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25/08/2026

کیا روڑ سرٹیفکیٹ عدالت میں پیش کیے بغیر صرف یہ کہنا کہ ہم نے اگلے ہی دن مال Malkhana میں جمع کرایا اور PFSA بھیج دیا کافی ہے؟
کیا یہ ثابت کرنے کیلئے کہ پولیس پارٹی patrol duty پر تھی روزنامچہ عدالت میں پیش کیا گیا؟
کیا Case Property کو عدالت میں کھولنا اور display کرنالازمیہے؟
اگر defence de-sealing کا مطالبہ نہ کرے تو کیا trial court parcel کھولنے کی پابند نہیں ؟
یہ فیصلہ منشیات کے مقدمات میں Chain of Custody، Case Property کی باقاعدہ نمائش، گواہوں سے شناخت، اور Roznamcha/Police Rules کی پابندی کے حوالے سے بہت اہم ہے۔ لاہور ہائی کورٹ، بہاولپور بنچ نے صرف تکنیکی خامیوں کی بنیاد پر نہیں بلکہ ایسے نقائص کی بنیاد پر اپیل منظور کی جو استغاثہ کے مقدمے کی بنیادی شہادت اور برآمد شدہ منشیات کی شناخت و حفاظت کو مشکوک بناتے تھے۔

1۔ مقدمے کے بنیادی حقائق

ملزم ذوالفقار علی کے خلاف تھانہ ایئرپورٹ، رحیم یار خان میں مقدمہ درج ہوا۔

پولیس کے مطابق:

ملزم کے قبضے سے 6 کلو گرام چرس برآمد ہوئی۔

چرس پانچ ٹکڑوں میں تھی، ہر ٹکڑا تقریباً 1200 گرام کا تھا۔

ہر ٹکڑے سے 60 گرام نمونہ لے کر پانچ الگ سیل شدہ پارسل بنائے گئے۔

باقی 5700 گرام چرس الگ پارسل میں محفوظ کی گئی۔

نمونے PFSA کو بھیجے گئے اور کیمیائی تجزیے کی رپورٹ مثبت آئی۔

ٹرائل کورٹ نے ملزم کو 14 سال قید بامشقت اور 4 لاکھ روپے جرمانہ کی سزا دی۔

ہائی کورٹ میں دفاع نے بنیادی طور پر کہا کہ:

1. مالِ مقدمہ کی محفوظ تحویل ثابت نہیں ہوئی۔

2. PFSA کو بھیجے گئے نمونوں کی محفوظ ترسیل ثابت نہیں ہوئی۔

3. متعلقہ Roznamcha اور Malkhana ریکارڈ پیش نہیں کیا گیا۔

4. مالِ مقدمہ کو عدالت میں کھول کر گواہوں سے شناخت نہیں کروائی گئی۔

5. ملزم کو مالِ مقدمہ سے باقاعدہ confront نہیں کیا گیا۔

6. برآمد شدہ چرس کی شکل کے بارے میں دونوں recovery witnesses کے بیانات مختلف تھے۔

ہائی کورٹ نے یہ اعتراضات تسلیم کر لیے۔

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2۔ سب سے اہم قانونی نکتہ: Chain of Custody

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ منشیات کے مقدمے میں Chain of Custody یعنی برآمد شدہ منشیات کی مسلسل، محفوظ اور قابلِ اعتماد تحویل انتہائی اہم ہے۔

اس کا مطلب ہے کہ prosecution کو ہر مرحلے پر یہ ثابت کرنا ہوتا ہے کہ:

برآمدگی → پولیس کے قبضے میں آنا → Malkhana میں جمع ہونا → sample parcels کا نکلنا → PFSA تک پہنچنا → Laboratory examination

کے دوران مال میں تبدیلی، substitution یا tampering کا کوئی امکان نہیں تھا۔

صرف یہ کہنا کافی نہیں کہ:

> "ہم نے مال Malkhana میں جمع کرایا اور اگلے دن PFSA بھیج دیا۔"

بلکہ اس کا دستاویزی ثبوت بھی ہونا چاہیے۔

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3۔ Roznamcha کیوں اہم تھا؟

پولیس کا موقف تھا کہ ASI Tayyab Shahid پولیس پارٹی کے ہمراہ patrol duty پر تھا اور اسے مخبری ہوئی، جس کے بعد کارروائی کی گئی۔

لیکن عدالت میں متعلقہ Roznamcha entries پیش نہیں کی گئیں۔

یعنی prosecution نے یہ ثابت کرنے کے لیے documentary record پیش نہیں کیا کہ:

پولیس پارٹی واقعی اس وقت patrol پر تھی؛

وہ Noor-e-Wali Phatak پر موجود تھی؛

وہاں سے raid کے لیے روانہ ہوئی؛

بعد ازاں پولیس اہلکاروں کی movement کیا رہی۔

ہائی کورٹ نے اس omission کو اہم سمجھا۔

عملی قانونی اصول

منشیات کے مقدمات میں پولیس کی movement اور case property کی movement دونوں کو جہاں قانون اور قواعد تقاضا کریں وہاں documentary record سے corroborate کرنا prosecution کے لیے انتہائی اہم ہے۔

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4۔ Malkhana Register No. XIX کیوں اہم تھا؟

یہ فیصلہ کا نہایت اہم حصہ ہے۔

Malkhana Moharrar نے بیان دیا کہ:

14.11.2023 کو اسے چھ sealed parcels ملے۔

15.11.2023 کو پانچ sample parcels ASI Tayyab Shahid کو PFSA بھیجنے کے لیے دیے۔

باقی مال دوسرے Malkhana میں جمع کروایا۔

لیکن اس نے Register No. XIX کی متعلقہ entries عدالت میں پیش نہیں کیں۔

اس کے علاوہ اس نے بتایا کہ samples:

Road Certificate No. 919/21

کے ذریعے بھیجے گئے تھے، مگر یہ Road Certificate بھی عدالت میں پیش نہیں کیا گیا۔

لہٰذا عدالت کے سامنے صرف زبانی بیان رہ گیا۔

ہائی کورٹ نے کہا کہ یہ محض معمولی procedural lapse نہیں بلکہ Chain of Custody میں serious gap ہے۔

