Tan & Tan Law Firm

Tan & Tan Law Firm "Justitia Nemini Neganda Est"

09/05/2026

SUPREME COURT: PATERNITY PROOF REQUIRED FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT UNDER VAWC LAW

The Supreme Court (SC) held that competent proof of paternity is a primary basis for demanding financial support, as it cleared a man charged with violence against women and their children (VAWC) for refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his.

In a 10-page decision penned by Associate Justice Japar Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Sec 5(i) Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2024 (Anti-VAWC Act).

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations. Although they discussed undergoing DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity, no test was conducted because they could not agree on who would pay for it.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name was marked “N/A” and left unsigned. The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

The RTC convicted the accused, giving more weight to the woman’s testimony than the accused’s denial. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, ruling that proof of paternity is not an element of the crime. This paved the way for him to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In reversing his conviction, the high court gave merit to the petition after it found that the prosecution failed to establish two out of the four elements that would find an accused guilty of a VAWC offense — that the accused and the aggrieved woman have a common child, and that the accused deliberately refused to provide financial aid to the child to inflict mental or emotional anguish on the aggrieved woman.

It explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the Anti-VAWC Act, the prosecution must show that: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

“Here (aggrieved woman) admitted before the trial court that (accused) did not give her financial support due to (child’s) uncertain lineage,” the Supreme Court said.

“In fact, she disclosed that (accused) offered to divide the expenses should the child be subjected to DNA testing, but it was her and her father who refused to bear a portion thereof,” it added.

The highest bench noted, that the accused “did not willfully refuse to provide financial support” just to inflict psychological harm to the aggrieved party. It added that the child’s birth certificate presented at trial did not include the father’s name, with only an “N/A” indicated in the document. It was also unsigned.

09/05/2026
09/05/2026

The has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵).

The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned.

The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

09/05/2026

Breaking the Chains of Formigones: The Supreme Court's Progressive Recalibration of the Insanity Defense in People v. ###

A Landmark Shift from Psychiatric History Requirements to Evidence-Based Mental Health Jurisprudence

Introduction

On October 20, 2025, the Supreme Court Third Division issued a watershed decision in People v. ### (G.R. No. 273354) that fundamentally recalibrates how Philippine courts evaluate the insanity defense . Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with the concurrence of the entire Division including Division Chairperson Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the Court acquitted a mother charged with parricide after she jumped off Delpan Bridge with her five-year-old daughter, resulting in the child's death by drowning .

This decision represents a critical departure from rigid evidentiary formalism toward a more nuanced, scientifically-grounded approach to assessing mental illness in criminal proceedings—one that recognizes the realities of psychiatric conditions like schizophrenia and rejects artificial temporal requirements for proving insanity.

The Factual Matrix: A Tragedy Born of Mental Illness

The facts of this case are both heartbreaking and legally instructive . On January 19, 2010, ###, suffering from undiagnosed and untreated schizophrenia, carried her daughter to Delpan Bridge in Manila . Eyewitnesses testified that she made the child stand on the bridge railing before jumping into the Pasig River while embracing her . ### survived after being rescued by a scavenger, but her daughter's body was recovered the following day, having died from asphyxia by drowning .

Charged with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, ### invoked insanity as an exempting circumstance . The defense presented compelling psychiatric evidence: multiple evaluations by accredited psychiatrists from the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) conducted between 2010 and 2018 consistently diagnosed her with schizophrenia . Dr. Mary Ann Linn testified that ### had experienced "thought disturbances" as early as 2004—six years before the tragic incident .

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the insanity defense, convicting ### of parricide and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua . Their reasoning hinged on a critical flaw: the absence of evidence showing ### exhibited schizophrenic symptoms "immediately before or simultaneous with the incident" .

The Legal Evolution: From Formigones to Paña to ###

The Formigones Doctrine (1950-2020)

For seven decades, Philippine jurisprudence on the insanity defense was dominated by People v. Formigones (1950), which required that an accused be "deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime" . This doctrine was later refined in People v. Rafanan, Jr. (1991) into two distinct tests: (a) the test of cognition—complete deprivation of intelligence; and (b) the test of volition—total deprivation of freedom of will .

