Meti Ukpeh, Uyo (2026)

24/08/2026

*OBIAJULU v. STATE (2024) LPELR-62782(CA)*

*- Position of the law on the admissibility of electronically generated evidence _(video evidence)_* _italicized emphasis is mine_

_"Therefore, exhibit P1 is covered by section 258(1) of Evidence Act 2011, the Court pronounces that it is a document and has clearly defined the essence of demonstrating the video Exhibit 1. "An electronically-generated document which has been admitted in evidence upon fulfilling all pre-conditions, and which is not taken as read by consent, ought to be demonstrated or played to prove the facts alleged; otherwise, it remains a closed or 'sleeping' document, which is unusable and which need not have been brought before the trial Court or Tribunal in the first place as it would merely amount to clutter.'' (P. 205, paras. E-G) Per GALADIMA, J.S.C. at page 216, paras. G-H: The purpose of a trial in Court is essentially to establish the justice of a case based primarily on the weight and substantially of proven facts. During trials, parties are required to establish by evidence, real, oral or documentary, those facts on which their cases rest and depend. See, OBASI & ANOR V ONWUKA & ORS (1987) 7 SC (PT 11) 233. In BORNU HOLDING COMPANY LTD V BOGOCO 1970 1 ALL NR 325 BATE J held as follows: "A trial is not an investigation and; investigation is not the function of a Court. A trial is the public demonstration and testing before a Court of the cases of the contending parties..." ?When an electronically generated document which has been admitted in evidence, upon fulfilling all preconditions and it is not taken as read by consent, then it ought to be demonstrated or played to prove facts alleged otherwise it remains closed or a sleeping document.'' In the case of DICKSON V SLYVA (SUPRA) (P. 209, paras. B-D). The Court went on to hold that electronically-generated documents must be demonstrated in open Court so as to afford the proponent of the documents the opportunity of linking them with their averments in their pleadings and evidence on record, but more importantly with a view to discharging the requirement which would facilitate the Court's attachment of weight to them. The demonstration in open Court would, equally, afford the opponents the opportunity of testing and contesting their accuracy in the usual adversarial method of cross-examination. A.P.G.A. V. AL-MAKURA (2016) 5 NWLR (PT. 1505) 316; OKEREKE V. UMAHI (2016) 11 NWLR (PT. 1524) 438; ONIBUDO V. AKIBU (1982)7 SC 60. The learned trial Judge at page 147 of the record said "Furthermore, this Court examined the video recording, Exhibit P1/P2, several times the video over and over again. At 02:35, 02:58, 05:23 etc.... and proceeded to analyze and compare their Exhibit P1 and P3 as per the ingredients of kidnapping..." This means that only the learned trial judge saw and viewed it in private, this amounts to cloister justice and examining evidence in the secret of the private chambers of the trial Court. In HON HENRY SERIAKE DICKSON V CHIEF TIMIPRE MARLYN SLYVA & ORS (2016) LPELR-41257 (SC), AKAAHS JSC at page 67-69 held: "Having met the preconditions, there is no impediment in the Evidence act that would prevent the playing or demonstrating the contents of the already demonstrated DVD on any computer such as laptop projector and screen." In the same report, NWEZE JSC AT PAGE 27 held that: "The impregnable juridical postulate of our adversarial jurisprudence prohibits a judge from embarking on an inquisitorial examination of documents outside the Court room." It is anathema for a Judge to be allowed to act on what he discovered from such a document. In relation to an issue when that was not supported by evidence or was not bought to the notice of the parties to be agitated in the adversary procedure. IVIENAGBOR V BAZUAYE (1999) 9 NWLR (PT 620) 552. ?AT PAGE 31-32 PARA D-A the Court held that: it is not the duty of a Court to do cloistered justice by making an inquiry into the case outside even if such inquiry is limited to examination of documents which were in evidence when the documents had not been examined in Court and their examination out of Court disclosed matters that had not been brought out and exposed to test in Court and were not such matters that, at length, must be noticed in Court. On the other hand, their demonstration in open Court would equally afford the opposition the opportunity of testing and contesting their accuracy in the usual adversarial method of cross-examination. This omission has been heavily frowned upon by the apex Court and as held in the case of DICKSON V SLVYA (SUPRA), INAKOJU V ADELEKE 2007 ALL FWLR (PT353) 3 AT 200(SC) and OYENIYI V ADELEKE (2009) ALL FWLR PT 476) 1902 AT 1912 that where a process of production of a computer document has been completed, the concept of playing or transmission of such documents cannot amount or be equated to the actual production thereof. ?The video recording is in line with Section 15(4) of Delta State Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2017. A completion of this section in summary of the above is that since the content of the video is relevant to the proof of the offence, the allegation that the statement was taken from the video recording, to confirm this, same must be demonstrated. See NDIDI V STATE (2007)13 NWLR (PT1052) AT 659 PAR C-D. Having not demonstrated same in the open Court, it means that offence has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the video exhibit was merely dumped on the trial. The implication is that having utilized the undemonstrated video to reach findings in the judgment, it is against the principles of fairness, there was no cross examination on the content of the video, it was not challenged nor shown to the respondent in open Court. I'm afraid, the analysis behind the Court's decision is unacceptable in law and cannot hold water. ?Section 15(4)b of the Delta State Administration of Criminal Justice Law 2017 is to the effect that "Provided that in the absence of video facility such statement shall be made in writing in the presence of any person of his choice.''_ Per ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, JCA (Pp 18 - 23 Paras E - F)

