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Both owner and driver liable under Motor Vehicles Act for carrying excess load in goods carriage: Kerala High Court The ...
02/02/2023

Both owner and driver liable under Motor Vehicles Act for carrying excess load in goods carriage: Kerala High Court The Kerala High Court recently held that the registered owner of a goods carriage as well as it driver are liable for carrying excess weight in it, as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) [Fasaludeen A & Ors. v State of Kerala]. Justice Ziyad Rahman AA clarified that in such cases, both the driver and the registered owner have committed two separate offenses, namely, the driving of a vehicle with excess weight (unladen or laden), and causing or allowing the driving of the vehicle with excess weight. “The offense which is specified under Sub-section (3) of Section 113 starts with the words “no person shall drive or cause or allow to be driven in any public place any motor vehicle or trailer” ... Therefore, it is evident that both the acts, namely, the driving of a vehicle with excess weight (unladen or laden) as well as causing or allowing the driving of the vehicle with excess weight, would attract the offenses, and these are separate offenses which could be committed by different person … by virtue of the stipulation contained in Subsection (3), the registered owners are liable to be prosecuted for the offense under Subsection (3) of Section 113 of the Motor Vehicles Act,”  the court said. The Court was considering a bunch of petitions filed by various owners and drivers of goods carriages challenging the prosecution initiated against them by the Motor Vehicles Inspector. The common allegation against the petitioners in all the cases was that they carried the excess load in their goods carriages and, thereby, committed the offences punishable under Sections 113(3)(b) read with Section 194(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The counsel for petitioners contended that the complaint filed against them specified an amount of penalty that has to be paid by them if found guilty and it also contained a prayer directing them to pay the fine as per the rates stipulated in a Government Order. The Court said that the complaint cannot be vitiated merely on this ground even though it is true that these complaints refer to a government order and also direct a specified amount to be paid. If there are sufficient averments in the complaint for prosecuting the accused on the basis of materials placed on record, nothing would preclude the court from taking cognizance, the High Court opined. The counsel for the petitioners further contended that the prosecution against them was wrong because the officers concerned of the MV department did not pass any orders directing the drivers to off-load the excess weight. The Court said that this too would not vitiate the proceedings against the petitioners because the offence has already been committed by the accused. “As far as the issuance of an order to offload the excess weight is concerned, the same is a subsequent event after the detection of the offense. Once the vehicle was found to be carrying excess weight, the offense under Subsection (3) of Section 113 would get attracted, and merely because of the reason that the officer concerned failed to pass an order directing the driver to off-load the excess weight, the proceedings would not be vitiated and efface the offense already committed by the accused persons. Moreover, the word used in Section 114 with regard to the issuance of an order to off-load the excess weight is ‘may’, and therefore it can only be interpreted as an enabling provision that empowers the Officer concerned to pass such a direction so as to avoid continued violation of Subsection (3) of Section 113 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, I do not find any merit in that contention as well,”  the Court elaborated. Consequently, the Court dismissed all the petitions. 

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12/11/2022

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“Left with no alternative”, Supreme Court acquits all 3 accused in Chhawla Gang R**e and Murder case Supreme Court:The 3...
10/11/2022