The Paña Reformation (2020)

In 2020, the Supreme Court En Banc issued People v. Paña, which "revisited Formigones and succeeding cases" and established a modernized "three-way test" for insanity :

1. Temporal Requirement: Insanity must be present at the time of the commission of the crime
2. Medical Proof Requirement: Insanity must be medically proven as the primary cause of the criminal act
3. Functional Requirement: The effect of insanity must be the inability to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the act

The ### Innovation: Rejecting Artificial Evidentiary Barriers

The ### decision applies Paña with critical refinements that protect mentally ill defendants from impossible evidentiary burdens. The Supreme Court decisively rejected the lower courts' requirement for evidence of symptoms "immediately before or simultaneous with" the criminal act .

Citing Ruiz v. People (2024), Justice Gaerlan emphasized that "having a documented history of a psychiatric condition is not, and should never be, an element required to prove legal insanity" . The Court explained that "prior psychiatric records could not establish insanity at the precise time of the commission of the crime because, for obvious reasons, medical reports from doctors prior to the commission of the crime cannot be considered as having been rendered immediately before the commission of the crime, unless the facts clearly establish so".

This represents a profound shift: courts must evaluate the totality of psychiatric evidence rather than demanding snapshot-in-time symptom documentation—a requirement that would be practically impossible to satisfy in most cases.

Application of the Paña Three-Way Test

The Supreme Court meticulously applied each prong of the Paña test:

First Prong: Temporal Presence of Insanity

Dr. Linn's expert testimony established that ### "may be experiencing disturbances at that time," noting that she "demonstrated paranoid ideation" during the incident . She felt that people were "nagtatangka, nagbabanta, nagtsitsismis, naiinggit" (threatening her, gossiping, envious)—classic manifestations of persecutory delusions associated with schizophrenia .

Second Prong: Medical Proof

The Court found this requirement satisfied through:

- Multiple psychiatric evaluations by three accredited psychiatrists (Dr. Linn, Dr. Espinosa, and Dr. Galindez) conducted on August 13, 2010, September 1, 2010, and April 26, 2013
- Mental Status Examination Report dated March 8, 2013 diagnosing schizophrenia
- Confirmatory Mental Assessment Report by Dr. Sixto Bravo, Jr. dated November 15, 2018
- Patient history showing thought disturbances since 2004

The Court emphasized that "reports and evaluation from medical experts have greater evidentiary value in determining an accused's mental state" because "the nature and degree of an accused's mental illness can be best identified by medical experts equipped with specialized knowledge to diagnose a person's mental health" .

Third Prong: Inability to Appreciate Wrongfulness

Drawing on psychiatric literature, the Court recognized that schizophrenia is "a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions" . It constitutes "a medical condition which deprives a person of discernment" .

Dr. Linn's testimony was particularly probative: psychosis means "a break with reality" where "the judgment of the patient is impaired" . Persons experiencing psychotic episodes "have [a] different way of perceiving their surroundings, or [an] inaccurate way of perceiving their surroundings" and sometimes "cannot" recognize their loved ones .

###'s own testimony corroborated this: she stated she was "not herself" and "not in her right mind" at the time .

The Doctrinal Significance: Five Key Principles

This decision establishes several critical principles for Philippine criminal jurisprudence:

1. Rejection of Temporal Snapshot Requirements

Courts cannot demand evidence of psychiatric symptoms at the exact moment of the criminal act. Such requirements ignore the episodic nature of mental illness and create insurmountable proof problems.

2. Holistic Evaluation of Psychiatric Evidence

Medical evaluations conducted after the incident, when combined with patient history and expert analysis, can sufficiently establish the accused's mental state at the time of the crime .

3. Primacy of Expert Medical Testimony

While lay witnesses may testify about mental condition, psychiatric evaluations by accredited mental health professionals carry greater evidentiary weight .

4. Understanding of Schizophrenia's Nature

The Court demonstrated sophisticated understanding of schizophrenia as a condition that impairs reality testing, judgment, and the ability to appreciate wrongfulness—directly addressing the functional requirements of Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code .

5. Civil Liability Despite Criminal Exemption

Even when acquitted on grounds of insanity, the accused remains civilly liable . The Court ordered ### to pay ₱275,000.00 in damages (₱75,000 civil indemnity, ₱75,000 moral damages, ₱75,000 exemplary damages, and ₱50,000 temperate damages) .

Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Treatment Over Punishment

The decision exemplifies therapeutic jurisprudence by ordering ###'s immediate transfer from the Correctional Institution for Women to the National Center for Mental Health for psychiatric treatment . She may only be released upon court order based on recommendation from her attending physician .

This approach recognizes that persons found legally insane require medical intervention, not penal sanction—a humane response that protects both the accused and society.

Comparative Perspectives: International Alignment

The ### decision aligns Philippine jurisprudence with international standards on mental health in criminal justice. The functional test—inability to appreciate wrongfulness—mirrors the M'Naghten Rule's cognitive prong used in common law jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code's substantial capacity test.

By rejecting formalistic evidentiary requirements, the Supreme Court joins progressive jurisdictions that recognize psychiatric evidence must be evaluated holistically rather than mechanistically.

Potential Critiques and Responses

Critique 1: Does this decision make the insanity defense too easy to invoke?

Response: No. The accused still bears the burden of proving insanity by "clear and convincing evidence" . The decision merely removes artificial barriers while maintaining rigorous substantive requirements: medical proof by qualified experts and demonstration of functional impairment.

Critique 2: Could this encourage fabricated insanity defenses?

Response: The requirement for multiple evaluations by accredited psychiatrists, corroborated by patient history and behavioral evidence, provides robust safeguards against malingering. Mental health professionals are trained to detect feigned mental illness.

Critique 3: What about public safety concerns?

Response: The decision mandates confinement in a mental health facility, continued treatment, and release only upon court approval based on medical recommendation . This arguably provides better public protection than imprisonment without treatment.

Conclusion: A More Just and Scientific Approach

People v. ### represents a quantum leap forward in Philippine criminal jurisprudence's treatment of mental illness. By dismantling artificial evidentiary barriers and embracing scientifically-grounded psychiatric assessment, the Supreme Court has created a framework that is simultaneously more just to mentally ill defendants and more protective of legal integrity.

The decision honors the fundamental principle that criminal liability requires moral blameworthiness—a requirement incompatible with psychotic breaks from reality that destroy the capacity for rational choice. It recognizes that schizophrenia and similar severe mental illnesses are not moral failings but medical conditions that can obliterate the mental elements necessary for criminal responsibility.

For practitioners, this decision provides both opportunity and obligation: the opportunity to raise meritorious insanity defenses with realistic evidentiary standards, and the obligation to present rigorous, expert-supported psychiatric evidence that meets the Paña test's substantive requirements.

For society, it represents a more humane, scientifically informed approach to the intersection of mental illness and criminal justice—one that neither excuses criminal conduct nor punishes those who, through no fault of their own, lack the mental capacity for moral culpability.

The shift from Formigones to Paña to ### charts the evolution of a legal system growing in sophistication, compassion, and alignment with contemporary understanding of mental health. It is jurisprudence at its finest: principled, progressive, and profoundly human.

Case Citation: People of the Philippines v. ###, G.R. No. 273354, October 20, 2025

Ponente: Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan

Division: Third Division (Justices Caguioa, Inting, Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh)

Caveat: The material presented herein is based on a Supreme Court ruling. This is intended solely for academic and intellectual discourse and should not be construed as a piece of legal advice. The discussion aims to provide an analytical summary of the ruling and its implications within the framework of Philippine jurisprudence.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS. An “honest mistake” is not a sufficient shi...
08/05/2026

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS.

An “honest mistake” is not a sufficient shield when public health is involved.

In a dental medical mission, especially one sanctioned by the LGU, the level of care required is not ordinary diligence but extraordinary diligence, considering that medical professionals deal directly with human life and safety. Jurisprudence has consistently held that doctors are expected to exercise the highest degree of caution, competence, and vigilance in the discharge of their duties. This necessarily includes the basic but critical responsibility of verifying the safety, validity, and expiration of medicines before administration.

The use of expired medicines is not a trivial oversight. It reflects a serious lapse in professional judgment and standard protocols, particularly in a setting where beneficiaries rely entirely on the expertise and integrity of the medical team.

While the LGU may characterize the incident as an honest mistake, accountability cannot be set aside. Public service, more so in the medical field, is imbued with public interest. With that comes a higher threshold of responsibility. The circumstances call for a thorough, impartial investigation to determine the extent of negligence and identify those responsible.