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- Position of the law on the admissibility of electronically generated evidence (video evidence) _"Therefore, exhibit P1 is covered by section 258(1) of Evidence Act 2011, the Court pronounces that it is a document and has clearly defined the essence of demonstrating the video Exhibit 1. "An electro...

19/08/2026

*IBE v. A.G. & C.J, ENUGU STATE & ORS (2023) LPELR-60305(CA)*

*- Whether a power of attorney authorizing the commencement of a suit must be notarized or be by deed*

_"Section 150 of the Evidence provides thus: The Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before and authenticated by a notary public or any Court, judge, magistrate, consul or representative of Nigeria or as the case may be, of the President, was so executed and authenticated. With due respect to Mr. Alingele, the provisions above are not about the formal requirements of a power of attorney. As was held by the Supreme Court, there is no formal requirement that a power of attorney authorizing the commencement of a suit should be by deed. See VULCAN GASES LTD VS. G.F. IND. GASVERWERTUNG A.G., (2001) 9 NWLR (PT. 719) 610 and ARJANDAS MELWANI VS FIVE STAR INDUSTRIES LTD (supra). The power of attorney, Exhibit A was signed by the principal, Dr. Frank I. Ibe. The action was appropriately commenced in the name of the principal, Dr. Frank I. Ibe and not that of the agent. As a disclosed principal, any defect in capacity goes to the principal and not the agent. This therefore implies that the issue of locus standi based on any defect in the power of attorney of the agent cannot arise. More importantly, the principal has not complained about the activities of his agent and it is trite that no one else can complain about the scope of the authority given by him to his agent. See ARJANDAS MELWANI VS FIVE STAR INDUSTRIES LTD (supra). I see no merit in the contentions of the 4th Respondent in this regard."_ Per JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, JCA (Pp 25 - 26 Paras B - C)

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- Whether a power of attorney authorizing the commencement of a suit must be notarized or be by deed _"Section 150 of the Evidence provides thus: The Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before and authenticated by a notary public or...

17/08/2026

*MARK v. GOMBE & ORS (2026) LPELR-83911(SC)*

*- Whether appeals involving grounds of mixed law and facts can be made to the Supreme Court*

