12/08/2026
THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRESENT:
Ms. Justice MUSARRAT HILALI
Mr. Justice SHAHID BILAL HASSAN
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 a/w C.A. No.436-L of 2012
[Against judgement and decree dated 30.03.2012 passed by the
Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in C.Rs.
Nos.618 & 619 of 2011/BWP]
Saad Younis & 6 others
…Appellant(s)
Versus
Ghulam Bari & 2 others
…Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Ejaz Ahmad Ansari, ASC
Mr. Aamir Aqeel Ansari, ASC
(In Both Cases)
For the Respondent(s) :
Date of Hearing :
Sheikh Sakhawat Ali, ASC.
(For Respondents No. 1 [a-e], in
both cases)
30.07.2026
J U D G E M E N T
SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, J- The controversy arises out of two
consolidated suits concerning agricultural land measuring 100
kanals and 4 marlas situated in Mouza Pallu Shah, Tehsil Rahim
Yar Khan. The appellant, Ghulam Bari, instituted a suit on
14.12.1978 seeking possession of the suit property and recovery of
its produce, asserting that although he was owner of the land, the
respondents had unlawfully dispossessed him. During the pendency
of that suit, respondent Muhammad Younas instituted a separate
suit on 08.03.1979 for specific performance on the basis of an
agreement to sell dated 20.01.1979, allegedly executed on behalf of
the appellant by his attorney, Ahmad Din, pursuant to a registered
power of attorney dated 31.08.1977. Both suits were consolidated
and, after recording evidence, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rahim 2
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
Yar Khan, vide common judgment and decree dated 29.07.1986,
dismissed the appellant's suit for possession and decreed the
respondent's suit for specific performance.
The litigation thereafter underwent a protracted procedural
course. The appeals preferred by the appellant were initially
dismissed but were repeatedly remanded by the High Court on
different occasions for fresh decision in accordance with law.
Ultimately, the learned Additional District Judge, Rahim Yar Khan,
vide judgment dated 25.07.2011, upheld the judgment and decree
of the trial court. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Civil Revision Nos.
618 and 619 of 2011, which were allowed by the Lahore High Court,
Bahawalpur Bench, through judgment dated 30.03.2012. The High
Court set aside the concurrent judgments of the courts below, held
that the alleged power of attorney had not been proved in accordance
with law and further observed that, in any event, it did not authorize
the attorney to enter into an agreement to sell on behalf of the
principal. Consequently, the suit for specific performance was
dismissed while the appellant's suit for possession was decreed.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondents have preferred the present
appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the High
Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court
while exercising revisional jurisdiction. It was argued that the
registered power of attorney dated 31.08.1977 stood duly proved
through cogent oral and documentary evidence, including the
testimony of the petition writer, the Sub-Registrar, Ahmad Din, and
other corroborative evidence demonstrating that Ahmad Din had
acted as the appellant's attorney by redeeming the Agricultural
Development Bank loan from the earnest money received under the
agreement to sell. Learned counsel further submitted that the
subsequent ex*****on of the deed of revocation (Ibtal Nama)
unequivocally acknowledged the existence of the power of attorney.
It was lastly contended that the authority to sell necessarily
encompassed the authority to execute an agreement to sell, and the
High Court erred in adopting an unduly restrictive interpretation of 3
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
the instrument. The impugned judgment, therefore, being contrary
to the record and settled principles governing revisional jurisdiction,
warrants interference.
3. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents supported
the impugned judgment and submitted that the ex*****on of the
power of attorney had not been proved in accordance with law,
particularly in view of the testimony of Nazir Ahmad, the identifying
witness before the Sub-Registrar, who categorically denied having
identified Ghulam Bari at the time of its ex*****on. It was argued
that the very foundation of Muhammad Younas's suit for specific
performance consequently collapsed. Learned counsel further
maintained that even assuming the power of attorney had been
validly executed, it merely authorized the attorney to administer and
sell the property and did not expressly empower him to enter into
an agreement to sell, which creates independent contractual
obligations binding upon the principal. It was, therefore, submitted
that the High Court rightly reversed the erroneous findings of the
courts below and no case for interference by this Court is made out.
4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
examining the record, the following questions arise for
determination: (i) whether the High Court, while exercising
revisional jurisdiction, was justified in reversing the concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the first
appellate court regarding the due ex*****on and proof of the
registered power of attorney dated 31.08.1977; and (ii) whether the
authority conferred upon Ahmad Din under the said power of
attorney to sell the suit property included, either expressly or by
necessary implication, the authority to execute the agreement to sell
dated 20.01.1979, thereby entitling Muhammad Younas to the
decree for specific performance.
5. At the very outset we note that the learned High Court
reversed the concurrent findings of the trial court and the first
appellate court primarily on the premise that the ex*****on of the
registered power of attorney was not proved in accordance with law,
as Nazir Ahmad (D.W.4), who had identified the executant before the 4
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
Sub-Registrar, subsequently stated that he had identified Ahmad
Din as Ghulam Bari at the instance of one Arshad. With respect, we
find ourselves unable to subscribe to this view.
