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24/04/2026

(i) Under section 7(3) of the MFLO, a Talaq does not become legally effective until the expiry of 90 days from the date on which notice under section 7(1) is received by the Chairman of the Union Council, unless it is revoked earlier. Section 7(3) precludes the Talaq from taking effect for a specified period, during which the parties continue to be the husband and wife in law.

(ii) During this 90-day period, the husband retains the right to revoke the Talaq either expressly or by any unequivocal conduct indicating such intent. Intimation to the Chairman is not a statutory precondition for revocation.

(iii) Where the Talaq is revoked within the aforementionedperiod, the marriage continues to subsist in law, regardless of the form in which the divorce was originally pronounced (including Talaq-ul-bidaat).

(iv) Failure to send notice to the Chairman may attract penal consequences under section 7(2), but does not by itself amount to revocation of Talaq. It renders the pronouncement ineffective, not invalid, in law.

(v) The legal effect of divorce under Islamic law without compliance with section 7 has limited recognition only in prosecutions for Zina, where the Shariat Appellate Bench has held that such divorces, though unnotified, may still be valid under Shariah. This exception does not apply to the offence of r**e under section 376 PPC.

(vi) The Chairman of the Union Council is required, upon receiving notice under section 7(1), to constitute an Arbitration Council and facilitate reconciliation between the parties. However, failure of either party to appear or of the Council to conduct proceedings does not prevent the operation of section 7(3). The Chairman is not empowered to adjudicate on the validity or effect of Talaq, and the issuance or non-issuance of a certificate has no legal bearing on its effectiveness.

(vii) A divorce by Mubara’at, once duly executed and communicated to the Chairman, is irrevocable, and the husband has no authority to withdraw from it unilaterally. The requirement of notice under section 7(1) of the MFLO applies mutatis mutandis. However, it only ensures procedural regularity and does not affect the validity or finality of the dissolution.

Jameel AhmadVs. The State and others
PLD 2026 Lahore 343
M.Yahya khan Handlana Sial Advocate
03007681455

19/04/2026

*"قانونِ شہادت 1984 اور پنجاب رینٹ ایکٹ 2009 کا تقابلی مطالعہ"رینٹ پروسیڈنگز میں شہادت کی قانونی حیثیت اور عدالتی طریق کار"آرٹیکل 10-A کے تحت منصفانہ سماعت اور کرایہ داری قوانین میں شہادت کے تقاضے"*

2025 SCMR 690
Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah

کیا قانونِ شہادت آرڈر 1984 کرایہ داری کی کارروائیوں پر لاگو ہوتا ہے؟

ایک منصفانہ سماعت اور واجب قانونی طریقہ کار کا تقاضا ہے کہ کسی ایسے مواد پر انحصار نہ کیا جائے جو شہادت کے زمرے میں نہ آتا ہو۔ کوئی متنازعہ حقیقت ایسے مواد سے ثابت نہیں کی جا سکتی جو کسی قابل گواہ کے ذریعے پیش نہ کی گئی ہو۔ اسی طرح، جب کوئی دستاویز بطور شہادت پیش کی جاتی ہے تو بنیادی سوال یہ ہوتا ہے کہ آیا وہ دستاویز اصلی ہے۔ لہٰذا، اگرچہ قانونِ شہادت کے تمام دفعات کا اطلاق کرایہ داری کے ایکٹ کے تحت ہونے والی کارروائیوں پر سختی سے نہ بھی ہو، تب بھی یہ ناانصافی ہوگی اگر کرایہ داری عدالت ناقابلِ قبول مواد، جیسے سنی سنائی باتوں (hearsay) پر انحصار کرے یا ایسے دستاویزات کی نقول پر فیصلہ کرے جن کی اصل موجود ہو مگر وہ عدالت میں پیش نہ کی گئی ہو یا مناسب طریقے سے ثابت نہ کی گئی ہو۔

یہ بات اس امر کی اہمیت کو اجاگر کرتی ہے کہ کرایہ داری عدالت کو چاہیے کہ وہ قانونِ شہادت میں مدوّن شہادت کے عمومی اصولوں کو لاگو کرے تاکہ فریقین کے شہری حقوق و فرائض کے تعین میں منصفانہ سماعت اور واجب قانونی طریقہ کار کو یقینی بنایا جا سکے۔ تاہم، شہادت کے عمومی اصولوں کا اطلاق اس بات کا تقاضا نہیں کرتا کہ کرایہ داری عدالت قانونِ شہادت کے تمام دفعات کو نافذ کرے، کیونکہ ایسا کرنا ایکٹ کی دفعہ 34 کو غیر مؤثر بنا دے گا اور ایکٹ کے بنیادی مقصد یعنی کرایہ کے معاملات کو فوری طور پر نمٹانے کے مقصد کو ناکام بنا دے گا۔

