Adv Muhammad Shah Faysal

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2026  YLR  564     Holding of identification parade is not a legal requirement in each and every case---Any fact in any ...
26/04/2026

2026 YLR 564
Holding of identification parade is not a legal requirement in each and every case---Any fact in any form, which establishes the identity of accused is relevant under Art.22 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ---Petitioners (accused persons) were visible on CCTV camera recorded clips---Said piece of evidence was admissible under Art.22 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 --- It was also to be considered under Art.164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 being an evidence through modern device subject to its genuineness and authenticity---Thus, there was no need of holding of identification parade in the present case in the light of availability of said piece of evidence-

PLD 2026 Lahore 332PLJ 2026 Lahore 43لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے 13 سالہ بچے کو حقیقی والدین سے لے کر لے پالک والدین کے حوالے کرن...
25/04/2026

PLD 2026 Lahore 332
PLJ 2026 Lahore 43
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے 13 سالہ بچے کو حقیقی والدین سے لے کر لے پالک والدین کے حوالے کرنے کا حکم دے دیا۔

جسٹس فیصل زمان خان نے ارشد علی کی درخواست پر 8 صفحات پر مشتمل فیصلہ جاری کرتے ہوئے لے پالک والدین سے بچے کی حوالگی حقیقی والدین کو دینے کا ٹرائل کورٹ کا فیصلہ کالعدم قرار دے دیا۔

فیصلے میں کہا گیا ہے کہ بچوں کی حوالگی کے کیس میں ان کی خواہش اور ذہنی کیفیت کو مقدم رکھا جائے، سپریم کورٹ کے فیصلے کے مطابق بچے کی رائے کو اہمیت دینا ضروری ہے۔

تحریری فیصلے میں کہا گیا ہے کہ موجودہ کیس میں بچے نے لے پالک والدین کے ساتھ جانے کا بیان دیا، عدالت نے ایک ہفتے کے لیے بچے کو حقیقی والدین کے ساتھ بھیجا۔ بچے نے دوبارہ پیشی پر پھر لے پالک والدین کے ساتھ جانے کا بیان دیا۔

لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے کہا کہ بچے کی حوالگی کے کیس اصولی طور پر حقیقی والدین کو ترجیحی حق حاصل ہوتا ہے، حقیقی والدین نے اپنی مرضی سے پیدائش کے وقت بچہ اپنے بھائی کو دیا، لے پ الک والدین نے 9 سال تک بچے کی پرورش کی، اس کی عمر 13 برس ہو چکی ہے۔

فیصلے میں کہا گیا ہے کہ حقیقی والد کی 3 شادیاں اور 13 بچے ہیں، اتنے بڑے خاندان میں بچے کو بھیجنا مناسب نہیں، حقیقی والدین یہ نہیں ثابت کر سکے کہ بچے کی بہتر پرورش نہیں ہوئی۔

عدالت نے کہا کہ بچہ بغیر کسی شکایت کے 9 سال تک گود لینے والے والدین کے ساتھ رہا، ایک صبح اچانک بچے پر بم گرایا گیا کہ وہ اصل والدین کے ساتھ نہیں رہ رہا،بچے کو اچانک اجنبی ماحول میں بھیج دینا اس کے مفاد میں نہیں۔

تحریری فیصلے کا کہنا ہے کہ بچے کے کیا جذبات ہوں گے جب پتہ چلا کہ یہ 6 بہنیں اور ایک بھائی اس کے اپنے نہیں، گھریلو تنازع کی بنیاد پر حقیقی والدین نے بچے کی حوالگی کا دعویٰ دائر کیا، موجودہ کیس میں بچے کی فلاح نہیں بلکہ گھریلو تنازع دعوے کی وجہ بنا۔

لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے کہا کہ درخواست گزار کے مطابق بھائی نے پیدائش کے وقت اپنی مرضی سے بچہ انہیں دیا، حقیقی والدین کے مطابق بچے کو کچھ عرصے کے لیے بھائی کو دیا تھا، حقیقی والدین حوالگی کے عارضی ہونے کا ثبوت نہ دے سکے، حقیقی والدین بچے سے ملاقات کے لیے گارڈین کورٹ سے رجوع کر سکتے ہیں
WP 43188/23

وہ افراد جو حقیقتاً پاکستانی ہیں مگر افغان سٹیزن کارڈ رکھتے ہیں — پشاور ہائی کورٹ کا وہ افراد جو حقیقتاً پاکستانی ہیں مگ...
25/04/2026

وہ افراد جو حقیقتاً پاکستانی ہیں مگر افغان سٹیزن کارڈ رکھتے ہیں — پشاور ہائی کورٹ کا
وہ افراد جو حقیقتاً پاکستانی ہیں مگر افغان سٹیزن کارڈ رکھتے ہیں — پشاور ہائی کورٹ کا اہم اور بڑا ریلیف ⚖️

اکثر لوگ راشن یا دیگر سہولتوں کے لیے افغان سٹیزن کارڈ (ACC) بنوا لیتے ہیں، حالانکہ حقیقت میں وہ پاکستانی ہوتے ہیں۔ بعد میں یہی ریکارڈ ان کے خلاف استعمال ہونا شروع ہو جاتا ہے۔

لیکن حالیہ عدالتی فیصلہ (2026 MLD 18) ایک بڑا ریلیف لے کر آیا ہے…

عدالت نے واضح کر دیا:
صرف نادرا کے ریکارڈ یا کسی ایک اندراج کی بنیاد پر کسی کی پاکستانی شہریت ختم نہیں کی جا سکتی۔

