Legal Law

10/02/2026

Please read this articles.

🔔 Supreme Court Alert:
An Agreement to Sell or General Power of Attorney does not confer property ownership. 🏠
Only a registered sale deed transfers valid title.
👉 Read my detailed article below to understand the ruling and its implications.

🏛️ Agreement to Sell & GPA Do Not Confer Property Title: Supreme Court Reiterates
Property transactions in India often involve shortcuts like agreements to sell or general powers of attorney (GPA). The Supreme Court has once again made it clear: these documents do not transfer ownership of immovable property. Only a registered sale deed does.
⚖️ Legal Background
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882: An agreement to sell creates only a contractual right, not ownership.
- Registration Act, 1908: Title passes only through a registered instrument.
- Suraj Lamp Case (2011): Landmark ruling that GPA or agreement to sell cannot substitute for a sale deed.
📌 Supreme Court’s Key Observations
- Agreement to Sell → Creates a right to obtain a sale deed, but no ownership.
- General Power of Attorney (GPA) → Grants authority to act, but not title.
- Registered Sale Deed → The only valid instrument to transfer ownership.
The Court also noted that GPA sales are often used to evade stamp duty and registration fees, which undermines the integrity of property transactions.
🔍 Practical Implications
- Buyers: Always insist on a registered sale deed.
- Banks: Exercise strict due diligence before approving loans.
- Lawyers: Draft agreements carefully, clarifying that they don’t confer ownership.
- Courts: Continue discouraging GPA-based transfers to prevent parallel property markets.
✅ Conclusion
This ruling reinforces a simple but powerful principle: ownership of immovable property in India can only be transferred through a registered sale deed. Agreements to sell and GPAs may create rights or obligations, but they do not confer title.

Difference between sale deed and agreement to sell.

The Court explained the difference between a registered sale deed and an agreement to sell as follows :

"There is a difference between a sale deed and an agreement for sale, or a contract for sale. A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. Section 54 in its definition of sale does not include an agreement of sale and neither confers any proprietary rights in favour of the transferee nor by itself create any interest or charge in the property. If after entering into a contract for sale of property, the seller without any reasonable excuse avoids executing a sale deed, the buyer can proceed to file a suit for specific performance of the contract."

General Power of Attorney doesn't confer title

Further, the Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on the Power of Attorney, stating that such documents also do not validate transfer, as “it would not ipso facto change the character of the document transforming it into a conveyance deed.”

"A power of attorney is not a sale. A sale involves transfer of all the rights in the property in favour of the transferee but a power of attorney simply authorises the grantee to do certain acts with respect to the property including if the grantor permits to do certain acts with respect to the property including an authority to sell the property," the Court explained.

The judgment added :

“it is essential to peruse the recitals of the General Power of Attorney, which is on record and pressed into service by plaintiff. The said GPA merely authorises the grantee to manage the affairs of the suit property, which includes the power to let out the property on rent, and create a mortgage of the same, etc. However, it is silent on the aspect of conveyance. Be that as it may. The recitals of the power of attorney would indicate the intent of the grantor is to limit the powers of the grantee to only manage the suit property, and not to create any interest in his favour, which is in consonance with the settled position of law as discussed above that a power of attorney is an agency by which the agent derives the authority or the right to enter into transactions on behalf of the principal. Even if we accept the validity of the Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff, still it does not confer a valid title on him with respect to the suit property.”, the court observed.

08/02/2026

🔔 Supreme Court Alert:
An Agreement to Sell or General Power of Attorney does not confer property ownership. 🏠
Only a registered sale deed transfers valid title.
👉 Read my detailed article below to understand the ruling and its implications.

