Ale Ojo Chambers

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Compliments of the Season.We say thank you for being there for us in this excellent year, we look forward to a more rewa...
24/12/2020

Compliments of the Season.

We say thank you for being there for us in this excellent year, we look forward to a more rewarding year 2021.

Compliments.We say thank you for availing us the opportunity of serving you this Excellent year. We wish you a more pros...
24/12/2020

Compliments.

We say thank you for availing us the opportunity of serving you this Excellent year. We wish you a more prosperous 2021.

31/07/2020

Eid-el-Kabir to our esteemed clients, friends and colleagues. Wishing you all to witness more of it.

Barka da Sallah.

23/09/2019
17/01/2019

The Lord will sustain you.

10/07/2018

TRIAL TIPS: PREPARING YOUR WITNESS FOR THE UNEXPECTED!

- Odirachukwumma Stanley Emejulu, Esq.

It's difficult to impeach a "clever" witness. You know, when you're cross-examining a 5 Star witness, you have to develop a strategy that is capable of upsetting their balance and keeping you in control.
But let's say you're unable to roll out this strategy, you may like to try this:
During cross-examination, ask the witness where they signed their written deposition.

YOU: "Mr./Mrs......you did not sign your deposition in your lawyer's office, you signed it at home!"..and watch them admit angrily that they signed it in their lawyer's office!

Why is this question important?
Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as amended provides:
"An affidavit SHALL NOT BE ADMITTED which is proved to have been sworn before a person on whose behalf the same is offered, or before his legal practitioner, or before a partner or clerk of his legal practitioner".
But one may argue:
"an affidavit is different from a written deposition (witness statement on oath)
OR
"Section 112 isn't talking about a written deposition (witness statement on oath)"!