اگر آپ کے پاس پاکستانی ہونے کے شواہد موجود ہیں —
تو محض ACC یا کسی غلط اندراج کی بنیاد پر آپ کو غیر ملکی قرار نہیں دیا جا سکتا۔

اہم بات:
شہریت دینا یا ختم کرنا صرف Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 کے تحت، مکمل قانونی طریقہ کار اور ٹھوس ثبوتوں سے ہی ممکن ہے۔

یعنی… ایک کارڈ آپ کی اصل شناخت ختم نہیں کر سکتا۔

📌 اگر آپ یا آپ کے کسی قریبی شخص کو اس قسم کے مسئلے کا سامنا ہے، تو بروقت قانونی رہنمائی آپ کا حق محفوظ کر سکتی ہے -

1. پوسٹ مارٹم کی قانونی حیثیت اور متعلقہ قوانین​پاکستان میں پوسٹ مارٹم درج ذیل قوانین کے تحت کیا جاتا ہے:​ضابطہ فوجداری ...
20/04/2026

1. پوسٹ مارٹم کی قانونی حیثیت اور متعلقہ قوانین
​پاکستان میں پوسٹ مارٹم درج ذیل قوانین کے تحت کیا جاتا ہے:
​ضابطہ فوجداری (CrPC) دفعہ 174 اور 176: جب بھی کوئی مشکوک موت، قتل، خودکشی یا حادثاتی موت واقع ہوتی ہے، تو پولیس افسر (دفعہ 174) یا مجسٹریٹ (دفعہ 176) لاش کا معائنہ کرنے اور اس کی موت کی وجوہات جاننے کے لیے پوسٹ مارٹم کا حکم دینے کا مجاز ہے۔
​پنجاب میڈیکل لیگل مینوئل (Medical Legal Manual): یہ ڈاکٹروں کو پوسٹ مارٹم کے طبی طریقہ کار، نمونے لینے اور رپورٹ تیار کرنے کے تفصیلی قواعد فراہم کرتا ہے۔
​تعزیراتِ پاکستان (PPC): پوسٹ مارٹم کی رپورٹ سے یہ طے ہوتا ہے کہ ملزم پر قتل (دفعہ 302)، اقدامِ قتل (دفعہ 324) یا دیگر دفعات کا اطلاق کیسے ہوگا۔
​2. ٹائم فریم (Time Frame) اور وقت کی اہمیت
​میڈیکل جیورس پروڈنس (Medical Jurisprudence) میں وقت کو کلیدی اہمیت حاصل ہے:
​فوری ضرورت: پوسٹ مارٹم جتنا جلدی ہو سکے (ترجیحاً موت کے 24 گھنٹے کے اندر) ہونا چاہیے تاکہ جسم میں تعفن (Putrefaction) پیدا نہ ہو، جس سے زخموں کے نشانات مٹ سکتے ہیں۔
​وقتِ وفات کا تعین: ڈاکٹر جسم کے درجہ حرارت، اکڑن (Rigor Mortis) اور خون کے جمنے کی حالت دیکھ کر بتاتا ہے کہ موت کو کتنا وقت گزر چکا ہے۔ یہ ملزم کے "البی" (Alibi) یعنی جائے وقوعہ پر موجودگی کو جھٹلانے کے لیے اہم ہے۔
​3. پوسٹ مارٹم میں تاخیر (Delay) اور اس کا حل
​اگر پوسٹ مارٹم میں تاخیر ہو جائے تو اس کا طریقہ کار یہ ہے:
​تحریری وجہ: پولیس اور ڈاکٹر کو تاخیر کی ٹھوس وجہ بیان کرنی پڑتی ہے۔ اگر تاخیر جان بوجھ کر ہو تو یہ تفتیش کو مشکوک بنا دیتی ہے۔
​قبر کشائی (Exhumation): اگر لاش دفنا دی گئی ہو اور بعد میں قتل کا شبہ ہو، تو CrPC کی دفعہ 176 کے تحت علاقہ مجسٹریٹ کی اجازت اور موجودگی میں لاش نکال کر پوسٹ مارٹم کیا جاتا ہے۔ اس کے لیے میڈیکل بورڈ تشکیل دیا جاتا ہے۔
​4. اعلیٰ عدلیہ (Supreme Court & High Court) کے فیصلے
​اعلیٰ عدالتوں نے پوسٹ مارٹم رپورٹ کی اہمیت پر کئی رہنما اصول طے کیے ہیں:
​تضاد کا نتیجہ (2020 SCMR 1564): سپریم کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ اگر پوسٹ مارٹم رپورٹ اور عینی شاہدین کے بیان میں واضح تضاد ہو (مثلاً گواہ کہے کہ گولی سامنے سے لگی اور رپورٹ کہے کہ پیچھے سے لگی)، تو اس کا فائدہ ملزم کو ملے گا اور اسے بری کیا جا سکتا ہے۔
​پوسٹ مارٹم میں غیر ضروری تاخیر (PLD 2011 SC 350): عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ پوسٹ مارٹم میں بلاوجہ تاخیر اس بات کی علامت ہو سکتی ہے کہ پولیس "فرضی گواہ" تیار کرنے کے لیے وقت گزار رہی ہے، جس سے استغاثہ کا کیس کمزور ہو جاتا ہے۔
​میڈیکل بورڈ کی تشکیل: اگر پہلی رپورٹ پر شک ہو، تو ہائی کورٹ یا سیکرٹری صحت کو درخواست دے کر سینئر ڈاکٹروں پر مشتمل میڈیکل بورڈ سے دوبارہ معائنہ کروایا جا سکتا ہے۔