لہٰذا، کرایہ داری عدالت پر لازم نہیں کہ وہ قانونِ شہادت کے تمام اصولوں یا ان خصوصی دفعات کی پابندی کرے جو عمومی شہادت کے اصولوں میں ترمیم کرتی ہیں۔ قانونِ شہادت میں مدوّن عمومی اصولوں اور اس میں شامل خصوصی دفعات کے اطلاق میں امتیاز قائم کرنا ضروری ہے۔ چنانچہ، جب کرایہ داری عدالت بے دخلی کی کارروائیوں میں شہری حقوق و فرائض کا تعین کرے، تو وہ صرف انہی عمومی اصولوں کو لاگو کرے جو آئین کے آرٹیکل 10A کے تحت فریقین کے بنیادی حقوق کو مؤثر بنانے کے لیے ضروری ہوں؛ اسے قانونِ شہادت کے تمام اصول یا اس میں شامل کوئی خصوصی دفعات لاگو کرنے کی ضرورت نہیں۔

یہ امتیاز کرایہ داری کارروائیوں کی خلاصہ نوعیت میں مضمر ہے، جو کہ بغیر مکمل دیوانی کارروائی کے رسمی طریقہ کار کے، فوری فیصلے کے لیے ترتیب دی گئی ہے۔ تاہم، شہادت کے عمومی اصول—جیسے بارِ ثبوت، شہادت کی مطابقت، اور جرح کا حق—کا اطلاق ضروری ہے تاکہ منصفانہ سماعت کا آئینی حق محفوظ رہے۔ مگر شہادت کے تفصیلی قواعد، جیسے کہ دستاویزات کی سخت رسمی تصدیق یا سنی سنائی باتوں کے اخراج کی پابندی میں نرمی کی اجازت، کرایہ داری کارروائیوں کی تیز رفتاری اور رسائی کے لیے جائز ہے۔

یہ طریقہ کار انصاف، واجب قانونی طریقہ کار، اور کرایہ داری کارروائیوں کی خلاصہ نوعیت کے درمیان توازن قائم کرتا ہے۔

معاشی اور سماجی نقطۂ نظر سے، شہادت کے اصولوں میں نرمی عوامی پالیسی کے اہم مقاصد کو پورا کرتی ہے۔ یہ قانونی اخراجات کو کم کرتی ہے، اور ان افراد کو نظامِ انصاف تک رسائی دیتی ہے جو سخت شہادتی تقاضوں کو پورا کرنے کے وسائل نہیں رکھتے۔ اس سے کرایہ پر مکان دینے میں سرمایہ کاری کو بھی فروغ ملتا ہے، کیونکہ مالکان کو تنازعات کے فوری حل کا قابلِ اعتماد طریقہ مہیا ہوتا ہے۔ ساتھ ہی، یہ اصول کرایہ داروں کو ناجائز بے دخلی اور بے گھر ہونے سے بچاتے ہیں، جو کہ رہائشی استحکام اور سماجی ہم آہنگی کو برقرار رکھتے ہیں۔ مالکان اور کرایہ داروں کے درمیان طاقت کے عدم توازن کو دور کر کے، یہ نرمی مساوات اور انصاف کو فروغ دیتی ہے تاکہ قانون کا استعمال ظلم یا ناجائز فائدہ حاصل کرنے کا ذریعہ نہ بنے۔

خلاصہ یہ کہ کرایہ داری کارروائیوں میں شہادت کے اصولوں میں نرمی صرف ایک سہولت نہیں، بلکہ انصاف، معاشی کارکردگی اور سماجی بہبود کے اصولوں کے تحفظ کے لیے ایک ضروری اقدام ہے۔

مندرجہ بالا اصولوں کی روشنی میں جب ہم قانونِ شہادت کے آرٹیکلز 17(2)(a) اور 79 کا جائزہ لیتے ہیں تو یہ واضح ہوتا ہے کہ یہ عمومی اصول نہیں بلکہ اس میں شامل خصوصی دفعات ہیں۔ لہٰذا، کرایہ داری عدالت پر ان دفعات کے اطلاق کی کوئی قانونی پابندی نہیں ہے تاکہ کرایہ داری معاہدے کی اصلیت کا تعین کیا جا سکے۔ چنانچہ ہم اس سوال کا جواب اس طرح دیتے ہیں کہ کرایہ داری عدالت کے روبرو کوئی متنازعہ کرایہ داری معاہدہ قانونِ شہادت کے آرٹیکلز 17(2)(a) اور 79 کے مطابق ثابت کرنا ضروری نہیں ہے۔

مسٹر جسٹس سید منصور علی شاہ...
تجزیاتی قانونی جائزہ
مقدمہ: Zafar Iqbal & another v. Syed Riaz Hussain Shah and others
حوالہ: 2025 SCMR 690
فیصلہ نویس: مسٹر جسٹس سید منصور علی شاہ
قانونی سوال:
کیا قانونِ شہادت آرڈر 1984 کرایہ داری کی کارروائیوں (Rent Proceedings) پر لاگو ہوتا ہے؟

متعلقہ قانونی دفعات:
1. قانونِ شہادت آرڈر، 1984
آرٹیکل 17(2)(a):
شہادت دینے کی اہلیت اور معاہدات کو ثابت کرنے کے تقاضے۔

