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UNDERSTANDING INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND DECISIONS UNDER THE NIGERIAN LAW!-​By-: C.K. Anyanwu, LL.M.               &...
04/08/2026

UNDERSTANDING INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND DECISIONS UNDER THE NIGERIAN LAW!

-​By-: C.K. Anyanwu, LL.M.
&
C.K. Ezeaku (Miss)

*​INTRODUCTION*

​Basically, civil and criminal litigation rarely proceed in a single, uninterrupted line from initial filing of cases to final determination of the matter. Along the way, trial courts are routinely called upon to resolve mid-stream disputes, whether to preserve property, amend pleadings, grant extensions of time, rule on the admissibility of evidence, or decide preliminary objections. The judicial decisions arising from these interim applications are known as interlocutory rulings.​ Interestingly, interlocutory appeals are a double-edged sword. On one hand, appealing an adverse ruling immediately can protect a client’s legal rights on a crucial preliminary point. On the other hand, mismanaging an interlocutory appeal, or deploying it simply to stall trial, can lead to severe consequences, including the striking out of grounds of appeal, heavy cost penalties against counsel, or an outright dismissal for abuse of court process.​This article examines the legal, statutory, and judicial framework governing interlocutory applications and decisions in Nigerian law. It analyzes the test for finality, statutory time limits in civil versus criminal matters, stay of proceedings, the duty of counsel to avoid frivolous interlocutory appeals, and the precise procedure for incorporating interlocutory complaints into a final appeal.

*​A) MEANING OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS*

​In *School of Banking Honours Ltd v. Karsmal Int'l Services Ltd & Ors (2025) LPELR-81169(CA),* per Eberechi Suzzette Nyesom-Wike, JCA, defined an interlocutory application by relying on Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition) as:
​'A motion for equitable or legal relief sought before a final decision.'

​This definition encompasses applications filed to preserve the res, regularize processes, seek leave to amend pleadings, or resolve evidentiary points raised during trial.

*​B) LEGAL STATUS OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND DECISIONS*

​In *Aminu & Ors v. Governing Council FPO & Anor (2023) LPELR-60789(CA),* the Court of Appeal held per Tunde Oyebamiji Awotoye, JCA (Pp 8-9 Paras E-A) held as follows:
​'By virtue of Section 14(1) of the Court of Appeal Act (as amended): '(1) Where in the exercise by the High Court of a State or, as the case may be, by the Federal High Court of its original jurisdiction an interlocutory order or decision is made in the course of any suit or matter, an appeal shall, by leave of that Court or of the Court of Appeal, lie to the Court of Appeal; but no appeal shall lie from any order made ex parte, or by consent of the parties, or relating only to costs.'

*​C) DISTINCTION BETWEEN FINAL DECISION AND INTERLOCUTORY DECISION*

​The major distinction between a final decision and an interlocutory decision rests on the test of finality, that is, the effect of the ruling on the rights of the parties. As held by Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JCA, in *Nigeria Customs Service & Anor v. Bazuaye (2005) LPELR-5948(CA):*

​'Whether a decision is final or interlocutory depends on its results. If the decision finally disposes of the rights of the parties, it is final decision and not an interlocutory decision... Where a decision has determined the rights of the parties in the substantive case or application, the decision is final and not an interlocutory decision.'

*​Whether an Appeal in Respect of Admissibility of a Document is an Interlocutory Appeal*

​In that same decision of *Nigeria Customs Service & Anor v. Bazuaye (2005) LPELR-5948(CA):* the Court of Appeal clarified that evidentiary rulings made in the course of trial, such as a ruling admitting or rejecting a document, do not automatically constitute stand alone interlocutory decisions that must be appealed within 14 days, unless an actual interlocutory order was formally made and appealed independently.

