01/05/2026
PLJ 2026 CrC 330
It is well settled that in respect of ordinary criminal offences, a Court may assume cognizance under Section 190, Cr.P.C. either upon receipt of a police report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. or upon a private complaint. Contrarily, the legislative scheme governing offences under Chapter XVII-B, PPC conspicuously restricts the initiation of proceedings at the instance of the general public. A comparative reading of Section 462-O, PPC alongside Sections 195 and 196, Cr.P.C. is instructive in this regard. Under Section 195, Cr.P.C., cognizance of specified offences is taken only upon a written complaint by a public servant or a Court, without any statutory requirement of recording reasons prior to taking such cognizance. Section 196, Cr.P.C., on the other hand, imposes a bar on the taking of cognizance of certain offences except upon a complaint or sanction by the Federal or Provincial Government or an authorized officer. Notably, several offences enumerated in Section 196, Cr.P.C., such as those under Sections 123-B, 171J, 153-A and 505, PPC, are cognizable in nature. Consequently, FIRs are duly registered and investigations conducted, yet cognizance by the Court is conditioned upon the requisite complaint or sanction at the stage of framing of charge. A similar legislative pattern is discernible in Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which mandates prior sanction for prosecution, notwithstanding the fact that an FIR is registered and investigation is carried out under the said law.
A complaint lodged by a duly authorized officer, culminating in the registration of an FIR under Section 462-I, PPC, is procedurally sufficient and legally efficacious to enable the competent court to assume cognizance of the matter and proceed in accordance with Section 462-O, PPC. It is pertinent to mention here that the legislative intent underlying Section 462-O, PPC, is to ensure regulatory oversight and accountability and not to engraft an additional procedural impediment or superfluous layer of formality which would unnecessarily protract or frustrate the course of criminal justice. Needless to mention here that once the criminal law is set in motion through the registration of an FIR on the basis of a complaint by an authorized officer, the court is fully empowered to take cognizance of the offence without insisting upon the filing of a separate or subsequent complaint. In view of the above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.
Crl.Misc.No.66147-M of 2020
(Farhan Anwar Vs. ASJ, Faisalabad & two others)
