Constitution Bench on 2 February, is the most significant curative petition to be heard in the open court, after the last one filed by CBI against the 1996 judgment in Bhopal case. Therefore, it is important to know whether the Naz curative petition does not suffer from the same flaws which led to the dismissal of the CBI curative petition in 2011. First and foremost, the Naz curative petition has been filed in time in 2014, after the dismissal of the review petition by the Court in January 2014. The Supreme Court’s Division Bench comprising justices GS Singhvi and SJ Mukhopadhaya reversed the 2009 Delhi high court judgment decriminalizing consensual sexual acts of adults in private on 11 December 2013. On 22 April 2014, a four-Judge bench directed the registry to list the curative petition for hearing in the open court the following week. Strangely, this did not happen, and the petitioners too were not keen on pressing it, obviously for strategic reasons. Justice Singhvi retired on 12 December, 2013 and Justice Mukhopadhaya retired on 14 March 2015. The Supreme Court rules require that if the Judges who delivered the main judgment had not retired, they would also sit along with the first three senior-most Judges to hear the curative petition in their chambers. Justice Mukhopadhaya was part of the bench which heard the petition in circulation in the chambers on 22 April 2014. But that did not come in the way of direction to list it for hearing in the open court. But the inexplicable question is why it took nearly two years to be listed until on 2 February 2016. Probably, the former CJI, HL Dattu did not want to hear it during his tenure, and therefore, passed the buck. Meanwhile, Justice Mukhopadhaya, one of the authors of the 11 December 2013 judgment , also retired. The curative petitioners thus had no reason to worry. Unlike the review petitions, the Naz curative petition before the Court claims that there is a larger, gross miscarriage of justice that must be corrected. The curative plea filed by the CBI in 2010 in the Bhopal disaster case probably did not make similar convincing claim. The composition of the Constitution bench to hear the Naz curative petition will be of interest. In 2011, Chief Justice SH Kapadia presided over the Bhopal curative bench, comprising himself, and justices Altamas Kabir, RV Raveendran, B Sudershan Reddy and Aftab Alam. Although the first three senior most Judges of the Court are likely to be part of the bench in terms of the Supreme Court Rules, one can speculate that the fourth and fifth senior-most Judges will also become the part of the Constitution Bench. In other words, all the five members of the Supreme Court Collegium will form part of the Constitution Bench to hear the Naz curative. Thus apart from the CJI, and justices Anil R Dave, and JS Khehar, justices Dipak Misra and J Chelameswar are likely to be part of the Constitution bench to hear the curative petition. The Hindu has reported today that the CJI has assured senior advocate Anand Grover, appearing for petitioner, Naz Foundation, that the new bench may not limit itself to the narrow confines of the curative law, but opt for a comprehensive hearing of the arguments placed for the protection of the dignity and rights of the LGBT community. This has given hopes to the LGBT activists that justice will be done. At last. Some facts which may be of use to the readers: In the Bhopal disaster case, the 1996 judgment was delivered by a two-Judge Bench. The Bhopal curative petition was first heard by a three-Judge bench in circulation in their chambers, on 31 August 2010, which directed that it be listed, after service was complete. The bench which delivered the 11 May 2011 judgment included justices B.Sudarshan Reddy and Aftab Alam. Their order of seniority at that time could have been four and five, given the fact that the first three at that time were the three senior-most. However, Livelaw would stand corrected if the facts are otherwise. The Naz curative petition was first heard by a four-Judge bench on 22 April 2014. The bench directed its listing in the following week.

04/02/2016

New Juvenile law challenged in SC.