​Furthermore, in *Platinum Mortgage Bank Ltd v. Oluseyi (2025) LPELR-82412(CA),* the issue before the court was on whether a ruling on the admissibility of evidence is an interlocutory decision which can be incorporated in an appeal against final judgment without leave or extension of time, Boloukuromo Moses Ugo, JCA (Pp 14-14 Paras A-E), held:

​'First, as regards respondent's argument that Ground 1 of the appeal, wherein appellant complained about the ruling of the trial Judge admitting Exhibit 1 in evidence is an interlocutory ruling so appeal against it can only lie to this Court with leave of Court first obtained or time extended for her to appeal, it is settled that a decision of the Court rejecting or admitting evidence is considered part of the main trial, rather than an interlocutory decision, unless a special case has been made of it, so a challenge of such decision can be raised in an appeal against the final judgment in the case without the necessity for obtaining leave of Court or an order extending time to appeal against it. See Okobia v. Ajanya & Anor (1998) LPELR-2454 (SC) page 17-19; F.B.N. v. Tsokwa (2003) FWLR (Pt. 153) 205 @ 223. Ground 1 of the appeal is therefore competent.'

*​D) TIME LIMITS AND REQUIREMENTS OF LEAVE IN CIVIL MATTERS*

​Where a party is aggrieved by an interlocutory decision in a civil matter and chooses to challenge it immediately, strict statutory timelines apply.
​Under Section 24(2) / Section 25(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act and Section 220(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), an appeal against an interlocutory decision in a civil cause must be filed within 14 days of the delivery of the ruling.

​In *Mohammed & Anor v. Olawunmi & Ors (1990) LPELR-1893(SC),* Andrews Otutu Obaseki, JSC, observed:

​'Being interlocutory, the times ordered by the Rules or Act in which to appeal is severely reduced and limited to 14 days. If there is an appeal within the 14 days and the ground of appeal involves question of law alone, the appeal is competent as the Constitution enables appellant to appeal as of right in such circumstances.'

​Where an interlocutory appeal in a civil matter is brought after the expiration of 14 days, or where the grounds of appeal involve facts or mixed law and facts, obtaining leave of court is an absolute condition precedent. Section 14(1) of the Court of Appeal Act (as amended) governs this requirement. *See also Aminu & Ors v. Governing Council FPO & Anor, (supra).*

*​Failure to seek and obtain the requisite leave renders the appeal or the specific ground of appeal incompetent, null, and void.*

In *Ugumba v. Nwawunwanne (2023) LPELR-60553(CA),* Abimbola Osarugue Obaseki-Adejumo, JCA, emphasized:

​'I must state categorically that by virtue of Section 241(1) and 242(2) of the Constitution 1999 (amended) leave must be obtained when filing an interlocutory appeal out of time irrespective of the fact that a final decision has been made at the trial Court. Therefore, a ground of appeal distilled without leave is held to be incompetent and liable to be struck out for being null and Void.'

*​E) INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CAUSES*

​A fundamental statutory distinction exists between civil and criminal matters regarding interlocutory appeals. While Section 25(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act splits civil appeals into 14 days for interlocutory decisions and 3 months for final decisions, Section 25(2)(b) draws no distinction between interlocutory and final decisions in criminal matters.

​In *State v. Duke & Ors (2002) LPELR-6163(CA),* Sule Aremu Olagunju, JCA (Pp 10-16 Paras A-E), explained this statutory distinction in detail:

​'It is obvious from the above provisions that there is a clear separation between 'civil' and 'criminal' matters and that while Sub-section (a) in respect of civil matters draws a line between 'interlocutory' and 'final' decisions, Sub-section (b) regulating the period of appeal in criminal matters does not draw a distinction between interlocutory and final decisions... From the reading of Sub-section 25(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Act, I am satisfied that the period within which appeal from a decision in criminal matter must be filed is one uncompounded time-frame of 90 days from the date of the decision... the period within which an appeal can be filed in criminal matters remains the same whether the decision on appeal is interlocutory or final...'

​This position was reaffirmed in *Agbo v. FRN (2013) LPELR-22870(CA),* where Ejembi Eko, JCA (Pp 8-9 Paras D-A), held:

​'The distinction between appeals against interlocutory and final decisions, in criminal matters or causes, is only as regards whether the ground of appeal is based on law alone, which requires no leave and the appeal is of right; and whether the ground is based either on facts alone, or mixed law and facts, which under Sections 241 and 242 of the 1999 Constitution requires leave as a pre-condition. Section 25(1)(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004 makes no distinction between interlocutory and final appeals as regards the stipulation of the periods for giving notice of appeal. It simply provides that 'in an appeal in a criminal cause or matter' the notice of appeal shall be filed 'within 90 days from the date of the decision appealed against.'