“Left with no alternative”, Supreme Court acquits all 3 accused in Chhawla Gang R**e and Murder case Supreme Court:The 3-judge bench of UU Lalit, CJ and S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela M. Trivedi*, JJ has acquitted the three accused in the Chhawla kidnapping, r**e and murder case by giving them a benefit of doubt as the prosecution was not able to prove the case against them beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at hand, a girl was allegedly kidnapped in Chhawla, gang r**ed, killed and dumped in the fields ahead of Jhajjar by the three accused. The girl was allegedly walking with her two friends when she was forcibly pulled inside an Indica car. Three boys were arrested, who had later, admitted having kidnapped, gang r**ed and killed the victim. The entire case of prosecution rested on the circumstantial evidence, and that the victim was r**ed and brutally murdered. The Trial Court relying upon the certain circumstances as “proved” convicted and sentenced the accused for the charged offences. The Delhi High Court also believing the same set of circumstances as “proved” further noted that the two incriminating circumstances of the DNA of a strand of hair recovered from the girl’s dead body matching DNA of Ravi and DNA generated from semen spots found on seat cover of the Indica car matching DNA profile of Vinod were overlooked by the Trial Court. In the case at hand, the Supreme Court found it difficult to hold that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused by adducing cogent and clinching evidence. The evidence with regard to the arrest of the accused, their identification, discoveries and recoveries of the incriminating articles, identity of the Indica Car, the seizures and sealing of the articles and collection of samples, the medical and scientific evidence, the report of DNA profiling, the evidence with regard to the CDRs etc  were not proved by the prosecution by leading, cogent, clinching and clear evidence much less unerringly pointing the guilt of the accused . There were many glaring lapses having occurred during the course of the trial. Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel. Hence,  material witnesses examined by the prosecution having not been either cross-examined or adequately examined, and the trial court also having acted as a passive umpire, the Court held that the accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court. Stating that no conviction should be based merely on the apprehension of indictment or condemnation over the decision rendered, Court observed, it may be true that if the accused involved in the heinous crime go unpunished or are acquitted, a kind of agony and frustration may be caused to the society in general and to the family of the victim in particular, however the law does permit the Courts to punish the accused on the basis of moral conviction or on suspicion alone. “The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against them beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case, resultantly, the Court is left with no alternative but to acquit the accused, though involved in a very heinous crime.” The Court, hence, set aside the judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court and acquitted the accused by giving them a benefit of doubt. The Court made clear that in view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased- victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted and hence, the parents of the victim would be entitled to the compensation, if not awarded so far by the Delhi State Legal Services Authority, as may be permissible in accordance with law. [Rahul v. State of Delhi, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 611 OF 2022, decided on 07.11.2022] Background Supreme Court’s Ruling Effect of acquittal on compensation to victim’s family *Judgment by: Justice Bela M. Trivedi. For more info visit us at http://www.rajeshgehlawat.com/latest-update/-left-with-no-altern/172?utm_source=facebookpage

Supreme Court |Handing over cash to a public servant would be considered “proceeds of crime” under the Prevention of Mon...
10/11/2022

