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Atty. Bon Cyrell Villacarlos Plazos, Pag-asa B, Bato, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur (2026)

09/05/2026

𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘢𝘭𝘴𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘢 𝘋𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘛𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘥 (𝘋𝘛𝘙) 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘵𝘩 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘍𝘢𝘭𝘴𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘖𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘋𝘰𝘤𝘶𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴. 𝘐𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘺 𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦 𝘥𝘶𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘦𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘯 𝘨𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘷𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘱𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘣𝘺 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘭 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘪𝘳𝘴𝘵 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦.

𝗠𝗔𝗬 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲 𝗖𝗔𝗦𝗘 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗺𝘂𝗹𝗴𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝟰 𝗙𝗲𝗯𝗿𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲

𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘢𝘭𝘴𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘢 𝘋𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘛𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘥 (𝘋𝘛𝘙) 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘵𝘩 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘍𝘢𝘭𝘴𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘖𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘋𝘰𝘤𝘶𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴. 𝘐𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘺 𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦 𝘥𝘶𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘦𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘯 𝘨𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘷𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘱𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘣𝘺 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘭 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘪𝘳𝘴𝘵 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦.

𝘜𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘢𝘯𝘰𝘯 𝘝, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 26 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 2025 𝘊𝘊𝘈𝘊𝘖𝘗, 𝘢 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘣𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥 𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘯 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘭𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘢𝘴 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭 𝘢𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘮𝘶𝘭𝘵𝘪𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘴𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘢 𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘭𝘦 𝘢𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨.

𝗠𝗔𝗥𝗜𝗧𝗘𝗦𝗦 𝗠. 𝗬𝗔𝗠𝗕𝗔 𝘃𝘀. 𝗟𝗨𝗭𝗩𝗜𝗠𝗜𝗡𝗗𝗔 𝗚. 𝗛𝗘𝗥𝗡𝗔𝗡𝗗𝗘
𝗔.𝗠. 𝗡𝗼. 𝗣-𝟮𝟱-𝟮𝟰𝟴, 𝗙𝗲𝗯𝗿𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟰, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲

𝐅𝐀𝐂𝐓𝐒:
Maritess M. Yamba (Complainant), a court stenographer at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Buenavista, Agusan Del Norte, was authorized to attend the Court Stenographers Association of the Philippines (COSTRAPHIL) convention in Dipolog City from April 26 to 28, 2023. She secured financial assistance from the local government unit (LGU) for her expenses but ultimately decided not to attend.

Upon learning this, Luzviminda G. Hernandez (Respondent), the Clerk of Court II of the same court, decided to travel to Dipolog City. Despite not being a court stenographer and lacking official authorization, Hernandez attended the convention. During the event, Hernandez:

Used Yamba's identity to attend the convention, despite Yamba's explicit refusal to allow the use of her name.

Caused the issuance of a Certificate of Attendance and an Acknowledgment Receipt under Yamba's name.

Signed reimbursement documents (Certificate of Travel Completed, Itinerary of Travel, and Obligation Request) "for" Yamba without authority.

Received an LGU check amounting to PHP 11,448.00 payable to Yamba.

Falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR) for April 2023, making it appear that she reported for work at the MTC from April 26 to 28, 2023, when she was actually in Dipolog City.

Hernandez defended herself by claiming she attended upon the suggestion of their Presiding Judge, that she only used Yamba's name on the first day, that she voluntarily returned the check, and that her trip constituted "official business."

𝐈𝐒𝐒𝐔𝐄:
𝙄𝙨 𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙇𝙪𝙯𝙫𝙞𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙖 𝙂. 𝙃𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙖𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙯 𝙖𝙙𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙡𝙮 𝙡𝙞𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙞𝙛 𝙨𝙤, 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙖𝙧𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙧𝙤𝙥𝙧𝙞𝙖𝙩𝙚 𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙖𝙡𝙩𝙞𝙚𝙨 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙥𝙪𝙡𝙨𝙤𝙧𝙮 𝙧𝙚𝙩𝙞𝙧𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩?