Three weeks after President Pranab Mukherjee gave assent to the new Juvenile law which permits minors between 16 and 18 who committed heinous offences like r**e and murder to be tried as adults, a public interest litigation has been filed in the Supreme Court challenging its constitutional validity. Parliament had passed the bill on December 22 last year amidst a national outrage after the juvenile involved in the Nirbhaya gangr**e case walked free in accordance with the earlier provision under the law after a three year stay at a reformatory home. The PIL , filed by Congress leader and Activist Tahseen Poonawalla said the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, cleared in the winter session of Parliament which repeals and recasts the old Act is unreasonable, arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 (right to equality) of the Constitution. It challenges section 15 of the new Act which says in case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of 16 years, the Juvenile Justice Board shall conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether a juvenile offender is to be sent for rehabilitation or be tried as an adult. The plea said the impugned amended Act is draconian and unconstitutional which instead of providing care and protection to children deems them as adult in cases where the alleged commission of crime by them is heinous in nature. It further said that the amendment goes against the letter and spirit of The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and is against the protection accorded to Child and adolescent criminals since 1800s. In a decisive step to curb crimes by minors which has witnesses a sharp rise in recent times, the new law gives Juvenile Justice Board the power to decide if a minor between the ages of 16 and 18 accused of heinous crimes like r**e and murder should be tried as adults in a regular court.Under the law, the juvenile board will conduct an assessment of factors including the “premeditated nature” of the offence and “the child’s ability to understand the consequences of the offence”. Based on the assessment, children can be prosecuted in an ordinary criminal court, and punished as adults if convicted. As per the blanket rule earlier, any person aged below 18 accused of any offence, including heinous, can only be sent to a reformatory home for three years. The Board, which will have a magistrate and 2 social workers as members are to conduct an assessment of factors including the “premeditated nature” of the offence and “the child’s ability to understand the consequences of the offence”. If there is no majority view the juvenile is to be sent for rehabilitation and lodged at an observation home. No juvenile can however be given death sentence or life imprisonment. Minimum punishment which can be given for heinous offence is 7 years imprisonment. The new law proposed a Juvenile Justice Board and Child Welfare Committee to be set up in each district. It also prescribed penalties for cruelty against a child, offering a narcotic substance to a child, and abduction or selling a child.

Happy Independent Day.
14/08/2015

Happy Independent Day.

  cannot be used by Govt. for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of...
13/08/2015

cannot be used by Govt. for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of food grains, cooking fuel,LPG etc ;SC

The Supreme Court bench constituting Justices J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde and C. Nagappan has decided to refer the challenges to the Aadhar program to a constitution bench, especially to determine the existence of a right to privacy as a fundamental right.

The Bench also passed an interim order issuing the following directions;

The Union of India shall give wide publicity in the electronic and print media including radio and television networks that it is not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhaar card;
The production of an Aadhaar card will not be condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen;
The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card will not be used by the respondents for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution Scheme;
The information about an individual obtained by the Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation.

Agreement with consortium of banks: Stamp duty is payable on number of transactions, not instrument; SCThe Supreme Court...
13/08/2015

Agreement with consortium of banks: Stamp duty is payable on number of transactions, not instrument; SC

The Supreme Court of India has held that a security trustee agreement entered into by a borrower with one banker acting as security trustee for a consortium of banks, can only be regarded as a set of distinct transactions with each banker forming the consortium and consequently stamp duty would have to be paid on each such individual and distinct transaction.

In holding so, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Gujarat High Court which had held that stamp duty is payable on instruments and not on transactions. The High Court had held that the instrument executed does not involve either “distinct matters” or “distinct transactions” so as to attract Section 5 of the Gujarat Stamp Act.

The Apex Court after referring to Section 5 of the Gujarat Stamp Act, the interpretation whereof was the issue, said that the said provision deals only with the instrument which comprises more than one transaction and it is immaterial for the purpose whether those transactions are of the same category or of different categories

The facts discernible from the judgment are as follows: a Company named Coastal Gujarat Power Ltd secured assistance from few lenders for setting up an Ultra Mega Power Project in the area of Kutch-Bhuj. The lenders i.e. financial institutions, which were thirteen in number, formed a consortium as a trust and executed a security trustee agreement (STA) inter se appointing one banker, viz. the State Bank of India as the lead trustee, called the security trustee.

The respondent executed an “Indenture of Mortgage for Delayed After Assets Deed’ with the State Bank of India, the said security trustee, mortgaging its assets as mentioned in the deed itself. The said document was presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Mudra, by paying stamp duty of Rs. 4,21,000/- and the deed was registered.

According to the Revenue Authority which was appellant, the respondent-borrower was liable to pay a total of Rs. 54,62,000/- on the said deed and, hence, demanded the balance amount of Rs. 50,41,000/- from the respondent by issuing show cause notice dated 5.11.2009. The issue was forwarded for consideration of the Deputy Collector, Stamp Duty Valuation Organisation, Bhuj-Kutch under Section 33 of the Act.

The respondent was given an opportunity of hearing and vide order dated April, 3, 2010, the Deputy Collector held that the respondent was liable to pay the deficit stamp duty with the amount of penalty of Rs.250/-.

