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Alhumdulillah!Our Founder elected as President High Court Bar Association Multan with a triumphous victory and lead of 1...
25/02/2023

Alhumdulillah!
Our Founder elected as President High Court Bar Association Multan with a triumphous victory and lead of 1.5k votes.
Thankyou everyone who supported and voted for the President.
President Founder Rana Asif Saeed for year 2023-2024!

Let’s celebrate freedom by promoting a human right in which respect, dignity and equality become a code for living. This...
14/08/2022

Let’s celebrate freedom by promoting a human right in which respect, dignity and equality become a code for living. This will be our role to live up to the dreams of 1947.

Team 11th Lawyer wishes countrymen and those overseas Pakistanis living outside the country a very happy 75th anniversary of our homeland our beloved PAKISTAN.
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Trust, comfort, and convenience with our clients has always been and will always continue to be a matter of priority for...
06/08/2022

Trust, comfort, and convenience with our clients has always been and will always continue to be a matter of priority for us for deeply understanding of the client’s needs.

Meet the Managment of 11th Lawyer!Rana Asif Saeed - The FounderCh Usama Fazal - PartnerRana Nawal - PartnerIn addition, ...
02/08/2022

Meet the Managment of 11th Lawyer!

Rana Asif Saeed - The Founder
Ch Usama Fazal - Partner
Rana Nawal - Partner

In addition, the Firm has offered a broad range of legal services through a team of highly skilled associates and legal consultants within the Country.

11th Lawyer Law Firm is a leading legal practice which was founded by Rana Muhammad Asif Saeed in 1992 with its first of...
01/08/2022

11th Lawyer Law Firm is a leading legal practice which was founded by Rana Muhammad Asif Saeed in 1992 with its first office in Multan, Punjab, Pakistan. Since 1992, the Firm has offered a broad range of legal services through a team of highly skilled associates and legal consultants within the Country. It has gradually expanded in almost all the cities of the Country with 4 operational offices in Multan, Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi.
It has recently expanded its work internationally, UK and Canada, where the team is actively working on cases related to Family Law, Immigration Law, and Personal Injury.

Solution to all your legal needs. Legal experts for 30 years now!
01/08/2022

Solution to all your legal needs.
Legal experts for 30 years now!

2000 Y L R 85 Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S.216---Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--Art.199---Constitutional petition...
08/11/2020

2000 Y L R 85

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S.216---Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--Art.199---Constitutional petition-- Allegation of harbouring a proclaimed offender--Harassment of the petitioner and his family by the police---Father of such proclaimed offender had prayed for a direction to the police to act in accordance with law, not to harass him and his family members by launching illegal raids through trespassing his house, making their movements limited by making them sit in the police station, to humiliate them and penalize them by interfering in their privacy or to injure their dignity in any manner whatsoever for the alleged misdeeds of his son for which he and his family members were not responsible--Father, according to police (respondents), was an accused in a case registered under S.216, P. P. C: for having harboured and concealed his son who was a proclaimed offender in a murder case and that police had the authority to proceed in the matter--Allegation against father was that his son (absconder) was seen taking meals with him at a- "Chap " of "Abadi "---Father could not be expected to have provided meals openly to his son about whom he had got published a notice of disinheritment in a daily newspaper---Such type of allegation against the petitioner did not come within the ambit of the words "harbour" or "conceal" as used in S. 216, P. P. C. ---Police, thus, was out to harass the father and his family members to put pressure for the surrender of the absconding accused and in this regard the taking of the father and his family members to police station and adopting third degree methods could not be ruled out---Police were consequently restrained from harassing and insulting the father and his family members in any manner with respect to the offences/misdeeds committed by the son, the absconder---Constitutional petition was accepted accordingly.


----S.216---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.4, 9, 14 & 25---Equality of citizens--Offender alone being responsible for the offence, police was not competent to enter the house of a fugitive from law wherein he was not present/living while his nears and dears were putting up who had no concern with the occurrence and not liable for the occurrence.All citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law. If some member of the family has shown disrespect to the rule of law by committing any offence of ordinary, sensational or heinous nature that does not mean that other family members can be put to the ordeal of facing dishonour, disrespect and harassment in the alleged manner. In this regard the kind words of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) contained in the last Sermon (Khutba-tul-Hajja-tul-Wida) have to be referred to that "henceforth, the offender himself will be responsible for the offence; no son will be charged for the father's crime and no father will be punished for the crimes committed by the son". Consequently the police is not competent to enter the house of a fugitive from law wherein he is not present/living while his nears and dears are putting up who have no concern with the occurrence and not liable for the occurrence.