​5. میڈیکل جیورس پروڈنس (Medical Jurisprudence) کے اہم نکات
​زخموں کی نوعیت: ڈاکٹر یہ بتاتا ہے کہ زخم گولی کا ہے، چھری کا ہے یا کسی کند آلے کا۔
​کیمیائی تجزیہ (Chemical Examiner): اگر زہر کا شبہ ہو تو معدے کے نمونے (Viscera) لیبارٹری بھیجے جاتے ہیں۔
​DNA ٹیسٹ: شناخت نہ ہونے کی صورت میں یا جنسی زیادتی کے کیسز میں ڈی این اے نمونے لیے جاتے ہیں۔
​خلاصہ (کاپی پیسٹ کے لیے):
​قانون: CrPC دفعہ 174 (پولیس انکوائری) اور 176 (مجسٹریٹ انکوائری)۔
​مقصد: موت کی اصل وجہ (Cause of Death) اور وقتِ وفات معلوم کرنا۔
​تاخیر کا نقصان: ثبوت مٹ سکتے ہیں اور ملزم کو "شک کا فائدہ" (Benefit of Doubt) مل سکتا ہے۔
​عدالتی موقف: پوسٹ مارٹم رپورٹ ایک ماہر کی رائے ہے، لیکن اگر یہ عینی شاہدین کے خلاف ہو تو استغاثہ کا کیس ختم ہو سکتا ہے۔
1. پوسٹ مارٹم رپورٹ کو چیلنج کرنا (Challenging Autopsy Report)
اگر آپ کو لگے کہ ڈاکٹر نے جان بوجھ کر حقائق چھپائے ہیں یا رپورٹ غلط تیار کی ہے، تو آپ درج ذیل اقدامات کر سکتے ہیں:
میڈیکل بورڈ کی تشکیل (Medical Board): آپ متعلقہ ڈسٹرکٹ ہیلتھ آفیسر (DHO) یا سیکرٹری صحت کو درخواست دے کر سینئر ڈاکٹروں پر مشتمل ایک "سپیشل میڈیکل بورڈ" بنانے کا مطالبہ کر سکتے ہیں جو پہلی رپورٹ کا دوبارہ جائزہ لے۔
سول ریٹ پٹیشن (Writ Petition): اگر انتظامیہ بورڈ نہ بنائے، تو آئینِ پاکستان کے آرٹیکل 199 کے تحت ہائی کورٹ میں رٹ دائر کی جا سکتی ہے تاکہ عدالت میڈیکل بورڈ بنانے کا حکم دے۔
جرح (Cross-Examination): ٹرائل کے دوران، آپ کا وکیل ڈاکٹر پر جرح کر کے اس کی رپورٹ کی خامیوں کو ثابت کر سکتا ہے، خاص طور پر میڈیکل جیورس پروڈنس کی کتب کا حوالہ دے کر۔
2. قبر کشائی (Exhumation) کا قانونی فورم
قبر کشائی کا عمل ضابطہ فوجداری (CrPC) کی دفعہ 176(2) کے تحت ہوتا ہے۔
متعلقہ فورم: قبر کشائی کی اجازت دینے کا اختیار علاقہ مجسٹریٹ (Illaqa Magistrate) کے پاس ہوتا ہے۔
درخواست کا طریقہ: ورثاء یا پولیس مجسٹریٹ کو تحریری درخواست دیتے ہیں کہ موت مشکوک ہے اور سچائی جاننے کے لیے لاش کا دوبارہ معائنہ ضروری ہے۔
قانونی تقاضے: 1. مجسٹریٹ کی موجودگی لازمی ہے۔
2. میڈیکل بورڈ کا ہونا ضروری ہے۔
3. شناخت کے لیے ورثاء کی موجودگی ضروری ہے۔
3. قانونی خصوصیات اور عدالتی نظائر (Case Laws)
عدالتیں ان معاملات میں درج ذیل اصولوں کو مدنظر رکھتی ہیں:
پوسٹ مارٹم کی تاخیر (2022 YLR 145): اگر پوسٹ مارٹم میں غیر معمولی تاخیر ہو، تو اسے استغاثہ کے خلاف سمجھا جاتا ہے کیونکہ اس سے یہ شبہ پیدا ہوتا ہے کہ پولیس نے کہانی گھڑنے کے لیے وقت لیا۔
قبر کشائی کا مقصد (PLD 2015 SC 327): سپریم کورٹ نے قرار دیا ہے کہ قبر کشائی صرف "انصاف کی فراہمی" کے لیے کی جانی چاہیے، محض شک کی بنیاد پر قبر کی بے حرمتی نہیں کی جا سکتی۔ ٹھوس شواہد ہونے چاہئیں کہ دوبارہ معائنہ سے کیس کا رخ بدل سکتا ہے۔
میڈیکل بورڈ کی رائے (2018 P.Cr.L.J 45): اگر پہلا پوسٹ مارٹم اور میڈیکل بورڈ کی رپورٹ مختلف ہوں، تو بورڈ کی رپورٹ (جو کہ سینئر ڈاکٹرز دیتے ہیں) کو زیادہ اہمیت دی جاتی ہے۔
4. درخواست میں شامل کیے جانے والے اہم نکات
جب آپ چیلنج کریں یا قبر کشائی مانگیں، تو درج ذیل نکات لازمی لکھیں:
پہلی رپورٹ میں تضاد: (مثلاً زخم کی جگہ غلط لکھی گئی ہے)۔
پولیس اور ڈاکٹر کی ملی بھگت: اگر آپ کو شبہ ہو کہ رشوت یا دباؤ کے تحت رپورٹ بدلی گئی۔
عینی شاہدین کا بیان: اگر گواہ کچھ اور کہہ رہے ہیں اور میڈیکل رپورٹ کچھ اور۔