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5۔ صرف PFSA کی Positive Report کافی نہیں

یہ اصول خاص طور پر یاد رکھنے کے قابل ہے۔

اگر PFSA رپورٹ کہتی ہے کہ sample چرس ہے، تب بھی prosecution کو پہلے یہ ثابت کرنا ہوگا کہ:

PFSA نے جس sample کا تجزیہ کیا، وہی sample تھا جو ملزم سے برآمد ہوا تھا۔

اگر sample کی identity اور safe transmission ہی مشکوک ہو جائے تو:

> Positive Chemical Report اپنی evidentiary value کھو سکتی ہے۔

یعنی:

Positive PFSA Report ≠ automatically proved prosecution case

جب تک اس sample کی محفوظ اور مسلسل custody ثابت نہ ہو۔

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6۔ Case Property کو عدالت میں کھولنا کیوں ضروری تھا؟

یہ فیصلہ کا سب سے اہم اور قابلِ استعمال اصول ہے۔

Lahore High Court Rules & Orders کے:

Rule 14-F

کے مطابق ہر ایسی چیز جو circumstantial evidence کا حصہ ہو، مثلاً:

narcotics

weapon

clothes

money

وغیرہ، عدالت میں پیش ہونی چاہیے اور گواہ اس کی:

identity اور connection with the case

ثابت کرے۔

عدالت نے کہا کہ صرف parcel عدالت میں لا کر اسے:

Exhibit P-1

نمبر دے دینا کافی نہیں۔

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7۔ Sealed parcel کو کھولنا ضروری ہے

عدالت نے بہت واضح طور پر کہا:

اگر case property sealed parcel میں موجود ہے تو trial کے دوران اسے de-seal کیا جانا چاہیے تاکہ:

1. مال عدالت میں display ہو؛

2. recovery witness اسے دیکھے؛

3. witness اس کی شناخت کرے؛

4. یہ ثابت کرے کہ یہی وہ چیز ہے جو ملزم سے برآمد ہوئی تھی؛

5. پھر اسے proper exhibit بنایا جائے۔

یعنی عدالت کے نزدیک:

Exhibition alone is not sufficient.

صرف یہ کہنا کہ:

> "Parcel P-1 پیش ہوا اور exhibit کر دیا گیا"

کافی نہیں۔

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8۔ اس مقدمے میں اصل غلطی کیا ہوئی؟

PW-3 نے 5700 گرام باقی چرس والا parcel عدالت میں پیش کیا۔

اسے Exh. P-1 بنایا گیا۔

لیکن:

parcel کھولا نہیں گیا؛

اندر موجود چرس گواہوں کو دکھائی نہیں گئی؛

PW-3 نے اندر موجود چرس کو دیکھ کر identify نہیں کیا؛

PW-4 نے بھی اسے identify نہیں کیا؛

ملزم کو بھی اس case property سے confront نہیں کیا گیا۔

لہٰذا عدالت نے کہا کہ witnesses کی identification meaningless ہو گئی۔

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9۔ چار مرحلوں کا اصول

ہائی کورٹ نے Rule 14-F کو apply کرتے ہوئے case property کی identification کے چار مراحل بیان کیے:

پہلا:

Article کو competent witness کے ذریعے عدالت میں پیش کیا جائے۔

دوسرا:

اسے open court میں display کیا جائے۔

تیسرا:

Witness اسے identify کرے اور بتائے کہ یہی وہ چیز ہے جو مقدمے سے متعلق ہے۔

چوتھا:

اسے properly mark کرکے exhibit کیا جائے۔

اگر parcel sealed ہو تو:

> trial کے دوران اسے de-seal کرنا ضروری ہے۔

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10۔ دفاع کے لیے بہت اہم نکتہ

عدالت نے یہ بھی واضح کیا کہ یہ کہنا درست نہیں کہ:

> "اگر defence de-sealing کا مطالبہ نہ کرے تو trial court parcel نہیں کھولے گی۔"

ہائی کورٹ نے کہا کہ یہ court کی ذمہ داری ہے۔

یعنی prosecution یا defence کے objection کا انتظار کیے بغیر trial court کو Rule 14-F کے مطابق case property کی proper production اور identification کروانی چاہیے۔

یہ observation دفاعی وکلاء کے لیے بہت اہم ہے۔

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11۔ Article 10-A بھی شامل ہوگیا

عدالت نے Amjad Siddiqui v. The State (2016 PCr.LJ 1800) پر انحصار کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ case property کو عدالت میں properly expose نہ کرنا Article 10-A، یعنی fair trial کے اصول سے بھی متصادم ہو سکتا ہے۔

کیونکہ عدالت کسی sealed parcel کو دیکھے بغیر یہ فرض نہیں کر سکتی کہ:

> اندر وہی چیز موجود ہے جو prosecution کہہ رہی ہے۔

Prosecution کو evidence کو قانون کے مطابق establish کرنا ہوگا۔

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12۔ Recovery witnesses کے بیانات میں تضاد

ایک اور اہم circumstance یہ تھا کہ دونوں recovery witnesses نے چرس کی شکل مختلف بیان کی۔

PW-3:

اس نے کہا کہ پانچوں pieces square تھے۔

PW-4:

اس نے کہا کہ پانچوں pieces round تھے۔

ہائی کورٹ نے اس تضاد کو material سمجھا۔

وجہ یہ تھی کہ اگر case property عدالت میں کھول کر witnesses کو دکھائی جاتی تو یہ تضاد واضح یا test کیا جا سکتا تھا۔

لیکن چونکہ parcel کھولا ہی نہیں گیا، اس لیے prosecution کی recovery story مزید مشکوک ہوگئی۔

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13۔ عدالت نے سزا کیوں ختم کی؟

ہائی کورٹ نے prosecution کے مقدمے میں متعدد اہم doubts پائے:

1۔

Roznamcha entries پیش نہیں کی گئیں۔

2۔

Malkhana Register No. XIX پیش نہیں کیا گیا۔

3۔

Road Certificate No. 919/21 پیش نہیں کیا گیا۔

4۔

PFSA samples کی محفوظ transmission مکمل طور پر documentary evidence سے ثابت نہیں ہوئی۔

5۔

Chain of Custody میں serious gap پیدا ہوا۔

6۔

5700 گرام case property کو de-seal نہیں کیا گیا۔

7۔

Witnesses نے case property کو properly identify نہیں کیا۔

8۔

ملزم کو case property سے confront نہیں کیا گیا۔

9۔

Recovery witnesses نے چرس کی شکل مختلف بیان کی۔

ان تمام circumstances کو ملا کر عدالت نے prosecution case کی integrity پر شک ظاہر کیا۔

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14۔ سخت سزا کا ایک اور اہم اصول

عدالت نے Ameer Zeb v. The State (PLD 2012 SC 380)، Ahmed Ali v. The State (2023 SCMR 781) اور Jeehand v. The State (2025 SCMR 923) پر reliance کرتے ہوئے کہا:

> جتنی سنگین سزا ہوگی، اتنا ہی prosecution سے مضبوط اور سخت معیارِ ثبوت کا تقاضا ہوگا۔

چونکہ CNSA کے تحت سزا سخت ہوتی ہے، اس لیے prosecution کو معمولی سے زیادہ مضبوط طریقے سے:

recovery + identity + custody + transmission + laboratory connection

ثابت کرنا ہوتا ہے۔

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15۔ آخر میں Benefit of Doubt

ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ prosecution:

continuous and secure chain of custody

ثابت کرنے میں ناکام رہی۔

Case property بھی قانون کے مطابق produce نہیں کی گئی اور recovery witnesses کے بیانات میں material discrepancy بھی موجود تھی۔

لہٰذا doubts پیدا ہوئے۔

پاکستانی فوجداری قانون کا بنیادی اصول ہے:

> ایک معقول شک بھی ملزم کے حق میں جاتا ہے۔

چنانچہ:

اپیل منظور → conviction اور sentence ختم → ملزم بری۔

اور عدالت نے حکم دیا کہ اگر کسی دوسرے مقدمے میں مطلوب نہ ہو تو اسے فوراً رہا کیا جائے۔

فیصلے کا Ratio

"صرف مثبت PFSA رپورٹ اور sealed parcel کو exhibit کر دینا کافی نہیں؛ prosecution کو برآمد شدہ narcotics کی محفوظ Chain of Custody، عدالت میں proper production، de-sealing، گواہوں سے شناخت اور اس کی case سے connection قانون کے مطابق ثابت کرنا لازم ہے، ورنہ پیدا ہونے والا reasonable doubt ملزم کے حق میں جائے گا۔"

25/08/2026

This is a case in terms of Section 489-F P.P.C. which does not fall within the prohibitory clause of subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.). As per settled law, grant of bail in case involving offence falling outside prohibitory clause is a rule and refusal an exception, which may attract in cases where there is likelihood of abscondence of the accused; apprehension of the accused tempering with the prosecution evidence; and the danger of the offence being repeated.
Quantum of amount involved in a case registered under section 489-F P.P.C., could not be treated as an exception to the general rule that in cases falling under the category of non-prohibitory clause, bail shall be considered favorably.

Crl. Misc. No.40200-B/2026
Austin Sabir vs State
21-08-2026
2026LHC5313

25/08/2026

A postmortem report is a documented expert opinion. Although admissible as documentary evidence, it does not prove itself. Its production must comply with the requirements of the QSO, which demand proof of both ex*****on and contents. When the doctor who conducted a postmortem report is unavailable, secondary evidence may be permitted, but only upon fulfilment of the conditions set out in (naeem)Article 76 QSO. These include proof that the original has been lost, destroyed, unlawfully withheld, or otherwise cannot be produced without unreasonable delay or expense.

Section 509(1) Cr.P.C. provides a statutory exception: The deposition of a Civil Surgeon or other medical witness, taken and attested by a Magistrate in the presence of the accused, or taken on commission under Chapter XL, may be given in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code of 1898, although the deponent is not called as a witness. However, section 509(2) provides that the court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine such deponent as to the subject-matter of his deposition. The utility of this provision is also underscored in Rule 6, Chapter 18, Volume III of the High Court Rules and Orders.

The Code of 1898 does not expressly employ the term “remand” in the context of appellate proceedings. However, such power is implicit in sections 423 and 428 Cr.P.C., which authorize the appellate court to order retrial or direct the taking of additional evidence where necessary for a just decision of the(naeem) case. At the same time, section 537 Cr.P.C. provides that no finding, sentence, or order shall be reversed or altered on account of any error, omission, or irregularity in the proceedings unless it has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice. Therefore, when considering whether a remand is necessary to cure a procedural irregularity, the appellate court must determine: (i) whether the irregularity is one that goes to the root of the case or is merely technical, (ii) whether it is curable under section 537 Cr.P.C., and (iii) whether its impact has occasioned a failure of justice. If the defect is such that it can be remedied without prejudicing the accused, a remand may be justified. However, it cannot be ordered merely to afford the prosecution an opportunity to fill lacunae in its case. The distinction between an “curable irregularity” and a “lacuna” is, therefore, crucial in determining whether a remand is warranted.

A criminal court is not a passive spectator and must ensure that evidence is recorded in accordance with the law.7 Where material evidence has been improperly exhibited owing to non-compliance with statutory requirements, an appellate court may, in appropriate circumstances, consider remand so that such evidence is proved in the manner prescribed. Whether such a course would amount to permitting a party to fill a lacuna or merely to rectify a procedural defect depends upon the facts of each case. In the (naeem)present matter, the postmortem report forms part of the record but stands excluded because it was not proved in accordance with the law. However, the power to remand is discretionary and must be exercised with due regard to its practical utility. Even if the postmortem report were to be duly proved on remand, it would only establish the nature and cause of death. It would not, by itself, remedy the serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s ocular, forensic, and circumstantial evidence, which are examined below. In these circumstances, a remand would merely prolong the proceedings without affecting the ultimate decision of the case. It would therefore serve no useful purpose. I decline to remand the case.