𝐑𝐔𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐆:
YES. The Supreme Court found Luzviminda G. Hernandez GUILTY of three distinct administrative offenses: Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, and Gross Misconduct.

The Court ruled that:

Serious Dishonesty: Hernandez employed fraud and falsification of official documents, causing grave prejudice to the government by creating a false appearance of authorized attendance and entitlement to public funds.

Falsification of Official Documents: She knowingly made false statements in her DTR by indicating she was at work when she was in Dipolog City. She also falsified LGU reimbursement papers by signing them on behalf of Yamba without authority.

Gross Misconduct: Her repeated acts of falsification and misrepresentation demonstrated a clear intent to violate the law and a flagrant, persistent disregard for established rules and procedures.

𝘼𝘾𝘾𝙊𝙍𝘿𝙄𝙉𝙂𝙇𝙔, 𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙇𝙪𝙯𝙫𝙞𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙖 𝙂. 𝙃𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙖𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙯 𝙞𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙙 𝙂𝙐𝙄𝙇𝙏𝙔 𝙤𝙛 𝙨𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙤𝙪𝙨 𝙙𝙞𝙨𝙝𝙤𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙮, 𝙛𝙖𝙡𝙨𝙞𝙛𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙛 𝙤𝙛𝙛𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝙙𝙤𝙘𝙪𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙜𝙧𝙤𝙨𝙨𝙢𝙞𝙨𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙘𝙩. 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙤𝙧𝙙𝙚𝙧𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙁𝙊𝙍𝙁𝙀𝙄𝙏𝙐𝙍𝙀 𝙤𝙛 𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙞𝙧𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙩𝙞𝙧𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙗𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙛𝙞𝙩𝙨, 𝙚𝙭𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙧𝙪𝙚𝙙 𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙫𝙚 𝙘𝙧𝙚𝙙𝙞𝙩𝙨 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝘿𝙄𝙎𝙌𝙐𝘼𝙇𝙄𝙁𝙄𝘾𝘼𝙏𝙄𝙊𝙉 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙣𝙨𝙩𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙤𝙧 𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙤𝙞𝙣𝙩𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙣𝙮 𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘 𝙤𝙛𝙛𝙞𝙘𝙚, 𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙡𝙪𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙜𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙤𝙬𝙣𝙚𝙙 𝙤𝙧 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙩𝙧𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙚𝙙 𝙘𝙤𝙧𝙥𝙤𝙧𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨.

FULL:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/P-25-48.pdf

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𝐒𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐁𝐐𝐀𝐬
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𝚂𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚌𝚛𝚒𝚋𝚎 𝙽𝙾𝚆

🌱✨

29/04/2026

The Supreme Court clarified that the term “forthwith” in Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution means within a reasonable time, which may be longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances of each case.

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, April 29, 2026, dismissed the petition for mandamus filed by Catalino Aldea Generillo, Jr., which sought to compel the Senate to immediately convene as an impeachment court to try the charges against Vice President Sara Duterte.

In a 14-0-1 Decision written by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the SC held that mandamus, which is meant to enforce a clear legal duty, was not the proper remedy. It ruled that the Senate’s actions within its sphere cannot be revised or controlled by the judicial department through mandamus. As a co-equal constitutional body, the Senate’s exercise of its duties is beyond the SC’s power of review, except in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

However, specifically for this case and in the interest of equity, the SC treated the petition as one for certiorari and proceeded to determine whether the Senate acted unlawfully or abused its discretion when it did not convene immediately as an impeachment court during its session break.

Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the Senate acted on the impeachment complaint in a timely manner.

While the Constitution requires the House of Representatives to act within a certain number of session days on an impeachment complaint, it does not specify a fixed timeframe for the Senate to start an impeachment trial. It simply provides that the trial “shall forthwith proceed,” leaving the timing to the Senate’s discretion.

The SC clarified that the term “forthwith” in Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution means within a reasonable time, which may be longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances of each case. This allows the Senate to make the necessary preparations to convene as an impeachment court.