_"there is the compelling need to clarify the position of this Court on the deletion of Subsection (3) of 233 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered) on whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decision of the Court below on grounds of mixed law and facts. Learned senior counsel for the 1st Respondent, as seen earlier, has cited the decision in Anyanwu v. Emmanuel (supra) which was delivered by this Court on 21/03/25, wherein it was held that with the deletion of Subsection (3) of Section 233 of the Constitution, this Court no longer possesses the jurisdiction to entertain appeals on grounds of mixed law and facts from decisions of the Court below. Also, that such appeals terminate at the Court below as this Court also lacks the power to grant leave to appeal on such grounds of mixed law and facts. However, there is the decision of the Court in FRN v. Ibrahim Gidado & Ors in SC/ML/347/2025 where, after a review of the previous decisions of the Court on the issue, it was held, inter alia, that: "Subsection (2) of S. 233 provides for and lists the part of the appeal from the Court of Appeal that can lie to this Court as of right. Therefore Subsection (2) of S. 233 has not reduced the appeal from the Court of Appeal that this Court can hear and determine. It merely lists the ones that lie as of right to this Court. It is elementary that appeal as of right means the right or liberty of a party to appeal against a decision without the duty to seek the leave of Court to do so. S. 233(1) of the 1999 Constitution having given this Court the jurisdiction to hear and determine all appeals from the Court of Appeal, the necessary implication of the prescription in Subsection (2) that the ones listed shall lie as of right, is that the other appeals from the Court of Appeal to this Court must be with leave of Court.. .there is no provision in the Constitution expressly ousting or removing the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal on grounds of facts or mixed law and facts, which is part of the jurisdiction expressly conferred on this Court by S. 233(1) of the Constitution to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal. The general principle in law is that every presumption is made in favour of a Court retaining its jurisdiction unless the relevant statute or law expressly and unequivocally ousts such jurisdiction or part of it. Courts are generally reluctant to infer an ouster of jurisdiction. See Akintokun v. LPDC (2014) LPELR-2294(SC), AGF & Ors. v. Sode& Ors. (1990) LPELR-601 (SC) and Mabera v. Obi & Anor. (1972) LPELR-1798 (SC). An ouster of this expressly conferred jurisdiction cannot be implied from the deletion of Subsection (3) of S. 233 which merely restated the position resulting from Subsections (1) and (2) that appeals not listed in Subsection (2) as those that can lie as of right, shall be brought with leave of Court". The decision was delivered on 12/12/25, and so, is later in time to the decision in Anyanwu v. Emmanuel (supra) and at variance with it. Well, faced with a similar situation of two (2) decisions by the Court being at variance with each other, this Court, in Osude v. Azodo (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 293 @ 322, para. B, stated that: "The decision in Lokpobiri v. Ogola (supra) was delivered after the decisions in PDP v. Sylva (supra) and Kakih v. PDP. This Court, apart from correcting the defect in the decisions of the lower Court, has the onerous responsibility of correcting itself, since it is the apex Court and there is no other Court to which its errors can be submitted for correction. It follows therefore where its later decisions are at variance with its previous decisions, it means that the previous decisions have been overruled to the extent of the variation". This position was affirmed and restated recently by the Court in SCC. Nig. Ltd. v. Joseph (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2025) 227 @ 278 paras. D-E and Nigerian Airforce v. Chia (2026) 2 NWLR (Pt. 2028) 369 @ 407 paras. A-C. In the above premises, the position of the law, as stated in FRN v. Gidado (supra), and restated in later decisions that inspite of the deletion of subsection (3) of Section 233 of the Constitution (as altered), the Court retains the jurisdiction vested in it by the provisions of 233(1) to hear all appeals from the decisions of the Court below other than as of right, where the grounds involve questions of mixed law and facts, with the prior leave of Court properly obtained by an Appellant. In other words, the Court retains the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate over an appeal from the decisions of the Court below where grounds involve questions of mixed law and facts, with prior leave of the Court obtained before filing the Notice of such an appeal, in spite of the deletion of subsection (3) of Section 233." Per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC (Pp 19 - 24 Paras E - A)

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- Whether appeals involving grounds of mixed law and facts can be made to the Supreme Court _"there is the compelling need to clarify the position of this Court on the deletion of Subsection (3) of 233 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered) on whether this Court has...

12/08/2026

*MUHAMMADU v. PEOPLE OF GOMBE STATE (2026) LPELR-84380(CA)*

*- NO CASE SUBMISSION - Whether conceding to a no-case submission which was overruled at trial prevents the prosecution from defending an appeal against the substantive judgment*