​Muhammad Shah Faisal AHC
03113636716

18/04/2026

کریمینل ٹرائل کا مکمل طریقہ کار

میں فوجداری ٹرائل (Criminal Trial)
فوجداری (CrPC) اور قانون شہادت (QSO) کے تحت مکمل ہوتا ہے۔ ذیل میں ایف آئی آر سے لے کر فیصلے تک کے تمام مراحل اردو میں تفصیل کے ساتھ درج ہیں:
​1. ابتدائی معلوماتی رپورٹ (FIR) - دفعہ 154 CrPC
​کسی بھی قابل دست اندازی جرم (Cognizable Offence) کی اطلاع ملنے پر پولیس ایف آئی آر درج کرنے کی پابند ہے۔ یہ ٹرائل کی بنیاد ہوتی ہے۔
​قانون شہادت (QSO): ایف آئی آر بذات خود کوئی ٹھوس ثبوت نہیں ہے بلکہ یہ قانون کو حرکت میں لانے کا ایک ذریعہ ہے۔ (حوالہ: PLD 2022 SC 45)
​2. تفتیش اور چالان - دفعہ 156 تا 173 CrPC
​ایف آئی آر کے بعد تفتیشی افسر جائے وقوعہ کا معائنہ کرتا ہے، نقشہ بناتا ہے اور گواہوں کے بیانات (دفعہ 161 CrPC کے تحت) ریکارڈ کرتا ہے۔
​چالان (دفعہ 173): تفتیش مکمل ہونے پر پولیس اپنی رپورٹ عدالت میں جمع کرواتی ہے جسے چالان کہا جاتا ہے۔
​3. نقول کی تقسیم - دفعہ 241-A (مجسڑیٹ) / 265-C (سیشن)
​فردِ جرم عائد کرنے سے کم از کم 7 دن پہلے ملزم کو پولیس رپورٹ، ایف آئی آر، اور گواہوں کے بیانات کی نقول فراہم کی جاتی ہیں تاکہ وہ اپنا دفاع تیار کر سکے۔
​4. فردِ جرم (Framing of Charge) - دفعہ 242 / 265-D
​عدالت ملزم کو اس پر لگے الزامات پڑھ کر سناتی ہے۔
​اگر ملزم صحت جرم سے انکار کرے تو عدالت ٹرائل شروع کرنے کا حکم دیتی ہے۔
​قانونی نکتہ: فردِ جرم میں غلطی ٹرائل کو اس وقت تک کالعدم نہیں کرتی جب تک اس سے ملزم کے دفاع کو نقصان نہ پہنچا ہو۔ (دفعہ 221-225 CrPC)
​5. استغاثہ کی شہادت (Prosecution Evidence)
​یہ ٹرائل کا سب سے اہم مرحلہ ہے جہاں قانون شہادت کے درج ذیل اصول لاگو ہوتے ہیں:
​بیانِ حلفی (Examination-in-Chief): استغاثہ کا گواہ اپنا بیان ریکارڈ کرواتا ہے (Article 132 QSO)۔
​جرح (Cross-Examination): ملزم کا وکیل گواہ سے سوالات کرتا ہے تاکہ سچائی کا پتا لگایا جا سکے (Article 133 QSO)۔
​عدالتی فیصلہ: جرح کے بغیر بیان کی کوئی قانونی حیثیت نہیں ہوتی۔ (حوالہ: 2019 SCMR 129)
​6. ملزم کا بیان - دفعہ 342 CrPC
​استغاثہ کی شہادت مکمل ہونے کے بعد عدالت ملزم کو اپنے خلاف آنے والے ثبوتوں کی صفائی کا موقع دیتی ہے۔
​اہمیت: اگر کوئی ثبوت دفعہ 342 کے بیان میں ملزم کے سامنے نہیں رکھا گیا، تو وہ اسے سزا دینے کے لیے استعمال نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ (حوالہ: PLD 2017 SC 717)
​7. صفائی کی شہادت - دفعہ 340(2) CrPC
​ملزم چاہے تو حلف پر بیان دے کر خود کو بطور گواہ پیش کر سکتا ہے یا اپنے دفاع میں گواہان پیش کر سکتا ہے۔
​8. حتمی بحث (Final Arguments)
​دونوں اطراف کے وکلاء اپنے اپنے موقف کے حق میں دلائل دیتے ہیں اور عدالتی نظائر (Judgements) پیش کرتے ہیں۔
​9. فیصلہ (Judgement) - دفعہ 366/367 CrPC
​عدالت تمام شہادتوں اور دلائل کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے فیصلہ سناتی ہے۔
​شک کا فائدہ (Benefit of Doubt): اگر کیس میں معمولی سا بھی شک پیدا ہو جائے تو اس کا فائدہ صرف ملزم کو ملے گا اور اسے بری کر دیا جائے گا۔ (حوالہ: PLD 2020 SC 249)

16/04/2026

Section 161(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code” or “Cr.P.C.”) empowers any police officer conducting an investigation under Chapter XIV or any police officer of a rank prescribed by the Provincial Government through a general or special order, acting on that officer’s requisition to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.1 Under section 161(2), such a person is bound to answer all questions relating to the case, except those whose answers may expose him to a criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture. Section 161(3) further provides that the police officer may reduce into writing any statement made during such examination. If he does so, he must record separately the statement of each person examined.

