13/08/2026
پیشی کلچر، آخری موقع اور قطری آخری موقع کی روش پر سپریم کورٹ کا انتہائی سخت فیصلہ
Where the previous adjournment was not granted on the request of the plaintiff, Order XVII Rule 3 CPC could not be invoked for closing the plaintiff's evidence.
It has become increasingly common to find orders successively recording "last opportunity", followed by "final opportunity", and thereafter yet another "last and final opportunity". Such repeated indulgence reduces solemn judicial directions to empty formalities and inevitably erodes the authority and sanctity of the Court's own orders. A judicial order describing an opportunity as the "last" must ordinarily mean precisely that. If the Court itself repeatedly dilutes its own directions, litigants inevitably begin to treat judicial orders as negotiable rather than mandatory. If the Court genuinely considers that the default warrants the consequences contemplated by law, it should not hesitate to invoke the relevant statutory provision, including Order XVII Rule 3, C.P.C., where its conditions are satisfied. Conversely, at the cost of repetition, where justice requires further indulgence, the Court must record reasons for extending time and impose realistic and deterrent costs commensurate with the inconvenience caused to the opposite party and the burden placed upon the justice system. Nominal costs,imposed merely as a matter of routine, have ceased to serve any meaningful deterrent purpose.
Before parting with this judgement, we consider it appropriate to advert to certain systemic concerns which this litigation has brought into sharp focus. The present case is a classic illustration of the distinction between the existence of judicial discretion and its sound exercise. A perusal of the order sheets reveals that the learned trial Court had, on several earlier occasions, before it,instances where the delay in the proceedings was genuinely attributable to the conduct of the plaintiffs. Had the learned trial Court considered that the repeated defaults had reached a stage warranting invocation of the penal provisions of Order XVII Rule 3, C.P.C., it could have exercised such jurisdiction on one of those occasions, subject always to the fulfilment of the statutory requirements. Curiously, however, the provision was invoked on the one date when the preceding adjournment had not been granted at the request of the plaintiffs at all, but had resulted from a strike observed by the legal fraternity. Thus, while the trial Court possessed the discretion to invoke Order XVII Rule 3, CPC, in an appropriate case, its exercise in the facts obtaining on 14.10.2009 was contrary to law. Judicial discretion is not an unfettered licence; it is a legal trust to be exercised on sound principles, consistent with the statute and the facts of the case. An order passed in disregard of the conditions prescribed by law ceases to be an exercise of discretion and becomes an arbitrary exercise of power.
This case also compels us to express our deep concern over the growing culture of unwarranted adjournments which continues to plague the administration of civil justice. Members of the Bar undoubtedly shoulder demanding professional commitments and frequently appear before multiple fora on the same day.
Nevertheless, every advocate owes an overriding duty to the client, to the Court and to the administration of justice. Once a counsel accepts a brief, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that the matter is properly attended to, particularly where important proceedings, such as recording of evidence, are scheduled. The routine plea that learned counsel is engaged before a superior Court cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause. Superior Courts ordinarily conclude substantial judicial work well before the close of the working day, leaving adequate time for counsel to honour commitments undertaken before subordinate Courts. Trial Courts ordinarily function throughout the working day, and, in the ordinary course, there exists sufficient opportunity for counsel to attend proceedings before subordinate Courts after conclusion of matters in the superior Courts. More fundamentally, an advocate should accept only such number of briefs as can reasonably be discharged with competence, diligence and fidelity to the client's cause. Professional overcommitment cannot be permitted to become a justification for repeated disruption of judicial proceedings.
The unfortunate consequence of this practice is seldom borne by the defaulting advocate. More often than not, it is the litigant who is admonished in open Court for the absence of counsel, or a junior associate, having no meaningful instructions and no effective control over the conduct of the case, is left to face the displeasure of the Court. Such a practice neither serves the interest of justice nor enhances public confidence in the legal profession. Every advocate is an officer of the Court, and the obligations attached to that office require punctuality, preparedness and respect for the Court's time as much as they require loyalty to the client.
The responsibility, however, does not rest with the Bar alone. Trial Courts are equally entrusted with maintaining discipline in judicial proceedings and must adhere to the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit the adjournment of a case only where ‘sufficient cause’ is shown. It has become increasingly common to find orders successively recording "last opportunity", followed by "final opportunity", and thereafter yet another "last and final opportunity". Such repeated indulgence reduces solemn judicial directions to empty formalities and inevitably erodes the authority and sanctity of the Court's own orders. A judicial order describing an opportunity as the "last" must ordinarily mean precisely that. If the Court itself repeatedly dilutes its own directions, litigants inevitably begin to treat judicial orders as negotiable rather than mandatory. If the Court genuinely considers that the default warrants the consequences contemplated by law, it should not hesitate to invoke the relevant statutory provision, including Order XVII Rule 3, C.P.C., where its conditions are satisfied. Conversely, at the cost of repetition, where justice requires further indulgence, the Court must record reasons for extending time and impose realistic and deterrent costs commensurate with the inconvenience caused to the opposite party and the burden placed upon the justice system. Nominal costs,imposed merely as a matter of routine, have ceased to serve any meaningful deterrent purpose.
The ultimate responsibility for ensuring orderly conduct of proceedings rests upon the Judges while sitting in Court during Court hours and is not left to the convenience of the litigants or their counsel2. A trial Judge is expected to regulate the progress of the case with firmness, fairness and consistency, ensuring that judicial orders command respect and that proceedings are not allowed to drift through repeated and unjustified adjournments. Equally, it is unsettling to observe the growing tendency of counsel to seek yet another adjournment despite earlier orders expressly recording that the opportunity granted would be the "last", "final" or “absolute final” one. Such requests ought not to be made as a matter of course, for they undermine the authority of the Court and encourage the perception that judicial directions are negotiable rather than binding. Respect for the rule of law begins with respect for the orders of the Court, and both the Bench and the Bar share an equal responsibility to ensure that the administration of justice is conducted with discipline, efficiency and faithfulness to the law.Stepping further, every segment of society has a collective responsibility to contribute towards the development of a just,harmonious, and progressive social order, worthy of its people. Such an objective can only be grasped and developed through observance of moral values, mutual respect, and a spirit of tolerance, rather than by yielding to personal gains. Personal vendetta when allowed to surpass reason and civility, not only weakens the threads that unite individuals within society but also destabilizes the moral fabric of the nation, ultimately contributing to its institutional and social decay; therefore, when a counsel makes professional commitments, he has to fulfill the same timely so as to augment the trust of the individual(s) on the institution(s) and not to linger on the matter only for worldly gains.
C.A.357-L/2013
Shakeel Ahmad, etc v. Abdul Ghaffar
Mr. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan
03-08-2026