آرٹیکل 79:
تحریری دستاویزات کو بطور شہادت پیش کرنے کے لیے لازم ہے کہ اس کی تحریر کرنے والے گواہ کا بیان ہو، یا کوئی استثنائی صورت ہو۔

2. پنجاب رینٹ ری اسٹرکشن ایکٹ، 2009
سیکشن 34:
یہ دفعہ وضاحت کرتی ہے کہ کرایہ داری عدالتیں دیوانی عدالتوں کے طریقہ کار کی مکمل پابند نہیں ہوں گی، اور وہ زیادہ مختصر اور غیر رسمی طریقے سے سماعت کر سکتی ہیں۔

3. آئینِ پاکستان، 1973
آرٹیکل 10-A (منصفانہ سماعت کا حق):
ہر شہری کو منصفانہ سماعت اور واجب قانونی طریقہ کار کے تحت اپنے حقوق و فرائض کے تعین کا حق حاصل ہے۔

قانونی نکات اور تجزیہ:
1. قانونِ شہادت کا اطلاق — عمومی اصول بمقابلہ خصوصی دفعات:
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ کرایہ داری کارروائیاں چونکہ summary proceedings ہوتی ہیں، اس لیے قانونِ شہادت کے تمام سخت اصول مثلاً آرٹیکل 17(2)(a) اور 79 کا اطلاق لازم نہیں۔

البتہ شہادت کے وہ "عمومی اصول" (general principles) جو انصاف کے بنیادی تقاضے پورے کرتے ہیں، مثلاً:

بارِ ثبوت (Burden of Proof)

شہادت کی مطابقت (Relevance of Evidence)

جرح کا حق (Right to Cross-Examination)
ان کا اطلاق ضروری ہے تاکہ آرٹیکل 10-A کے تحت فریقین کو منصفانہ سماعت کا حق حاصل رہے۔

2. خلاصہ نوعیت کی کارروائیاں اور شہادتی نرمی:
چونکہ رینٹ کیسز کی کارروائیاں خلاصہ نوعیت کی ہوتی ہیں، اس لیے ان میں سخت شہادتی اصول اپنانا قانونی مقاصد کو نقصان پہنچا سکتا ہے۔

اس ضمن میں دستاویزات کی اصل پیش نہ کرنے یا سنی سنائی باتوں پر انحصار جیسے معاملات میں نرمی کی گنجائش ہے، بشرطیکہ بنیادی انصاف متاثر نہ ہو۔

3. آئینی تناظر (Article 10-A):
اگرچہ قانونِ شہادت مکمل طور پر لاگو نہیں، مگر آرٹیکل 10-A تقاضا کرتا ہے کہ:

کسی بھی فیصلے کی بنیاد قابلِ قبول اور معقول شہادت پر ہو۔

فریقین کو دستاویزات اور گواہوں کو چیلنج کرنے کا موقع دیا جائے۔

4. پبلک پالیسی اور سماجی انصاف:
عدالت نے اس فیصلے میں یہ بھی تسلیم کیا کہ شہادت کے اصولوں میں نرمی:

عدالتی اخراجات کم کرتی ہے۔

کمزور طبقے کو انصاف تک رسائی دیتی ہے۔

مالکان کو قانونی تحفظ فراہم کرتی ہے۔

کرایہ داروں کو ناجائز بے دخلی سے بچاتی ہے۔

نتیجہ / قانونی اصول:
قانونِ شہادت 1984 کا مکمل اور سخت اطلاق کرایہ داری عدالتوں پر نہیں ہوتا۔

البتہ، شہادت کے عمومی اصول (مثلاً بارِ ثبوت، جرح، اور شہادت کی مطابقت) لاگو ہوں گے تاکہ انصاف کا تقاضا پورا ہو۔

آرٹیکل 17(2)(a) اور 79 قانونِ شہادت کی وہ خصوصی دفعات ہیں جن کا کرایہ داری مقدمات میں اطلاق لازمی نہیں۔

سیکشن 34 پنجاب رینٹ ایکٹ کرایہ داری عدالت کو خلاصہ کارروائی کی اجازت دیتا ہے، مگر یہ آئینی حقِ سماعت پر اثرانداز نہیں ہو سکتا۔
*M.Yahya khan Handlana Sial Advocate
03007681455

16/04/2026
13/04/2026

The Lahore High Court (LHC) has directed the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to return a refined gold bar to an international departing passenger upon payment of a penalty of Rs 100,000, and also to return USD 10,000 to the said passenger.

In this regard, the LHC has issued an order against the Collector of Customs of the FBR.

According to the latest order of the LHC (Writ Petition No 57129 of 2022), the petitioner’s entitlement to the seized gold jewellery is protected under Article 24 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and prohibits its deprivation except in accordance with law. The court observed that once the petitioner’s entitlement had attained finality up to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, any action by the Customs department resulting in denial of restoration of the property or its refined form through arbitrary valuation amounts to deprivation of property in violation of constitutional safeguards.