Section 162(1) Cr.P.C. mandates that no statement made to a police officer during an investigation shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the maker. Further, no such statement, or any record of it in a police diary or otherwise, shall be used at any inquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation at the time the statement was made, except as stipulated by the Code. Provided that, when a prosecution witness whose statement was so recorded as aforesaid, is called at trial or inquiry, the court must, on the accused’s request, refer to that statement and direct that a copy is furnished to the accused so that it may, if duly proved, be used to contradict the witness in accordance with section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. If a portion of the statement is used in cross-examination, any part of it may also be used in re-examination solely to explain matters referred to in his cross-examination. However, if the court considers that any part of such statement is not relevant to the inquiry or trial, or whose disclosure is unnecessary in the interest of justice or inexpedient in the public interest, it shall record such opinion (but not the reasons therefor), and shall exclude such part from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused. Section 162(2) clarifies that section 162 does not affect the admissibility of statements falling under section 32(1) or section 27 of the Evidence Act.

CDRs may form part of the circumstantial evidence and are a useful investigative tool for the police. Nevertheless, their evidentiary worth depends on the availability of corroborative material and the elimination of alternative explanations. Courts must remain mindful that an accused may not have been in possession of the phone at the relevant time or may have intentionally left it elsewhere to create a false alibi.

In the present case, apart from the absence of any voice recording or transcript, there is no material on record to show that the SIM whose CDRs are relied upon by the prosecution was registered in the Petitioner’s name or was in his exclusive use at the relevant time. While this does not preclude the prosecution from establishing its evidentiary value at trial, for present purposes, the court must approach such material with circumspection.

Nevertheless, the legal principles articulated therein are not confined to the trial stage. They are grounded in the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 10A of the Constitution, which applies at all stages of a criminal case, including the bail stage. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Petitioner’s statement was recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. while he was in police custody and not before a Magistrate. It may be described as his earliest version on record, though not the first version in the technical sense, as it was not recorded contemporaneously with his arrest but rather six days later during physical remand. Such a statement has no substantive evidentiary value unless the accused affirms and relies upon it. The Petitioner does not do so here. Under section 162(1) Cr.P.C., no statement made by a person to a police officer during an investigation, if reduced to writing, can be used as evidence against him at trial. The fact that the Investigating Officer also video-recorded the statement does not alter its legal character or enhance its admissibility. It remains a non-substantive piece of evidence and is expressly barred from being used against the accused, except for the limited purpose of contradiction under the conditions prescribed by law. It cannot, by itself, justify the denial of bail.

A video recording must be proved genuine, and shown to be free from tampering in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others(PLD 2019 SC 675), insofar as they may be relevant, before it can be used. However, the legal principle that a statement made by a witness to the police during an investigation cannot be used as substantive evidence applies equally to video-recorded statements – even where video recording is used to facilitate documentation.

The narrative describes how a girl arrived at his residence late at night, and left after a few hours with people she claimed were her relatives. The Petitioner neither admits participation in her abduction nor acknowledges knowledge of any prior wrongdoing. At most, certain aspects of the account may appear unusual or raise suspicion, but viewed as a whole, the statement is exculpatory. It does not amount to a confession and, in any case, having been recorded by the police while the Petitioner was in custody and not before a Magistrate, it is inadmissible under section 162 Cr.P.C. The fact that the Petitioner now disowns this statement further excludes any basis for its admissibility, even under the limited ‘first version’ doctrine.

The Petitioner’s video-recorded statement is inadmissible. It cannot be relied upon for any evidentiary purpose, even at the bail stage, because of the bar contained in section 162 Cr.P.C. The prosecution’s reliance on the transcript, whether or not it exists in parallel to the video, makes no difference. That statement aside, the Petitioner’s role must be assessed on the strength of the remaining material. On the available record, there is nothing to indicate that he played any direct role in A.B.’s abduction. The only allegation is that A.B. remained in his house for a few hours during the night she went missing. In the absence of any other incriminating material linking him to the offence, the case against him falls within the purview of further inquiry under section 497(2) Cr.P.C.

The Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 classifies offences into three categories: minor, major, and heinous. Section 6(3) states that where a juvenile is arrested or detained for the commission of a minor or a major offence, he shall be treated as if he was accused of commission of a bailable offence. Section 6(4) provides that where a juvenile above the age of sixteen is arrested or detained for a heinous offence, the Juvenile Court may withhold bail if it finds reasonable grounds to believe that he is involved in its commission. In contrast, section 6(5) stipulates that any juvenile, regardless of age, who has been detained for a continuous period exceeding six months without conclusion of trial shall be released on bail, unless the delay is attributable to the juvenile himself. In Mehran, the Supreme Court ruled that while section 6(4) deals with the matter of bail on merits, section 6(5) provides a distinct statutory ground for bail based solely on delay. Since minor and major offences are treated as bailable under section 6(3), the rigour of section 6(5) applies only to juveniles accused of heinous offences. The Supreme Court further held that a juvenile detained for a heinous offence is entitled to post-arrest bail as of right, whether below or above sixteen years of age, if the requirements of section 6(5) are met.
Crl. Misc. No. 8607/B/2025
Muhammad Naveed Vs The State and another
2025LHC8551

2026  CLC  59     Maintenance allowance for minor children---Minor requiring special needs---Obligation of father---Quan...
15/04/2026