Last Sermon (Khutba-tul-Hajja-tul-Wida) ref.



Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss.47 & 48---Search of place and procedure where ingress not obtainable--Permission is to be obtained to enter a house properly and according to the situation and it is after the refusal of the occupants to let the police enter the premises for the arrest of the absconding accused that the authority is notified, demand for admittance is made and thereafter in case of refusal doors and windows of the house can be broken open and even at that time the females of the house have to be provided the opportunity to withdraw before the doors, windows are broken open to arrest the accused.



Practice and procedure---
----Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all---Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art.4---Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law---Police has no authority to humiliate the citizens---To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen---Police officers have not been given unbridled authority to humiliate and ridicule the citizens without any iota of evidence against them---To call a person to police station without factual and legal justification, make him to sit there against his will, prima facie, amounts to wrongful confinement and action needs to be taken against the police.

----S.216---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.54---Allegation of harbouring a proclaimed offender---Police has no unfettered powers to arrest any person without warrant and to enter any premises for such purpose---General impression to the contrary is not well founded.



The general impression amongst the Police Officers is that any person can be arrested by them without warrant. It is generally expressed by some of the autocratic Police Officers that they can arrest any person under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without warrant and fir that matter they can enter/get ingress in any premises. Legally it is not so, which stands projected by the aforesaid statutory provisions. Some times the male, female, old, young relatives of the absconding accused are arrested, removed under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure whose arrest is not shown in the Daily Diary and out of them some are even crippled or eliminated. The habeas petitions are filed and unnecessary expenses of imposed litigation have to be borne. To maintain the balance in the social set-up and in the larger interest of the citizens the unfettered powers cannot be allowed to be used by the Police or the Executive/Political Authorities at whose command also they have to proceed in the aforesaid illegal and unauthorized manner.



----Ss.76, 77, 78, 79, 80 to 88, 92, 100 & 103---Homicide, its classification and categories detailed.



Homicide is the killing of human being by a human being. Homicide is of three categories; it may be premeditated, involuntary, or voluntary.



Homicide is either lawful or unlawful.



Lawful homicide or simple homicide includes several cases falling under the General Exceptions contained in Chapter .IV of the Pakistan Penal Code. Lawful homicide may be divided, for the sake of convenience, into (1) excusable homicide and (2) justifiable homicide. "Excusable homicide" includes the following cases:--

(a) Where the death is caused by accident or misfortune and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution (section 80, P.P.C.).



(b) When the death is caused by a child or a person of unsound mind or an intoxicated person (sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of P.P.C.).



(c) Where the death is caused intentionally by an act done in good faith, for the benefit of the person killed when (i) he, or if a minor or lunatic, his guardian, has expressly or impliedly consented to such an Act (sections 87 and 88, P.P.C.) or (ii) where it is impossible for the person killed to signify his consent, or where he is capable of giving consent and has no guardian from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit (section 92, P.P.C.).



"Justifiable homicide" includes the cases where the death is caused--



(a) by a person who is bound, or by a mistake of fact, in good faith, believes himself bound by law (section 76, P.P.C.);



(b) by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be given to him by law (section 77, P.P.C .);



(c) by a person acting in pursuance of the judgment or order of a Court of Justice (section 78, P.P.C.). The ex*****on of a lawful sentence of death do not constitute a legal offence;



(d) by a person who is justified or who by reason of a mistake of fact, in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law (section 79, P.P.C.);



(e) by a person acting without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith, for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property (section 81, P.P.C.);



(f) where the death is caused in exercising the right of private defence of person or property (sections 100 and 103, P. P. C.).



"Unlawful homicide" is also known as "culpable homicide". Culpable homicide under the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code would be murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or secondly, if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or thirdly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or fourthly, if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.



Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art.9---Security of person---Extra judicial killing---Law cannot be illegally stretched to eliminate the persons without trial.