In the present case, the trial court observed that neither party had come forward with the whole truth and invoked Syed Ali Bepari v. Nibaran Mollah and others (PLD 1962 SC 502) to reconstruct the incident. It misdirected itself in doing so, as that authority is of limited application. It permits independent evaluation of the evidence where both parties have suppressed material facts, but it does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Any inference drawn by the court must be founded on admissible evidence and proved circumstances, (naeem)and not on conjecture or speculation. In any event, if the trial court was inclined to discard both versions and reach its own conclusion, it was incumbent upon it to do so neutrally and on the basis of legally admissible evidence. Instead, it rested its findings substantially on the prosecution’s account, without addressing the material contradictions and omissions discussed above. The Appellant also raised a specific plea in his statement under section 342 Cr.P.C., denying his presence at the scene, whereas the prosecution attributed to him a direct and fatal role. The trial court did not engage with this fundamental inconsistency or resolve it through a reasoned evaluation of the record.
Criminal Appeal No.12055/J/2022
Umar Hayat Vs. The State
Criminal Revision No.10970/2022
Muhammad Hanif Vs. The State

25/08/2026

1932 کی پرانی رجسٹری بھی ملکیت ثابت نہ کر
سکی—سپریم کورٹ نے کہا: پرانا کاغذ، خود بخود ملکیت کا ثبوت نہیں بنتا!

یہ فیصلہ زمین کی ملکیت، پرانی دستاویزات، انتقال، ریونیو ریکارڈ اور ثبوتِ ملکیت کے حوالے سے نہایت اہم ہے۔ سپریم کورٹ نے واضح کیا کہ صرف 1932 کی پرانی Sale Deed، Mutation یا کاشت کے اندراج کی بنیاد پر یہ نہیں کہا جا سکتا کہ زمین کی ملکیت منتقل ہو چکی تھی۔

📌 تنازع اصل میں کیا تھا؟

مدعا علیہان کا مؤقف تھا کہ متنازعہ زمین ان کے پیشرو نے 25 جولائی 1932 کو خرید لی تھی۔ اس دعوے کے لیے انہوں نے بنیادی طور پر:

1932 کی Sale Deed
Mutation No. 63
ریونیو ریکارڈ میں کاشت/لگان کے اندراجات
پیش کیے۔
لیکن سپریم کورٹ نے کہا کہ صرف یہ دستاویزات پیش کر دینا کافی نہیں تھا؛ اصل فروخت اور ملکیت کی منتقلی کو قانون کے مطابق ثابت کرنا بھی ضروری تھا۔

🔹 کیا 30 سال سے پرانی دستاویز حتمی ثبوت بن جاتی ہے؟

نہیں۔
عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ پرانی دستاویز کے بارے میں قانون بعض حالات میں اس کے ex*****on یا signatures کے حوالے سے presumption کی اجازت دیتا ہے، لیکن:

Presumption is not conclusive proof.

یعنی صرف یہ کہنا کہ “دستاویز 1932 کی ہے، اس لیے لازماً درست ہوگی” کافی نہیں۔
اگر حالات و شواہد اس لین دین پر سنجیدہ سوال اٹھاتے ہوں تو یہ presumption ختم بھی ہو سکتی ہے۔

🔹 Sale Deed اور Mutation میں رقم مختلف تھی
1932 کی Sale Deed میں قیمت 90 روپے درج تھی، جبکہ Mutation No.63 میں یہی رقم 100 روپے لکھی گئی۔
مدعا علیہان اس فرق کی قابلِ اطمینان وضاحت نہ کر سکے۔
عدالت کے نزدیک ایک ہی مبینہ لین دین سے متعلق دو اہم دستاویزات میں ایسا تضاد اہم تھا اور اسے نظر انداز نہیں کیا جا سکتا تھا۔

🔹 زمین کی شناخت بھی واضح نہ ہو سکی

ایک اور اہم مسئلہ یہ تھا کہ پرانی Sale Deed میں موجود تفصیل سے یہ اطمینان بخش طور پر ثابت نہیں ہو رہا تھا کہ 1932 میں فروخت ہونے والی زمین وہی زمین تھی جو موجودہ مقدمے میں متنازعہ تھی۔
یعنی بنیادی سوال ہی پوری طرح حل نہیں ہوا:
آخر 1932 میں کون سی زمین فروخت ہوئی تھی؟
جب زمین کی شناخت ہی مشکوک ہو تو محض پرانی دستاویز کی بنیاد پر موجودہ زمین کی ملکیت ثابت نہیں کی جا سکتی۔
🔹 پرانی Sale Deed بھی باقاعدہ ثابت کرنا ضروری ہے

یہ فیصلہ کا نہایت اہم evidentiary principle ہے۔
مدعا علیہان نے یہ مؤقف اختیار کیا کہ چونکہ Sale Deed 1984 کے Qanun-e-Shahadat Order سے پہلے کی ہے، اس لیے Article 79 کی requirements لاگو نہیں ہوں گی۔
سپریم کورٹ نے اس مؤقف کو قبول نہیں کیا۔
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ دستاویز کو اس وقت نافذ قانون کے مطابق ثابت کرنا ہوگا، یعنی Evidence Act, 1872 کی Section 68 کے تقاضے پورے کرنا ضروری تھے۔

لیکن:

attesting witnesses پیش نہیں کیے گئے؛
ان کی وفات یا عدم دستیابی ثابت نہیں کی گئی؛
ان کے signatures/thumb impressions کی شناخت کے لیے مناسب ثبوت نہیں دیا گیا۔

لہٰذا Sale Deed کی ex*****on بھی مناسب طریقے سے ثابت نہ ہو سکی۔

⚖️ Mutation ملکیت پیدا نہیں کرتا
سپریم کورٹ نے ایک بار پھر بنیادی اصول دہرایا:
Mutation title نہیں ہوتا۔
انتقال بنیادی طور پر revenue/fiscal purposes کے لیے ہوتا ہے۔ اگر کوئی شخص یہ دعویٰ کرتا ہے کہ اس نے زمین خریدی ہے تو اسے اصل sale transaction بھی ثابت کرنا ہوگا۔

