GACA Law Office

17/08/2026

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

13/08/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that an employee's absence from work, by itself, is not enough to prove abandonment or justify dismissal.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division found Green Era Biotech Corp. (Green Era Biotech) and Great Value Management and Services Corporation (Great Value) guilty of illegally dismissing production utility worker Alvin G. Carpio (Carpio).

Carpio claimed he was originally hired by Green Era Biotech but was later transferred to its manpower service provider, Great Value. After he was absent from work at Green Era Biotech for eight straight days due to illness, Great Value issued him a notice to explain. He was warned that another similar violation would lead to an absence without leave (AWOL) notice.

Carpio was later absent from work for another nine consecutive days. Great Value issued him an AWOL notice, stating that his continued absences were considered serious misconduct and abandonment of work.

He later took another leave with his supervisor’s permission. However, when he returned to work the next day, he was barred from entering the workplace. A few days later, Carpio was informed he had been declared AWOL.

Carpio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Ruling that Carpio was illegally dismissed, the SC reiterated that abandonment, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, requires proof of two elements: (1) the employee was absent without a valid reason; and (2) the employee clearly intended to end the employer-employee relationship.

Of these, the second element is more important and must be shown through the employee’s actions. Since abandonment is a ground for dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving both elements.

In this case, although Carpio’s absences were unauthorized, the SC found no evidence that he intended to abandon his job. Instead, he tried to return to work and immediately challenged his dismissal by filing a complaint.

The SC ordered Carpio’s reinstatement but ruled that he was not entitled to backwages because his dismissal was made in good faith based on his unauthorized absences. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the companies must instead pay him separation pay.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168002.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165378.

Read the full text of Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao’s Dissenting Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165383.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

13/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a husband and wife’s mutual desire to end their marriage, by itself, is not enough to prove collusion in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. A lack of objection is not the same as collusion.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that there was no collusion between the spouses in a petition to declare their marriage void. “Collusion” means that the spouses secretly agreed to fake or misrepresent facts in order to nullify their marriage.

The SC voided the marriage due to the husband’s psychological incapacity.

The wife filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that her husband was unable to fulfill his marital duties because of continued physical, psychological, and economic abuse, which she said began even before their marriage.

When the husband did not file his answer to the petition, the RTC directed the Provincial Prosecutor to investigate possible collusion between the spouses. The Associate Provincial Prosecutor reported that there was no collusion.

During trial, the wife presented several witnesses while the husband presented none. He also did not oppose the petition.

Despite this, the RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the evidence did not sufficiently prove psychological incapacity.

The RTC pointed out that the husband’s father admitted discussing his testimony with his son, and that the husband was willing to have the marriage dissolved.

Explaining that collusion is a secret agreement to defraud or obtain something illegal, the SC noted that although the RTC observed suspicious circumstances, these did not clearly prove that the spouses conspired to fake grounds to nullify their marriage.

The SC emphasized that a mutual desire to end the marriage does not automatically mean collusion. A spouse’s agreement or lack of objection is not the same as a secret scheme to mislead the court.

Without proof that the spouses faked evidence or suppressed valid defenses, collusion cannot be established.

It added that the husband’s failure to file an answer or present evidence does not, by itself, prove collusion.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168319.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165664.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

13/08/2026

Nagpasya ang na kung ang karahasang sikolohikal (psychological violence) ay ginawa sa pamamagitan ng Facebook, maaari itong ituring na paggamit ng information and communications technology (ICT). Dahil dito, puwedeng patawan ang gumawa nito ng mas mabigat na parusa alinsunod sa Seksyon 6 ng RA 10175 o Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Sa isang Resolusyon na isinulat ni Kasangguning Mahistrado Ramon Paul L. Hernando, binago nang bahagya ngunit pinagtibay ng Unang Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang nauna nitong Desisyon noong Oktubre 22, 2025. Sa naturang desisyon, pinanatili ang hatol na nagkasala ang isang indibidwal (###) dahil sa paggawa ng karahasang sikolohikal laban sa dati niyang kasintahan (AAA) sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(i) ng Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, o ang Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act), matapos siyang mag-post ng mga mapanirang pahayag tungkol kay AAA sa Facebook.

Gayunman, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na itaas ng isang antas ang parusa dahil ang paglabag ay ginawa sa pamamagitan ng Facebook, na malinaw na nakasaad sa sakdal at napatunayan sa paglilitis.

Nagsampa si AAA ng kasong VAWC laban sa dati niyang kasintahan na si ### matapos siyang mag-post sa Facebook ng pahayag kung saan tinawag niya si AAA na maruming babae at hayop, at nagbanta siyang susuntukin kapag nakita niya ito. Inulit pa ni ### ang mga panlalait sa mga komento sa naturang post na maaaring mabasa ng publiko.

Habang dinidinig ang kaso, iniharap ni AAA ang mga screenshot ng post sa Facebook at sinabi niyang siya ang gumawa ng account para kay ### kung saan nai-post ang naturang pahayag. Pinatunayan naman ng dalawa niyang kapatid na kay ### ang account at nakatanggap sila ng mga mensahe mula sa kanya gamit ang parehong account.