While the Constitution does not set an exact date for the trial, the Senate must avoid undue delay to uphold the principle that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people.

The SC considered the petition moot because the Senate had begun impeachment preparations, and the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Duterte were nullified by the SC’s July 25, 2025 Decision and January 28, 2026 Resolution in Duterte v. House of Representatives. A case is moot when subsequent events remove any issues, making court rulings unnecessary. Since no Articles of Impeachment remained, the SC had no reason to order the Senate to convene as an impeachment court.

Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen concurred only in the result, that the petition was moot. However he was of the position that the impeachment court should have been convened immediately and that the impeachment court—not merely the Senate President—should have taken charge of organizing that court. (Updated as of April 29, 2026, 5:30 p.m.)

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa took no part.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164510

The full text of the Decision will be uploaded to the SC website once available.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

03/01/2026

SUPREME COURT DECLARES MARRIAGE VOID DUE TO WIFE’S CONTROLLING CONDUCT.

The Court ruled that the wife’s psychological incapacity was demonstrated through her domineering and controlling attitude, to the extent that she constantly demanded that her husband update her on his whereabouts.

SUPREME COURT DECLARES MARRIAGE VOID DUE TO WIFE'S CONTROLLING CONDUCT

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) ruling that nullified the marriage of a couple on the ground of the wife's psychological incapacity demonstrated through her domineering and controlling attitude to the extent that she always demands her husband to always update her of his whereabouts.

In a 14-page decision authored by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, the SC's Third Division has declared void from the beginning the marriage between a couple on the ground of the wife's psychological incapacity as provided under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The couple were married on January 22, 1995. They had no antenuptial agreement, and their property relations are governed by the regime of absolute community of property.

The husband narrated that even prior to the wedding, the psychological incapacity of his wife, whose childhood was marked with overindulgence at a time when her pathogenic family was still wealthy, was demonstrated by her domineering attitude coupled with her lazy and poor study habits.

He added that after the wedding, the wife's incapacity to perform her marital obligations supposedly became more apparent given that she continued to be domineering and controlling as she required the husband to always update her of his whereabouts. She also displayed an arrogant and haughty attitude, especially towards his mother.

More than these, the husband also claimed that the wife's psychologically abused their children when she physically attacked him in the presence of their kids while he was holding their daughter, and reached the point when she sneaked in the house of the husband's mother to take the kids home without telling anyone. This paved the way for him to file a petition for nullification of marriage.

A clinical psychologist testified that the wife suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with paranoid features, which is categorized as grave, incurable, and with antecedents. The expert recommended the nullification of their marriage.

In her defense, the wife countered that it was the husband who abused their children, not only psychologically but also sexually. She averred that in times of disagreement, her husband also physically and verbally abused her.

The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petition and declared void ab initio their marriage. The CA gave much weight to the psychological reports, which showed that the wife's psychological incapacity is grave and incurable. Aggrieved the wife elevated the case before the Supreme Court.

In denying her appeal, the high court found no valid reason to overturn the consistent findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA, which are supported by the evidence on record.

It cited the landmark case of Tan-Andal vs. Andal, which requires that in order to grant the nullification of marriage due to psychological incapacity, the same must be grave enough to cause the couple's inability, not mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty, to perform the essential marital obligations.

It must also be shown that the psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and it must be proven that the spouse, by reason of his or her psychological incapacity, persistently fails to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The SC agreed to the CA finding that the evidence presented by the husband is sufficient to establish that the wife suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder with paranoid features through the accounts of his witnesses, corroborated by the psychological report and testimony of the clinical psychologist.

It also emphasized that the nature of the wife's psychological incapacity is severe and pervasive, citing the psychological reports that revealed it affects all areas of her life, to the point that she is unable to perform her essential marital obligations to her husband.

The high court also took into consideration that it is quite apparent that the wife's psychological incapacity, as shown by the behavioral manifestations of her personality disorder, existed even before their marriage, as the same is rooted in her childhood and carried over into her adulthood.