🏛️ Agreement to Sell & GPA Do Not Confer Property Title: Supreme Court Reiterates
Property transactions in India often involve shortcuts like agreements to sell or general powers of attorney (GPA). The Supreme Court has once again made it clear: these documents do not transfer ownership of immovable property. Only a registered sale deed does.
⚖️ Legal Background
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882: An agreement to sell creates only a contractual right, not ownership.
- Registration Act, 1908: Title passes only through a registered instrument.
- Suraj Lamp Case (2011): Landmark ruling that GPA or agreement to sell cannot substitute for a sale deed.
📌 Supreme Court’s Key Observations
- Agreement to Sell → Creates a right to obtain a sale deed, but no ownership.
- General Power of Attorney (GPA) → Grants authority to act, but not title.
- Registered Sale Deed → The only valid instrument to transfer ownership.
The Court also noted that GPA sales are often used to evade stamp duty and registration fees, which undermines the integrity of property transactions.
🔍 Practical Implications
- Buyers: Always insist on a registered sale deed.
- Banks: Exercise strict due diligence before approving loans.
- Lawyers: Draft agreements carefully, clarifying that they don’t confer ownership.
- Courts: Continue discouraging GPA-based transfers to prevent parallel property markets.
✅ Conclusion
This ruling reinforces a simple but powerful principle: ownership of immovable property in India can only be transferred through a registered sale deed. Agreements to sell and GPAs may create rights or obligations, but they do not confer title.

Difference between sale deed and agreement to sell.

The Court explained the difference between a registered sale deed and an agreement to sell as follows :

"There is a difference between a sale deed and an agreement for sale, or a contract for sale. A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. Section 54 in its definition of sale does not include an agreement of sale and neither confers any proprietary rights in favour of the transferee nor by itself create any interest or charge in the property. If after entering into a contract for sale of property, the seller without any reasonable excuse avoids executing a sale deed, the buyer can proceed to file a suit for specific performance of the contract."

General Power of Attorney doesn't confer title

Further, the Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on the Power of Attorney, stating that such documents also do not validate transfer, as “it would not ipso facto change the character of the document transforming it into a conveyance deed.”

"A power of attorney is not a sale. A sale involves transfer of all the rights in the property in favour of the transferee but a power of attorney simply authorises the grantee to do certain acts with respect to the property including if the grantor permits to do certain acts with respect to the property including an authority to sell the property," the Court explained.

The judgment added :

“it is essential to peruse the recitals of the General Power of Attorney, which is on record and pressed into service by plaintiff. The said GPA merely authorises the grantee to manage the affairs of the suit property, which includes the power to let out the property on rent, and create a mortgage of the same, etc. However, it is silent on the aspect of conveyance. Be that as it may. The recitals of the power of attorney would indicate the intent of the grantor is to limit the powers of the grantee to only manage the suit property, and not to create any interest in his favour, which is in consonance with the settled position of law as discussed above that a power of attorney is an agency by which the agent derives the authority or the right to enter into transactions on behalf of the principal. Even if we accept the validity of the Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff, still it does not confer a valid title on him with respect to the suit property.”, the court observed.

20/12/2020

The Supreme Court has observed that the candidates belonging to reserved category, are eligible to fill general/open category vacancies also.

The bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Hrishikesh Roy held that this principle should also be followed while filling vacancies in horizontal reservations in open category.

The Court has disapproved the view taken by some High Courts that, at the stage of accommodating candidates for effecting horizontal reservation, the candidates from reserved categories can be adjusted only against their own categories under the concerned vertical reservation and not against the "Open or General Category.

This case pertains to selection process undertaken by State of Uttar Pradesh to fill up 41,610 posts of Police Constables [U.P. Civil Police/Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC)/Fireman]). Ms. Sonam Tomar and Ms. Reeta Rani who had participated in the Selection Process had approached the Court aggrieved with non-consideration of their claim [of OBC female and SC female candidates] against the posts meant for General Category female candidates.