*​Practice Directions Discouraging Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Matters*

​Despite the 90-day filing window, appellate practice directions strictly discourage interlocutory appeals in criminal prosecutions, particularly financial crimes. In *Ugo-Ngadi v. FRN (2018) LPELR-43903(SC),* Paul Adamu Galumje, JSC (Pp 24-25 Paras F-D), highlighted Paragraph 4(e) of the Court of Appeal (Fast Track) Practice Directions 2014:

​'Active case management includes discouraging interlocutory appeals and requiring the parties, except in the most deserving cases, to subsume their interlocutory matters under a final appeal or under the substantive suit at the trial Court. The High Courts and the Court of Appeal are hereby called upon to observe and enforce the provision of this practice direction in order to cut down the delay experienced in the hearing and disposal of corruption related cases.'

*​F) PROCEDURE AND GROUNDS FOR AN APPLICATION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS*

​Where a party genuinely requires a stay of proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal, the application must first be presented to the trial court before approaching the appellate court.

​In *Idris & Ors v. Audu (2004) LPELR-7322(CA),* Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad, JCA (as he then was, Pp 23 Paras A-D), highlighted the jurisdictional precondition:

​'Further, the need for a stay of proceedings arises generally, where a trial Judge rules on an interlocutory point. Any party aggrieved by that ruling may appeal against it and after appealing the party may apply to that Court for a stay of proceedings pending appeal. If refused, the party may apply for same to the Court of Appeal. There is no evidence of appeal yet before this Court. This stripes this Court of jurisdiction on that relief. That was why I found it necessary to strike out that relief.'

​Courts do not grant a stay of proceedings automatically. As Olufunlola Oyelola Adekeye, JSC, noted in *Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2010) LPELR-40142(SC):*

​'The Courts had decided that where an interlocutory appeal will finally dispose of the case pending before a lower Court, a stay of proceedings will be granted.'

*​G) EFFECT OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS ON TRIAL COURTS*

​A common misconception in litigation is that filing a Notice of Appeal against an interlocutory ruling automatically halts proceedings in the trial court. The law is settled: a Notice of Appeal does not operate as an automatic stay of proceedings or ex*****on.

​In *NCSU v. EKASA & ORS (2022) LPELR-57143(CA), Uchechukwu Onyemenam, JCA, stated:*

​'The position of the law is settled that a notice of appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings. For proceedings of a Court to be stayed, there must be an application granted by that Court to that effect... Hence, any party appealing against an interlocutory decision of a Court is under a duty to apply for stay of further proceedings until the determination of the interlocutory appeal if the party believes that the result of his appeal will affect further proceedings in the matter.'
*See also Josiah Cornelius Ltd & Ors v. Ezenwa (1996) LPELR-1632(SC).*

*​Hearing Substantive Suits Pending Interlocutory Appeals*

​Unless an explicit order staying proceedings is granted, trial courts are enjoined to proceed with the substantive matter.

*In Uzuda & Ors v. Ebigah & Ors (2009) LPELR-3458(SC),* Muhammad Saifullahi Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC, held:

​'...where an interlocutory appeal does not affect the outcome of the determination of the substantive matter before the trial Court, or based on fundamental issue like, jurisdiction, the trial Court is enjoined to continue the hearing and determination of the substantive matter pending before it in order to hasten or quicken the dispensation of cases and have the rights of the litigating parties determined within a reasonable time.'

*​H) DUTY OF COUNSEL, FRIVOLOUS APPEALS, AND ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS*

​Appellate courts strongly deprecate the practice of using interlocutory appeals on minor issues to stall trials and frustrate opposing parties. Counsel owe an ethical and professional duty to the court and to litigants to avoid unnecessarily fracturing trials with interlocutory appeals.

​In *Nsefik v. Muna (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1390) 151 (SC),* Mahmud Mohammed, JSC (at p. 177, paras C-D; pp. 188-189, paras H-A), lamented:

​'Counsel to parties have a duty to avoid filing appeals against decisions on trifling legal issues which can be taken up with the substantive appeal at the conclusion of a suit before a court... It is indeed very unfortunate that this simple probate matter which commenced since November, 1989 after the death of the deceased who died on 12th March, 1989, is still pending unheard at the trial court after nearly 24 years while the estate left behind by the deceased remained not administered...'

