A.S.K Law Associates

30/09/2026

PLD 2024 SC 645 — Dissolution of marriage

Short overview

The Supreme Court clarified the fundamental distinction between “dissolution of marriage” under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (DMMA) and “khula.”

1. Khula is the exclusive right of the woman. It can be exercised only when the wife clearly and unequivocally expresses her intention to seek khula.

2. Family Court cannot suo motu convert a suit for dissolution into a suit for khula. Merely filing a suit for dissolution of marriage does not amount to a request for khula. The wife's consent is essential.

3. Dower consequences are materially different: where marriage is dissolved on a statutory ground under the DMMA, the wife's dower rights are not forfeited merely because she sought dissolution. In contrast, khula ordinarily involves relinquishment/return of dower as consideration for release from the marriage.

4. Cruelty under section 2(viii), DMMA is not confined to physical violence. It may include mental and emotional abuse, and the Court emphasized assessing the cumulative impact of the husband's conduct upon the wife.

5. The Supreme Court also dealt with evidence concerning an alleged talaq, observing that where the evidence establishes that talaq had already been pronounced, there was no justification for unnecessarily converting the matter into khula.

Practical proposition

The case can conveniently be cited for the proposition:

> A Family Court cannot grant khula on its own motion where the wife has sought dissolution of marriage on statutory grounds and has not expressly sought khula; conversion of such a suit into khula without her clear and voluntary consent is unlawful, particularly because khula carries different consequences regarding dower.

This principle has subsequently been relied upon by Pakistani courts in cases where Family Courts granted khula despite the wife having pleaded dissolution on statutory grounds.

28/09/2026

PLD 2024 SC 291 — Haq Mahar- Mst. Haseena Bibi v. Abdul Haleem & others

Short overview

The case principally concerned dower (Haq Mehr) and **custody (Hizanat).

1. Haq Mehr: The Supreme Court held that the wife's right to dower is an exclusive and absolute right. The Court treated an Iqrarnama/agreement/compromise by which the wife purported to surrender her dower, particularly in the context of family dissolution, as legally ineffective. The judgment emphasized that such a right cannot simply be extinguished through a family agreement.

2. Custody/Hizanat: The Court also held that an agreement by which a mother gives up her legal right of Hizanat is not enforceable where it conflicts with the governing principles of Muslim law and the welfare/legal rights of the minor. It relied, among others, on PLD 2020 SC 508 and section 23 of the Contract Act regarding agreements contrary to public policy.

3. Important proposition: The judgment therefore takes a strict approach toward purported contractual waiver of statutory/religious family rights, particularly dower and maternal custody. Subsequent courts have cited PLD 2024 SC 291 for the proposition that dower cannot be waived through an agreement or compromise.

25/09/2026

PLD 2001 SC 96 - Murder for Honour (Ghairat)- This judgment
is a foundational precedent by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on honor killings (*Ghairat*).

Case Overview

Facts:The appellant, Muhammad Akram Khan, shot and killed a man, claiming he acted under grave and sudden provocation upon seeing the deceased talking to his sister in a field. He sought a lighter sentence by pleading that the act was committed out of customary "honour" (*Ghairat*).

Legal Issue:Whether a murder committed under the pretext of family honor or custom can serve as a mitigating factor to reduce criminal liability for *Qatl-i-Amd* (intentional murder) under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

Key Rulings & Principles**

1. Murder Simpliciter: The Supreme Court ruled that killing under the guise of honor is premeditated murder plain and simple (Qatl-i-Amd simpliciter) and cannot be downgraded or mitigated by custom.
2. Rejection of Customary Defense: Neither Islamic jurisprudence nor the legal system permits "honour" as a defense or excuse to take a human life.
3. Constitutional Violation: The Court held that custom-based killings violate the fundamental Right to Life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Furthermore, under Article 8(1), any custom or usage inconsistent with fundamental rights is void.
4. No Vigilante Justice: No individual or community has the legal right to take the law into their own hands.

Significance:
The verdict permanently closed the legal loophole of claiming "Ghairat" to obtain reduced sentences in homicide cases, establishing a precedent that honor-based crimes are punishable strictly as murder.