It is, however, an admitted position that the seized gold jewellery was transmitted to the Pakistan Mint for melting, resulting in reduction of its original weight to 2467.300 grams. Such transformation of the seized property does not extinguish or impair the proprietary rights of the petitioner, which have attained finality up to the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. The record is conspicuously silent regarding any lawful disposal of the refined gold through a legally recognized mode of sale. In the absence of a sale conducted in accordance with law, reliance placed by the respondents on Section 169(5) of the Act, 1969 is wholly misconceived. The said provision becomes applicable only where the seized property has actually been sold and sale proceeds have come into existence. Mere melting of the gold and its subsequent lifting by the State Bank of Pakistan, followed by credit of an amount into the Government treasury on the basis of the London Bullion Market price, cannot be treated as a lawful substitute for the statutory requirement of sale.

WP. 57129/22
Abbas Ali Vs COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS ETC. .
Mr. Justice Malik Javid Iqbal Wains
02-02-2026
2026 LHC 2292
*M.Yahya khan Handlana Sial Advocate
03007681455

11/04/2026
10/04/2026

ہماری ٹیم لاہور ہائی کورٹ میں مستحق اور نادار افراد کی مفت قانونی رہنمائی اور مدد کے لیے موجود ہے۔ اگر آپ فیس ادا نہیں کر سکتے تو ہم سے رابطہ کریں! ضرورت مندوں کی مدد کرنا ہمارا فرض ہے۔

10/04/2026

کسی بھی تحفے کو جو منگنی کے وقت دولہا کو دیا جائے، جہیز کا حصہ نہیں سمجھا جا سکتا کیونکہ وہ سامان بیوی کی ملکیت نہیں بلکہ شوہر کی ملکیت ہوتا ہے۔ جہیز صرف وہ سامان ہے جو شادی کے وقت دلہن کو دیا جاتا ہے، اور وہی سامان جہیز میں شمار ہوتا ہے جو شادی کے موقع پر دلہن کو دیا جائے نہ کہ منگنی کے وقت دولہا کو دیے جانے والے تحفے۔

🔴 PLD 2023 Lahore 669

Before Anwaar Hussain, J

MUHAMMAD AFZAL---Petitioner

Versus

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and 3 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No. 57778 of 2022, heard on 26th April, 2023.
(a) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Husband's (petitioner) case was that there was no evidence that the car was given at the time of marriage as part of the dowry and that the Appellate Court had wrongly decreed the suit---Validity---Petitioner in response to the respondent's (wife) plaint had stated that the car was purchased with the cash provided by him, as such, it was also registered in his name in token of acknowledgment---Response of the petitioner, in his written statement, had exhibited an admission on part of the petitioner that the car, in fact, was purchased and transferred in the name of the petitioner, at the time of wedding, albeit with cash amount given by the petitioner---Petitioner had not proved his stance by leading any evidence---Moreover, there was no explanation as to why the petitioner remained mum and did not demand the delivery of the car, from the father of respondent for a considerable period of time, when the marriage between the parties was subsisting and the relationship was cordial, therefore, the assertion of petitioner that no such car was ever purchased or delivered to the petitioner was baseless and hence, discarded---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly.

(b) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Alternate price of dowry articles---Appreciation of value of dowry articles---Scope---Husband's (petitioner) case was that there was no evidence that the car was given at the time of marriage as part of the dowry and that the Appellate Court had wrongly decreed the suit---Wife's (respondent) case was that alternate price of the car had not been properly determined/ascertained by the Appellate Court and the prayer was made for award of current market value of the car and not the date on which it was given---Validity---In case of articles such as the car, while determining/ascertaining amount of money as an alternate price, the principle of appreciation should be kept in mind inasmuch as if the principle of depreciation is to be considered with respect to one set of the dowry articles such as furniture, etc., which involves depreciation of articles on account of wear and tear, the principle of appreciation must also be taken into account with respect to such other articles that involve increase in value---Failure to do so would not only by iniquitous but would also put premium on the unlawful retention of such dowry articles by the husband even after the dissolution of marriage or demand for return of the same by the wife---Wife was held entitled to recover the market value of the car as on the date of realization of the decree---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly.

(c) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Alternate price of dowry articles---Appreciation and depreciation of value of dowry articles---Scope---Primarily a suit for the return of dowry articles, whenever decided, is decreed by the Courts as such with the observation that in case of failure, on the part of the judgment-debtor, to return the said articles, as an alternate, the amount equivalent to the price of dowry articles is to be paid and while determining the alternate value of the dowry articles, the Courts consider the depreciation of most of the dowry articles on account of normal and natural wear and tear thereof that takes place over the passage of time since marriage of the parties---Rationale underlying the application of principle of depreciation is that the dowry articles are to be returned in their current position and if the same is not done, their price is to be paid as an alternate and since most of the value of dowry articles put to use during subsistence of marriage do undergo depreciation on account of daily use, therefore, while determining the alternate price, it is justifiable that the depreciation in value of such articles is to be taken into account---However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that there may be some articles forming part of the dowry, for instance, the gold ornaments or the vehicles or even few electrical appliances, etc., value whereof may appreciate over the years.