_"The Appellant has implored the Court to discountenance the Respondent's brief on the ground that the Respondent has been inconsistent in its position in this matter and cannot change the position it took at the lower Court where it submitted that it did not prove its case. Without a doubt, the law is settled beyond peradventure that parties must be consistent in their case, both at the Court of trial and on appeal, as a party is not allowed to approbate and reprobate over the same issue. See AJIDE vs. KELANI (1985) LPELR (302) 1 at 35, SUBERU vs. THE STATE (2010) LPELR (3120) 1 at 30, CHUKWUNYERE vs. THE STATE (2017) LPELR (43725) 1 at 30-32 and CHRISTOPHER vs. THE STATE (2022) LPELR (57565) 1 at 10-11. However, it is pertinent to state that this trite principle of law only establishes a principium, and not a rule: FAWEHINMI vs. NBA (NO. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT 105) 558 at 650 or (1989) LPELR (1259) 1 at 139, ADEGOKE MOTORS vs. ADESANYA (1989) 5 SC 92 at 100 and ADEMOK CONTINENTAL LTD vs. OGUN STATE GOVT (2022) LPELR (54618) 1 at 34-37. In law, context is everything; so, whether the principle is applicable will depend on the diacritical facts of the case, since facts are the fountainhead of the law and the principles decided in a case are not pulled out of context and given a general application but are only used to govern cases with similar facts. That said, it has not been controverted that when the Appellant made a no-case submission, the Respondent conceded the submission. The lower Court however overruled the submission, and evidence was then adduced in defence of the charge. This appeal is not against the decision of the lower Court overruling the no-case submission. If it were, then the Respondent cannot be heard to contend the contrary. However, the undisputed facts are that evidence was led in defence and the lower Court in its judgment convicted the Appellant as charged. This appeal is against the said judgment. Though it may not necessarily be so, but the likelihood that there may have been changed circumstances, as it relates to proof between when the no-case submission was made and after the defence evidence in defence of the Charge, cannot be ruled out. In such a situation, the Respondent cannot be hamstrung by its position when the no-case submission was made. Since this appeal is not against the no-case submission, it is not correct that the Respondent has not been consistent in the case it is making. Accordingly, the Respondent has done no more than stick to the traditional role of a respondent to defend the judgment appealed against. See DANGANA vs. USMAN (2012) LPELR (25012) 1 at 21, SCC (NIG) LTD vs. JOSEPH (2025) LPELR (81444) 1 at 30 and EDEDE vs. A-G, FEDERATION (2025) LPELR (82109) 1 at 118. I therefore decline to discountenance the Respondent's brief."_ Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA (Pp 13 - 16 Paras F - A)

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- Whether conceding to a no-case submission which was overruled at trial prevents the prosecution from defending an appeal against the substantive judgment _"The Appellant has implored the Court to discountenance the Respondent's brief on the ground that the Respondent has been inconsistent in its p...

10/08/2026

*ABEDNEGO v. C.O.P KADUNA STATE & ANOR (2026) LPELR-84402(CA)*

*- Nature of a declaratory relief and what a plaintiff must establish to be entitled to same*

_"It is settled that a declaratory relief cannot be granted merely on default of defence or even on admission. The Applicant must show with credible evidence that he/she is entitled to the declaratory relief sought. This settled position of the law was restated recently by the Supreme Court per Ibrahim Mohammed Saulawa, JSC, in Olakehinde v. EFCC (2025) LPELR- 80483(SC) thus; "It's a well settled fundamental doctrine, declaration of right is purely declaratory remedy. It's never granted as a matter of course. Indeed, the Court must be satisfied of the desirability of granting same. Thus, the Plaintiff has the onerous duty to satisfy the Court by presenting a very strong and cogent case in the statement of claim and the affidavit evidence thereof. Such a burden must be discharged by the plaintiff even in the absence of a statement of defence."_ Per ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, JCA (Pp 27 - 28 Paras F - D)

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Nature of a declaratory relief and what a plaintiff must establish to be entitled to same _"It is settled that a declaratory relief cannot be granted merely on default of defence or even on admission. The Applicant must show with credible evidence that he/she is entitled to the declaratory relief so...

05/08/2026

*EMMANUEL v. STATE OF EKITI (2026) LPELR-84580(CA)*

*- Proper person to inform the Court on how a confessional statement was obtained*

_"It is for the type of scenario that happened in this case, where it was counsel who initially spoke to the trial Court that the statement was not made voluntarily and later informed the Court what the defendant, who was the maker of the document said, that prompted this Court to pronounce in THOMPSON v. THE STATE (2023) LPELR-61413(CA) (Pp 28-29 Paras. A-B, per Peter Obiorah, JCA, that: "I think it is wrong for a defence counsel to be the person who will inform the Court how a confessional statement was obtained. The Bconfessional statement was not made by counsel. He was not there when it was made. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of a defence counsel to just get up in Court and say that the statement of the accused person was obtained under duress... The ideal thing is that when such confessional statement is sought to be tendered in evidence, it will be shown to the accused person in the dock who can admit making the statement or deny signing the statement or that he signed under duress. It is the statement of the accused person that the trial Court must record and then decide on the next course of action depending on what the accused person said."_ Per PETER CHUDI OBIORAH, JCA (Pp 22 - 23 Paras D - C)

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Proper person to inform the Court on how a confessional statement was obtained _"It is for the type of scenario that happened in this case, where it was counsel who initially spoke to the trial Court that the statement was not made voluntarily and later informed the Court what the defendant, who was...