If indeed there was a failure to observe the expected standard of care, then it is only just and proper that the responsible professionals be held accountable, not only to uphold the law but to preserve public trust in government-led health initiatives.

This is not merely about punishment, it is about ensuring that such a dangerous lapse does not happen again.

07/05/2026

The has disbarred a lawyer for using a false Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance number in his pleadings.

In a 𝘗𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘮 Decision, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 disbarred Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) for dishonest conduct in violation of the 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈).

Atty. Hidalgo represented the defendant in a malicious prosecution case pending before Branch 153, Regional Trial Court, Biñan City. In the answer he filed for his client, Atty. Hidalgo included his MCLE compliance number, which is required for lawyers.

The plaintiff's lawyer filed a motion to expunge Atty. Hidalgo's answer from the records, claiming that he did not actually comply with the MCLE requirements. Attached to the motion was a Certification from the MCLE Office stating that Atty. Hidalgo had not complied from the first compliance period up to the present.

In ordering the disbarment of Atty. Hidalgo, the SC emphasized that Canon II of the 𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈 requires lawyers to act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior.

Lawyers are also required under Canon III to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for laws and legal processes.

The SC held that Atty. Hidalgo violated these Canons, stating that his act of indicating false information in the pleadings he filed “constitutes bad faith and dishonesty, and shows blatant disrespect of the courts and its rules.”

The SC also fined Atty. Hidalgo PHP 35,000 for willful disobedience, a less serious offense, for ignoring the IBP's order when he did not submit an answer and a verified position paper.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164745.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164728.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

A small but meaningful win for our firm today.The Court has granted our Petition for Habeas Corpus, affirming that the c...
06/05/2026

A small but meaningful win for our firm today.

The Court has granted our Petition for Habeas Corpus, affirming that the custody and welfare of minor children must always be guided by law, fairness, and the best interests of the children.

This case is a reminder that separation between parents does not justify the exclusion of one parent from a child’s life. When a parent is able, fit, and actively providing support, they have every right to be part of their children’s upbringing.

To deliberately deprive a parent of access to their own children is not only unjust; it is contrary to law, morals, and basic decency.

Co-parenting is not a privilege granted by one parent to another. It is a right of both parents, and more importantly, a right of the children.

We remain committed to upholding these principles and protecting the welfare of families through the rule of law.

05/05/2026

SPECIAL JURISDICTION OVER
CYBER CRIMES
BY JUDGE M@RLO C@MP@NILL@

Under Section 32, Batas Pambansa Blg. Under Section 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine. If the offenses are punishable by imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial Court.

BP Blg. 32 provides the general rule on criminal jurisdiction. However, there are laws that provide special rules on criminal jurisdiction, such as Section 21 of RA No. 10175, which provides that:

“Section 21. Jurisdiction - The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of this Act. x x x There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.”

Under Section 2.2 of A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC, the criminal actions for violation of Sections 4 and 5 of RA 10175 shall be filed before the designated cybercrime court x x x x x. Under Administrative Matter 03-03-03-SC, the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts shall be designated as Cybercrime Courts.

Under Section 5 in relation to Section 8 of RA No. 10175, the penalty for aiding or abetting in the commission of cybercrime, such as computer-related identity theft (e.g., opening a Facebook account using the name and pictures of another person), is prision correccional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years). Even though the penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA No. 10175 does not exceed 6 years, the Regional Trial Court designated as Cybercrime Court, and not the Metropolitan Trial Court, has jurisdiction over this crime.

Under A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC, all crimes under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which are committed with the “use of information or communication technology” under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, shall be filed before the regular or other specialized “Regional Trial Courts,” as the case may be.

The penalty for unjust vexation under Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is arresto menor or a fine of not less than P1,000 but not more than P40,000 or both. However, under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, if communication or information technology is used in committing a crime, the penalty shall be graduated by one degree. In such a case, the crime is called cyber unjust vexation
Note: A defamatory statement against a person (e.g., imputing prostitution) posted on Facebook is cyber libel. However, if such a defamatory statement is sent to the complainant through a private message (e.g., through Viber), the crime is cyber unjust vexation.