Supreme Court |Handing over cash to a public servant would be considered “proceeds of crime” under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 Supreme Court: In a case wherein the appeal challenged the final judgment and order passed by the High Court of Madras (High Court) in writ petition, filed by the respondent seeking quashing of proceedings initiated against him under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002  (PML Act), the Division Bench of UU Lalit, CJ. and Bela M. Trivedi, J. held that the respondent was involved in the activity connected with proceeds of crime and hence, liable under the provisions of the PML Act. Facts of the Case Andasu (Appellant 1) was working as Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and on intelligence, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) checked the car that was parked in front of the premises of the Andasu’s house and recovered Rs. 50,00,000 in cash. It was alleged that Andasu and Uttam (Appellant 3) were in that car at that time. During investigation, it was found that the sum of Rs. 50,00,000 was handed over to Andasu by Padmanabhan (Appellant 2/Respondent), whose income tax file was pending with Andasu for clearance and since Padmanabhan wanted certain benefits, he had paid Rs. 50,00,000 as bribe to Andasu. CBI then registered an FIR and after the completion of the investigation, filed a charge sheet before the Special Court for the CBI Cases for the offences under Section  120-B  of the  Penal Code, 1860  (IPC) and Sections  7 ,  12  and  13(1)(d)  read with Section  13(2)  of the  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988  (PC Act) against the appellants. Since the case registered by CBI disclosed the commission of a ‘schedule offence’ under the PML Act, the Enforcement Directorate registered a case and after completing the investigation, filed a complaint against Everonn Education Limited and three others including Padmanabhan for the offences under Sections 3 read with Section 4 of the PML Act. The respondent contended that the amount in question, till it was in the hands of the respondent, cannot be said to be tainted money and it assumed such character only after it was received by the public servant and therefore, respondent cannot have said to related to proceeds of crime and cannot be proceeded against the provisions of the PML Act. Questions for Consideration 1. Whether the respondent can be proceeded against under the provisions of the PML Act? 2. Whether the role played by respondent could come within the purview of Section 3 and 4 of the PML Act? Analysis, Law and Decision The High Court accepted the contention of the respondent with the following observations: “For attracting the penal provisions of the PML Act, the accused should have projected the proceeds of a crime as untainted money. The sum of Rs. 50,00,000 became the proceeds of a crime only when Andasu accepted it as a bribe. Even before Andasu could project the sum of Rs. 50,00,000 as untainted money, the CBI intervened and seized the money in the car. Therefore, the prosecution of Padmanabhan under the PML Act, is misconceived.” The High Court thus allowed the writ petition and quashed the proceedings in PML Act against Padmanabhan. This decision was under challenge before this Court. The definition of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the PML Act is as follows: “2. Definitions. — (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, — ### ### ### (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad; Explanation. — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;” Paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act deals with offences under the PC Act. Sections 7, 12 and 13 of which are stated as follows: “Section 7 – Offence relating to public servant being bribed. Section 12 – Punishment for abetment of offences. Section 13 – Criminal misconduct by a public servant.” The definition of “proceeds of crime” in PML Act means any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13 are scheduled offences, as is evident from paragraph 8 of part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act. Thus, any property derived as a result of criminal activity relating to the offence mentioned in said paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule would certainly be “proceeds of crime”. Further, Section 3 of the PML Act states that whoever knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition, or use shall be guilty of the offence of money laundering. The Court opined that  “It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. The crucial part therefore is the requisite intent to hand over the amount as bribe and normally such intent must necessarily be antecedent or prior to the moment the amount is handed over. Thus, the requisite intent would always be at the core before the amount is handed over. Such intent having been entertained well before the amount is actually handed over, the person concerned would certainly be involved in the process or activity connected with “proceeds of crime” including inter alia the aspects of possession or acquisition thereof. By handing over money with the intent of giving bribe, such person will be assisting or will knowingly be a party to an activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Without such active participation on the part of the person concerned, the money would not assume the character of being proceeds of crime. The relevant expressions from Section 3 of the PML Act are thus wide enough to cover the role played by such person” . Therefore, it was quite clear that the respondent was  prima facie  involved in the activity connected with the proceeds of crime and the view taken by the High Court that the respondent could not be held liable for the offence under the PML Act was completely incorrect. Thus, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court. [Directorate of Enforcement v. Padmanabhan Kishore,  2022 SCC OnLine SC 1490 , decided on 31-10-2022]. For more info visit us at http://www.rajeshgehlawat.com/latest-update/supreme-court-handi/171?utm_source=facebookpage

Constitutionality of 10% Quota for EWS upheld in 3:2 verdict: Key takeaways from Majority Rulingincluding suggestion for...
08/11/2022

Constitutionality of 10% Quota for EWS upheld in 3:2 verdict: Key takeaways from Majority Rulingincluding suggestion for prescribing time limit for reservation While Dinesh Maheshwari, Bela M Trivedi and JB Pardiwala, JJ wrote separate but concurrent opinions forming majority, S. Ravindra Bhat, J wrote the minority opinion for himself and U.U. Lalit, CJ.. For more info visit us at http://www.rajeshgehlawat.com/latest-update/constitutionality-of/168?utm_source=facebookpage

‘Identifier for 10% Quota for EWS is economic deprivation; Social or educational backwardness irrelevant’: Key takeaways...
08/11/2022

‘Identifier for 10% Quota for EWS is economic deprivation; Social or educational backwardness irrelevant’: Key takeaways from Dissenting opinion While Dinesh Maheshwari, Bela M Trivedi and JB Pardiwala, JJ wrote separate but concurrent opinions forming majority, S. Ravindra Bhat, J wrote the minority opinion for himself and U.U. Lalit, CJ.. For more info visit us at http://www.rajeshgehlawat.com/latest-update/-identifier-for-10-/167?utm_source=facebookpage