The bench, in its judgment has referred to various earlier judgments of Supreme Court and High Court which deals with the issue of vertical and horizontal reservation. About the former, the bench observed:

The principle that candidates belonging to any of the vertical reservation categories are entitled to be selected in "Open or General Category" is well settled. It is also well accepted that if such candidates belonging to reserved categories are entitled to be selected on the basis of their own merit, their selection cannot be counted against the quota reserved for the categories for vertical reservation that they belong.
The court noted that the High Courts of Rajasthan, Bombay, Uttarakhand, and Gujarat have adopted the same principle ( of vertical reservation) while dealing with horizontal reservation whereas the High Court of Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh have taken a contrary view. According to the second view, at the stage of accommodating candidates for effecting horizontal reservation, the candidates from reserved categories can be adjusted only against their own categories under the concerned vertical reservation and not against the "Open or General Category". Disapproving the second view, the bench observed:

"The second view may lead to a situation where, while making adjustment for horizontal reservation in Open or General Category seats, less meritorious candidates may be adjusted, as has happened in the present matter. Admittedly, the last selected candidates in Open General female category while making adjustment of horizontal reservation had secured lesser marks than the Applicants. The claim of the Applicants was disregarded on the ground that they could claim only and only if there was a vacancy or chance for them to be accommodated in their respective column of vertical reservation"
"The second view, based on adoption of a different principle at the stage of horizontal reservation as against one accepted to be a settled principle for vertical reservation, may thus lead to situations where a less meritorious candidate, not belonging to any of the reserved categories, may get selected in preference to a more meritorious candidate coming from a reserved category."
The judgment explains the incongruity of the second view by way of an illustration (Read from Para 26).

Therefore, the court held that all candidates coming from 'OBC Female Category' who had secured more marks than the marks secured by the last candidate appointed in 'General Category–Female' must be offered employment as Constables in Uttar Pradesh Police.

Justice Ravindra Bhat, in his concurring opinion explained the concept of horizontal and vertical reservation

"The quota provided for women, as well as dependents of freedom fighters (DFF) and ex-servicemen, in the present case are characterized as 'horizontal' whereas the quotas for social groups (SCs, STs, OBCs) are characterized as 'vertical'. The coining of this differential terminology is underscored by the fact that the latter is sanctioned explicitly in Article 16(4), whereas the former is evolved through a process of permissible classification (Articles 14, 16(1)), although such horizontal reservations have been located additionally in Article 15(3)14"
Rejecting the State's contention that the women candidates who are entitled to benefit of social category reservations, cannot fill open category vacancies, the judge further observed:

"I would conclude by saying that reservations, both vertical and horizontal, are method of ensuring representation in public services. These are not to be seen as rigid "slots", where a candidate's merit, which otherwise entitles her to be shown in the open general category, is foreclosed, as the consequence would be, if the state's argument is accepted. Doing so, would result in a communal reservation, where each social category is confined within the extent of their reservation, thus negating merit. The open category is open to all, and the only condition for a candidate to be shown in it is merit, regardless of whether reservation benefit of either type is available to her or him."

CASE: SAURAV YADAV vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [ M.A. NO.2641 OF 2019 of SLP (CIVIL)NO.23223 OF 2018 ]
CORAM: Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Hrishikesh Roy
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The Supreme Court has observed that the candidates belonging to reserved category, are eligible to fill general/open category vacancies also.The bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra...

20/12/2020

Recently, the Allahabad High Court called the conduct of the Jailer/Jail Superintendent, who refused to release the applicant, Vinod Baruaar as the word 'Kumar' was missing to his name in bail order of the Allahabad High Court, "not only reprehensible, but also contumacious".

The Bench of Justice J. J. Munir directed the Jail Superintendent/Jailer to appear before the Court and explain as to why appropriate departmental inquiry may not be recommended against him.

The matter before the Court

It was prayed before the Court that the applicant's name, shown as "Vinod Baruaar" in the cause title of the bail application and also in the rejection order dated 04.09.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.-II, Siddharthnagar, in Bail Application No. 731 of 2019, may be corrected to "Vinod Kumar Baruaar".

It was submitted by the counsel for the applicant that despite HC's order granting him bail on 09.04.2020, the applicant was not released from jail.

In fact, the jail authorities refused to comply with the release order passed in the case, because the name mentioned in the release order was "Vinod Baruaar", whereas that in the remand sheet, his name is "Vinod Kumar Baruaar".

On this technicality, the Jail Superintendent/Jailer flouted the bail order of the High Court by refusing to release the applicant.