It ruled that since their marriage was declared void, the rules on co-ownership, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, govern the liquidation, partition, and distribution of their common properties.

Hence, the highest bench deemed it proper to remand the case back to the trial court, as it appears that both parties have raised issues regarding their property relations in their respective pleadings.

17/12/2025

SUPREME COURT ACQUITS MAN OF VAWC CHARGE AFTER COMPLAINANT FAILS TO PROVE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP.

The highest bench underscored that since the complainant failed to prove that she still had a relationship with Caridaoan, her alleged mental or emotional anguish could not be attributed to his actions of entering into a relationship with Michelle.

"Truly, ending a relationship is heartbreaking and causes one to experience, among others, emotional distress, anxiety, and depression. However, that the woman experiences mental or emotional distress in a relationship does not automatically translate to a crime of psychological violence and criminal liability under Republic Act No. 9262," the Supreme Court said. ⚖️

SUPREME COURT ACQUITS MAN OF VAWC CHARGE AFTER COMPLAINANT FAILS TO PROVE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP

The Supreme Court (SC) has acquitted a man accused of violating Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act), after ruling that his live-in partner failed to prove that he was engaged in an illicit affairs with his secretary while maintaining a relationship with her.

In a 23-page ruling penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa, the SC's Third Division granted the petition for review on certiorari filed by the accused, Ronel Caridaoan, and reversed his criminal conviction for violating Section 5(i) of RA 9262, or the Anti-VAWC Act.

The case stemmed from the complaint filed by Caridaoan's live-in partner, who alleged that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously committed an act of emotional abuse and/or psychological abuse by having an affair with another woman named Michelle Agcanas.

Caridaoan and the complainant had been living together without the benefit of marriage since 1998. During their cohabitation, they put up a business of a 24-hour car wash. In 2009, the complainant hired Michelle as secretary. Since the business was operating on a 24-hour basis, they took turns in tending the shop; the complainant and Caridaoan worked during the day and Michelle at night. Michelle was likewise staying with them at their rented house.

In 2010, the complainant alleged that she confirmed that Caridaoan and Michelle were having a relationship. Despite this act of infidelity, the complainant told Caridaoan that she could not continue with her life without him that's why she agreed to an arrangement in which Caridaoan would spend the daytime with Michelle and the nighttime with her.

The complainant added that after her heart surgery in June 2010, Caridaoan would seldom go home as per their arrangement. This paved the way for her to file a complaint after she sought psychological consultation. The psychiatrist diagnosed her with a panic disorder and concluded that she was a victim of psychological abuse.

Meanwhile, Caridaoan denied the allegations, emphasizing that he and the complainant had long since parted ways. He said that he later courted Michelle at a time when he no longer had any relationship, and whom he married in 2019.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused for violating Section 5(i) of the Anti-VAWC Act, highlighting that the complainant suffered from battered woman syndrome characterized by intense anxiety, inadequacy, weakness, and insecurity brought about by Caridaoan's relationship with their secretary. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision, paving the way for him to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In acquitting the accused, the SC ruled that the complainant failed to prove that her mental or emotional anguish was a result of or directly attributable to the alleged acts intentionally committed by Caridaoan.

It gave credence to the testimony of Caridaoan, who narrated that he did not have a relationship with Michelle while he was still living with the complainant.

The Court added that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish that Caridaoan intended to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation to the complainant. It explained that since psychological violence under RA 9262 is a mala in se crime, good faith and lack of criminal intent can be used as a defense.

The SC noted that to secure a conviction for psychological abuse under RA 9262, the requisite criminal intent, or mens rea, is "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation" upon the victim, which the complainant failed to establish.

It also highlighted the unclear and inconsistent statements of the complainant as to the supposed arrangement imposed by Caridaoan to supposedly keep their relationship.

The highest bench underscored that since the complainant failed to prove that she still had a relationship with Caridaoan, her alleged mental or emotional anguish could not be attributed to his actions of entering into a relationship with Michelle.