یعنی:
Mutation ≠ Ownership

🌾 کاشت کا اندراج بھی ملکیت کا ثبوت نہیں

مدعا علیہان کے پیشرو کا نام ریونیو ریکارڈ میں کاشت/لگان کے کالم میں موجود تھا، جبکہ ملکیت کے کالم میں مدعی کے پیشرو کا نام برقرار تھا۔
عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ کاشت کا اندراج مختلف قانونی حیثیتوں کے ساتھ compatible ہو سکتا ہے، مثلاً:

permissive possession؛
tenancy؛
cultivation rights۔

اس لیے:

Cultivation ≠ Ownership

🏦 1991 کی Mortgage نے پرانے دعوے پر بڑا سوال اٹھا دیا

مقدمے میں ایک انتہائی اہم circumstantial evidence یہ بھی تھا کہ مدعی کے پیشرو نے بعد میں یہی زمین Agricultural Development Bank کے پاس mortgage کی۔
بعد میں وہ mortgage بھی redeem کر دی گئی۔
سپریم کورٹ نے اس subsequent conduct کو اہم سمجھا۔
اگر واقعی 1932 میں زمین فروخت ہو کر ملکیت منتقل ہو چکی تھی تو پھر مدعی کے پیشرو کے پاس 1991 میں اس زمین کو mortgage کرنے کا حق کیسے باقی رہ گیا؟
یہ بعد کا عمل defendants کے 1932 والے دعوے سے مطابقت نہیں رکھتا تھا۔

📂 اہم دستاویز چھپانے پر adverse inference

Revenue proceedings میں Pert Patwar اور Pert Sarkar دونوں اہم ریکارڈ تھے۔
مدعا علیہان نے Pert Patwar تو پیش کی، لیکن Pert Sarkar پیش نہیں کی اور اسے روکنے کی کوئی تسلی بخش وجہ بھی نہیں بتائی۔
سپریم کورٹ نے Article 129(g), Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 کے تحت adverse inference لیا۔

سادہ الفاظ میں:

اگر کسی فریق کے پاس اہم ترین ثبوت موجود ہو اور وہ بلاجواز اسے عدالت سے چھپائے، تو عدالت یہ سمجھ سکتی ہے کہ وہ ثبوت اس فریق کے حق میں نہیں تھا۔

⚖️ سپریم کورٹ نے تمام شواہد کو مجموعی طور پر دیکھا

عدالت نے صرف ایک خامی کی بنیاد پر فیصلہ نہیں کیا بلکہ تمام حالات کو اکٹھا دیکھا، جن میں:
90 روپے بمقابلہ 100 روپے کی discrepancy، زمین کی شناخت کا مسئلہ، Sale Deed کا صحیح طور پر ثابت نہ ہونا، attesting witnesses کی عدم پیشی، مسلسل ownership entries، بعد کی mortgage، Pert Sarkar کی عدم پیشی اور mutation میں crop sale کا مبہم ذکر شامل تھے۔
ان تمام حالات کو مجموعی طور پر دیکھنے کے بعد عدالت اس نتیجے پر پہنچی کہ defendants 1932 میں ملکیت منتقل ہونے کا دعویٰ ثابت نہیں کر سکے۔

🏛️ حتمی فیصلہ

سپریم کورٹ نے ماتحت عدالتوں کے concurrent findings میں کوئی ایسی:

illegality؛
material irregularity؛
misreading/non-reading of evidence؛ یا
jurisdictional defect

نہیں پایا جس کی بنیاد پر مداخلت ضروری ہوتی۔

چنانچہ Civil Appeal No.19-P of 2015 خارج کر دی گئی اور مدعی کے حق میں موجود decree برقرار رہی۔

⭐ فیصلے کا آسان قانونی سبق

زمین کی ملکیت صرف پرانے کاغذ، انتقال یا کاشت کے اندراج سے ثابت نہیں ہوتی۔
جو شخص کسی پرانی Sale Deed کی بنیاد پر ملکیت کا دعویٰ کرے گا، اسے یہ ثابت کرنا ہوگا کہ:
کیا واقعی فروخت ہوئی؟
کس زمین کی فروخت ہوئی؟
دستاویز قانون کے مطابق ثابت ہے؟
اور بعد کے حالات بھی اس دعوے کی تائید کرتے ہیں یا نہیں؟

سب سے اہم بات:

پرانا دستاویز قابلِ غور ضرور ہو سکتا ہے، لیکن صرف پرانا ہونے کی وجہ سے وہ ملکیت کا حتمی ثبوت نہیں بن جاتا

25/08/2026

تتیمہ (Tatimma) تقسیمِ جائیداد کا متبادل نہیں —🫠 شریک مالک کی مخصوص حصے کی فروخت کا قانونی اثر
2026 PHC 5299
اس فیصلے میں مشترکہ جائیداد، شریک مالک کی طرف سے مخصوص حصے کی فروخت اور تتیمہ (Tatimma) کے درمیان اہم فرق واضح کیا گیا ہے۔

1۔ شریک مالک کا حق:
شریک مالک اپنی غیر منقسم ملکیتی حیثیت (undivided share) کسی دوسرے شخص کو منتقل کر سکتا ہے، لیکن وہ اپنے حصے سے زیادہ ملکیت منتقل نہیں کر سکتا۔

2۔ مخصوص حصہ فروخت کرنے کا اثر:
اگر مشترکہ کھاتہ/خسرہ نمبر میں سے کوئی شریک کسی مخصوص ٹکڑے کو فروخت کرتا ہے تو محض اس فروخت سے وہ ٹکڑا مشترکہ جائیداد سے الگ نہیں ہو جاتا۔ خریدار صرف فروخت کنندہ کے حقوق میں اس کی جگہ لیتا ہے اور دیگر شریک مالکان کے حقوق برقرار رہتے ہیں۔