The revision application filed by the respondent under Section 53[1] of the Act was dismissed vide order dated March, 28, 2011. The respondent thereafter made an application under Section 54[1-A] of the Act thereby giving rise to the Reference Proceedings before the High Court

The High Court opined that the State of Gujarat is not entitled to recover any additional stamp duty based upon its perception of the legislative intendment behind Section 5 of the Act. The Court noted that stamp duty is payable on instruments and not on transactions. Therefore, merely because the intended effect was achieved by executing one single document as against different sets of documents, such fact would not enable the State authorities to justify the conclusion that the one single document falls under the purview of Section 5 of the Act. It was SBI alone which had the power to enforce the document against the respondent. The High Court further opined that there being only one instrument creating a mortgage by a borrower in favour of a security trustee, such relation between the borrower and security trustee is independent of the relationship between the borrower and the lending banks. The relationship between the borrower and the security trustee is that of a mortgagor and mortgagee. By taking aid of the provision of the Indian Trust Act and after creation of a different valid trust deed and making payment of stamp-duty thereon in accordance with law, the State Bank of India became the security trustee of the lending Banks and held the mortgage for and on behalf of those beneficiaries. Therefore, by the instrument in question, either fictionally or otherwise, no separate or distinct matters or transactions are created. Thus, the applicant is the mortgagor and the S.B.I., in the capacity of a trustee, is the mortgagee. The instrument does not involve either “distinct matters” or “distinct transactions” so as to attract Section 5 of the Act. The Court found from the document in question that the State Bank of India is the only mortgagee under the instrument and no rights in the mortgaged property had been created in favour of secured parties or any other persons.

The counsel for the Revenue Authority advanced the contention that respondents had formed the consortium and had executed the present mortgage instead of several distinct instruments of mortgage with the sole purpose of evading Stamp Duty. The Authority further submitted that admittedly the respondents had availed financial assistance from 13 lenders for its project and consequently, the respondent was required to execute mortgage deed in favour of the 13 lenders. However, in order to avoid payment of Stamp Duty on each mortgage deed, the respondent got the lenders to form a consortium and appointed State Bank of India as security trustee. Thus, in substance, the mortgage deed between the SBI on behalf of the lenders and respondent is a combination of 13 mortgages dealing with the respondents and such lenders, hence, the respondent cannot be allowed to evade payment of stamp duty by forming a consortium.

It was also submitted that the instrument in question relates to several distinct matters or distinct transactions inasmuch as the respondent borrower availed distinct loan from 13 different lenders, hence, the instrument falls under Section 5 of the Gujarat Stamp Act.

The respondent on the other hand contended that since no independent right has been created in favour of the lenders under the mortgage deed it cannot be held to be a separate and distinct transaction

It was further contended what has to be looked into for the purpose of stamp duty is the instrument, i.e., the Mortgage Deed, to see whether it dealt with distinct matters. The Mortgage Deed dealt with only one single matter, i.e., the mortgage of a single property with one mortgagee. Merely because there was beneficial interest for all the individual banks forming the consortium, this would not amount to distinct matters as per the ratio of the Benthall Case, since there were no distinct mortgages regarding distinct properties, but one common mortgage for one property. Hence, even assuming that the banks were seen to have an individual interest, there was in fact a commonality of such interest with all the other “secured lenders” and, therefore, the instrument did not deal with distinct matters.

Negativing the contentions of the respondents and upholding those of the appellant, the Apex Court held that Section 5 deals only with the instrument which comprises more than one transaction and it is immaterial for the purpose whether those transactions are of the same category or of different categories. The Court held that from the deed of indenture executed in the case, it has to be regarded as 13 distinct transactions.

The Court relied on the dictum laid down in The Member, Board of Revenue vs. Arthur Paul Benthall wherein it had been held that:

“When a person possesses both a personal capacity and a representative capacity, such as trustee, and there is a delegation of power by him in both those capacities, the position in law is exactly the same as if different persons join in executing a power in respect of matters which are unrelated. There being no community of interest between the personal estate belonging to the executant and the trust estate vested in him, they must be held to be distinct matters for purposes of section 5”

The Court justified its finding thus: “It appears from the trustee document that altogether 13 banks lent money to the mortgagor, details of which have been described in the schedule and for the repayment of money, the borrower entered into separate loan agreements with 13 financial institutions. Had this borrower entered into a separate mortgage deed with these financial institutions in order to secure the loan there would have been a separate document for distinct transactions. On proper construction of this indenture of mortgage it can safely be regarded as 13 distinct transactions which falls under Section 5 of the Act.

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