​Similarly, in *Nzekwe v. Anaekwenegbu (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1674) 235 (SC)* at p. 251, para B, the Supreme Court stressed that counsel owe a duty to help reduce trial delays by avoiding unnecessary interlocutory appeals. In First Fuels Ltd v. N.N.P.C. (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) 276 (CA) at p. 301, paras B-D, the Court of Appeal warned that interlocutory appeals succeed only in delaying the conclusion of suits, defeating the administration of justice.

​The Supreme Court expressed sharp frustration over interlocutory delays in C.B.N. v. Akingbola (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1685) 84 (SC), where Bode Rhodes-Vivour, JSC (pp. 102-104), noted:
​"Before I bring the curtains down on this judgment I must comment on this interlocutory appeal. The originating motion was filed in court in 2009. The trial court delivered an interlocutory ruling on 26 October 2009 while the Court of Appeal affirmed that ruling in its judgment delivered on 4 October 2013. The judgment of this court is being delivered on 15 February 2019... Interlocutory appeals have been frowned upon on several occasions by the Supreme Court. They are a waste of the clients’ resources and precious judicial time.'

*​Where an interlocutory appeal is deployed as a stall tactic, it constitutes a clear abuse of court process.*

In *J.M.R. Ltd. v. MT Mother Benedicta (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1686) 323 (SC),* the Supreme Court held:

​'It is unconscionable to pursue an interlocutory appeal that can be conveniently taken along with the appeal against the final decision, for the purpose of bringing about inordinate delay in the hearing and determination of the substantive claim.'
​*See also Ecobank (Nig) Ltd & Ors v. Tempo Energy (Nig) Ltd & Ors (2025)* LPELR-81609(CA), per Okon Efreti Abang, JCA).

*​I) PROCEDURE FOR INCORPORATING AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL IN THE MAIN/FINAL APPEAL*

​A litigant aggrieved by an interlocutory ruling is not always required to interrupt trial by filing an immediate appeal. The law permits a party to reserve their grievance and incorporate the challenge to the interlocutory ruling into the main appeal filed after final judgment. However, specific procedural steps must be followed.

​In *Ohuabunwa & Ors v. Nbagwu (2025) LPELR-80779(SC)* [also reported as Ohuabunwa v. Nbagwu (2026) 6 NWLR (Pt. 2040) 465 S.C.], Haruna Simon Tsammani, JSC, outlined the proper procedure:

​'An appeal against an interlocutory ruling may be incorporated in the main appeal against the final decision or judgment of the Court. It is good practice to do so, but there is a prescribed procedure for so doing. To do that, the Appellant may opt to file the interlocutory appeal and later apply to consolidate same with the appeal against the final judgment, or seek leave when filing the appeal against the final decision, to include grounds of appeal affecting the interlocutory ruling.'

​It is crucial for litigators to note that if the statutory period for appealing the interlocutory ruling has lapsed by the time final judgment is delivered, the appellant must seek leave to include grounds of appeal challenging that interlocutory ruling within the final appeal. *See Ugumba v. Nwawunwanne, (supra).*

*J) THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF STAY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACJA 2015*

Historically, Nigerian courts possessed discretionary power to grant or refuse an application for a stay of proceedings during a criminal trial, as stated by Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in Col. Halilu Akilu v. Chief Gani Fawehinmi (No. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 102) 122 at 1105 C-H to 167 A-B.

However, that position was changed by the enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015.

In *Onnoghen v. FRN (2019) LPELR-47524(CA),* the Court of Appeal addressed whether an application for stay of proceedings can be entertained in criminal matters. Delivering the ruling, Peter Olabisi Ige, JCA (Pp 63-66 Paras C-D), held that the jurisdiction of courts to stay criminal proceedings has been removed by Sections 306 and 396(2) of the ACJA 2015.

Section 306 of the ACJA 2015 provides:

'An application for stay of proceedings in respect of a criminal matter before the Court shall not be entertained.'

Section 396(2) of the ACJA 2015 further complements this by providing:

'After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge or the information at any time before judgment provided that such objection shall only be considered along with the substantive issues and a ruling thereon made at the time of delivery of judgment.'