Sa kabila ng pagtanggi ni ###, pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema, sa desisyong inilabas nito, ang mga naging pasya ng Family Court at Court of Appeals (CA) na naghatol na nagkasala si ###. Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na sa mga kasong kriminal, kailangang mapatunayan ng prosekusyon hindi lamang ang mga elemento ng krimen kundi pati ang pagkakakilanlan ng gumawa nito. Pinagtibay din ng Korte Suprema ang parusang ipinataw ng CA kay ###, na kinabibilangan ng pagkakakulong mula anim na buwan at isang araw hanggang walong taon at isang araw, multang PHP 100,000, at pagsailalim sa psychological counselling o psychiatric treatment.

Sa pagresolba sa Motion for Reconsideration ni ###, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na napatunayang si ### ang gumawa ng post sa Facebook nang lampas sa makatwirang pagdududa (beyond reasonable doubt), batay sa mga pamantayang itinakda nito sa nauna nitong desisyon:

1. Pag-amin sa pagmamay-ari ng account o sa paggawa ng naturang post;
2. Pagkakaroon ng patunay na nakita ang akusado na gumagamit ng account o nagsulat ng naturang post;
3. Paglalaman ng impormasyon na tanging ang nagkasala o iilang tao lamang ang nakaaalam;
4. Paggamit ng mga salita o pananalitang naaayon sa karaniwang paraan ng pagpapahayag ng nagkasala;
5. Mga tala mula sa internet service provider, kumpanya ng telekomunikasyon, o social media site, pati na ang resulta ng pagsusuri sa mga digital device na nagpapakita ng lokasyon at iba pang katangiang nag-uugnay sa account sa nagkasala;
6. Mga kilos o gawain na naaayon sa mga nauna niyang post; o
7. Iba pang mga pangyayaring nagpapakita ng pagmamay-ari, paggamit, o paggawa ng account o post.

Dahil napatunayan na si ### ang gumawa ng post sa Facebook at natugunan ang lahat ng kinakailangang elemento ng karahasang sikolohikal, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na naaangkop ang Seksyon 6 ng Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Itinatakda ng probisyong ito ang pagpapataw ng mas mabigat na parusa sa mga krimen at paglabag na ginawa gamit ang ICT. Mas mabigat ang parusa dahil maaaring magamit ang ICT para makaiwas ang mga nagkasala sa pananagutan, makapinsala sa mas maraming tao, o magdulot ng mas malaking pinsala.

Batay sa kahulugan ng ICT, sinabi ng Korte na ang mga social media platform tulad ng Facebook ay maituturing na ICT systems dahil pinapayagan ng mga ito ang mga gumagamit na lumikha, magpadala, tumanggap, mag-imbak, at magproseso ng mga datos na elektronikong mensahe gamit ang mga kompyuter, mobile phone, o iba pang katulad na kagamitang elektroniko.

Sa kasong ito, nakasaad sa sakdal na ginawa ni ### ang post sa Facebook gamit ang kanyang “Facebook Messenger Account… na maaaring makita ng sinuman (set to public view).” Ayon sa Korte Suprema, sapat na ang pahayag na ito para ipakitang ginamit ang ICT bilang isang nagpapabigat na sirkumstansya. Bagaman hindi tahasang nabanggit ang terminong “ICT,” malinaw pa ring ipinaalam sa sakdal kay ### na siya ay inaakusahan ng paggawa ng karahasang sikolohikal laban kay AAA sa pamamagitan ng Facebook, na kabilang sa saklaw ng isang ICT system.

Napatunayan ng prosekusyon ang nasabing pahayag sa paglilitis.

Dahil dito, itinaas ng Korte ng isang antas ang parusa mula sa pagkakakulong na anim na buwan at isang araw hanggang walong taon at isang araw, tungo sa pagkakakulong na anim na taon at isang araw hanggang 14 na taon, walong buwan, at isang araw. Nanatili naman ang multang PHP 100,000. Inatasan din si ### na sumailalim sa psychological counselling o psychiatric treatment.

Basahin ang buong press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Basahin ang buong kopya ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

11/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

11/08/2026

The (SC) has declared unconstitutional the Department of Agriculture’s (DA) directive to commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to be tracked and monitored, and to report and send fisheries data, as it violates rights against unreasonable searches, seizures, due process, and equal protection under the law.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DA and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 266 unconstitutional for failing to pass the rational basis test.

In 2020, the DA, through the BFAR, issued FAO No. 266 requiring all commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to adopt Vessel Monitoring Measures (VMM). These measures include a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to track and monitor vessels, and an Electronic Reporting System (ERS) to record and transmit fisheries data. FAO No. 266 also mandated the securing of Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers from the National Telecommunications Commission.