03/08/2026

*UBN PLC v. KAYNATH (NIG) LTD (2026) LPELR-84517(CA)*

*- Documents an applicant for extension of time to appeal should file along with his application"?*

_Every application for enlargement of time for leave or extension of time to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the failure to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal within the time allowed. The following documents shall be attached to the application: (a) A copy of the judgment from which it is intended to appeal, (b) A copy of the proposed notice and grounds of appeal, which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard, (c) Where leave has been refused by the lower Court, a copy of the order refusing leave. See Order 6 Rule 7 Court of Appeal Rules 2021." Per MUSLIM SULE HASSAN, JCA (Pp 11 - 12 Paras F - D)_

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UBN PLC v. KAYNATH (NIG) LTD (2026) LPELR-84517(CA) - Documents an applicant for extension of time to appeal should file along with his application"? Every application for enlargement of time for leave or extension of time to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substanti...

31/07/2026

*OCHEJA v. OCHEJA (2023) LPELR-81194(CA)*

*- Whether the intolerable behavior of a third party can substantiate the ground for the dissolution of the marriage under Section 15(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act*

_"The allegation at page 46, paragraph 61 was that the Petitioner attempted to indoctrinate the Respondent/Cross Petitioner into a cult and her relentless inference throughout the marriage. The allegation was against the mother of the Appellant, as such, the lower Court should have ignored it because that had nothing to do with the conduct of the Appellant under Section 15(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. The Section specifically provides for the intolerable behavior of the Respondent and not that of a third party to substantiate the ground for the dissolution of the marriage."_ Per ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO, JCA (Pp 33 - 33 Paras A - D)

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29/07/2026

*ABUBAKAR v. PEOPLE OF GOMBE STATE (2026) LPELR-84383(CA)*

*- Whether the failure of the police to investigate a defence of alibi is fatal to the case of the prosecution*

_"The Appellant complains about the decision of the lower Court that the Prosecution evidence destroyed his alibi. He argued that the alibi was not investigated at all. The above pericope from the case of NJOVENS vs. THE STATE makes it clear that where there is evidence fixing an accused person at the scene of crime, then it is not fatal if the alibi was not investigated. The eyewitness testimony of the PW1 and PW7 fixed the Appellant at the scene of crime."_ Per UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA (Pp 19 - 19 Paras B - D)

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27/07/2026

*MOLOKWU v. CHISOMEKWU & ORS (2025) LPELR-80818(CA)*

*- Whether a power of attorney can confer title on a donee*

_"Counsel for the appellant submitted that a power of attorney, whether it be irrevocable or otherwise, is not an instrument of transfer of title. He placed reliance on Ude v Nwara supra among other cases. It was his further submission that the 1st respondent did not aver or testify that he had conveyed the property either to himself or a third party. Counsel for the 1st respondent contended that the 1st respondent acting under the specific mandate of the power of attorney donated to him by the deceased alienated the property to his attorney. In the case of Ude v Nwora supra 32-33, Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, opined that: "A power of attorney merely warrants and authorises the donee to do certain acts in the stead of the donor and so is not an instrument which confers, transfers, limits, charges or alienates any title to the donee; rather, it could be a vehicle whereby these acts could be done by the donee for and in the name of the donor to a third party. So even if it authorises the donee to do any of these acts to any person including himself, the mere issuance of such a power is not per se an alienation or parting with possession. So far, it is categorised as a document of delegation: it is only after, by virtue of the power of attorney, the donee leases or conveys the property, the subject of the power, to any person including himself then there is alienation.".. Furthermore, in the case of Ibrahim v Obaje (2017) LPELR-43749 (SC) 36 the Supreme Court endorsed the finding of the Court of Appeal, per Peter-Odili, JCA, as he then was, that: "I am of the clear view that depending on the particular Power of Attorney that is its contents and its intendment it can transfer interest to a donee or the Donee can equally hold unto all the rights or Powers of the Donor." See also Ugorji v Apugo (2019) LPELR-46733(CA). Thus, whether or not a power of attorney is an instrument of transfer of title, interest or alienation depends on its contents and the circumstances of the case or transaction. Whichever way one views this matter, it is clear to me that the trial Court was right in holding that the transfers of the land by way of irrevocable power of attorney from the deceased to the 1st respondent and then to the attorney of the 1st respondent were perfectly in order, valid and unimpeachable." Per JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JCA (Pp 23 - 25 Paras C - D)
See again the case of Cardoso v. Daniel supra and U.T.C. V. Pamotei (2001) 43 WRN 63 at 113; also United Nigeria Co. V. Nahman (supra)." Per CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI, JSC (Pp 25 - 27 Paras B - D)

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