Well put, not until you read: EROKWU & ANOR v. EROKWU(2016) LPELR-41515(CA): “I had hitherto been of the view that even where the witness statement of the Respondent at the trial Court was not sworn to before a person duly authorized to take oaths in contravention of Section 112 of the Evidence Act 2011, the subsequent adoption of the written deposition after he had been sworn in open Court to give oral evidence regularizes the deposition. I was of the view that the witnesses' statements which are adopted during oral evidence on oath are different from mere affidavit evidence which stand on their own without any oral backup and which are not subjected to cross-examination. That it is such affidavit evidence which do not meet the requirements of Sections 112 Evidence Act 2011 that are intrinsically inadmissible.
However, that previous way of thinking must perforce give way to the opinion of the Supreme Court in BUHARI V. INEC (2008) 12 SCNJ 1 AT 91.
In that case, the Supreme Court unequivocally agreed with the Court of Appeal's decision to strike out the depositions of the Appellant's witnesses sworn before a Notary Public who was also counsel in the chambers of the senior counsel to the Appellant which was in violation of Section 19 of the Notary Publics Act and 83 of the Evidence Act (now Section 112).
The term 'affidavit' is medieval Latin for 'he has declared on oath'.
It is a formal sworn statement of fact, signed by the deponent and witnessed as to the veracity of the deponent's signature by the taker of oaths, such as the Commissioner for Oaths, Notary Public. It has been accepted that a Judge or Magistrate could also take such oaths. An affidavit must comply with the requirements as set out in Sections 107-120 of the Evidence Act 2011.
Let me state that the argument of learned counsel to the Respondent that it is not necessary for a deponent to sign before the oath taker is totally misguided. Counsel is of the erroneous opinion that what is important is that it was sworn before an authorized oath taker. He made a strenuous attempt at distinguishing between signing and swearing.
The concept of oath taking involves:
i. The deponent making a statement in writing,
ii. The document is taken to a Commissioner for Oaths or any person duly authorized to
take the oath,
iii. The Commissioner for Oaths requires the deponent to swear on a holy book particular to the deponent's faith or a mere declaration for a deponent whose faith forbids him to swear,
iv. The Commissioner for Oaths then asks the deponent to verify what has been stated,
v. The deponent afterwards signs in the presence of the Commissioner for Oaths who witnesses that the affidavit was sworn to in his presence. This explains the phrase "Before me" usually signed by the Commissioner for Oaths.
Any arrangement other than the above amounts to a nullity.
The learned trial judge in his wisdom held at page 348 of the Record that the provisions of Sections 112 & 113 of the Evidence Act 2011, make the written deposition valid in law because it was sworn before an authorized person. The learned trial judge failed to avail himself of the provisions of Section 117 (4) of the Evidence Act 2011.
Section 117 (4) of the Evidence Act is clear on this, it provides as follows:
"An affidavit when sworn shall be signed by the deponent or if he cannot write or is blind, marked by him personally with his mark, in the presence of the person before whom it is taken".
When a deponent swears to an oath, he signs in the presence of the Commissioner for Oaths who endorses the document authenticating the signature of the deponent.
Signatures signed outside the presence of the Commissioner for Oaths fall short of the requirement of the statute and such document purported to be sworn before the Commissioner for Oaths is not legally acceptable in Court.
In CHIDUBEM V. EKENNA & 12 ORS (2008) LPELR-3913,(2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 455) 1692, this Court held as follows:
"The attempt by learned counsel for the Appellants to draw a distinction between signing a deposition and swearing an oath is in my humble view, merely splitting hairs.
The two acts are of the same transaction. The law is that the deposition on oath must be signed in the presence of the person authorized to administer oaths."
In this case, the Respondent upon cross examination stated when asked where he signed his statement on oath that:
'I guess in my counsel's chambers'.
This to my mind presupposes that the document was not signed before a Commissioner for Oaths.
Respondent's counsel's reference to the word 'guess' as being a supposition and not definite or certain cannot obviate the implication of the response. Respondent would easily have said:
'I signed before the Commissioner for Oaths', if he did.
'I guess in Court' or 'I guess before the Commissioner for Oaths' would confer another impression on the Honourable Court. The impression conferred is that he signed in chambers of his counsel but a Commissioner for Oaths later attested to it. He simply did not sign it in the presence of a Commissioner for Oaths as required by law.
This is not a defect in form as envisaged by Section 113 of the Evidence Act 2011. It is a fundamental and statutory error that cannot be waived.
THEREFORE THE WITNESS STATEMENT OF THE RESPONDENT DATED 9/10/2008 IS INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE, IT IS HEREBY EXPUNGED HAVING FAILED THE STATUTORY TEST OF AUTHENTICITY AND ADMISSIBILITY."
- Per OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Pp. 17-22, Paras. A-A)

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03/01/2017

We at Toluwase Ale & Co. (Ale Ojo Chambers) felicitate with our Clients and well wishers for your patronage and kind support in the year 2016. We wish you a prosperous new year 2017 filled with the fulfillment of your heart desires.

We look forward to more of your patronage in 2017.

Thank you.

A. Toluwase Ale Esq.
Toluwase Ale & Co.,
(Ale Ojo Chambers)
Legal Practitioners & Consultants,
8b, Fabac Close,
off Ligali Ayorinde St., Victoria Island,
Lagos, Nigeria
M: 08030638375, 08055821589
E: Mail : [email protected]

13/02/2015

To all our Clients, Colleagues, Friends and Well wishers we say Happy Valentine, please conduct yourself within the ambits of the Law. Do have a great Weekend.

12/02/2015

Case Review

*APC v. FBN PLC**

HIGH COURT OF THE F.C.T. (ABUJA DIVISION)
* *
(AFFEN, J.)

The Congress for Progressive Change (“CPC”) filed a suit against the Defendant seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs as well as monetary damages for alleged breach of contract and libel flowing from the Defendant’s dishonouring cheques issued to third parties.

As a result of the merger of several political parties including the CPC to form the All Progressives Congress (“APC”), the CPC obtained orders substituting the CPC with the APC as the Plaintiff and amending the processes accordingly.

