Atty.Chester Clark Dula

09/05/2025

SC Uses Clear, Straightforward Language in Discussion of R**e to Ensure Accuracy in Court Judgments |

“The safety and dignity of all persons are worth the disconcerting conversation that must be had, if [the Court] is to dispense with honest justice.”

Thus, held the Supreme Court En Banc in a landmark ruling where, using straightforward language, it clarified when the crime of r**e through pe**le pe*******on is considered consummated.

In a 40-page Decision penned by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the Court affirmed the Valenzuela Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) conviction of Efren Agao of two counts of Statutory R**e, as also upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA). The Supreme Court, however, modified the lower courts’ rulings and found Agao guilty of one count of Statutory R**e and one count of Simple R**e.

In ruling against Agao, the Supreme Court stressed the need to use unambiguous language in the resolution of r**e cases. “The Court now recognizes that there is perhaps no other way to reconcile and refine the current jurisprudence on r**e than to peel away the euphemistic shrouds that have been resorted to so far, and instead inform case law with the exact anatomical situs of the pertinent body parts referred to in jurisprudence, which, unlike other matters that attend the crime of r**e, are uncolored, self-evident and inarguable in their precision.”

The Court noted that the use in jurisprudence on r**e cases of “euphemistic but largely inaccurate descriptions have only so far convoluted matters regarding the act of r**e that should have been kept unambiguous and definitive.”

Thus, in laying down the operative definition of the minimum threshold for a finding of consummated r**e, the Court proceeded to a brief descriptive discussion, with illustrations, of the parts of the external female genitalia, including “a clear indication of the situs of the pertinent parts, in order to categorically delineate for the bench and the bar which physical threshold, when crossed, constitutes r**e in the consummated stage.”

The Court then concluded that “mere introduction, however slight, into the cleft of the l***a majora by a p***s that is capable of pe*******on, regardless of whether such pe**le pe*******on is thereafter fully achieved, consummates the crime of r**e.

Reconciling the diverging rulings in existing jurisprudence, the Court clarified that “mere touch” of the p***s on the l***a majora legally contemplates not mere surface touch or skin contact, but the slightest pe*******on of the v***al or pudendal cleft, however minimum in degree.”

The Court stressed that such clarification is necessary, as otherwise any nature and degree of touch of a p***s of the female genitalia can be considered consummated r**e, effectively resulting in all sexual assaults involving a p***s and the v***a to only either be acts of lasciviousness or consummated r**e, with no gradation of the attempted stage in between.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-uses-clear-straightforward-language-in-discussion-of-r**e-to-ensure-accuracy-in-court-judgments/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/248049-people-of-the-philippines-vs-efren-agao-y-anonuevo/.

09/05/2025

SC: In Criminal Law, Intent to Commit Crime is Different from Intent to Perpetrate the Act |

Dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita, where criminal intent is not an element, does not discharge the prosecution’s burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the prohibited act was done by the accused intentionally.

Thus ruled the Supreme Court’s Third Division, in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, granting the petition for review on certiorari filed by Felix G. Valenzona (Valenzona). The petition challenged the rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA) which had affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) conviction of Valenzona for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree (PD 957).

The Court clarified that while jurisprudence has recognized that a violation of PD 957 is regarded as malum prohibitum, or such offenses which are prohibited regardless of the person’s intent, the prosecution nevertheless still needs to show that the prohibited act was done intentionally by the accused.

The Court thus proceeded to distinguish between ‘intent to commit the crime’ and ‘intent to perpetrate the act’: “[W]hile a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime regarded as malum prohibitum, he or she may still be held liable if he or she did intend to commit an act that is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. Thus, for acts that are mala prohibita, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown.”

“While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent which is punished by crimes mala in se,” held the Court.

Thus, for crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously, provided that it is established that the accused had the volition or intent to commit the prohibited act.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-in-criminal-law-intent-to-commit-crime-is-different-from-intent-to-perpetrate-the-act/.