To reinforce this position, the Court of Appeal relied on the Supreme Court judgment in *Destra Investments Ltd v. FRN (2018) 1 SCM 66* at 72E-73A-C, where Akaahs, JSC, explained that Section 396(2) was specifically enacted to ensure speedy trials and eliminate delays:

'This appeal is most unnecessary as it seeks to question the exercise of discretion by the learned trial judge who decided to deal with the preliminary objection alongside the substantive case which charged the appellant and the 2nd respondent (who was 1st accused) with the offence of money laundering... I totally agree with the reply given by learned counsel for the 1st respondent to the effect that the application could not stop the Court from proceeding with the Substantive trial since Section 396(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 allows for a consideration of any objection to be done at the time of delivery of judgment in the substantive case... This provision allows for speedy trial of cases and is meant to obviate the difficulties often encountered by trial Judges who are most often bogged down by interlocutory appeals filed by defence counsel in order to stultify proceedings and if possible truncate trials of accused persons... The submission by learned senior counsel that the issue of jurisdiction is involved and so must be resolved first is not quite true.'

Based on these combined statutory provisions and judicial authorities, Peter Olabisi Ige, JCA, concluded in *Onnoghen v. FRN (supra)* that the appellate court has no jurisdiction to grant an order staying criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, a related issue arises when a party argues that a procedural law barring stay of proceedings cannot apply to an offence committed before the law was enacted. In *Azi v. FRN (2019) LPELR-46430(CA),* the Court of Appeal examined the applicability of procedural enactments, specifically Section 304 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law (ACJL) 2017 of Delta State.

Delivering the judgment, Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JCA (as she then was, Pp 5-10 Paras C-F), clarified the distinction between substantive law and procedural (adjectival) law:

*Substantive Law:* The law defining the offence and penalty must be the law in force at the time the alleged crime was committed.

*Procedural Law:* The law governing court practice and procedure is always the law in force at the time the trial step or court proceeding takes place.

This principle was established by the Supreme Court in *Gabriel Daudu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) LPELR-43637(SC),* where Akaahs, JSC, held:

'Let me state straightaway that it is the substantive law in operation at the time an offence is said to have been committed that has to be referred to when a person is being charged to Court... but the procedural law to be used would be the current one. Thus if the Evidence Act or the criminal procedure Law has been amended or replaced and a new one is in place at the time of trial, it is the amended or newly enacted Evidence Act/Criminal Procedure code that will be used to guide the trial... On the other hand, it is the current or extant Adjectival/procedural law that applies to such charge.'

This position is supported by long-standing judicial precedent, including *Rossek v. ACB (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382 at 475, per Bello, JSC; Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Mike (2014) 1 SC (Pt. 1) 27; and First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Hon. Aniedi Okon Etim (2016) LPELR-41374(CA).* Consequently, state administration of criminal justice statutes apply immediately to pending criminal trials as procedural enactments.

Section 304 of the Delta State ACJL 2017 provides:

'Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, an application for stay of proceedings in respect of any criminal matter before the High Court or Magistrates' Court or any other Court within the State shall not be entertained until judgment is delivered.'

Beyond statutory bars, applying for a stay of proceedings in a criminal trial runs contrary to the constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time guaranteed under *Section 36(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).*

In *Metuh v. FRN (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 86,* the Supreme Court affirmed that applications for stay of criminal proceedings directly violate constitutional guarantees, holding:

'The appellant/applicant's motion for stay of proceedings is violently in conflict with the provisions of Section 36 (4) CFRN 1999 (as amended), Section 306 ACJA, 2015 and Section 40 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004 as well as the plethora of case law authorities cited. The application is hereby refused and dismissed.'

Finally, Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JCA, pointed out in *Azi v. FRN (supra)* that under *Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act,* the appellate court cannot grant an order or injunction which the trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant. Because the trial court is statutorily prohibited from entertaining a stay of proceedings, the Court of Appeal similarly lacks the jurisdiction to grant such an application.

*​CONCLUSION*

In all, interlocutory applications and decisions demands sound strategic judgment from trial counsel. While the law preserves a litigant's right to challenge interim errors made by a trial court, it strictly guards against using interlocutory appeals as instruments of delay. ​As established by appellate authorities, the safest and most efficient path for counsel in civil and criminal litigation is often to reserve minor interlocutory complaints until the end of the trial, incorporating them into the final appeal with the required leave of court. Where an immediate interlocutory appeal is unavoidable, counsel must strictly observe statutory deadlines (14 days in civil matters; 90 days in criminal matters), secure necessary leave where required, and remember that filing a notice of appeal alone does not halt the trial court's proceedings. By adhering to these procedural rules, lawyers protect their clients' rights while upholding the integrity of the judicial process.