In these circumstances, the applicant made an application for correction of the applicant's name to the learned Trial Judge, who refused to correct the name in the release order, contrary to the order passed by the High Court.

Court's observations

Reprimanding the conduct of the Jail Superintendent/Jailer, the Court said,

"This Court does not appreciate our orders being flouted with impunity. This Court fails to understand that when the applicant's name mentioned in the bail rejection order is 'Vinod Baruaar', then why 'Kumar' must be added to the name mentioned in the bail order, in order to make it effectual."

The Court also remarked,

"This kind of a trifling of mistake pointed by the Jail Authorities must invite severe punishment, unless there is a serious doubt or dispute about the identity of the applicant. That, apparently, is not the case here."

Further, the Court noted,

"The sole purpose of not complying with the bail orders for all these eight months appears to be, prima facie, an obstinate attitude of the jail administration in carrying out the orders of this Court. In the process, they have deprived a citizen of his liberty, without any just or reasonable cause, since April, 2020 till date. This illegal deprivation of liberty is patently an illegal confinement and that too, during these perilous CoViD-19 times."

Lastly, the correction application was rejected by the High Court with orders that the applicant, Vinod Baruaar, with that name, be forthwith released upon a release order to be passed by learned Special Judge (R**e and POCSO Act Cases), Siddharthnagar within the time period of 24 hours.

The Jailer/Jail Superintendent was directed to comply with the release order passed by the Special Judge (R**e and POCSO Act Cases), Siddharthnagar and forthwith release the applicant, without raising any objection about absence of "Kumar" to his name.

[Update - An affidavit of compliance was filed by Rakesh Singh, Superintendent, District Jail, Siddharth Nagar on 08th December and he also appeared in person. He furnished the explanation for non compliance with this Court's order.

He stated in his affidavit that the "applicant has been released from prison on 08.12.2020 at 12:22 hours."

In consequence, the Court "reluctantly accepted" the delay in release of the applicant. The personal presence of the Jail Superintendent was exempted. He was "warned to remain careful in future."]

Case Title - Vinod Baruaar v. State of U.P. [Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. - 3837 of 2020]

Click Here https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/illegal-confinement-as-kumar-missing-to-his-name-in-bail-order-allahabad-high-court-summons-jailer-167464

12/12/2020

The Supreme Court has held that it is permissible to alter a charge under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code(IPC) to a charge under Section 34 IPC if the facts prove that the crime has been committed in furtherance of a common intention.

Section 149 IPC provides for vicarious liability of members of an unlawful assembly for the crime committed by any member of the assembly in furtherance of the common object and makes them liable for the same punishment. The condition for invoking this Section is that there should be five or more persons in the assembly.

The Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where three out of the seven persons accused of the offence under Section 307 IPC(attempt to murder) were acquitted. Therefore, the number of convicts under the assembly became less than five. So the application of Section 149 IPC was not possible in the case. The issue before the court was whether it was lawful to use the aid of Section 34 IPC(common intention) to attribute criminal liability to the members of the group.

Referring to various precedents, the Supreme Court held that Section 34 IPC can be used in such a situation if common intention has been proved.

The bench comprising Justices N V Ramana, Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose observed that Sections 211 to 224 of CrPC, which deal with framing of charges in criminal trials, give significant flexibility to Courts to alter and rectify the charges.

"The only controlling objective while deciding on alteration is whether the new charge would cause prejudice to the accused, say if he were to be taken by surprise or if the belated change would affect his defence strategy. The emphasis of Chapter XVII of the CrPC is thus to give a full and proper opportunity to the defence but at the same time to ensure that justice is not defeated by mere technicalities", the judgment authored by Justice Surya Kant obseved.

The bench quoted the dictum laid down by a coordinate bench in the case Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab(1953) as follows :

"..if the facts to be proved and the evidence to be adduced with reference to the charge under section 149would be the same if the charge were under section 34,then the failure to charge the accused under section 34could not result in any prejudice and in such cases the substitution of section 34 for section 149 must be held to be a formal matter".