3۔ تتیمہ کیا ہے؟
تتیمہ بنیادی طور پر ایک ریونیو طریقہ کار ہے جس کے ذریعے موجودہ خسرہ نمبر کے کسی حصے کو الگ شناخت دی جاتی ہے۔ یہ بذاتِ خود تقسیم (Partition) کا متبادل نہیں ہے۔

4۔ یکطرفہ تتیمہ ناقابلِ قبول:
اگر تتیمہ کے ذریعے مشترکہ خسرہ کا مخصوص حصہ باقی شریک مالکان سے الگ کر کے ایک علیحدہ ملکیتی پارسل بنا دیا جائے تو اس سے تمام شریک مالکان کے ملکیتی اور قبضہ کے حقوق متاثر ہوتے ہیں۔ لہٰذا تمام شریک مالکان کی رضامندی ضروری ہے۔

5۔ رضامندی نہ ہو تو کیا ہوگا؟
اگر تمام شریک مالکان رضامند نہ ہوں تو مشترکہ جائیداد کو الگ کرنے کا واحد قانونی راستہ مجاز اتھارٹی کے سامنے باقاعدہ تقسیم (Partition) کی کارروائی ہے۔

نتیجہ:
عدالت نے اصل alienation/فروخت کو برقرار رکھا، لیکن Mutation No. 857 اور اس کے نتیجے میں تیار کردہ یکطرفہ Tatimma کے ذریعے مشترکہ جائیداد کے مخصوص حصے کو الگ کرنے کو تسلیم نہیں کیا۔

اہم اصول:

> Co-sharer مخصوص حصہ فروخت کر سکتا ہے، لیکن محض فروخت یا یکطرفہ تتیمہ کے ذریعے مشترکہ جائیداد سے اس حصے کو قانونی طور پر الگ نہیں کر سکتا؛ علیحدگی کے لیے رضامندی یا باقاعدہ partition ضروری ہے۔

25/08/2026

PLD 2024 SC 843
نابالغ ملزم کی ضمانت کے موضوع پر سپریم کورٹ کا رہنما فیصلہ

A bare reading of the provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 shows that Section 6(4) of the 2018 Act provides that where a juvenile of more than sixteen years of age is arrested or detained for a heinous offence, he may not be released on bail if the Juvenile Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such juvenile is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. While, Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act provides that any juvenile who has been detained for a continuous period exceeding six months and whose trial has not been completed shall be released on bail, provided that the delay in the conclusion of the trial has not been occasioned by an act or omission of such juvenile.

It is thus evident that while Section 6(4) deals with the matter of bail on merits, while Section 6(5) provides for a distinct and separate ground of bail, namely, the delay in the conclusion of the trial of the juvenile. It is also important to underline that since both ‘minor offence’ and ‘major offence’ are treated as bailable under Section 6(3), the ground of delay in the(Naeem)conclusion of the trial provided by Section 6(5) for grant of bail applies solely to juveniles detained for a ‘heinous offence’.Therefore, post-arrest bail is to be granted as a matter of right to a juvenile detained for a heinous offence, regardless of his age, whether above or below sixteen years, provided the prerequisites of Section 6(5) are fulfilled.

The 2018 Act is a beneficial legislation that favors juvenile offenders. It not only reduces the period for granting bail on the statutory ground of trial delay for juveniles detained pending trial under the previous law, i.e., the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 (“2000 Ordinance”), from one year to six months but also removes the disqualification of having a previous criminal record for bail on this ground. Unlike the 2000 Ordinance or Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the 2018 Act does not(Naeem) impose any other statutory disqualifications for granting bail to juveniles on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial. The subsequent ameliorative and benevolent legislation, i.e., the 2018 Act, reflects the legislature's intent to ensure that the trial of a juvenile is concluded within six months of his detention, and any delay beyond this period entitles the juvenile to be released on bail. Furthermore, since the denial of bail and detention of an accused pending trial curtail his fundamental rights to liberty, fair trial and dignity guaranteed by Articles 9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution, statutory provisions on bail matters, such as Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act, must be interpreted in a manner that is progressive and expansive of these rights.
The nature of the offence is not a valid ground to withhold bail under Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act; in fact, this provision only applies to heinous offences, as other offences are bailable under Section 6(3) of the 2018 Act.

The High Court has also erred in law by attributing the delay in concluding the trial to the petitioner, who had filed an application for determination of his age under Section 8 of the 2018 Act, which took time. It is crucial to emphasize that the initial duty to determine the age of an accused who appears or claims to be a juvenile lies with the police. When the police fail in (Naeem)this duty, it passes on to the court. Therefore, the time spent by the court in making this determination constitutes an act of the court, which cannot be construed as delay caused by the petitioner in the trial, thereby depriving him of his right to bail on the statutory ground of delay.So far as the delay caused by the frequent absence of the co-accused during trial is concerned, the same cannot be attributed to the petitioner as one is responsible for his own acts or omissions, not of others.
Crl.P.L.A.80-P/2024
Mehran v. Ubaid Ullah and others.