God has bestowed life to a person as a trust (Amanat) and breach of trust (Khianat) has not been allowed by Him. This is the reason that su***de through any form, viz. self-immolation, taking of poison, hanging, firing etc. etc. has strictly been prohibited and declared as "Haraam". Su***de is a sin. If one cannot murder himself i.e. is not allowed to commit breach of trust regarding his own life by committing su***de, how he can commit "Khianat" in other's life through murder/extra judicial killing while no policeman is injured or receives any scratch. Law cannot be illegally stretched to eliminate the persons without trial. Rather the law can be used for the betterment of the mankind and not to eliminate the citizens and eclipse the moral, legal values.



Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---
----Art.9---Security of person---Extra judicial killings---Strategy employed by police in eliminating persons without trial discussed.

----Art.9---Police Act (V of 1861), S.4--Extra judicial killings---Duty of District Magistrate---District Magistrate who has the control of the administration of Police throughout the local jurisdiction of the District, has also to play his positive role to maintain the check and balance, who can pass the order for holding of judicial inquiry or registration of murder case with respect to extra judicial killings and thereafter the law can be set in motion and the investigation can be conducted under 5.156, Cr. P. C.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S.167---Police Rules, 1934, Appendix No.25.58(1)---Remands to police custody-Instructions quoted.

Acquittal  of  co-accused  with  roles  trivially  different,  by  itself does  not  pave  way  for  the  petitioner  to...
29/07/2020

Acquittal of co-accused with roles trivially different, by itself does not pave way for the petitioner to escape consequences of his individual criminal act, otherwise established beyond doubt.

Burning/blackening, though a predominant factor to determine distance inter se the assailant and the victim, nonetheless, is not the conclusive indicator; it depends upon factors more than one i.e. quality of munition and process of combustion that may possibly vary the impact of combusted gun powder; a smudging shot may cause deceptive appearance as well, therefore, in the absence of other qualifying evidence, hypothesis of inter se distance cannot be constructed with empirical exactitude on the presence of burning alone (Parikh’s Text Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 1989 Edition, Pages 280/282).

Site plan has never been considered as a substantive piece of evidence nor any benefit may be extracted therefrom unless the witnesses are duly confronted with the purported anomaly or discrepancy therein; no such attempt has been undertaken by the defence.

Javed Ishfaq …Versus.....The State
Jail Petition No.112 of 2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)

PRESENT:
Mr. Justice Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel
Mr. Justice Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed

Jail Petition No.112 of 2017
(Against judgment dated 30.1.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.8 of 2012 along with M.R. No.7 of 2012)

Javed Ishfaq …Petitioner(s)

Versus

The State …Respondent(s)

For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Safdar Hussain Tarrar, ASC
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR
For the State: N.R.
Date of hearing: 06.07.2020.

JUDGMENT

Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, J.- Indicted for homicide, Javed Ashfaq, petitioner herein, claimed trial along with six others before a learned Additional Sessions Judge at Wazirabad; they were arrayed in the backdrop of shifting of an electric transformer in the village that disrupted power supply to the annoyance of co-villagers, lined up into two groups that clashed at the site, 6:00 p.m. on 2.7.2010; both suffered injuries, opined to have been caused with blunt weapons with the exception of Noor Muhammad, deceased, 70, fatally trapped by petitioner’s solitary shot in the abdomen with a corresponding exit. Receipt of injuries suffered by the accused failed to weigh with the police to set up a counter-version and the accused faced trial without recourse to a private complaint. The petitioner was alone to receive a guilty verdict with death sentence, altered into imprisonment for life by the High Court vide impugned judgment dated 30.1.2017.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that evidence disbelieved qua majority of the accused cannot haul up the petitioner without independent corroboration, according to him, hopelessly lacking; that the crime report is completely silent on the injuries suffered by no less than five accused, a suppression spelling out an incident incompatible with the details mentioned in the crime report; that there exists a clear conflict between ocular account and medical evidence as presence of blackening around the wound belies the inter se distance mentioned in the crime report as well as site plan; it is next argued that the deceased, in his late seventies, was done to death by his own clan to hush up the mischief.
3. Heard.