(d) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Gold ornaments---Scope---Gold ornaments are always possessed by females unless snatching is not only alleged but also proved.

Javed Iqbal v. Additional District Judge Faisalabad and another 2017 CLC Note 25 and Muhammad Saeed v. Additional District Judge and others 2019 CLC 1008 ref.

🍀(e) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---🍀

----S. 5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Dowry articles---Meaning---Any gift given to the groom at the time of engagement, cannot be treated as part of the dowry as the same is not the property of wife rather ownership vests with the husband---Dowry is only such articles that are given at the time of marriage to the bride and not the gifts to the bridegroom at the time of engagement.

Abdul Razzaq Younas for Petitioner.

Muhammad Younas Bhullar for Respondents Nos.3 and 4.

Date of hearing: 26th April, 2023.

🔴 JUDGMENT

ANWAAR HUSSAIN, J.---Through this single judgment, the present as well as connected constitutional petition bearing W.P. No.60517/2022 are intended to be decided by this Court. Respondent No.3, namely, Mst. Madiha Kiran has filed the connected constitutional petition. Both the petitions have laid challenge to the findings of the learned Appellate Court below, rendered in proceedings emanating from the suits instituted by respondents Nos.3 and 4 (respondents Nos.3 and 4 are hereinafter collectively referred as 'the respondents').

2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the respondents instituted three suits. The first suit was for recovery of maintenance allowance and delivery expenses whereas the second suit was for recovery of dowry articles or in alternate prevailing market price thereof; and the third suit was instituted for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty along with recovery of the dower. Suit to the extent of dissolution of marriage became infructuous as during the pendency of the third suit, the petitioner divorced respondent No.3. The suits were consolidated and issues were accordingly framed. After recording evidence led by the parties, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit of the respondents, vide judgment and decree dated 30.10.2021, in the following terms:

"1. The plaintiff No.1 is entitled to recover maintenance @ Rs.10,000/- per month from the date of her desertion i.e. January, 2018 from the defendant till her legal entitlement.

2. The plaintiff No.2/minor is entitled to recover maintenance @ Rs.15,000/- per month from his date of birth till his legal entitlement with 10% annual increment. It is made clear that annual increment shall be calculated from 30.10.2022. The interim maintenance paid during trial shall be adjusted accordingly.

3. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover expenses incurred on reception of Barat i.e. Rs.19,52,900/-.

4. Plaintiff is entitled to recover maternity/delivery expenses to the tune of Rs.20,000/- from the defendant.

5. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover dower amount mentioned in column No.13 of Nikahnama.

6. Plaintiff is held entitled to recover dowry articles mentioned in Annexure A to Annexure I, from the defendant except items mentioned in Annexure-A, Annexure B and items mentioned against Sr. Nos. 06 and 08 in Annexure-E in their existing condition. And, in absence of dowry articles, she is entitled to recover Rs.1700,000/- as alternate price from the defendant."

Feeling aggrieved, the respondents preferred appeal, which was partially accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, vide judgment and decree dated 14.07.2022. The judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court has been modified and respondent No.3 has been held entitled to the recovery of Toyota Corolla GLi, Model 2017 (hereinafter referred to as 'the car') or its alternate price i.e., Rs.2,285,000/-.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submits that he is only challenging the findings of the learned Appellate Court below pertaining to the award of the car and does not lay challenge to the findings of learned Appellate Court below to the extent of maintenance, expenses incurred on birth of respondent No.4, dowry articles etc. Inter alia, avers that the car does not exist and the documents prepared in respect thereof were fictitious. Adds that the car was never delivered to the petitioner; that registration book of the car was not brought on record; that in criminal case registered in respect of the misappropriation of the car, nothing was brought on record to indicate that the petitioner was involved in any wrong doing; that respondent No.3 is not participating in the trial in respect of the criminal case registered regarding the car; and merely on the basis of registration of a criminal case, the learned Appellate Court below has upset the findings of the learned Trial Court, therefore, the said findings are not sustainable.

4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner is a practicing doctor and the amount awarded as maintenance does not commensurate with the sound financial position of the petitioner as well as prevailing inflation rate and therefore, in the interest of justice, amount of Rs.25,000/- per month is to be granted, as maintenance to the minor/respondent No.4. Adds that para 7 of the plaint of the second suit is self-explanatory in which claim regarding the giving of car, as well as motorcycle at the time of engagement, has been mentioned and that the learned Courts below have erred in not awarding the motorcycle inasmuch as any property given in reference to a marriage is to be considered as part of the dowry articles. Places reliance upon case reported as "Mirza Arshad Baig v. Additional District Judge, Multan and others" (2005 SCMR 1740) in support of his contentions. Further contends that the alternate value of the car has not been properly determined by the learned Appellate Court below and draws the attention of this Court to Exh.P-3 and Exh.P-6 in reference to the proof of purchase of the car as well as Exh.P-9 regarding the gold ornaments. Adds that evidence regarding expenses incurred on the birth of respondent No.4 has been misread as well. Concludes that brothers of the petitioner also acknowledged giving of car as part of the dowry. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially, the brothers of the petitioner, who persuaded and forced the petitioner to enter into marriage with respondent No. 3, were arrayed as defendants in the suit for recovery of dowry articles but their names were later on deleted and hence, any assertion regarding giving of the car in affidavits executed by brothers of the petitioner is not of any evidentiary value.