2026 CLC 59

Maintenance allowance for minor children---Minor requiring special needs---Obligation of father---Quantum of maintenance---Determination---Factors to considered---Scope---Quantum of maintenance requires due consideration of all factors on the basis of which the court can determine the actual need of the minor---In this regard, it is important for the court to first determine the expenses incurred or likely to be incurred on the minors---For this purpose the court must look into the living conditions of the minor and the manner and means by which the mother is maintaining the minors which will include factors like where they reside, whether the mother is dependent upon her family, if so what is the income on the basis of which the minor is also being cared, whether she has a job and whether she has any source of independent income---Special needs of the minor which will include medical or physical needs or special educational needs should also be seen---Special needs will vary from case to case, if relevant, as it is unique to the situation and individual---Yet for the purpose of maintenance it is the obligation of the father to fulfill these special needs---In the case of enhancement, the court must also determine as to what extent the maintenance already fixed meets the requirement and expenses of the minor and for what purpose, further enhancement is required---At the same time the court must determine the income of the father either through proper documentary evidence or on the basis of the social status and earning capacity of the father---In order to ensure that proper information is before the court, it may always require the father to produce documents such as his salary slips or any bank statement or property document on the basis of which he is able to show his monthly income or earning or his financial status---In this regard, the assets owned by the father are relevant as it contributes towards establishing the financial status of the father that has to be probed into by the court and based on attending circumstances the court can conclusively establish the means through which the father will be able to maintain the minors---It is also important to take into consideration any liability of the father, that is whether he is paying any bank loan or debt, whether he has remarried or has other children or whether his parents are dependent on him---In this way the court can determine the manner in which the income of the father is spent and balance the income and capacity with the reasonable requirements of the minors seeking maintenance---In this regard, it is noted that S.17(A) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 specifically provides in subsection (4) that for the purposes of fixing maintenance, the court may summon the relevant documentary evidence from any organization, body or authority to determine the estate and resources of the defendant---The purpose of this provision is to facilitate the court to determine the financial position of the father---The court therefore is not dependent on documents or information provided by the father and can call for relevant documents or information be it from the relevant department or organization or as the case requires, in order to determine the income of the father.

Obligation of father to maintain minor children---Quantum of maintenance, determination of---Father contracting second marriage---Effect---Financial capacity of father, consideration of---Power of family court to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint---Scope---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner/wife contracted marriage with respondent/husband and from the wedlock a son was born---During her pregnancy, the respondent/husband expelled the petitioner/wife from his house and failed to provide any financial support during pregnancy or after childbirth---The petitioner filed suit for recovery of past and future maintenance for herself and the minor child, along with dowry articles and dower amount---The family court decreed partial maintenance i.e. Rs. 20,000 per month for the petitioner till the iddat period and Rs.25,000 per month for the minor till an interim order, followed by Rs. 30,000 per month with annual increment, while dismissing her claim for dowry and delivery expenses---The appellate court later reduced the maintenance by Rs.10,000/-, leading the petitioner/wife to file the present writ petition---Held: When the quantum of maintenance was examined in the context of double-digit inflation, the rising cost of living, and the specialized requirements of an autistic child, it became manifest that the sum of Rs.10,000/- reduced by the appellate court did not align with either the welfare of the minor or the established principles of law---Moreover, plea of father of having contracted second marriage and having more dependents to maintain was misconceived---Obligations arising from subsequent marriage could not operate to the detriment of children from an earlier marriage particularly where the child needed special care---Father could not absolve himself from his primary and continuous duty of maintaining such a child merely on the plea that he had additional dependents---Amount determined by the appellate court was inadequate to meet even the most basic needs of a child, much less a special child requiring continuous medical and therapeutic attention---As and when the final order was passed the amount fixed by the family court could be modified and revisited in that the quantum of maintenance could be increased or decreased after appraising, evaluating and examining the evidence produced during the trial---Thus, the mere fact that the interim maintenance was initially fixed at Rs.7000/- could not have constrained the Trial Court from enhancing the quantum of final maintenance to Rs.30,000/- due to peculiar needs of the minor who was a special child---Appellate court was directed to make a fresh determination of maintenance keeping in view the updated medical, special, educational and other living expenses of the minor---However, the assessment was to be made whilst considering the father's actual income and financial capacity which required determination through cogent evidence---

A father is not only under a legal obligation but it is also his moral and religious duty to maintain his children---This obligation is firmly rooted in the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an, which in Surah Al-Baqarah declares, "And clothing and maintenance must be borne by the father in a fair manner." [Al-Baqarah: 233]---The dictate of the Qur'an, therefore, places upon the father a continuous responsibility to provide sustenance, clothing, education, and medical care to his children in a just and equitable manner, commensurate with his means and status---This duty becomes even more accentuated where the child requires special care---Any attempt to dilute or evade such responsibility would be contrary not only to the law of the land but also to the spirit of Shariah, which emphasizes compassion, fairness, and protection of the vulnerable---Father is under a legal and moral obligation to maintain his children---The concept of maintenance is not confined merely to food and shelter; rather, it encompasses all necessary expenses relating to education, clothing, medical treatment, transportation, and recreational activities, so as to enable the child to live a life of dignity consistent with the status of his father.