4. With no previous bad blood, shifting of an electric transformer, with power breakdown, rocked an otherwise peaceful neighbourhood in the sizzling heat of the season and in this backdrop initial receipt of injuries, established during the course of investigation to have been caused by clubs, etc. has to be viewed in the peculiar background of the incident. This appears to be a reason for absence of the injured from the witness box; worst casualty was the deceased, hit by petitioner’s shot as the clash graduated more violent and, thus, in the given circumstances acquittal of the co-accused by the trial Court in the absence of the injured from both sides has been an option wisely preferred by the learned trial Judge; acquittals do not extenuate petitioner’s culpability for additional reasons as well; the police declined to entertain the counter version and the accused by their own choice considered institution of private complaint as a futile exercise. A bipartisan suppression appears to be the predominant cause behind the acquittal of co-accused with roles trivially different, thus, by itself does not pave way for the petitioner to escape consequences of his individual criminal act, otherwise established beyond doubt. In the circumstances, plea of indivisibility of evidence is not available to the petitioner. It was held by this Court in the case of Syed Ali Bepari v. Nibaran Mollah and others (PLD 1962 SC 502)“…..the Court must not be deterred by the incompleteness of the tale from drawing the inferences that properly flow from the evidence and circumstances”, a view reaffirmed in the case of Ali Raza alias Peter and others Vs. The State and others (2019 SCMR 1982).

Hypothesis of conflict between ocular account and medical evidence, inordinately agitated to highlight presence of burning around the entry aperture is without foundation as well. According to site plan (Ex.PU), the petitioner fired fatal shot from point ‘B’ standing in a window that hit the deceased at point ‘A’. According to Masood Ahmed Bhatti (PW-12), the inter se distance between two points is four feet and, thus, presence of blackening around the entry wound is not surprising; the relevant portion of the cross-examination is reproduced below:

“It is incorrect to suggest that according to the scaled map the distance between point ‘A’ and point ‘B’ is 12 feet. Volunteered that it is four feet.”

Burning/blackening, though a predominant factor to determine distance inter se the assailant and the victim, nonetheless, is not the conclusive indicator; it depends upon factors more than one i.e. quality of munition and process of combustion that may possibly vary the impact of combusted gun powder; a smudging shot may cause deceptive appearance as well, therefore, in the absence of other qualifying evidence, hypothesis of inter se distance cannot be constructed with empirical exactitude on the presence of burning alone (Parikh’s Text Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 1989 Edition, Pages 280/282). Even otherwise, site plan has never been considered as a substantive piece of evidence nor any benefit may be extracted therefrom unless the witnesses are duly confronted with the purported anomaly or discrepancy therein; no such attempt has been undertaken by the defence.

Ocular account has been furnished by Zafar Ullah (PW-7) and Fazal Ahmed (PW-8); they are in tune with each other on all the salient features of the case as well as details collateral therewith; they have no axe to grind to point their fingers on the petitioner alone, in a situation that cropped up with no past strings. Defence version that apprehending death of the injured, the deceased, in his late seventies, related in first degree with the complainant, was executed by his own kith and kin to fabricate a counter version is a story that being most preposterous would hardly find a buyer.

Despite strenuous efforts, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any flaw, discrepancy, legal or factual, calling for interference with the conclusions concurrently drawn by the Courts below. Petition fails.

Leave declined.

Islamabad, the 6th July, 2020

نادرا نے شناختی کارڈ بنوانے کے حوالے سے نئ پالیسی جاری کردی
16/07/2020

نادرا نے شناختی کارڈ بنوانے کے حوالے سے نئ پالیسی جاری کردی

FIR under Section 489-F PPC registered on the basis of a stale cheque: pre-arrest bail granted.Crl. Misc.-Pre-arrest Bai...
06/03/2020

FIR under Section 489-F PPC registered on the basis of a stale cheque: pre-arrest bail granted.
Crl. Misc.-Pre-arrest Bail-Under Section 498 Cr.PC 3516-B-19
NOOR AHMED VS THE STATE ETC.09-01-2020 2020 LHC 370

ORDER SHEET
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,
BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Crl. Misc. No. 3516-B of 2019
Noor Ahmad
VS
The State etc.

Date of order/proceeding:21.1.2020
Mr. Sheraz Muhammad Khan, Advocate, with the Petitioner.
Mr. Shahid Fareed, ADPP with Ismail ASI.
Mr. Muhammad Ayaz Kalyar, Advocate, for the Complainant.