23/08/2026

2026 P Cr. L J 949

Cross-examination, right of---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that prosecution produced three eye-witnesses before the Trial Court---Two witnesses were cross-examined whereas, the third witness, after recording of his examination-in-chief, was not cross-examined by the defence rather he was abandoned by the prosecution without any plausible reason---Held: Non-production of that witness in spite of recording of his examination-in-chief raised many questions in a prudent mind---Legally, for many factors, that witness, who had already entered the witness box and recorded his examination-in-chief asserting therein certain facts posing himself to be the eye-witness of the occurrence, could not be treated as a mere formal witness or a matter of prosecution's choice to abandon him without bringing on record any valid justification particularly when he was admittedly alive---In this case, the other two eye-witnesses had already been examined and cross-examined but in the attending circumstances of the case, the cross-examination of third witness played a decisive role---Once a witness stepped into the witness-box and also recorded examination-in-chief then the prosecution could not subsequently abandon that witness merely on the ground that other witnesses had already been examined---Once a witness entered the dock and gave a statement on material facts then in such an eventuality, the Court had a duty to regulate the proceedings and ensure that such a witness was cross- examined in accordance with law by the defence---If there was no compelling circumstances, the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the same witness was required to be recorded on the same date---Court could not act as a passive bystander but it must actively steer and control the trial process to maintain fairness and balance between the parties for administering justice---Responsibility of the Trial Court was to have ensured uniformity and consistency in the examination process of the witnesses and to prevent the prosecution or any party including the defence from manipulating the legal proceedings only for the sake of their convenience---If a prosecution witness was not cross-examined due to the prosecution' sunilateral decision to abandon him and the Court failed to act as per law, it amounted to a miscarriage of justice---In this case in view of the factual aspect that "cross-examination reserved", the prosecution could not take the plea that the defence had waived off its right to cross-examine the witness---Exercise of cross-examination was not just a formality but it was a vested valuable right of the accused as provided by S.133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Plain reading of this provision of law would clearly indicate that the statement and testimony of the witness could not be considered as admissible in evidence unless such a witness was subjected to cross-examination by the defence---In other words, it might be stated that the cross-examination of a witness was the fundamental and statutory right of the accused and the same could not be taken away from him, save in accordance with law, which was not the position in the case in hand---Therefore, the impugned judgment on the appreciation of the available evidence without affording an opportunity to the defence for cross-examining third witness whose examination-in-chief had already been recorded, could not sustain rather remand of the case for his re-summoning/re-examination was inevitable, in the circumstances---Appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment of the Trial Court to the extent of the present appellant was set aside and consequently, the case to his extent was remanded to the Trial Court with directions to re-summon third witness for his cross-examination and thereafter decide the case in accordance with law but after hearing the parties.

When a thing is required to be done in a particular manner that must be done in that manner and not otherwise.

Judgment---This criminal appeal filed under section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C) is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Upper Dir at Wari dated 20.03.2024 rendered in case bearing FIR No.318 dated 18.08.2021 registered under sections 302, 109, 127 P.P.C at Police Station Wari, District Dir Upper, whereby the appellant namely Muhammad Hayat was convicted and sentenced under section:

1) 302 (b) P.P.C to undergo imprisonment for life, with directions to pay Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased, which shall be recoverable under section 544-A Cr.P.C or in default, to undergo 06 months S.I.

2) 427 P.P.C to undergo two years S.I with a fine of Rs.40,000/- or in default to undergo further 02 months S.I.

3) The benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C was extended to the appellant/ convict.

2. Brief facts as glean out from murasila (Ex.PW1/1) are that on 18.08.2021 at 20:00 hours, the complainant namely Sajjad (PW-1) reported the matter to the local police that on the eventful day at 18:00 hours, he along with his deceased brother namely Noor Muhammad and other co-villagers namely Qaisar Hayat (PW-2), Samiullah (PW-), after offering 'Asar' prayers, were present near the shop of co-accused namely Nabi Khan while his deceased brother proceeded to start his motorcar (Ghawagai) and seated on the driving seat, at that moment, the appellant/ accused namely Muhammad Hayat suddenly emerged from the shop of co-accused Nabi Khan duly armed with a Kalashnikov and opened firing at his brother, due to which, he sustained injuries on the back of his right shoulder and on the way to the hospital succumbed to the injuries. Previous blood feud was cited as motive behind the occurrence. It was further stated that the occurrence besides the complainant was also witnessed by PWs Qaisar Hayat and Samiullah. On the strength of the murasila, the instant FIR was registered against the present appellant and his co-accused Nabi Khan and Razi Khan.

3. On arrest of all the accused three accused persons including the present appellant and completion of the investigation, their case in shape of challan was put in Court for trial. To the charge, they pleaded not guilty and claimed a fair trial. The prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses, followed by the statements of the accused recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C wherein they neither wished to be examined on oath nor desired to produce evidence in defence. After hearing the arguments, the learned trial Court acquitted the co-accused namely Nabi Khan and Razi Khan while convicted and sentenced the present appellant namely Muhammad Hayat as per the details, mentioned in the first para of this judgment vide its impugned judgment dated 20.03.2024, hence, this appeal.

4. Arguments heard and record perused.

5. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant-accused invited our attention to the fact that during trial though the prosecution produced the eye-witnesses i.e., the complainant Sajjad as PW-1, Qaiser Hayat as PW-2 and Sami Ullah as PW-3 before the learned trial Court but out of them, only the former two were cross-examined whereas, the latter namely Sami Ullah (PW-3), after recording of his examination-in-chief, was not cross-examined by the defence rather he was abandoned by the prosecution without any plausible reason. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the main reason behind the non-production of the said witness (PW-3) for his cross-examination was probably that in fact he was not an eye-witness of the occurrence irrespective of mentioning his name as such in the initial report and thus in case of his cross-examination by the defence, the truth would have come to surface. When the learned counsel for the complainant-side and the learned A.A.G representing the State were confronted with this fact regarding the abandonment of this star prosecution witness and that too after recording his examination-in-chief, they stated at the bar that the witness was ill and could not attend the Court, however, there is no reliable material in shape of medical document on record to support such an assertion of the prosecution, which could amount to exceptional circumstances. It was also admitted by the learned counsel for the complainant-side at the bar that the said Sami Ullah (PW-3) is alive and available in the country. It may be highlighted here that had the witness been declared as hostile after his examination-in-chief or any plausible reason for his abandonment been offered then the situation would have been different but in the current situation, non-production of this witness in spite of recording of his examination-in-chief raises many questions in prudent mind. Legally, for many factors, this witness, who has already entered the witness box and recorded his examination-in-chief asserting therein certain facts posing himself to be the eye-witness of the occurrence, cannot be treated as a mere formal witness or a matter of prosecution's choice to abandon him without brining on record any valid justification particularly when he is admittedly alive. In this case, the other two eye-witnesses have already been examined and cross-examined but in the attending circumstances of the case, the cross-examination of PW3 was playing a decisive role. It may be observed here that when a witness once stepped into the witness-box and also recorded examination-in-chief then the prosecution cannot subsequently abandon that witness merely on the ground that other witnesses have already been examined. Once a witness enters the dock and gives a statement on material facts then in such an eventuality, the Court has a duty to regulate the proceedings and ensure that such a witness is cross-examined in accordance with law by the defence and if there is no compelling circumstances, the examination in chief and cross-examination of the same witness is required to be recorded on the same date. The Court cannot act as a passive bystander but it must actively steer and control the trial process to maintain fairness and balance between the parties for administering the justice. It was the responsibility of the learned trial Judge to have ensured uniformity and consistency in the examination process of the witnesses and to prevent the prosecution or any party including the defence from manipulating the legal proceedings only for the sake of their convenience. It may be said that if a prosecution witness is not cross-examined due to the prosecution's unilateral decision to abandon him and the Court fails to act as per law, it amounts to a miscarriage of justice. In this case in view of the factual aspect that "cross-examination reserved", the prosecution cannot take the plea that the defence has waived off its right to cross-examine the witness. It is also a settled criminal jurisprudence that the exercise of cross-examination is not just a formality but it is a vested valuable right of the accused as provided by section 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The relevant portion of the said provision of law is reproduced below:

"133. Order of examination. (1) Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.

(2) ……………………………………………”

The plain reading of this provision of law would clearly indicate that the statement and testimony of the witness cannot be considered as admissible in evidence unless such a witness is subjected to cross-examination by the defence. In other words, it may be stated that the cross-examination of a witness is the fundamental and statutory right of the accused and the same cannot be taken away from him, save in accordance with law, which is not the position in the case in hand. It is also a settled principle of law that when a thing is required to be done in a particular manner that must be done in that manner and not otherwise.

6. In quite similar controversy emerged before this Court, in the case of "Akhtar Ali and 02 others v. Amir Hatam and another" (2021 PCr.LJ 1439), where a star prosecution witness even after recording of his examination in chief was abandoned by the prosecution and the accused persons were awarded imprisonment for life, has allowed the appeal of the convicts, the judgment of the trial Court was set aside by remanding the case with directions to the learned trial Court to re-summon that relevant PW namely Momin Khan for recording his cross-examination and thereafter shall decide the case in accordance with law. For ready reference, the relevant portion of the said judgment of this Court, is reproduced as under:

"Record depicted that examination-in-chief of a witness was recorded on 14.06.2017 but he was abandoned by ADPP and counsel for the complainant on 25.04.2018 on the ground that other eye-witnesses had already been examined. Even his statement was relied upon by Trial Court at the time of passing the impugned judgment. High Court observed that view of the Trial Court that mere production of a witness and recording his examination-in-chief would not take away from prosecution the right to abandon a witness save in exceptional cases, were misconceived. No doubt, prosecution or a party to a /is was at liberty to abandon a witness but once a witness came into the dock and he opened his mouth with regard to facts of the case then in that eventuality he could not be abandoned by prosecution rather it was the duty of the court to take the proceedings into its own hands. Court had prime duty to steer, control and regulate the course of examination of a witness on proper lines and to strike a fair balance between the parties before it for bringing uniformity and consistency in process of examination. Courts were also required to act vigilantly and not to remain oblivious of their duty in controlling and regulating the process of examination of a witness. In the present case, the court had not discharged its duty and had acted as a silent spectator by allowing the prosecution to deal with the witnesses according to their own whims. Nothing was on record to show that the defence had ever given up its right of cross-examination rather the defence counsel had time and again requested the Trial Court for re-summoning of the witness for cross-examination. Appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded the Trial Court with directions to summon the witness for his cross-examination and thereafter decide the case after hearing the parties."

In the case titled "Muhammad Zaheeruddin Anwar v. The State" (1986 SCMR 620), the apex Court, while addressing the issue that as to whether the prosecution witness had put his appearance before the Court or not when noted that such a witness was not cross-examined by the defence, has directed the trial Court to re-summon the witness and provide an opportunity for cross-examination to the defence. For such a purpose, the matter was remanded by the apex Court to the trial Court. The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Apex Court reads as under:

"In the impugned order the learned High Court Judge observed that after considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he was not persuaded to agree with him as there was no affidavit of the learned counsel for the petitioner placed on the record to the effect that the petitioner had come to take him to the Court and that when they appeared before the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, the evidence of Abdul Majid P.W. 1 had already been recorded in the absence of the accused. It was further observed by the learned Judge that it was within the discretion of the Court to resummon or refuse to re-summon the witness for cross-examination, and, therefore, the order of the learned trial Court was neither perverse nor illegal."

The situation is almost the same, which was before this Court in Akhtar Ali's case (supra), therefore, the impugned judgment on the appreciation of the available evidence without affording an opportunity to the defence for cross-examining Sami Ullah (PW-3) whose examination-in-chief has already been recorded, cannot sustain rather remand of the case for his re-summoning/ re-examination is inevitable in the circumstances. At his moment, all concerned including the learned counsel for the complainant-side and the learned A.A.G expressed their consent when remained unable to wriggle out of the above legal position.

7. It is worth mentioning here that through the impugned judgment, the present appellant was convicted and sentenced whereas the co-accused namely Razi Khan and Nabi Khan were acquitted of the charge. However, neither the prosecution nor the complainant has showed dissatisfaction with the decision of the learned trial Court to the extent of the afore-said acquitted co-accused because no appeal was filed before this Court against said judgment, therefore, in such circumstances, the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court to the extent of the acquitted co-accused merits to be maintained.

s8. In view of the above discussion coupled with the dicta laid down in the referred to above cases, the instant appeal stands allowed, the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court dated 20.03.2024 only to the extent of the present appellant namely Muhammad Hayat is set aside and consequently, the case to his extent is hereby remanded to the learned trial Court with directions to re-summon Sami Ullah (PW-3) for his cross-examination and thereafter decide the case in accordance with law but after hearing the parties. The appellant shall be treated as under trial prisoner. Since, the appellant/ accused was arrested in the instant case on the very date of occurrence i.e., 18.08.2021, therefore, the learned trial Court is expected to complete the required exercise and decide the case within a period of two months if not earlier.

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