6. Before adverting to the appreciation of evidence, it is pertinent
to note that the document in question is a registered power of
attorney, to which the law attaches a statutory presumption of due
ex*****on and authenticity1. Article 95 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat
Order, 1984 mandates that the Court shall presume every document
purporting to be a power of attorney and authenticated by the
competent authority to have been duly executed. In Mst. Iqbal Bibi
v. Kareem Hussain Shah (2024 SCMR 1233) this Court reiterated
that a registered power of attorney "enfolds a presumption of truth
and genuineness" and the burden lies upon the party alleging fraud
to rebut such presumption by satisfactory evidence. Likewise, in
Anjuman-e-Khuddam-ul-Qur'an, Faisalabad v. Lt. Col. (R) Najam
Hameed (PLD 2020 SC 390) it was held that a registered document
carries sanctity and can only be displaced by strong and cogent
evidence and this same principle was reaffirmed in Abdul Aziz v.
Abdul Hameed (2022 SCMR 842). In the present case, the
registered power of attorney was produced from proper custody and
its ex*****on was supported not merely by its registration but also
by the testimony of the petition writer (D.W.6), the then Sub-
Registrar (D.W.5), Ahmad Din himself (D.W.7), and the documentary
evidence showing that, acting as attorney, Ahmad Din redeemed the
Agricultural Development Bank loan admittedly obtained by
Ghulam Bari by utilizing the earnest money received under the
agreement to sell. Significantly, Ghulam Bari himself subsequently
executed an Ibtal Nama revoking the very same power of attorney on
21.02.1979. Had no such power of attorney ever existed, there would
have been no occasion to execute a formal deed of revocation. This
subsequent conduct constitutes a strong circumstance
corroborating the defendants' case regarding its prior ex*****on.
1 Muhammad Siddique (deceased) v. Mst. Noor Bibi (deceased) (2020 SCMR 483),
Abdul Razaq v. Abdul Ghaffar (2020 SCMR 202); Muhammad Idrees v.
Muhammad Pervaiz (2010 SCMR 5); Rasool Bukhsh and another v. Muhammad
Ramzan (2007 SCMR 85) 5
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
7. Although the learned High Court placed decisive reliance
upon the statement of Nazir Ahmad (D.W.4), the trial court was not
bound to accept every part of his testimony in isolation. It is a settled
principle that the testimony of a witness is to be appreciated as a
whole and the court is entitled to accept those parts of the evidence
which inspire confidence while rejecting the remaining parts in the
light of the surrounding circumstances and the documentary
record. In the present case, the testimony of the petition writer, the
Sub-Registrar, Ahmad Din, the contemporaneous conduct of the
parties and the subsequent ex*****on of the Ibtal Nama furnished
ample corroboration for the ex*****on of the registered power of
attorney. The learned High Court, therefore, erred in treating the
isolated statement of Nazir Ahmad as conclusive while disregarding
the cumulative effect of the remaining evidence.
8. The statement subsequently made by Nazir Ahmad before the
trial court merely created a conflict in the oral evidence, which the
trial court, after recording evidence first-hand, resolved in favour of
the defendants. That finding was affirmed by the first appellate
court. It is settled that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115,
C.P.C. is supervisory and not appellate. It is confined to correcting
jurisdictional defects, material irregularity, illegality or findings
suffering from perversity arising from misreading or non-reading of
evidence. It does not permit a fresh appraisal of evidence merely
because another view is possible. The trial court had the advantage
of recording oral evidence and assessing the demeanour of
witnesses, while the first appellate court independently concurred
with those findings. In the absence of perversity or patent illegality,
the High Court was not justified in substituting its own view. The
High Court, however, reassessed the entire evidence as if exercising
first appellate jurisdiction and substituted its own opinion merely
because another view was possible. Moreover, the learned High
Court did not identify any material piece of evidence which had
either been misread or ignored by the courts below, nor did it point
out any jurisdictional error or perversity in the concurrent findings
warranting interference in revision. This approach is plainly
contrary to the settled law. In Sultan Muhammad and another v.
Muhammad Qasim and others (2010 SCMR 1630), this Court held 6
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
that concurrent findings of fact, if not based upon misreading or
non-reading of evidence and not suffering from any illegality or
material irregularity affecting the merits of the case, are not open to
interference in revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, such reappraisal in
the instant case transgressed the settled limits of revisional
jurisdiction. We, therefore, hold that the registered power of attorney
stood duly proved.
9. The second reason assigned by the High Court is that
although the attorney may have been authorised to sell the property,
he was not expressly empowered to enter into an agreement to sell,
and therefore the agreement dated 20.01.1979 was beyond the
scope of his authority. Again, we are unable to agree.