Through this application the Petitioner, Noor Ahmad, seeks pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 503/2019 dated 13.10.2019 registered at Police Station Saddar, Rahimyar Khan, for an offence under Section 489-F PPC.

2. As per FIR, the prosecution case is that the Petitioner borrowed Rs.13,00,000/- from the Complainant and issued him Cheque No.8485613 dated 30.7.2017 for its repayment which was dishonoured on presentation.

3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that FIR No.503/2019 was mala fide and vexatious. Cheque No. 8485613 was dated 30.7.2017 and as per prevalent practice of the banks the Complainant could present it for payment only within six months from the date of its issuance. Since it was presented after the said period no criminal case could be registered against the Petitioner. He further contended that the aforesaid cheque was without consideration and during investigation the Complainant failed to prove otherwise. He prayed that this application may be accepted and ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the Petitioner be confirmed.

4. On the other hand, the learned Assistant District Public Prosecutor assisted by the learned counsel for the Complainant controverted the above contentions. He contended that the Petitioner dishonestly issued a bad cheque which was dishonoured on presentation. He had thus committed an offence under Section 489-F PPC. Criminal law did not provide any limitation for registration of case so his objections against FIR No.503/2019 were misconceived. Lastly, the Petitioner had failed to bring any material on record which could show that the proceedings against him were mala fide. This was a sine qua non for grant of pre-arrest bail which was an extraordinary relief. The learned ADPP prayed for dismissal of this application.

5. Arguments heard. Record perused.

6. Section 489-F PPC criminalizes dishonest issuance of cheques. It reads:

489-F. Dishonestly issuing a cheque. − Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque.

7. A bare reading of the above section shows that it is not attracted in every case where a cheque is dishonoured. The foundational elements to constitute an offence under this section are: (i) the cheque was duly issued, (ii) it was issued with dishonest intent, (iii) it was issued towards repayment of a loan or fulfilment of an obligation, and (iv) it was dishonoured on presentation. Absence of even one of these elements would take the case out of the ambit of Section 489-F PPC.

8. Section 489-F PPC does not stipulate any period within which the holder must present the cheque to the bank for encashment. However, Section 84 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the “Act”), contemplates that presentation should be within a reasonable time. The question as to what is reasonable time is determined with regard to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and of bankers and the facts of a particular case. For facility of reference, Section 84 is reproduced hereunder:

84. When cheque not duly presented and drawer damaged thereby. –(1) Where a cheque is not presented for payment within a reasonable time of its issue, and the drawer or person on whose account it is drawn had the right, at the time when presentment ought to have been made, as between himself and the banker, to have the cheque paid and suffers actual damage through the delay, he is discharged to the extent of such damage, that is to say, to the extent to which such drawer or person is a creditor of the banker to a larger amount than he would have been if such cheque had been paid.
(2) In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and of bankers, and the facts of the particular case.
(3) ...

9. Section 75-A of the Act excuses delay in presentation of a cheque in certain circumstances. It stipulates:

75-A. Excuse for delay in presentment for acceptance or payment. Delay in presentment (for acceptance or payment) is excused if the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder, and not imputable to his default, misconduct or negligence. When the case of delay ceases to operate, presentment must be made within a reasonable time.

10. According to the prevalent practice, a cheque that is presented beyond six months from the date of issuance is generally regarded as “stale” or “out of date” and the bank is not obliged to honour it unless instructed by the account holder otherwise. Reference may be usefully made to the Banking Glossary issued by the State Bank of Pakistan1 which can be reckoned as an authentic reflection of the “usage of trade and of bankers” contemplated in Section 84(2) of the Act. It reads:
“Stale Cheque
A stale cheque is a cheque that has been outstanding for an unreasonable time. A cheque may be outstanding for more than six months and a bank may under its discretion refuse to honour such a cheque. A bank is under no obligation to a customer to pay a cheque, other than a certified cheque, after more than six months of its date, but it can charge its customer’s account for a payment made thereafter in good faith.”