Royale Fishing Corporation, Bonanza Fishing and Market Resources, Inc., and RBL Fishing Corporation (Royale Fishing et al.), operators of Philippine commercial fishing vessels, challenged FAO No. 266 before the RTC through a petition for declaratory relief. They argued that the continuous monitoring requirements violated their constitutional rights, exposed confidential business information and trade secrets, and denied them equal protection because only commercial fishing vessels were required to comply, even though the Fisheries Code also covers municipal and distant-water fishing vessels.

The SC upheld the RTC’s ruling that FAO No. 266 is unconstitutional.

It explained that courts apply different standards in reviewing government regulations. While stricter standards apply to regulations affecting fundamental rights and certain classifications, the rational basis test applies to cases that do not fall under those standards.

Under this test, the government must show a legitimate interest and a reasonable connection between that interest and the methods used. The SC found the Republic failed this because it did not adequately prove that the VMS and ERS requirements were reasonably connected to preventing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

In particular, the SC found that the VMS was not effective in detecting IUU fishing violations other than fishing within protected or restricted areas. It also noted that the expected output from VMS is no longer different from existing reporting requirements already being complied by the fishing vessels.

The SC likewise ruled that FAO No. 266 authorized monitoring beyond what RA 8550, as amended, allows. The Fisheries Code defines “monitoring” as the continuous observation of fishing effort, expressed through factors such as “number of days or hours of fishing, characteristics of fishery resources, and resource yields.”

According to the SC, this definition does not extend to the continuous tracking of the locations or destinations of commercial fishing vessels. It emphasized that RA 10654 does not require operators to disclose their location 24/7, recognizing that fishing grounds constitute proprietary business information.

While recognizing that combating illegal fishing and protecting the country’s marine resources are legitimate and compelling State interests, the SC emphasized that these objectives cannot justify measures that unnecessarily infringe constitutional rights, particularly when the same goals may be achieved through lawful and less restrictive means.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170021

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169871

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169872

Read the Separate Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169884

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169898

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169910

Read the Concurrence and Dissent of Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169918

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169926

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

11/08/2026

Nagpasya ang na ang mga empleyado na ilegal na tinanggal sa trabaho ay may karapatan hindi lamang sa buong 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘸𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴 kundi maging sa paghuhulog ng kanilang mga kontribusyon sa Social Security System (SSS).

Sa isang Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, nagpasya ang Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema na nagpapatuloy ang obligasyon ng employer na maghulog ng kontribusyon ng kawani nito sa SSS sa loob ng panahong saklaw ng ilegal na pagkakatanggal sa kawani.

Apat na manggagawa ang ilegal na tinanggal sa trabaho ng Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC). Inatasan ng National Labor Relations Commission ang LSC na ibalik ang apat sa kanilang dating mga posisyon at bayaran sila ng buong 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘸𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴 . Nang maging pinal na ang desisyon, hiniling ng mga empleyado sa LSC na ihulog ang kanilang mga kontribusyon sa SSS para sa panahong saklaw ng kanilang 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘸𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴 para maging kwalipikado sila sa mga benepisyo sa pagreretiro.

Tumanggi ang LSC at iginiit na sa ilalim ng 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, natatapos ang obligasyon nitong maghulog ng mga kontribusyon sa SSS sa oras na matigil ang pagtatrabaho ng mga empleyado, anuman ang dahilan o legalidad ng kanilang pagkakatanggal sa trabaho.

Isinantabi ng Social Security Commission (SSC) ang posisyon ng LSC at inatasan itong bayaran ang mga nasabing kontribusyon. Ayon sa SSC, dahil ilegal ang pagkakatanggal sa mga empleyado, itinuturing na nagpatuloy ang relasyon ng employer at empleyado sa panahong hindi sila nakapagtrabaho dahil sa kanilang ilegal na pagkakatanggal.

Sa pagpapatibay na nanatiling obligado ang LSC na ihulog ang mga kontribusyon ng mga empleyado sa SSS para sa panahong saklaw ng kanilang 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘸𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na sa ilalim ng 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 294 ng 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 ay may karapatan ang mga empleyadong ilegal na tinanggal sa trabaho sa buong 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘸𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴 at iba pang mga benepisyo.

Paliwanag ng Korte Suprema, itinuturing na nagpapatuloy ang pagtatrabaho ng mga nasabing empleyado sa panahong saklaw ng kanilang 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘸𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴. Dahil dito, may karapatan sila sa benepisyong dapat na naipagkaloob sa kanila sa panahong iyon.

Dahil nabigo ang LSC na ihulog ang mga kontribusyon sa 𝘴𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 ng mga empleyadong ilegal na tinanggal sa trabaho, pinanagot ito ng Korte Suprema sa pagbabayad ng tatlong porsiyentong multa bawat buwan sa mga naturang kontribusyon.

Basahin ang 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘦 sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165713.

Sumunod sa 𝘊𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘵 𝘈𝘵𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

10/08/2026

📍2F MT Cabras Building, Poblacion II, Sagay City, Negros Occ.
(Above New Mercury Drug Store)

10/08/2026