Article 71 of the RPC provides that the courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales: (1) Death; (2) Reclusión perpetua; (3) Reclusión temporal; (4) Prisión mayor; (5) Prisión correccional; (6) Arresto mayor; (7) Destierro; (8) Arresto menor; (9) public cesure (10) fine. Destierro (prohibition to enter a particular place, such as Quezon City) is immediately superior to arresto menor in the graduated penalty scale under Article 71. Hence, destierro is the penalty one degree higher than arresto menor.

Under Article 75 of the RPC, whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum. The penalty of fine for unjust vexation is not less than P1,000 but not more than P40,000. Applying Article 75, P40,000, which is the maximum amount prescribed by law, shall be increased by one fourth or P10,000 to determine the penalty higher by one degree. Hence, the penalty of a fine of not less than P1,000 but not more than P50,000 is higher by one degree than the penalty of a fine of not less than P1,000 but not more than P40,000.

Applying Articles 71 and 75 of the RPC, the penalty for cyber unjust vexation under the RPC in relation to RA No. 10175 is destierro and/or fine of not less than P1,000 but not more than P50,000. Although the penalty for cyber unjust vexation does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment, applying A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC in relation to Section 21 of RA No. 10175, the regular Regional Trial Court, and not the Metropolitan Trial Court, has jurisdiction over this crime.

The penalty for unlawful use of means of publication under Article 154 of the Revised Penal Code was arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos. However, RA No. 10951 amended Article 154 of the Revised Penal Code by prescribing the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine ranging from P40,000 to P200,000.

Under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, if communication or information technology is used in committing a crime, the penalty shall be graduated by one degree. Thus, the penalty for cyber unlawful use of means of publication under Article 154 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 10951, in relation to Section 6 of RA No. 10175, is prision correccional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine of ranging from P40,000 to P250,000.

Although the penalty for cyber unlawful use of means of publication does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment, applying A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC in relation to Section 21 of RA No. 10175, the regular Regional Trial Code, and not the Metropolitan Trial Court, has jurisdiction over this crime.

04/05/2026

The has affirmed that the President does not have the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition for review filed by the Office of the President (OP). The petition challenged a ruling of the Court of Appeals that voided the OP’s dismissal of then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang.

While Carandang can no longer be reinstated because his term as Overall Deputy Ombudsman already expired in 2020, the SC said that the penalties imposed on him, including the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, have no legal effect. It ruled that Carandang is entitled to his full retirement benefits and to the salaries he would have received during his preventive suspension and dismissal, up to the end of his term.

In 2017, Carandang was reported to have claimed in an ambush interview that the Office of the Ombudsman had proof of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of then President Rodrigo R. Duterte and his family, including bank transaction records said to have been transmitted by the Anti-Money Laundering Council to the Ombudsman. These statements related to a complaint filed by former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV regarding President Duterte’s alleged unexplained accumulated wealth.

Two administrative complaints were then filed against Carandang before the OP, accusing him of improperly disclosing confidential information and showing partiality during the interview. The OP ordered Carandang’s preventive suspension, but this was not enforced by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

Carandang challenged the complaints, arguing that the SC had already ruled in the 2014 case of 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘐𝘐𝘐 𝘷. 𝘖𝘗 (𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴) that Section 8(2) of the 𝘖𝘮𝘣𝘶𝘥𝘴𝘮𝘢𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1989 was unconstitutional for granting the President administrative disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman.

The OP, claiming that the SC abandoned its ruling in 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 in the 2016 case of 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦 𝘷. 𝘖𝘗 (𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦), proceeded to find Carandang liable for graft and corruption as well as betrayal of public trust and dismissed him from service. Then newly appointed Ombudsman Samuel Martires directed Carandang to cease and desist from performing his duties and declared his post vacant.

Holding that 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 had not been abandoned by 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦, the SC clarified that 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦 did not revisit or overturn 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 because that case merely upheld the dismissal of a complaint against then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro without imposing any sanction. The President’s disciplinary authority and the constitutionality of Section 8(2) were not at issue.

𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 was also decided by the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, and could not be modified or reversed by a Division ruling, such as 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦.

The SC explained that when it decided 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 in 2014, it became part of the law of the land, firmly establishing that the President has no authority to remove the Deputy Ombudsman.

Reaffirming 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴, the SC stressed that the Constitution expressly characterizes the Ombudsman as independent: free from executive control, supervision, or political influence.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164549.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164531.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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