Power of family court to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint---Scope---Family court is empowered to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint or higher than what was fixed as interim maintenance, having regard to the afflux of time or other relevant circumstances.
HINA vs ADIL SHAHZAD

13/04/2026

VVVVVVI. MUST READ JUDGEMENT.

2026 YLR 658
PLJ 2026 Cr.C. 147

Burden of proof on husband if wife is murdered in his house.
Jail Appeal: 10150/23
Fayyaz Ahmad Vs The State

2025 Y L R 40Date of birth---Correction---School record---Petitioner / plaintiff sought correction of her date of birth ...
13/04/2026

2025 Y L R 40

Date of birth---Correction---School record---Petitioner / plaintiff sought correction of her date of birth as per her school record---Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court dismissed suit and appeal filed by petitioner / plaintiff ---Validity---Entry in school Dakhil-Kharij (Admission-Leaving) Register was prepared by school when age of petitioner / plaintiff was ten years and she could not manage such document---Respondent / defendant did not dispute documents produced by petitioner / plaintiff which had come into the ambit of admission---Petitioner / plaintiff proved her date of birth as per her school record---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of two Courts below and decreed the suit in favour of petitioner / plaintiff---High Court directed respondents / defendants to correct date of birth of petitioner / plaintiff as per her school record---

Judgmen
---Through the instant petition, the petitioner/plaintiff has challenged the validity of the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2023 ("the impugned judgment and decree") passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Loralai ("the trial Court") and judgment and decree dated 24.04.2024 ("the impugned judgment and decree") passed by the Additional District Judge, Loralai ("the lower appellate Court"), whereby, suit of the petitioner/plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court as well as appeal was also dismissed by the lower appellate Court.

2. Brief facts leading to file the instant civil revision petition are that the petitioner/plaintiff filed a Civil Suit No.32 of 2023 for declaration and correction of date of birth of petitioner/plaintiff as 05.03.1997 instead of 05.03.1987 in her CNIC, certificate of SSC, HSSC and DMC before the trial Court with the averments that the petitioners/plaintiff was a student and got her early education from Government Girls High School, Kohlu and her actual date of birth has been entered in her school record i.e. Register Dakhil Kharij as 05.03.1997 at Serial No.504, the real date of birth of the petitioner/plaintiff is also evident from her school leaving certificate as 05.03.1997, but the respondent/defendant No.1 in computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) entered the incorrect date of birth as 05.03.1987 and similarly, the respondent/defendant No.2 has also been wrongly entered her date of birth as 05.03.1987 in the Secondary School Certificate ("SSC") of the petitioner/ plaintiff. The petitioner/plaintiff further averred that she approached the respondent/defendant No.1 for correction of her date of birth as 05.03.1997 as per her school record and school leaving certificate, but the petitioner/plaintiff was directed to first correct her certificate of SSC, hence, she approached the office of respondent/defendant No.2 through an application for correction of her SSC certificate and also filed form No.3 through her Head Mistress of Government Girls High School, Kohlu, including its verification certificate for correction of date of birth of the petitioner/plaintiff in her SSC certificate, but the respondent/defendant No.2 postponed the matter on one or the other pretext, thus, she filed the instant suit with the following prayer clause:-

"It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that a decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant may kindly be passed with following effects:

A. Declare that the correct date of birth of plaintiff is 05-03-1997 in view of her school record and school leaving certificate.

B. Declare that the defendants have wrongly endorsed her date of birth in her CNIC and Certificates of S.S.C, HSSC and D.M.C as 05-03-1987 instead of correct date of birth as 05-03-1997.

C. Directions be made to the defendants to correct the date of birth of plaintiff in its record and also issue revised CNIC, S.S.C, H.S.S.C and DMC in favor of plaintiff with the correct date of birth as 05-03-1997.

E. Any other relief, which may deem fit and proper according to the circumstances of the case may also be awarded to the plaintiff in the interest of justice, fair play and equity."

3. After registration of the suit, the trial Court issued notices to the respondents/defendants. The respondents/ defendants filed their separate written statements, controverted the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff on legal as well as on factual grounds.

4. The trial Court out of divergent pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues:-

"1. Whether no cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff against the defendants?

2. Whether the suit of plaintiff is barred by time under Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908?

3. Whether correct date of birth of plaintiff is 05-03-1997 instead of 05-03-1987 in her CNIC, SSC, HSC AND Detailed Mark Certificate?

4. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed for?

5. Relief?"

5. After framing issues, the trial Court directed the parties to produce evidence in support of their respective claim. The petitioner/plaintiff produced PW-1, Muhammad Tahir and lastly, appeared in the witness box and recorded her statement on oath, while producing certain documents, which were exhibited as Ex.P/1-A to Ex.P/1-H. In rebuttal, the representative of respondent/defendant No.1, namely, Shah Faisal, Deputy Superintendent, appeared and recorded his statement on oath, while, the representative of respondent/defendant No.2, namely, Surat Khan also appeared and recorded his statement on oath. After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit of petitioner/plaintiff vide impugned judgment and decree dated 15.12.2023.

6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied from the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court, the petitioner/plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 96 of the C.P.C. before the lower appellate Court, and the same was registered as Civil Appeal No.02/2024. The lower appellate Court issued notices to procure the attendance of respondents/defendants. The respondents/defendants appeared through their counsel/representative(s) and contested the appeal. After hearing the arguments of the parties, the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal by upholding the judgment and decree of the trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 24.04.2024, hence, this petition.

7. Learned counsel for petitioner/ plaintiff inter alia contended that the petitioner/plaintiff was knocked out on the sole ground of limitation; that both the Courts below have wrongly been held that the cause of action accrued to the petitioner/plaintiff from the date of issuance of SSC certificate; that the petitioner/plaintiff approached the office of the respondent/defendant No.2 for correction of her date of birth, but the same was refused, thus, the limitation starts from the date of the refusal of office of the respondent/defendant No.2; that the petitioner/plaintiff produced documentary evidence, which were brushed aside without any cogent reason by the fora below.

