Custodis Juris Legal Consult

29/09/2025

*APPEALS ON GROUNDS OF MIXED LAW AND FACTS WILL NOW END AT THE COURT OF APPEAL- LEAVE OR NO LEAVE*

Anyanwu v. Emmanuel (2025) 14 NWLR (Pt. 2006) 531
SUPREME COURT
..by virtue of the extant provisions of section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal of Rерubliс of Nigeria (Second Alteration) Act, 2010 vis-à-vis section 233 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s power to grant leave to appeal on gгounds of mixed law and facts, has been removed. That being the case, therefore, appeals on grounds of mixed law and facts аrе bound to terminate at the Couгt of Appeal. Ву the alterations, there is nо longer (section 233(3) оf the Constitution which allowed leave to арреаl to the Supreme Cоurt. That is to say, bу virtue оf section 233(1) and оf the constitution оf the Federal Rерubliс оf Nigeria, 1999 as altered, the Supreme Соurt сan оnlу hear appeals where the ground оf арреаl involves questions оf law. Тhе Supreme Соurt nо longer has jurisdiction to hear appeals where the ground of арреаl involves questions оf mixed law and facts. Appeals оn grounds of mixed law and facts end at the Court оf Appeal.

Anyanwu v. Emmanuel (2025) 14 NWLR (Pt. 2006) 531
SUPREME COURT

27/09/2025

15/09/2025

LAGOS TENANCY BILL 2025: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW!

The Lagos State Tenancy and Recovery of Premises Bill 2025 is here to reform housing laws and protect both tenants and landlords. Here’s a quick breakdown of the major changes:

🔹 Applies Statewide – No more area exemptions like in the 2011 Law. The new Bill covers all of Lagos, urban and rural (with limited exceptions).

🔹 Agent Regulation – All agents must register with LASRERA. Collecting rent from multiple tenants for one property is now a criminal offence. Max agent fee: 5%.

🔹 Rent Caps – No more than 3 months' rent in advance for monthly tenancies and 1 year for annual tenancies. Violations attract fines or jail time.

🔹 Faster Evictions – No need for “Notice to Quit” if tenant owes rent beyond the grace period. Just a 7-day eviction notice required.

🔹 Court Requirements – Tenants must show proof of rent and utility payment to file or appeal cases.

🔹 Virtual Hearings – Disputes can now be heard online to save time and increase access.

🔹 Challenge Unfair Rent Increases – Tenants can take landlords to court over unreasonable rent hikes, and can’t be evicted while the case is ongoing.

"Over 70% of Lagosians are tenants, many spend 40–60% of income on rent." ~Speaker Obasa
This Bill is a big step toward fairness, transparency, and modern housing regulation in Lagos.

01/09/2025

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📌 Business Name Registration

📌 Limited (Companies, Schools, Madrasah) Registration

📌 Incorporated Trustee (Foundation, Mosque, Club) Registration

📌 Upgrade of Business Name to Company Registration

📌 Annual Returns Filing

📌 Trademarks, Patents & Designs, Copyright Registration

📌 SCUML Registration

📌 SMEDAN Registration

𝑪𝒂𝒍??/𝑾𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒔𝒂𝒑𝒑:

16/02/2025

Never underestimate the services of a lawyer. Trust me, you need one

31/08/2024

Shout out to my newest followers! Excited to have you onboard! Imam Ibrahim Mohammed, Tortema Kásillâs YumDoo, Elizabeth Ochigbo, Harrison Eli, Belle Gist, Umar Abdulrazaq, Aondona James Homunga, Humaira Umar, Halima Babakura, Aliyu Suleiman Alkafawi, Barr Richkid