"Truly, ending a relationship is heartbreaking and causes one to experience, among others, emotional distress, anxiety, and depression. However, that the woman experiences mental or emotional distress in a relationship does not automatically translate to a crime of psychological violence and criminal liability under Republic Act No. 9262," the Supreme Court said.

09/07/2025

A doctor who offers proper medical advice, clearly explains the risks of a procedure, and secures proper consent from the patient is NOT LIABLE for medical malpractice.

The (SC) has ruled that a doctor who offers proper medical advice, clearly explains the risks of a procedure, and secures proper consent from the patient is not liable for medical malpractice.

In a Decision written by then Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division upheld the dismissal of a complaint against Dr. Avelino P. Aventura (Dr. Aventura), Head of the Philippine Heart Center Surgery Department, for the death of his patient, Quintin Que (Quintin).

Records of the case show that Elpidio Que filed a lawsuit for damages against Dr. Aventura, accusing him of medical malpractice in connection with the death of his father, Quintin, following a failed stenting procedure.

Quintin was first brought to Dr. Aventura due to an aneurysm in his aortic arch, a life-threatening condition. Dr. Aventura advised Quintin to first undergo a heart bypass operation and then address the aneurysm after. The bypass operation was successful.

However, Quentin’s aneurysm worsened. Dr. Aventura offered his family two options: an open-chest surgery or a newer, less invasive stenting procedure.

Dr. Aventura also informed the Que family that neither procedure guaranteed success and that stenting still posed the risk of death. He clarified he would not be the one performing the stenting, as it was outside his expertise. After introducing Quintin to visiting Belgian specialist Dr. Eric Verhoeven, who would do the stenting procedure, Quintin consented.

During the procedure, Dr. Verhoeven attempted to insert the custom stent three times but failed due to a bend in Quintin’s artery. As a result, Quintin suffered a stroke and never woke up.

Ruling that Dr. Aventura was not negligent and did not commit medical malpractice, the SC explained that medical malpractice occurs when a doctor fails to deliver the standard of care expected from other doctors in similar circumstances, resulting in harm to the patient.

A basis for malpractice is the lack of informed consent, which occurs when a patient agrees to a procedure without being fully informed about its risks and potential outcomes.

In this case, the SC found that Dr. Aventura clearly informed Quintin and his family about the risks associated with the stenting procedure, including the risk of death. He also clarified that another doctor would perform the procedure, and Quintin signed the consent forms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/jjjx4k7b.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/5n6a6e7p

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://tinyurl.com/yzmhvbbn.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

18/06/2025

When a Filipino asks a Philippine court to recognize a foreign divorce, they only need to prove the law of the country where the divorce was obtained – not the law of their foreign spouse’s nationality.

Rosary Kristine I. Anido v. Republic of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 253527 , October 21, 2024]

The (SC) has ruled that when a Filipino asks a Philippine court to recognize a foreign divorce, they only need to prove the law of the country where the divorce was obtained – not the law of their foreign spouse’s nationality.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division sent a case back to the Court of Appeals (CA) to give a Filipina a chance to properly prove the divorce laws of Kentucky, United States of America (U.S.A).

The Filipina married a Peruvian citizen in New Jersey, U.S.A; they later settled in Kentucky. Due to marital issues, the husband ended the marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Kentucky court.

The Filipina then filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court in the Philippines to have the divorce recognized. She submitted a copy of the divorce decree, along with printouts of Kentucky and Peruvian marriage laws.

The SC clarified that in recognition of foreign divorce cases, what matters is the law of the country that issued the divorce decree. Since the divorce was granted in Kentucky, only Kentucky law needed to be proven.

The SC explained that under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, a Filipino may remarry if their foreign spouse gets a valid divorce abroad that allows them to remarry. Philippine courts must first determine if the divorce was valid under the applicable foreign law, and the Filipino spouse must prove this law.