The bench also quoted from another precedent Nallabothu Venkaiah v. State of AndhraPradesh(2002) as follows :

"...charge under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 could be converted into one under Section 302 r/w Section 34 if the criminal act done by several persons less than five in number in furtherance of common intention is proved."

The bench also observed :

"Although both Section 34 and 149 of the IPC are modes for apportioning vicarious liability on the individual members of a group,there exist a few important differences between these two provisions.Whereas Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, Section 149 IPC assigns liability merely by membership of the unlawful assembly. In reality, such 'common intention' is usually indirectly inferred from conduct of the individuals and only seldom it is done through direct evidence".

The Supreme Court observed that the appellants did not suffere any adverse effect when the Punjab and Haryana High Court held the three of them individually guilty for the offence of attempted murder, without the aid of Section 149 IPC.

On facts, the SC noted that "the requirements of Section 34 of IPC are well established as the attack was apparently pre­meditated".

"The incident was not in a spur­ of­ the­ moment. The appellants had previously threatened the complainant with physical harm if he were to attempt to irrigate his fields. Their attack on 25.01.1998 was thus pre­planned and calculated.There is nothing on record to suggest that the complainant caused any provocation. Specific roles have been attributed to each of the appellants by the injured and the solitary eye­witness, establishing their individual active participation in the crime", the Court observed.

The conviction of the appellants under Section 307 IPC was thus upheld.

Case Details

Title : Rohtas and Another v State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal No.38/2011)

Bench : Justices N V Ramana, Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose.

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The Supreme Court has held that it is permissible to alter a charge under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code(IPC) to a charge under Section 34 IPC if the facts prove that the crime has been...

17/10/2020

The Allahabad High Court on Thursday directed the District Magistrate, Prayagraj, to resolve a property title/ possession dispute between a former Judge of the Allahabad High Court and his son, within two months.

The Bench comprising of Justices Shashi Kant Gupta and Pankaj Bhatia directed the Magistrate to pass a "speaking and reasoned order" and further granted liberty the parties to place the order before the Court, for further directions.

The order has come in a writ petition filed by Justice (Retd.) Anjani Kumar and his wife, alleging that the latter was the registered owner of the disputed house however, their son Chandan Kumar had illegally evicted them therefrom.

(Justice Kumar was elevated to the Bench as a Judge of the Allahabad High Court in April 2001 and served up till September 13, 2008)

Being senior citizens, they sought protection under the Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2014.

They sought the Court's assistance while submitting that even though the Legislature has enacted the aforesaid laws for protection of senior citizens, no mechanism has been provided for implementation of the orders passed thereunder.

Significantly, the state of UP adopted the Act of 2007 in September 2012. Under the Act, parents and senior citizens have the right to claim maintenance and protection from their children. As per Section 4 of the Act, the obligation of the children to maintain his or her parent extends to the needs of such parent either father or mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent may lead a normal life.

Further, it provides for establishment of Tribunals at tehsil/sub- division level, to be presided a Sub-Divisional Officer, to implement the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, it provides for establishment of Appellate Tribunals at District level, to be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District Magistrate.

As the Court was informed that no authority had yet been established to implement the Act, it ordered thus:

"the District Magistrate shall proceed with the matter and decide the aforesaid application/ petition of the petitioners in accordance with law by a speaking and reasoned order after hearing the petitioners and the respondent no. 5 by touching all the issues raised by the parties within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the said application/petition. In case the petitioners feel aggrieved with the order of the District Magistrate, they are granted liberty to place a copy of the said order before this court for perusal of this court and for passing further orders."

Notably, the Court did not grant any interim relief. The matter is now listed for orders on February 8, 2021.

Former Allahabad HC Judge And Wife Move HC Against Eviction From House By Son, HC Directs To Approach District Magistrate https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/former-allahabad-hc-judge-and-wife-move-hc-against-eviction-from-house-by-son-hc-directs-to-approach-district-magistrate-164594 #.X4p8-snCBPg.whatsapp

24/08/2020

The Bombay High Court on Thursday imposed a cost of Rs.50,000 on State Bank Of India for deducting more than Rs.3 lakh from 85-year-old pensioner Naini Gopal's account after the bank concluded that an amount of Rs.872 per month was 'erroneously paid' in excess to the petitioner from the October 2007 due to technical error in the system. Court imposed cost towards mental agony and harassment caused by the bank and also for expenses of the said litigation.