Pre-sentence hearing in Capital Punishment Cases: Mandatory or discretionary? CJI lead 3-judges Bench refers question to...
08/11/2022

Pre-sentence hearing in Capital Punishment Cases: Mandatory or discretionary? CJI lead 3-judges Bench refers question to Constitution Bench Supreme Court: In a suo motu  case initiated to address the question as to whether the provision of pre-sentence hearing in capital punishment cases is mandatory or discretionary, the 3-judges Bench of Uday Umesh Lalit, CJ., and S. Ravindra Bhat*, Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ., suggested that the matter be referred to a constitution Bench. Highlighting the apparent flaw of depriving the capital punishment convict of pre-sentence hearing, the Court held, “In all cases where imposition of capital punishment is a choice of sentence, aggravating circumstances would always be on record, and would be part of the prosecution’s evidence, leading to conviction, whereas the accused can scarcely be expected to place mitigating circumstances on the record, for the reason that the stage for doing so is after conviction. This places the convict at a hopeless disadvantage, tilting the scales heavily against him.” Question of Law Due to a difference of opinion and approach amongst various judgments, on the question of whether, after recording conviction for a capital offence, the court is obligated under law to conduct a separate hearing on the issue of the sentence, the Bench had assembled to adjudicate the issue. Validity of Capital Punishment and Valuable Safeguards In  Bachan Singh  v.  State of Punjab ,  (1980) 2 SCC 684 , the majority upheld the constitutionality of the death sentence, on the condition that it could be imposed in the “rarest of rare” cases. The Court, being conscious of the safeguard of a separate hearing on the question of sentence, articulated it as a valuable right, which ensures to a convict, to urge why in the circumstances of his or her case, the extreme penalty of death ought not to be imposed. The Court noted, “The present legislative policy discernible from Section 235 (2) read with Section 354 (3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences the Court should not confine its consideration “principally” or merely to the circumstances connected with a particular crime, but also give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal.” Bifurcated Hearing: Inconsistent Precedents Section  235  of the  CrPC, 1973  which deals with judgment of acquittal or conviction, reads as follows:  “235.’(1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case. (2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.” Hence, Section 235 (2) provides for a bifurcated trial and specifically gives the accused person a right of a pre-sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring on record material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant to or connected with the particular crime under inquiry, but nevertheless, have, consistently with the policy underlined in Section 354 (3) a bearing on the choice of sentence. Precedents holding Bifurcated Hearing is of mandatory nature In  Santa Singh  v.  State of Punjab ,  (1976) 4 SCC 190 , the Court had held that a separate stage should be provided after conviction when the court can hear the accused in regard to the factors bearing on sentence and then pass proper sentence on the accused—the nature of the offence, the circumstances of the offence (extenuating or aggravating), the prior criminal record of the offender, the age of the offender, the record of the offender as to employment, the background of the offender with reference to education, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, the emotional and mental condition of the offender, the prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the possibility of return of the offender to a normal life in the community, the possibility of treatment or training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence may serve as a deterrent to crime by the offender or by others and the current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in respect to the particular type of offence. In the aforesaid case, the Court had also noted, “Of course, care would have to be taken by the court to see that this hearing on the question of sentence is not abused and turned into an instrument for unduly protracting the proceedings. The claim of due and proper hearing 8 would have to be harmonized with the requirement of expeditious disposal of proceedings.” In  Mithu  v.  State of Punjab ,  (1983) 2 SCC 277 , the Court held that it is because the court has an option to impose either of the two alternative sentences, subject to the rule that the normal punishment for murder is life imprisonment, that it is important to hear the accused on the question of sentence. In  Allauddin Mian  v.  