"MY LORD" OR "MY LADY"? THE CORRECT MODE OF ADDRESSING FEMALE JUDGES!-By- Eyimofe Atake, SAN, PhD (Cantab)My view is str...
29/07/2026

"MY LORD" OR "MY LADY"? THE CORRECT MODE OF ADDRESSING FEMALE JUDGES!

-By- Eyimofe Atake, SAN, PhD (Cantab)

My view is straightforward: a female Judge should be addressed as My Lady or Your Ladyship, and a male Judge as My Lord or Your Lordship. That is not a concession to fashion. It is correct usage, good English, and the solution long ago adopted by the English, custodians of the tradition we inherited.

1. Where Did "We Are All Gentlemen at the Bar" Come From?

The contrary school rests on the old saying that there are no ladies at the Bar, that we are all gentlemen; it is, in all likelihood, the true basis on which some female Judges insist on being addressed as My Lord. Trace it to its root and it collapses.
The root is simple. For some six centuries the English Bar was, by law and not mere habit, an exclusively male institution. The exclusion rested on a medieval treatise, The Mirror of Justices, adopted by Coke and enshrined by Blackstone, which declared that "the law will not suffer women to be attorneys, nor infants nor serfs." Little more than a century ago, in Bebb v Law Society [1914] 1 Ch 286, the English Court of Appeal held that a woman was not a "person" within the meaning of section 2 of the Solicitors Act 1843 and so could not be admitted to the profession, although section 48 of the same Act provided that the masculine included the feminine. In such a world, "Gentlemen" was not courtesy but fact. That is the saying's entire pedigree: it described a legal reality, never an eternal rule.
That reality died more than a century ago. The S*x Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 received royal assent on 23 December 1919, providing that no person shall be disqualified by s*x or marriage from any civil profession. The very next day, Christmas Eve 1919, Helena Normanton was admitted to the Middle Temple, the first woman in any Inn of Court. Dr Ivy Williams became the first woman called to the English Bar on 10 May 1922, at Inner Temple, and Normanton, called that November, became the first to practise. Nigeria's first female lawyer, Stella Jane Thomas, followed in 1935; today women form a substantial share of every new call at our Law School.
From that day to this, the saying has been a fiction. A fiction may be harmless at a Bar dinner, where the toast survives as a fossil of etiquette; it becomes wrong English, and a contradiction in terms, when pressed into service in court to insist that a lady is a gentleman and My Lady must answer to My Lord. Even its defenders cannot locate its origin: searchers report that none exists; it survives on repetition, not authority. And England, whose all male Bar gave birth to the phrase, has abandoned it comprehensively: lady barristers are not addressed as gentlemen, and the English Bench itself now runs from Mrs Justice and Ms Justice through Lady Justice to the Lady Chief Justice. Whatever the history, it is archaic and does not stand the test of reality, for there are now both men and women at the Bar; a tradition whose factual foundation perished in 1919 cannot dictate our grammar today.

2. The English Practice Is Gendered, and Always Has Been

Female High Court Judges in England are addressed as My Lady, a settled usage recorded in the English courts' practice directions. A male High Court Judge is styled The Honourable Mr Justice; a female High Court Judge is styled The Honourable Mrs Justice or, where she herself so elects, Ms Justice; indeed the official guidance published by the Judiciary of England and Wales at judiciary.uk gives the styles as Mr, Mrs or Ms Justice. The office is one; the style is inflected to the holder, down to her own choice of honorific. That is the tradition properly understood.

3. The Butler-Sloss Lesson

The point was settled after 1988, when Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss became the first woman appointed to the English Court of Appeal. The governing statute, section 2(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (now the Senior Courts Act 1981), knew only the title Lord Justice of Appeal, so counsel were driven to the contortion "My Lady, Lord Justice Butler-Sloss." In 1994 the Master of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Bingham, issued a Practice Note, Mode of Address: Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss [1994] EW Misc 1, describing that usage as plainly absurd and directing that she be referred to as My Lady, Lady Justice Butler-Sloss; Parliament later amended the statute by the Courts Act 2003 to make Lady Justice the formal title. Mark the direction of travel: the English did not force the woman into the masculine title in the name of the unity of the office; they reformed the title to fit the holder. The principle has now reached the summit. When Northern Ireland appointed the first woman to head its judiciary in 2021, Dame Siobhan Keegan was sworn in as the Lady Chief Justice; when England and Wales followed in 2023, appointing the first woman in nearly eight hundred years, Dame Sue Carr took her oath as the Lady Chief Justice, the statute's masculine description notwithstanding. The dignity of the office lost nothing; the dignity of the person gained everything.