Read G.R. No. 248584 (Valenzona v. People) in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/248584-the-people-of-the-philippines-vs-felix-g-valenzona/.

09/05/2025

09/05/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that courts are not bound by parental custody agreements when these do not serve the child’s best interest.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division granted the petition filed by Jeffrey Rosacay Empuerto and his parents challenging a Court of Appeals ruling which upheld the validity of a compromise agreement between Jeffrey and Sheena Cabrillos, the mother of his child.

The SC sent the case back to the Family Court for determination of parental custody. It also gave custody to petitioners Jeffrey and his parents, who have actual care of the child, while the case remains pending.

Jeffrey and Sheena had a child in 2013. The couple eventually separated, with Sheena moving with their child to her parents’ home, and with Jeffrey exercising custody over the latter during long vacations.

In 2020, the child’s visit to Jeffrey was extended due to the COVID-19 lockdown, with Jeffrey refusing to return the child to Sheena even after restrictions were lifted. Sheena thus filed a complaint with the police and a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus with the Family Court.

The Family Court issued the writ and terminated the case. It adopted in an order the agreement between Jeffrey and Sheena that the latter would have custody of the child by July 2021. The Court of Appeals upheld this agreement as a provisional custody arrangement.

Petitioners then argued before the SC that the mere agreement between the parents before trial cannot determine the issue of a child’s custody.

Ruling in petitioners’ favor, the SC stressed that a petition for habeas corpus in custody cases is meant to determine who has rightful custody, not merely to secure a child’s appearance in court.

Trial courts must consider the totality of circumstances and grant custody only if:

- the petitioner has a legal right to custody;
- the child is being kept from them by the other party; and
- being with the petitioner is in the best interest of the child.

In this case, the SC found that the Family Court failed to evaluate these factors, relying solely on the parents’ agreement without conducting a case study or assessing parental fitness. It added that compromise agreements between parents as to a child’s custody are frowned upon. Courts should not simply approve custody agreements but must ensure that the child’s rights and welfare are protected.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/3p6v2cc2.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/52yna5zv.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

09/05/2025

The has reiterated that the presumption that a letter was properly delivered, based on a post office’s registry return receipt, does not apply when strong evidence suggests otherwise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division held that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) wrongly dismissed Victoria Labastida’s (Labastida) appeal for being filed late.

Labastida, the Municipal Planning and Development Officer of Saint Bernard, Leyte, was dismissed by the Disciplining Authority of the Office of the Municipal Mayor for gross neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on a complaint filed by respondent Monina Quires (Quires).

A copy of the Disciplining Authority’s June 10, 2016 decision was reportedly sent to Labastida by registered mail, as shown by a registry return receipt marked “refused to accept 06-14-16.”

However, Labastida denied ever receiving the decision. She claimed that she only learned about it on March 8, 2017, when she received a notice of suspension. She filed an appeal with the CSC on March 16, 2017, which the CSC dismissed for having been filed beyond the 15-day appeal period.

Remanding the case to the CSC for further consideration of Labastida’s appeal, the SC concluded that Labastida had successfully overturned the presumption that the decision was properly served on June 14, 2016.

The SC explained that presumptions under the Rules on Evidence, specifically that official duties are regularly performed and that mail is properly delivered, can be overturned by strong, opposing evidence.

In this case, Labastida denied receiving the decision, supported by the succeeding Mayor’s statement that neither his office nor the Human Resources Management Office of Saint Bernard had any record of the alleged June 10, 2016 decision or any administrative case leading to it. Instead, they were only notified of the decision on March 8, 2017. The registry return receipt also bears the signature of an unidentified postal official. These shifted the burden of proof to the complainant to show that the decision was actually received.

The SC also clarified that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, then in effect, mere presentation of a registry return receipt is not enough to prove proper service. It must be accompanied by a postmaster’s affidavit confirming when, how, and to whom the delivery was made. This requirement remains under the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/yckbpt78.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/4rbnppps.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.