21/09/2026

2024 SCMR 934 - 9C-
Short Overview-
This judgment established that in narcotics recoveries—especially in daytime/public areas—police and ANF are expected to preserve photographic or video evidence of the raid. The unjustified absence of modern visual evidence creates doubt, favoring the accused for post-arrest bail under the rule of further inquiry

15/09/2026

2025 CLC 145 - Minors custody-
Short overview-
Case: Mst. Neelofar and others v. Muhammad Khan and another
Court: Peshawar High Court
Citation: 2025 CLC 145 (Peshawar)
The minors’ father was murdered, and the minors were in the custody of their mother.
The paternal grandfather claimed custody and challenged the mother's guardianship.
The High Court held that the welfare of the minors is the paramount consideration under Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
Since the mother was considered fit to look after the minors, her custody/guardianship was maintained.
Importantly, the Court observed that the grandfather could approach the competent Court if he sought custody or visitation rights.
Thus, death of the father does not automatically give custody to the paternal grandfather, but the grandfather is not barred from seeking custody or reasonable visitation before the Guardian Court.
Practical proposition: This case is useful for a paternal grandfather's application because it recognizes his ability to seek custody/visitation, while making clear that the ultimate test is the welfare of the minors.

15/09/2026

14/09/2026

2025 SCMR 1955 - 489-F

Short overview-

The case involved Section 489-F PPC and concerned bail. The Supreme Court granted pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that where the matter essentially depends upon documentary evidence, and the circumstances surrounding the cheque/underlying liability require further examination, custodial arrest is not necessarily justified. The case has subsequently been relied upon by High Courts in 489-F bail matters.

Useful proposition for bail: Where the existence/nature of the underlying liability, dishonest intention (mens rea), or circumstances of issuance of the cheque are disputed, and the evidence is primarily documentary, the case may call for further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. rather than incarceration before trial.

Practical point: This judgment is particularly useful for a pre-arrest bail petition under 489-F PPC, especially where the accused argues that the dispute is essentially financial/civil, the cheque transaction is disputed, or custodial interrogation is unnecessary.

12/09/2026

2025 SCMR 1130 — 406 PPC

Short Overview

Muhammad Amjad Naeem v. The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another.

Key principle: The Supreme Court dealt with the ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Sections 405/406 PPC, particularly the requirement of entrustment.

The Court emphasized that:

Entrustment of property is an essential ingredient of an offence under Section 406 PPC.
A mere failure to pay money, fulfil a contractual obligation, or settle a commercial transaction does not, by itself, constitute criminal breach of trust.
Where the dispute is essentially civil/commercial, invocation of Section 406 PPC requires careful scrutiny.
For bail purposes, Section 406 PPC is outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., making the principle that bail is ordinarily the rule particularly relevant.

Practical use: If the FIR under 406 PPC does not clearly allege what property was entrusted, when it was entrusted, and how the accused dishonestly misappropriated / conversion of that entrusted property occurred, 2025 SCMR 1130 can be a strong authority in support of bail.

05/09/2026

2016 SCMR 267 — Trial vitiate-
Short Overview
Muhammad Nawaz and others v. The State and others, 2016 SCMR 267
Supreme Court of Pakistan — decided 4 December 2015

The appellants were convicted under Sections 449, 392, 376 and 411 PPC. The Supreme Court reappraised the evidence and acquitted all appellants, finding material deficiencies in the prosecution case.

Key legal proposition:
The Court held that any material piece of evidence relied upon against an accused must be put to him in his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. If such evidence is not confronted to the accused, it cannot be used against him for maintaining conviction.

03/09/2026

2025 YLR 2129 — de novo trial Short Overview
Muhammad Jalal and 2 others v. The State and others
Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench
Decided: 10 April 2025
Citation: 2025 YLR 2129

Facts: The accused were convicted in a murder case involving a pregnant woman. The prosecution had invoked Section 338-C PPC regarding the death of the fetus. The medical evidence showed that the fetus was approximately 19 weeks developed at the time of the incident.

Held: The Court concluded that, considering the development of the fetus, its killing was to be treated as the killing of a human being. Therefore, Section 302 PPC, rather than Section 338-C PPC, was the appropriate provision.

Regarding de novo trial: The convictions were set aside and the matter was remanded for a de novo trial after framing distinct charges under Section 302 PPC for the deaths of the woman and the unborn child.

Key proposition: This judgment supports the proposition that where the original trial has proceeded on a fundamentally incorrect charge and the proper charge materially changes the nature of the case, the appellate court may order a de novo trial after framing the correct charge.

Important: This case is not directly about a change/transfer of the trial Judge under Section 350 Cr.P.C. It is primarily an authority on de novo trial following a fundamental defect in the charge.