11. As already noted, one of the foundational elements of Section 489-F PPC is that the cheque is dishonoured on presentation. This follows that “presentation” must be “valid presentation”. A stale or out of date cheque cannot be said to have been validly presented. In Muhammad Ashraf v. The State and others (2015 PCr.LJ 1050), this Court granted pre-arrest bail to the accused as the cheque was presented to the bank after about 30 months from the date of its issuance. This case was subsequently followed in Anwaar Masood Khan v. State etc. (PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 904) and Altaf-ur-Rehman v. State and another (PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 532). In Shafaqat Hussain Hashmi v. The State (2012 MLD 1551), the Sindh High Court quashed the proceedings arising from a case registered under Section 489-F PPC on the basis of a stale cheque.

12. In passing, it may be pointed out that even on the civil side in certain circumstances courts have refused to entertain claims based on stale cheques. In Kamran Akhter v. Jawed Ahmed Khan (2005 CLC 797), the respondent filed a suit under Order ###VII CPC for recovery of money against cheque dated 7.12.2000 which was presented to the bank on 24.7.2001. The District Judge decreed the suit but the High Court set aside the judgment and decree in appeal and remanded the matter with a direction to treat it as an ordinary suit and decide the same according to the regular procedure prescribed by law (instead of a summary procedure under Order ###VII CPC).

13. Dishonour of cheque is culpable in India under Section 138 of the (Indian) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The said section, however, lays down certain conditions for the constitution of offence. It reads:

138. Dishonour of cheques for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. – Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheques or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless–

a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, ”debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

14. No doubt Section 138 of the Indian Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is distinguishable from Section 489-F PPC in many ways but it has two important aspects: first, it gives statutory recognition to the concept of stale cheque and, secondly, it emphasizes that the cheque must be valid at the time of presentation. In Rekha Rani Pyne Vs Sambhunath Halder [2000 (4) ICC 228], the Calcutta High Court quashed legal proceedings initiated on an out of date cheque. The Court ruled:
“… The validity period of the cheque has expired in the meantime. In that circumstances, the proceeding is bad in law as at the material point of time there was no existence of valid cheque. The existence of valid cheque is condition precedent under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. That is absent in this case. That apart, I have already found that even if there was an order of granting liberty, it cannot override the specific provision of Negotiable Instruments Act. Taking all these facts into consideration I find that the proceeding was bad in law and cognizance was also not taken legally. Therefore, the entire proceeding is liable to be quashed.”

15. Similarly, in Stanley Barros Pereira Vs Julieta Cota e Clemente and another [2006 (2) GOA L.R 287] the Bombay High Court ruled:

“As stated by Shri Hadiga/PW2 the subject cheque had become stale after the complainant was informed for the first time that the account was closed and therefore it could not have been presented again. The second presentation of the cheque by the complainant was not within the validity period of the said cheque as per banking practice though otherwise it was within a period of six months as contemplated by clause (a) to the proviso below Section 138…. In this view of the matter, no fault could be found with the acquittal of the accused.”

16. In Arunbhai Nilkanthrai Nanavati Vs Jayaben Prahladbhai (2000 CriLJ 1152), Gujrat High Court held:
“For the aforesaid reasons, the cheque is required to be presented at the paying Bank i.e., drawee within the period of 6 months or the period of validity whichever is earlier for valid initiation of the criminal action i.e., lodging of the complaint against the drawer. When this is the only possible interpretation, it cannot be said that the faith of those dealing with others through Bank will be frustrated. It is also not open to contend that the payee will be helpless. When in this case, the cheque is not presented at the paying Bank within six months, the application is required to be allowed, and the complaint, being Cri. Case No. 4061 of 1997, being not tenable for want of non-subsistence of cause of action, is not only required to be quashed, but the petitioner also deserves a discharge, allowing the applications Exhs. No. 8 & 10.”

17. Reverting to the instant case, it is observed that Cheque No. 8485613 is dated 30.7.2017. The Complainant presented it to the concerned bank on 25.3.2019, i.e. after one year, seven months and 25 days. It was thus patently out of date. The Complainant knew fully well that it would not be encashed yet he presented it merely to bring the case against the Petitioner under Section 489-F PPC. In Shafqat Hussain Hashmi’s case, supra, the Court held this contrivance malicious.

18. In view of the fact that further inquiry is required to determine the Petitioner’s guilt and the Complainant’s mala fides are floating on the surface of record, this application is allowed.
Ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the Petitioner is confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bond in the sum of Rs.200,000/- (Rupees two hundred thousand) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court.

(Tariq Saleem Sheikh)
Judge
Yasir *
Approved for reporting.
Judge

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