After the substitution was ordered, the Defendant’s counsel filed a notice of preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court on the following grounds:

"i. That there is no cause and/or reasonable cause of action disclosed by the plaintiff against the defendant.

ii. There is no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

iii. That the plaintiff’s reliefs against the defendant are legal impossibilities as the plaintiff only came into existence on 31/07/2013 about 2 years after the alleged wrong doing of the defendant took place.

iv. That the plaintiff does not have the locus standi to institute this suit against the defendant.

v. That the plaintiff’s suit is spent, otiose and an academic exercise.

vi. That the suit of the plaintiff is grossly incompetent.”

With reference to the grounds that raise the questions of whether the suit is spent and incompetent, learned counsel to the Defendant argued that the suit is predicated on events that relate to the CPC which is now defunct and has ceased to exist. The wrong allegedly done by the Defendant is stated in the pleadings to be largely libelous in nature, and it is settled law that a political party that is defunct or dead cannot maintain an action in libel.

Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued on the other hand that although the suit was instituted by the defunct CPC, the cause of action survives the death or extinction of CPC. The APC has sufficiently demonstrated that it has accepted the transferred interests, assets and liabilities of the former CPC and it can legitimately continue/maintain the action.

Considering both sides of the argument, the court noted that it is common ground between the parties that the original Plaintiff (CPC) has since become defunct and is substituted by the current Plaintiff (APC).

Striking out the suit for want of jurisdiction, the court held inter alia that:
* *
“The general rule is that a personal action does not survive death, which is encapsu -lated in the Latinism, actiopersonalismoritur cm persona.

This common law principle presupposes that a cause of action can only arise or subsist when both the plaintiff and the defendant are alive and will regard the cause of action as having ceased upon the death of either the plaintiff or the defendant since a dead person ceases to have any legal personality from the date of his demise and can neither sue nor be sued whether personally or in a representative capacity. See Kareem v. Wema Bank Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 485 CA; Akumoju v. Mosadolorun (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 236 (CA); Omokhafe v. Esekhomo (1993) NWLR (Pt. 309) 58; Hodge v. Marsh (1936) All E.R. 484.

It has however been held that the maxim does not apply to personal actions founded on contract nor to cases where the deceased is alleged to have wrongfully appropriated property. See Philips v. Homfray (1883) 24 Ch.D 439; Eyesan v. Sanusi (1984) LPELR-1185 (SC (per Obaseki, JSC). Indeed, even in respect of torts, the current attitude of the law is to restrict the application of the maxim only to causes of action founded on defamation. See Winfield & Jolowicz on Torts (17th Edition); National Electric Power Authority v. Malam Muhammad Auwa (2010) LPELR-4577(CA). As the present action is partly founded on the tort of defamation and partly on breach of contractual/fiduciary relationship, I take the considered view that the claims founded on defamation (notably reliefs 3 and 5) which are personal to the defunct CPC are caught by the maxim actiopersonalismoritur cm persona/. With great respect to learned counsel for the plaintiff, the aspect of the case which alleges that injury was done to the reputation of the defunct CPC does not survive the extinction of CPC and the current plaintiff (APC) cannot validly continue with that aspect of the claim. Quite contrary to the arguments pressed by Mrs. Obono-Obla of counsel, it is not the plaintiff's prerogative to decide what to prove and what not to prove in the case at hand. No. The plaintiff can only arrive at the juncture where proof is required if, and only if, there is a cause of action that survives the extinction of CPC. Since the cause of action (and claims) founded on defamation (libel) does not survive the extinction of CPC as I have held, there is nothing for the plaintiff to elect to prove in that regard. However, the claims founded on breach of contract survive and can ordinarily be continued with or maintained subject, of course, to a reasonable cause of action being disclosed and the current plaintiff (APC) being vested with the requisite locus standi.”

*Counsel:*

Mrs. J. O. Obono-Obla for the Plaintiff.

Dr. U. S. Ajala with Ikechukwu Ekene and Miss Ifekhai for the Defendant.

This summary is fully reported at (2014) 12 CLRN

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8b Fabac Close, Off Ligali Ayorinde, Victoria Island
Lagos

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