4. Our Own History Points the Same Way

My generation will recall that until the mid 1970s, Nigerian Judges were styled The Honourable Mr Justice. My own father, appointed a Judge of the High Court of the Mid-Western State in 1967, was styled The Honourable Mr Justice Atake until he retired, and in his day the style carried a weight the present generation may not appreciate: there was then no Court of Appeal in Nigeria, save for the short lived Western Nigeria Court of Appeal in the old Western State. The Court of Appeal was established only in 1976, by the Federal Court of Appeal Act, No. 43 of 1976; before then, as the Court's own official history records, appeals lay directly from the High Court to the Supreme Court, our final court from 1963 upon the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. A High Court Judge of that era therefore stood but one step below the apex of the judicature, and the style matched the station.
Why did The Honourable Mr Justice give way to today's neutral The Honourable Justice? No official instrument records the reason, but the timing tells its own story. The style changed within a few years of the elevation of our first female Judge, Hon. Justice Modupe Omo-Eboh, in 1969, and by about 1980 five women already sat on our Bench: Hon. Justice Modupe Omo-Eboh herself, our first; Hon. Justice Dulcie Oguntoye, our second, elevated to the Lagos State Bench in February 1976; and Justices Roseline Omotosho, Atinuke Ige and Aloma Mukhtar, the last of whom, elevated to the Kano State Bench in 1977, would rise to become our first female Chief Justice of Nigeria. The irresistible inference is that the masculine style was retired precisely because women had joined the Bench, and that rather than adopt the English Mrs Justice, we chose neutrality. When the composition of the Bench changed, our language changed with it; the mode of address should do the same.

5. The Pioneers Deserve Accuracy

Since the history is often told inaccurately, permit two precisions of record. The first woman to sit as a full time professional Judge in England was Sybil Campbell, appointed a stipendiary magistrate at Tower Bridge in 1945; the first woman on the English High Court Bench was Dame Elizabeth Lane, in 1965. Our own first, Hon. Justice Modupe Omo-Eboh, called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1953, was elevated to the High Court Bench at Benin City on 13 November 1969, in the old Mid-Western State judiciary. Of that I can speak with personal knowledge: she was our next door neighbour in those years. It is no service to these pioneers to address their successors by a masculine style their careers were spent transcending.

6. My Experience at the Bar

In the Lagos judiciary, female Judges accept, and understand, My Lady and Your Ladyship. Outside Lagos, many female Judges not only decline the style but receive it with something approaching hostility, as though it diminished them. One experience illustrates it. A female Justice once informed me that the Chief Justice of Nigeria at the time had directed that, for recognition and in the interest of gender equality, all Judges, male and female alike, must be addressed as My Lord and Your Lordship, and that I should not address her as My Lady or Your Ladyship. I did not argue; it was her court, and I complied. But I confess that I felt I was speaking wrong English, and the words sat so heavily in my mouth, My Lord, addressed to a lady plainly presiding before me, that wherever the occasion allowed I took refuge in "this Honourable Court," which offended neither her Ladyship's direction nor the English language. With the greatest respect, that directive makes my case: it sought equality by making the masculine style universal, when true equality lies in giving each holder of the office the style that fits her. My Lady is not a lesser form of My Lord; it is its exact equal, differing only as the person differs. To insist that a woman must be called My Lord is to say that the judicial office can only be imagined in male form. That, and not My Lady, is the truly diminishing position.

Conclusion

Address the office through the person: My Lord and Your Lordship for a male Judge, My Lady and Your Ladyship for a female Judge. It is correct, courteous and good English, which is exactly why the British adopted it. The saying that we are all gentlemen at the Bar belongs to a world the law itself buried in 1919, by the S*x Disqualification (Removal) Act. Until practice settles uniformly across our jurisdictions, prudence at the Bar remains what it has always been: when in doubt, follow the preference of the Judge before you, for respect for the Bench is the one rule that admits of no exception.

Eyimofe Atake, SAN, PhD (Cantab).

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