5. Arguments heard. Record perused.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on a single point to refute claim of respondent No.3, regarding the car, in the terms that there is no evidence available that the said vehicle was given at the time of the marriage as part of the dowry and, merely, on the basis of registration of a criminal case by father of respondent No.3 against the petitioner for misappropriation, the learned Appellate Court below has decreed the suit of respondent No.3 in respect of the car, whereas in respect of the same finding, it is the claim of respondent No.3 that alternate value of the car has not been properly determined/ascertained by the learned Appellate Court below and prayer has been made for award of present market value of the car. This Court will first address this core issue. Perusal of the record reveals that in her plaint, for recovery of dowry articles, in para 7 thereof, respondent No.3 asserted the following facts:

"7. That at the time of marriage, a new Toyota Car APL4, Auto-GLi, colour white, 1299-CC, bearing Engine No.Z500924, Chassis No.NZE170R-4127111, Model 2017, purchased by the father of the plaintiff from TOYOTA JINNAH MOTORS, 23-km Ferozpur Road, Lahore against Rs.22,85,000/- along with documents was given to plaintiff in dowry but was initially deployed on rent by the defendants and then subsequently sold out without any intimation."

Responding to the said paragraph, the petitioner took the following stance in his written statement:

"6) The vehicle mentioned in this Para was purchased with the cash provided by the answering defendant. It was also registered in the name of defendant in token of acknowledgment of cash provided by the defendant."

(Emphasis supplied)

In addition to the fact that respondent No.3 brought on record the sale invoice of the car, the above quoted response of the petitioner, in his written statement, exhibits an admission on part of the petitioner that the car, in-fact, was purchased and transferred in the name of the petitioner, at the time of wedding, albeit with cash amount given by the petitioner. Even if the stance of the petitioner is accepted that the car was purchased with the cash amount given by the petitioner, the same has not been proved by the petitioner by leading any evidence. Moreover, there is no explanation as to why the petitioner remained mum for not demanding the delivery of the car, from the father of respondent No.3 for a considerable period of time, when the marriage between the parties was subsisting and the relationship was cordial, therefore, the assertions of learned counsel for the petitioner that no such car was ever purchased or delivered to the petitioner are baseless to say the least and hence, discarded. As a natural corollary, the fact that the car was not recovered during investigation in the criminal case registered by the father of respondent No.3 becomes meaningless as the petitioner accepts registration of the case in his name.

7. Adverting to the fact that whether alternate value of the car was properly ascertained by the learned Appellate Court below, perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that value of the car has been fixed as Rs.2,285,000/- that is the amount, which was paid by the father of respondent No. 3 when the car was booked from M/s Toyota Jinnah Motors, in the year 2017, when the marriage of respondent No.3 with the petitioner took place. In this regard, it is imperative to note that primarily a suit for the return of dowry articles, whenever decided, is decreed by the Courts as such with the observation that in case of failure, on part of the judgment-debtor, to return the said articles, as an alternate, the amount equivalent to the price of dowry articles is ordered to be paid and while determining the alternate value of the dowry articles, the Courts consider the depreciation of most of the dowry articles on account of normal and natural wear and tear thereof that takes place over the passage of time since marriage of the parties. The rationale underlying the application of principle of depreciation is that the dowry articles are to be returned in their current position and if the same is not done, their price is to be paid as an alternate and since most of the value of dowry articles put to use during the subsistence of marriage do undergo depreciation on account of said daily use, therefore, while determining the alternate price, it is justifiable that the depreciation in value of such articles is to be taken into account. However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that there may be some articles forming part of the dowry, for instance, the gold ornaments or the vehicles or even few electrical appliances etc., value whereof may appreciate over the years. The car, in the instant case is such an article. Record depicts that giving of the car to respondent No.3, as part of her dowry has been established, as discussed hereinabove, and the same was registered in the name of the petitioner, at the time of his marriage with the former. Therefore, the principle i.e., the dowry article is to be returned in its present form, is applicable with respect to the car as well. In case of articles such as the car, while determining/ascertaining amount of money as an alternate price, the principle of appreciation should be kept in mind inasmuch as if the principle of depreciation is to be considered with respect to one set of the dowry articles such as furniture, etc., which involves depreciation of articles on account of wear and tear, the principle of appreciation must also be taken into account with respect to such other articles that involves increase in value. Failure to do so would not only be iniquitous but would also put premium on the unlawful retention of such dowry articles by the defendant/husband even after the dissolution of marriage or demand for return of the same by the plaintiff/wife. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court below erred in not considering the appreciation in the value of the car while fixing/ determining the alternate price thereof inasmuch as this is common knowledge that value of Pak Rupees has depreciated over the number of years and the value of new as well as used vehicles, like the car in instant case, is on continuous rise. Therefore, awarding amount spent on purchase of the car in the year 2017 is not justified and respondent No.3 is entitled to recover the market value of the car as on date of realization of the decree. Hence, connected constitutional petition bearing W.P. No.60517/2022, filed by the respondent, has force to this extent and the findings of the learned Appellate Court below merit modification.