8. On the other hand, learned counsels/representative for the respondent/defendants Nos.1 and 2 argued that the suit of petitioner/plaintiff is hopelessly barred by time and this issue was well appreciated by both the Courts below; that the petitioner/plaintiff failed to prove her case through reliable evidence.

9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the available record minutely with their able assistance. It is the case of the petitioner/plaintiff that the suit of petitioner/plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court by holding that the same is time-barred as the SSC certificate was issued to the petitioner/plaintiff on 24.07.2012, while in order to correct the date of birth mentioned in the SSC certificate, she filed suit in the year 2023, which is beyond the six (06) years limitation period, prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ("the Act of 1908"). In the suit, the petitioner/plaintiff has claimed that the cause of action accrued when the petitioner/plaintiff came to know about an inadvertent mistake that led to the recording of the wrong date of birth on the SSC certificate and consequently when the petitioner/plaintiff approached the respondent/defendant No.2 for correction of date of birth, which request was denied by the respondent/defendant No.2. The record transpires that respondents/ defendants in their written statements did not deny that the petitioner/plaintiff had approached the respondent/defendant No.1, but merely asserted that the date of birth recorded on the SSC certificate was in accordance with the examination form filled out by the petitioner/plaintiff. For the purpose of limitation, the trial Court concluded that limitation began to run from the date of issuance of the SSC certificate. It is the petitioner's/plaintiff's case that the incorrect date of birth recorded on the SSC is a continuing cause of action and also that cause of action accrued when the incorrect date of birth on the SSC came to her notice in the process of having her educational transcripts verified and she reached out to the respondents/defendants to seek its correction, which was refused by the respondents/defendants thereby denied her the right to have her correct date of birth reflected on her SSC. In this regard, the petitioner/plaintiff produced Form No.3 (Ex.P/1-C), the same was not denied/ rebutted by the respondents/ defendants. Article 120 of the Act of 1908 states that "when the right to sue would have accrued" it is evident that time begins to run for purposes of Article 120 of the Act of 1908 from the date when the cause of action accrues. In the instant case, the cause of action could have accrued from the date of the issuance of the SSC, if the incorrect date of birth recorded on the SSC had come to the notice of the petitioner/plaintiff at that time. Or the cause of action could have accrued from the date on which the respondents/ defendants refused to correct the incorrect date of birth mentioned on the SSC and bring in accord with the date of birth as mentioned on her birth form. I am fortified by the view of the Division Bench of the learned Lahore High Court in the case titled "University of the Punjab, Lahore through Registrar v. Muhammad Aslam Bora, Advocate and another" (PLD 1988 Lahore 658) that:-

"The period of limitation for filing the suits in hand is admittedly regulated by Article 120 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes six years' period commencing from the time when the right to sue accrues. The right to sue would have accrued to the respondents and they were to have recourse to the Court of law when they had acquired knowledge of their true dates of birth or when they had felt aggrieved with the wrong entries touching dates of birth. The respondents' suits, in view of the circumstances of the cases, were well within time and could not be said to be time-barred. "

12. The learned Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court in Secretary Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Islamabad v. Suriya Bano (2019 YLR 2354) held the following:

"Admittedly the period of limitation for filing of the suit for declaration is regulated by Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes six years period commencing from the time when the right to sue accrues. In the instant case when the plaintiff acquired knowledge of wrong entry of her date of birth in her matriculation certificate, she has filed the suit in the trial Court as evident/mentioned in Para 4 of the plaint. The respondent/ plaintiff's suit in view of circumstances of the instant case was well within time and could not be said to be time barred. My view is fortified by case law reported in (PLD 1988 Lahore 658)."

10. Another contention raised by the petitioner/plaintiff is that the examination form of the petitioner/plaintiff was filled in by the petitioner/plaintiff herself, as such, the date of birth cannot be substituted at such belated stage. While, when the query was put to the learned counsel for respondents/defendants Nos.1 and 2, both categorically admitted that the examination form is filled in by the school and not by the candidate, therefore, I see no force in the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents/ defendants Nos.1 and 2. The petitioner/ plaintiff exhibited verified certificates issued by the school that as per record at the time of admission, the actual date of birth has been mentioned in the register as 05.03.1997, further produced Register Dakhil-Kharij , pertains to the year 2001, where on Serial No.504, the date of birth of petitioner/plaintiff was also mentioned as 05.03.1997 (Ex.P/1-B). The scrutiny of Ex.P/1-B reflects that the same was prepared by the school, when the age of petitioner/plaintiff was under ten (10) years and she cannot manage such document(s). On the contrary, learned counsel for respondents/ defendants Nos.1 and 2 did not dispute the documents produced by the petitioner/ plaintiff. It is a settled principle of law that if a party does not dispute the document(s) produced by the other party, the same will come into the ambit of admission. The petitioner/plaintiff provided her case that her date of birth is 05.03.1997 instead of 05.03.1987.

Thus, keeping in view the above discussion, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff succeeded in making out a case in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff. Resultantly, the instant petition is allowed, the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2023, passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Loralai and judgment and decree dated 24.04.2024, passed by the Additional District Judge, Loralai are set aside and the suit of petitioner/plaintiff is decreed in her favour. The respondents/defendants are directed to correct the date of birth of the petitioner/plaintiff as 05.03.1997 instead of 05.03.1987.

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