15/01/2025
The GREGY interconnection between Europe and Egypt via Greece, a project undertaken by the Copelouzos (Renewables) group, was recently featured in the Greek media. This commercial cooperation project involves the transportation of 3,000 Megawatts of clean electricity between Egypt and Greece via a submarine cable, with the potential to feed this electricity into Egypt (or other South African countries) through photovoltaic or wind farms. The project is ambitious, with Europe aiming to secure abundant and affordable electricity in the future, particularly in the wake of the surge in K/W prices caused by the Russian and Ukrainian conflicts.The "GREGY" interconnector is financed by the European Union to the tune of 3.5 billion euros and is expected to be operational within 7 to 8 years, enabling European companies to benefit from advantageous gas prices. The first to benefit from the advantages of this agreement are, of course, Cyprus and Greece, which are implementing the program.
But as all good news does not come without a quid pro quo, the Greeks have to contend with the bellicose reaction of their neighbour Turkey, which does not look kindly on this commercial and strategic rapprochement in the Mediterranean.
Territorial issues and disputes
It should be recalled at the outset that Turkey has never signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). For the good reason that it believes its application would be detrimental to its interests. So it has no interest in doing so.
The main problem is therefore the appropriation of the natural resources of the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). If the 200 nautical miles stipulated for each country at the time in Montego are applied, the EEZs of Cyprus and Greece may come into proximity. The quick calculation de facto appropriates Cyprus and its waters to Greek territory. This is why Turkey disputes the extent of the two EEZs, and the military occupation of the island is a demonstration of its discontent. For the past 50 years, Turkish troops have been stationed on Cyprus, despite a UN resolution confirming almost every year that they should not be.
Other issues threaten the fragile geopolitical and diplomatic balance in the region. The older subject of Western Thrace revived on occasion to appeal to Turkey's far-right electorate is the presence of Turkish Muslims in Greece. The evocation of this subject is an integral part of the president's nationalist panoply, as he multiplies his provocations by daring to claim that “the West witnessed the atrocities committed against the Turkish Cypriots, just as it is witnessing the atrocities committed by Israel in Gaza”. In fact, the opposite is true, as the international community has not taken action against the massacres and expropriation of Greek citizens in Cyprus. And despite the massacres of Greeks compatriots in Turkey in 1922, Greece maintains the territorial integrity of Western Thrace within its own delimitations.
R. Erdogan adopts a moderate stance when addressing an international audience, he becomes more radical when the political message is broadcast on local television, where the cursing resume. He often reiterates that he can “throw the Greeks into the sea like in 1922, and that overnight he can invade a Greek island if he wants to”. If this threat (undoubtedly his favorite) is real and feasible, it doesn't seem to worry the world's major countries. And for good reason: what he's counting on is to inspire a sense of terror in the Greeks by repeating what Turkey has already done to Cyprus.
The year 2024 was marked by many green flags though, but only superficially. The only areas of agreement between the two countries are tourism and trade. Both Greece and Turkey are reliant on this indirect financing, a need that has only increased since October 7, 2023, when the Middle East entered a state of war. In recent months, several ministers from both countries have signed sixteen bilateral agreements on economic and trade cooperation. While Greece aspires to use these treaties to negotiate the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Turkey is not willing to make further compromises, as the sources of tension pertain to its energy security and independence in the face of challenging global economic conditions. Finally, just like Greece, but without Europe as a back up.
On the theater of velleities, it's not obvious yet that the Turks are keen for the Church of Saint Chora to follow in the footsteps of Saint Sophia and become a mosque. Moreover when the real issue is the economic situation of the turquish citizens, who have suffered from inflation since 1968 (the inflation rate in Turkey averaged 35.38% from 1965 to 2024). As a comparison, it means that when a middle-class Greek chooses to pay an entrance fee to the Bouzoukia club, a middle-class Turk has the right to enter a mosque without paying. Indeed, Turkey's economic activity grew by just 0.1% in the second quarter of 2024, due to the restrictive economic policy implemented by the government to overcome galloping inflation. Turkey therefore believes that joining the BRICS will give it a way out of the crisis instead of a recession. This announcement in September 2024 was a bombshell for Western democracies, while President Erdogan has long cultivated ties with China and Russia, authoritarian regimes that stand in stark opposition to the values of liberal democracy.
Perhaps we should explain that, in a clever parallel, Greece is securing the air after the sea by launching joint military exercises called “Medusa-13”. This operation was conducted in support of naval and air combat against all threats. This framework for growing partnerships and military cooperation with the region's armed forces was launched in Greece in October 2024. It brings together the air, naval and air defense forces of Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, France and Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, Bulgaria, Italy, Morocco and Rwanda attended the exercises as observers.
The Turkish position, in spite of itself
In light of the recent agreement between Greece and Egypt, Ankara has announced its intention to host the "Blue Homeland" aeronautical exercise in January 2025. The objective of this operation is to train Turkish naval forces in operational readiness, to observe the effectiveness of command and control, and to improve interoperability. This new stage in the ongoing situation represents a threat to Greece, and it is reasonable to assume that this will continue to evolve in 2025. Turkey's Minister of Defense, Yasar Güler, pointed out that “in addition to our fight against terrorism, we have continued to protect our rights and interests without compromise at sea”. Except that Turkey is illegally occupying Cyprus, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan has never wanted to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization as a member of NATO. In May 2024, he revealed that Turkey was treating “more than a thousand Hamas members” in its hospitals.
R. Erdogan's ability to blow hot and cold will continue to strain relations between Greece and Turkey in the region. It remains to be seen whether stability in the Mediterranean can be maintained through the multiplication of trade and military agreements between Greece and its neighbors in the region. In the meantime, the Turkish president, who has to wait for events to take their course, could lose some of his funding from the European Union since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad and the freezing of asylum applications by several European states (read my previous article). Even though its ally, the Iranian Hezbollah, has been weakened, Turquey is already forging alliances with the new authoritarian Syrian regime to try and keep its place on the political chessboard in the Middle East.
The other significant winner in the region is Egypt, which, under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah El-Sissi, is planning the new extension of the Suez Canal despite the threat posed by the Houthis. Militia attacks have reduced the Canal's revenues by 50% between 2023 and 2024. In response, a new international cooperation project has emerged: Apsides, which brings together defence forces from Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece and France to secure maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
One unknown factor remains, and it will be linked to Donald Trump's term in office, which begins in a few days' time, and to the United States, whose role will be decisive in promoting stability in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
Emilie LE BON
Jurist in International law & Economics
All right reserved