8. As regards amount of monthly maintenance awarded, the respondents claim that the same should be fixed at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month, per head, till their legal entitlement since the petitioner is a practicing doctor. This Court does not find merits in the arguments as the amount fixed by the learned Courts below is reasonable. Even otherwise, the marriage of the petitioner and respondent No.3 has come to an end and as regards maintenance awarded to respondent No.4 (the minor), he has been held entitled to 10% annual increase in maintenance amount of Rs.15,000/- per month with effect from 30.10.2022 and, therefore, the said increment caters for the growing financial needs of respondent No.4 as well as the rise in inflation rate, hence, no interference is required in this regard. Similarly, concurrent findings of the learned Courts below, to the extent of the remaining dowry articles, are also based on proper appreciation of record and no misreading or non-reading could be pointed out by learned counsel for the parties in general and learned counsel for the respondents in particular. Same is the position with respect to findings regarding the delivery charges incurred on birth of respondent No.4, expenses incurred on reception of barat and gold ornaments given as part of the dower. In addition, as regards gold ornaments, the learned Appellate Court below has put forth cogent reasons while observing that the gold ornaments were given as prompt dower and column No.14 of the Nikahnama between the parties clearly reflects that the same were paid at the time of solemnization of the nikah. Moreover, it is settled principle of law that the gold ornaments are always possessed by females unless snatching is not only alleged but also proved, which is not the position in the instant case. Therefore, respondent No.3 is not entitled to the grant of the gold ornaments. Cases titled "Javed Iqbal v. Additional District Judge Faisalabad and another" [2017 CLC Note 25 (Lahore)] and "Muhammad Saeed v. Additional District Judge and others" [2019 CLC 1008 (Lahore)] are referred in this regard. Adverting to the claim of respondent No.3 that a motorcycle was given at the time of engagement as gift to the petitioner and same also forms part of the dowry articles, needless to mention that any gift given to the groom at the time of engagement, cannot be treated as part of the dowry as the same is not the property of respondent No.3 rather ownership of said motorcycle vests with the petitioner. It is imperative to note that dowry is only such articles that are given at the time of marriage to the bride and not the gifts to the bridegroom at the time of engagement. Therefore, reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on case of Mirza Arshad Baig supra is misplaced, on account of distinguishable facts.

9. The learned Appellate Court below, after re-appraising the evidence on record, has maintained findings of facts to the extent of dower, maintenance allowance, motorcycle, expense incurred on birth of respondent No.4 and expenditure on reception of barat and has modified the finding to the extent of the entitlement of respondent No.3 to the car given as part of dowry and the same does not merit interference. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as "Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal and others" (PLD 2006 SC 457) has held as under:

"It was none of the business of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the court of appeal after due appraisal of evidence. We would, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court as well as that of the Family Court decreeing the suit in the sum of Rs.4,00,000 and restore the judgment of the appellate Court accepting the claim of the appellant, as pleaded in the suit."

10. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional defect or procedural impropriety in the findings of the learned Courts below in general and the learned Appellate Court below in particular, hence, present petition bearing W.P. No.57778/2022 is dismissed. Similarly, the prayer of respondent No.3 in connected petition, except to the extent of alternate value of the car determined by learned Appellate Court below, is also devoid of merits and hence, discarded. However, the connected petition bearing W.P. No.60517/ 2022 filed by the respondents is disposed of in the terms that respondent No.3 is entitled to recover market value of the car, from the petitioner, which can be ascertained/determined by the learned Executing Court, by having recourse to appointment of local commission/car dealers and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court below dated 14.07.2022 is accordingly modified.

SA/M-79/L Order accordingly.

Umair Shafique Mughal Family Lawyer Family Laws of Pakistan Law Teacher Online Law & Order: Legal Debates and Cases Legal Precedents in Civil Law Legal Precedents in Criminal Law

🍀جہیز کی واپسی --- والدین کی مالی حیثیت ایک فیصلہ کن عنصر --- قانونی حدود و دائرہ کار🍀

درخواست گزار نے اپنے سابق شوہر کے خلاف جہیز کے سامان کی واپسی کا دعویٰ دائر کیا اور متبادل طور پر ان کی قیمت کا مطالبہ کیا۔ فیملی کورٹ نے مقدمہ جزوی طور پر درخواست گزار کے حق میں فیصلہ سنایا، جسے اپیلٹ کورٹ نے برقرار رکھا۔