The SC also emphasized the relevance of the international law principle of comity of nations. This principle allows judicial acts of one country – such as court rulings or decrees – to be recognized in another, based on mutual respect between states. It also acknowledges the authority of a foreign state not only over its citizens but also over other individuals under its jurisdiction, like legal residents.

However, the SC returned the case to the CA to give the Filipina, who submitted a mere printout of Kentucky law, a chance to submit the proper documents.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/4jhyh8vv.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/ympmypuz.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

16/06/2025

There can be no conviction without proof of the identity of the culprit beyond a reasonable doubt, as the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to establish the identity of the perpetrator.

People of the Philippines vs. Aron Akil y Gumalon [G.R. No. 265570. April 7, 2025]

| The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that there can be no conviction without proof of the identity of the culprit beyond a reasonable doubt, as the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to establish the identity of the perpetrator.

In an 18-page ruling penned by Associate Justice Samuel Gaerlan, the SC's Third Division overturned the conviction of Aron Akil for the crime of carnapping, as defined and penalized under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 10883, otherwise known as the New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016, for allegedly stealing a motorcycle owned by JR Belardo.

The subject motorcycle was reported missing on August 22, 2017. Belardo checked the CCTV footage of the area where he parked the subject motor vehicle. It revealed that a tall man wearing a face mask, a ball cap, and sunglasses took away the subject motor vehicle. While Belardo did not see the said person's face, he saw that he was wearing a yellow Fubu shirt and faded pants and carried a sling bag.

Belardo then went to the nearby police station to report the incident. One month later, he received a call from the police informing him that an individual was arrested for a separate motornapping incident that has similarities with the person caught on CCTV who took away his motorcycle.

The said person was Akil. Several items were recovered from his possession, such as a red ball cap, sunglasses, a black sling bag, a black mask, and a yellow Fubu shirt. Through these items and Belardo's recollection of the CCTV footage that he saw earlier, he was able to identify Akil as the person who stole the subject motor vehicle.

The complaint was then filed against him for the crime of carnapping, but professing innocence, Akil vehemently denied the accusation. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals convicted Akil, saying there was "too much of a coincidence that two people stealing motorcycles on two different occasions would be wearing exactly the same articles of clothing as accessories," This prompted him to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In abandoning his conviction, the SC found that no direct evidence exists to prove that Akil was the one who stole the subject motor vehicle. The evidence the prosecution has is purely circumstantial evidence, which doesn't sufficiently prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

“Measured with the standards for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the Court finds merit in the appeal and acquits Akil. The court is not convinced that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution sufficiently established Akil's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime of carjacking,” the Supreme Court said.

The court held that the identification made by Belardo is unreliable and cannot be considered as a positive identification of Akil as the one who is responsible for the disappearance of his motorcycle.

It pointed out that since the identification was done through a show-up in a police station where Akil was being detained, it is tainted with apparent suggestiveness because Belardo knew that the purpose of why he was informed by the police was to identify the person who stole the subject motor vehicle.

The high court also found that even Belardo himself admitted that he was never able to see the face of the perpetrator of the crime in question, as he failed to witness the actual commission of the said crime. The only basis for how Belardo saw the perpetrator was through CCTV footage, which was technically unreliable.

“On this score alone, there is a nagging doubt that Akil and the person in the CCTV footage are one and the same person, to the exclusion of other suspects. Belardo's out-of-court identification of Akil cannot constitute a positive identification of the latter as the perpetrator of the crime in question,” the Supreme Court said.

The extrajudicial confession allegedly made by Akil to Belardo while he was languishing in detention cannot be used against him, as he was deprived of any legal assistance from his counsel of choice while making the same.

“In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Akil is the perpetrator of the crime of Camapping committed against Belardo, as well as the patent invalidity of his extrajudicial confession, the Court must overturn his conviction and render a judgment of acquittal in his favor,” the Supreme Court concluded.

Atty. Bon Cyrell Villacarlos Plazos

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