10. This principle finds statutory recognition in Sections 188 and
189 of the Contract Act, 1872, which embody the doctrine of implied
and incidental authority. Once a principal confers authority upon
an agent to accomplish a particular act, the authority extends to
every lawful thing necessary for accomplishing that act together with
every act ordinarily incidental thereto, unless the instrument itself
expressly restricts the agent's powers. A power of attorney, therefore,
is to be construed reasonably so as to give effect to the intention of
the principal as gathered from the instrument as a whole. Where an
attorney is expressly authorised to alienate immovable property,
such authority ordinarily comprehends the authority to negotiate its
terms and execute the antecedent agreement to sell, which
constitutes the contractual foundation of the eventual conveyance.
To hold that an attorney may execute the final sale deed but lacks
authority to execute the preceding agreement to sell would render
the authority to sell commercially impracticable and legally
incongruous, defeating rather than advancing the intention of the
principal as expressed in the instrument.
11. The interpretation adopted by the learned High Court would
lead to an anomalous result. If an attorney is competent to execute
the final conveyance transferring ownership of immovable property,
it would be incongruous to hold that he lacks authority to execute
the antecedent agreement to sell, which merely embodies the 7
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
contractual consensus culminating in that conveyance. Such a
restrictive construction would render the authority to sell
commercially impracticable and would defeat, rather than advance,
the manifest intention of the principal as expressed in the
instrument.
12. Nothing has been brought on record to demonstrate that the
power of attorney expressly prohibited Ahmad Din from entering into
a contract for sale or otherwise restricted the manner in which the
authority to sell was to be exercised. Once the ex*****on of the power
of attorney stood established and the authority to sell was conferred,
the ex*****on of the agreement to sell in furtherance thereof fell
within the ordinary scope of such authority.
13. The conduct of the parties further fortifies this conclusion.
Ahmad Din admittedly received Rs.35,000/- as earnest money and
utilized the same for redemption of Ghulam Bari's outstanding bank
liability. The balance sale consideration remained available for
payment at the time of ex*****on and registration of the sale deed.
The evidence concurrently appreciated by the courts below also
establishes the readiness and willingness of Muhammad Younas to
perform his part of the contract. The refusal to complete registration
emanated from Ghulam Bari after cancellation of the power of
attorney and not from any default attributable to Muhammad
Younas.
14. The judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court
reveal a comprehensive appreciation of both oral and documentary
evidence extending over several witnesses and exhibits. The findings
returned therein are neither arbitrary nor unsupported by the
record. Both Courts undertook an exhaustive appraisal of the oral
and documentary evidence and recorded concurrent findings after
assigning cogent reasons. None of those findings has been shown to
suffer from misreading, non-reading or perversity. The distinction
between appellate and revisional jurisdiction has repeatedly been
emphasized by this Court. In Muhammad Sarwar and others v.
Hashmal Khan and others (PLD 2022 SC 13) and Mst. Zarsheda v.
Nobat Khan (PLD 2022 SC 21), it was held that a revisional court 8
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
cannot interfere merely because another view of the evidence is
possible; interference is permissible only where the findings
recorded by the courts below are perverse, suffer from jurisdictional
error, or are founded upon misreading or non-reading of material
evidence. Similarly, in Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and
others (PLJ 2023 SC 8), this Court observed that a revisional court
cannot substitute its own findings simply because it considers them
more plausible than those recorded by the subordinate courts. More
recently, in Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb
(2024 SCMR 916), it was reiterated that where two courts have
concurrently reached the same conclusion after evaluating the
relevant evidence, the High Court ought not to revisit such
crystallized findings unless they are shown to be legally
unsustainable or productive of manifest injustice. The High Court
did not identify any perversity, jurisdictional defect or
misreading/non-reading of evidence in the concurrent findings;
rather, it merely preferred a different appreciation of the same
evidence and adopted a restrictive interpretation of the power of
attorney. Such an approach falls outside the permissible limits of
revisional jurisdiction
15. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the learned High Court
was not justified in reversing the concurrent findings of the courts
below. Accordingly, we hold that the learned High Court misdirected
itself both in law and in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
The registered power of attorney dated 31.08.1977 stood duly
proved; Ahmad Din was competent to execute the agreement to sell
dated 20.01.1979 on behalf of Ghulam Bari; and Muhammad
Younas successfully established his entitlement to the equitable
relief of specific performance. The impugned judgment, by
reappreciating the evidence in revision and by assigning an unduly
restrictive construction to the registered power of attorney, cannot
be sustained in law.
16. Consequently, these appeals are allowed. The judgment dated
30.03.2012 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench,
in Civil Revision Nos.618 and 619 of 2011 is set aside, while the
judgments and decrees dated 29.07.1986 passed by the learned 9
C.A. No.435-L of 2012 etc.
Senior Civil Judge, Rahim Yar Khan, and 25.07.2011 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Rahim Yar Khan, respectively, are
restored. The parties shall bear their own costs.
JUDGE
JUDGE
Announced in open Court at Lahore on 10.08.2026.
JUDGE
“Approved For Reporting”