🌸قانونی اصول:🌸
دلہن کے والدین کی مالی حیثیت جہیز کے سامان کی مقدار اور قدر کے تعین میں فیصلہ کن حیثیت رکھتی ہے۔ مقدمے کے شواہد سے یہ ظاہر ہوا کہ درخواست گزار کے والدین شادی کے وقت اپنی 2/3 ایکڑ زرعی زمین سے حاصل ہونے والی محدود آمدنی پر انحصار کرتے تھے اور ان کے پاس ایسا غیر معمولی مالی ذریعہ موجود نہیں تھا جو دعویٰ کردہ جہیز کے سامان کی تصدیق کر سکے۔

دونوں ماتحت عدالتوں کے متفقہ فیصلے میں نہ تو کوئی خلافِ قانون پہلو ظاہر ہوا اور نہ ہی کسی بے جا اختیارات کے استعمال کی نشاندہی ہوئی۔ اس لیے ہائی کورٹ نے ان فیصلوں میں مداخلت نہ کرنے کا فیصلہ کیا۔آئینی درخواست ناقابل سماعت قرار دے کر مسترد کر دی گئی۔

🔴 2020 Y L R 282 [Lahore]

Before Shujaat Ali Khan, J

AZRA BIBI---Petitioner

Versus

LATEEF and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No. 8882 of 2016, decided on 25th September, 2019.

Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)-

----Ss. 5 & 7---Recovery of dowry---Value, determination of---Financial status of parents of bride---Determining factor---Scope---Petitioner filed suit for recovery of her dowry articles against her ex-husband and in alternate claimed price of dowry articles---Family Court partially decreed the suit in favour of petitioner which judgment and decree was maintained by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---Financial status of parents of bride was determining factor to adjudge quantum of dowry articles---Parents of petitioner at the time of her marriage were dependent on their agricultural income which was received by them from 2/3 acres of land---Parents of petitioner did not have extraordinary source of income to give dowry articles as claimed by her---High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings by two Courts below as they were not proved to be perverse or result of arbitrariness---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous and others 2017 SCMR 393 and Farhat Jabeen v. Muhammad Safdar and others 2011 SCMR 1073 rel.

Riaz Hussain Haleem for Petitioner.

Muzammal Hussain Qasmi for Respondent No. 1.

🔴 ORDER

SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J.---Unnecessary details apart, the petitioner filed a suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dowry articles worth Rs.9,80,800/- which was partially decreed by the learned Judge Family Court, Bhowana (the learned Trial Court) vide ex-parte judgment and decree, dated 25.11.2014 and she was held entitled to recover Rs. 75,000/- as alternate price of the dowry articles. Being dissatisfied with the verdict of the learned Trial Court, both the parties filed their independent appeals. The learned Additional District Judge, Chiniot (learned Appellate Court) through consolidated judgment and decree, dated 20.01.2016, dismissed both the appeals; hence this petition.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that though the petitioner proved her claim, as set out in the plaint, but the learned Trial Court curtailed the same manifold whose findings were illegally upheld by learned Appellate Court; that when DW-1 admitted in cross-examination that the dowry articles were shifted to his house on tractor trolley the petitioner was entitled to decree for recovery of dowry articles as prayed for and that though the petitioner raised number of substantial questions before learned Appellate Court but the same were not attended to. Relies on Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous and others (2017 SCMR 393).

3. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.1, while defending the impugned judgments and decrees of the courts below, states that concurrent findings of facts cannot be upset by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction; that when the petitioner failed to prove sound financial status of her parents, at the time of her marriage, she was not entitled to the relief claimed in the suit; that both the PWs admitted that the parents of the petitioner were dependent on their income from 2/3 acres of agricultural land, thus, they were not in a position to give dowry articles of such magnitude as claimed by the petitioner in the suit; that the PWs contradicted on the point of preparation of list of dowry articles; that a glance over the list of dowry articles shows that exaggerated prices were mentioned therein.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the documents, annexed with this petition, as well as the case-law cited at the bar.

5. According to recitals of the plaint, the petitioner was given dowry articles valuing Rs.9,80,800/-. It is well established by now that financial status of parents of bride is determining factor to adjudge the quantum of dowry articles. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, admittedly, parents of the petitioner at the time of her marriage, were dependent on their agricultural income being received by them from 2/3 acres of land, thus, it cannot be believed that they had extra-ordinary source of income to give dowry articles as claimed in the plaint.

6. It is very astonishing to note that in his cross-examination the petitioner showed her inability to specify the detail of dowry articles or name of the shop-keeper or the shop from where the dowry articles were purchased. There is no denying the fact that hard and fast rules contained in Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 are not applicable to familial matters, however, a plaintiff in such suit is bound to prove her claim as set out in the plaint but the said onus was not discharged by the petitioner.

7. As per law laid down by the Apex Court of the country in the case of Farhat Jabeen v. Muhammad Safdar and others (2011 SCMR 1073) concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts below cannot be upset in Constitutional jurisdiction until and unless they are proved to be perverse or result of arbitrariness which is not the position in the case in hand.

8. For what has been discussed above, I see no force in this petition which is dismissed with no order as to costs.

MH/A-94/L Petition dismissed.
*M.Yahya Khan Handlana Sial Advocate
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