State of Bihar ,  (1989) 3 SCC 5 , the Court observed, “To assist the court in determining the correct sentence to be imposed the legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235. The said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule of natural justice by according to the accused an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and at the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the accused an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having a bearing on the question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality.” Similarly, other more recent three-judge decisions have also ruled that same day sentencing in capital offences violate the principles of natural justice, and is opposed to Section 235 (2). Precedents Stating Bifurcated Hearing is merely discretionary However, some the three-judge Benches have arrived at a different conclusion that same-day sentencing does not necessarily fall foul of Section  235 (2) of the  CrPC . This contrary line of cases are based on the premise that the court may adjourn for a separate hearing, but the absence of it would not in itself vitiate the sentence. In  Dagdu  v.  State of Maharashtra ,  (1977) 3 SCC 68 , a three-judge bench rejected the interpretation of  Santa Singh  case (supra) as laying down that failure on the part of the court to hear a convicted accused, on the question of sentence, would necessitate remand to the trial court. Instead, it held that such an omission could be remedied by the higher court by affording a hearing to the accused on the question of sentence, provided the hearing was  “real and effective”  wherein the accused was permitted to  “adduce before the court all the data which he desires to be adduced on the question of sentence” . Several decisions have since relied on Dagdu (supra), and concluded that the action of the court sentencing an accused on the same day as conviction in itself would not vitiate the sentence. The decision in  Dagdu  (supra) was in turn, followed by another three-judge bench in  Tarlok Singh  v.  State of Punjab ,  (1977) 3 SCC 218 . Similarly, in  Ramdeo Chauhan  v.  State of Assam ,  (2001) 5 SCC 714 , a similar conclusion was arrived at, but on differing reasoning. The Court held, “While the accused facing the possibility of death sentence was not entitled to an adjournment, nothing barred the court from granting the same.” Judicial Interpretation of “Sufficient Time” The Court through its various judgments had held that “sufficient time must be given to the accused on the question of sentence”. The common thread that runs through all these decisions is the express acknowledgment that meaningful, real and effective hearing must be afforded to the accused, with the opportunity to adduce material relevant for the question of sentencing. However, the Court noted, “What is conspicuously absent, is consideration and contemplation about the time this may require.” In  Manoj Pratap Singh  v.  State of Rajasthan ,  2022 SCC OnLine SC 768 , where ‘sufficient time’ for compliance with Section  235 (2)  CrPC  was considered; it was concluded that the trial court had “scrupulously carried out its duty in terms of Section 235(2)” since the sentence was awarded 3 days after the conviction, after considering both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. After hearing the parties on the question of conviction in  Manoj  v.  State of M.P. ,  2021 SCC OnLine SC 3219 , the Court had adjourned the matter for submissions on sentencing, with directions eliciting reports from the probation officer, jail authorities, a trained psychiatrist and psychologist, etc., to assist the accused in presenting mitigating circumstances. Noticing the lack of a uniform framework in this regard, the Court had initiated the present  Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1/2022  to address the necessity of working out the modalities of psychological evaluation, the stage of adducing evidence in order to highlight mitigating circumstances, and the need to build institutional capacity in this regard. Conclusion The Court, after observing that the social milieu, the age, educational levels, whether the convict had faced trauma earlier in life, family circumstances, psychological evaluation of a convict and post-conviction conduct, are relevant factors at the time of considering whether the death penalty ought to be imposed upon the accused, opined that it is necessary to have clarity in the matter to ensure a uniform approach on the question of granting real and meaningful opportunity, as opposed to a formal hearing, to the accused/convict, on the issue of sentence. Consequently, the Court held that a reference to a larger bench of five Judges is necessary for this purpose and directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders in this regard. [Framing Guidelines Regarding Potential Mitigating Circumstances to be Considered while Imposing Death Sentences: In re,  2022 SCC OnLine SC 1246 , decided on 19-09-2022] *Judgment by: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat. For more info visit us at http://www.rajeshgehlawat.com/latest-update/pre-sentence-hearing/166?utm_source=facebookpage

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