Division bench of Justice RK Deshpande and Justice NB Suryawanshi of the Nagpur bench heard the petition filed by the octogenarian after more than Rs.3.26 lakh was deducted from his account and observed-

"We need to remind the Bank that the pension payable to the employees upon superannuation is a 'property' under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and it constitutes a fundamental right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The deprivation, even a part of this amount, cannot be accepted, except in accordance with and authority of law."
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The Bombay High Court on Thursday imposed a cost of Rs.50,000 on State Bank Of India for deducting more than Rs.3 lakh from 85-year-old pensioner Naini Gopal's account after the bank concluded that an...

22/08/2020

The Supreme Court has extended the deadline to September 30, 2020 for the CBI Court to deliver its judgment in the Babri Masjid demolition case which sees senior BJP leaders like L K Advani, M M Joshi, Uma Bharati and Kalyan Singh facing criminal charges.

The Bench comprising of Justices Rohinton Nariman, Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee decided to extend the time given to Special Judge, Surendra Kumar Yadav, to arrive at a verdict after he submitted a progress report apprising the Court that the proceedings were near completion.

Having been informed of the status of the trial, the Top Court allowed the Special Judge's application and extended the previous deadline by one month.

"Having read the report of Mr. Surendra Kumar Yadav, learned Special Judge, and considering that the proceedings are at the fag end, we grant one month's time, i.e., till 30th September, 2020, to complete the proceedings including delivery of judgment", reads the Order dated August 19, 2020.

Earlier, on May 8, 2020, a Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justices Nariman and Surya Kant had extended the deadline for Special CBI Court, Lucknow to deliver its judgment in the case by August 31, 2020 after considering a similar request by the Special Judge.

Special Judge Surendra Yadav had written to the Supreme Court on May 6, intimating that even the recording of evidence had not been completed by then.

The Bench had then suggested that the Judge use video conferencing facilities to wrap up proceedings and had asked him to ensure that the deadline "is no longer breached".

Prior to that, on July 19, 2019, the same bench had directed the Trial Court to complete the recording of evidence within six months and deliver judgment within nine months. The Court had also directed the UP Government to issue administrative orders to extend the tenure of the Special Judge of CBI Court, Lucknow till the delivery of judgment. The judge was otherwise due to retire on September 30, 2019.

BJP veterans L K Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, Kalyan Singh, Uma Bharati and 13 others are facing trial on charges of criminal conspiracy behind the demolition of Babri Masjid in December, 1992.

On April 19, 2017, the Supreme Court Bench of Justices P C Ghose and R F Nariman had restored the conspiracy charges against the accused by allowing an appeal filed by the CBI against the discharge given by the Allahabad High Court to the accused.

Invoking its extraordinary constitutional powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the bench also transferred the pending separate trial in a Rae Bareilly Magistrate court and clubbed it with criminal proceedings in the Lucknow CBI Court.

The top court had further ordered day-to-day trial to be concluded in two years in the case.

The civil case pertaining to Ayodhya-Babri Masjid dispute attained finality on November 8, 2019, when a 5-judge bench directed that the entire disputed land of 2.77 acres in Ayodhya must be handed over for the construction of Ram Mandir.

The Top Court had held that an alternate plot of 5 acres must be allotted to the Sunni Waqf Board for the construction of a mosque. This direction was passed invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

The Court had then observed that the destruction of Babri Masjid in 1992 was a violation of law. The act of placing idols beneath the central dome of the mosque in 1949 was an act of "desecration", observed the Constitution Bench comprising of then CJI Ranjan Gogoi along with Justices S A Bobde, D Y Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan and Abdul Nazeer.

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The Supreme Court has extended the deadline to September 30, 2020 for the CBI Court to deliver its judgment in the Babri Masjid demolition case which sees senior BJP leaders like L K Advani, M M...