21/06/2024

Shout out to my newest followers! Excited to have you onboard! Afuye Toyin Andrew, Marcus Osai Dankwa, Abubakar Ahmad Kudu, Oyeleke Faruq, Ogochukwu Blessing, Chioma Chika, Abdullah Abubakr, Abida Buhari, Chidi Bakoch, Godstime Innocent, Makun Mohammed, Justice Muhammerd Uwaeesu Asheeru, Nura Abubakar, Hauwa Muhammad Amin, Mihz Ray Ner, Nuhu Dahiru, Itz Tukuru Jr., Aminah Tijjani, Ikechukwu Oforkansi, Eshat A Musty, Rose Charle, Comrnasir Sani, Osifeme John

12/10/2022

A National Industrial Court sitting in Makurdi the Benue State Capital Per Hon. Justice Isaac Essien on January 23 ruled that no law bars a Legal Practitioner in salary employment from appearing in court as advocate to represent the interest of his or her clients.

Justice Essien delivered the ruling in suit Number NICN/MKD/96/2020 filed by Comrade Ngodoo Toryem & One Other V Nigerian Civil Service Union, Benue Chapter & Three Others.

The defendant in the suit had engaged the Legal services of Barr. Ambrose A. Ikpa a Principal Special Assistant to the Governor of Benue State, Samuel Ortom on Legal Matters to represent the 1st, 2nd,3rd and 4th Defendants in the suit prompting Counsel to the 5 Defendants to raise a Notice of preliminary objection challenging the competence of A. A. Ikpa, Esq to appear for the defendants sequel to the Legal wheel clog that he is currently in the employment of the Benue State Government where he draws salaries and even an official Gac sport car to credit. Counsel to the Claimants premised the strength of his preliminary objection on Rule 8 of the rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners which provides that; “A lawyer, whilst a servant or in a salaried employment of any kind, shall not appear as advocate in a court or judicial tribunal for his employer except where the lawyer is employed as a legal officer in a Government department.” or “A lawyer, whilst a servant or in a salaried employment, shall not prepare, sign, or frank pleadings, applications, instruments, agreements, contracts, deeds, letters, memoranda, reports, legal opinion or similar instruments or processes or file any such document for his employer.”

Counsel to the Claimants further contended that by the above provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners in Nigeria, Mr Ambrose Ikpa lacks ground to appear in Court as advocate on behalf of his Clients except for the purpose of discharging such duties for his employer who is his paymaster and in this case he is not a legal officer as contemplated by the law and urge the court to so hold.

Responding to the the notice of preliminary objection of ground of fact and law, Mr Ikpa contended that Counsel to the Claimants has only read the extant Provisions of Rules Conduct for Legal Practitioners in Nigeria only to the extent that suit his case. He assumes without conceding that the Rules do not allow him profess his profession only to the extent that he cannot while serving in salary employment. That the law only places restrictions on him from preparing, signing, or frank pleadings, applications, instruments, agreements, contracts, deeds, letters, memoranda, reports, legal opinion or similar instruments or processes or file any such document in favour of his employer, but no law within the context of Rule 8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct forbids him from appearing for the defendants in the instance case, Ikpa further urged the Honourable Court to discountenance the invalid submissions of Counsel to the Claimants as being too elementary in law.

In his ruling, Hon. Justice Isaac Essien held inter alia that he has carefully perused the provisions of Rule 8(1)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007 and finds the arguments of A. A. Ikpa, Esq as being valid on the the strength that while a Legal Practitioner , whilst a servant or in a salaried employment of any kind, shall not appear as advocate in a court or judicial tribunal for his employer except where the lawyer is employed as a legal officer in a Government department or shall not prepare, sign, or frank pleadings, applications, instruments, agreements, contracts, deeds, letters, memoranda, reports, legal opinion or similar instruments or processes or file any such document for his employer, the law did not in any way contemplate any restriction on any lawyer appearing for his clients other than his employer or as law officer and accordingly ruled that A. A. Ikpa, Esq a Principal Special Assistant to the Governor of Benue State on legal matters has the right of audience before him to defend the interest of the defendants in the instance case.

30/09/2022

JACOB vs. EFURIBE & ORS.(2021) LCN/15000 (CA)

*ISSUE: CUSTOMARY COURT PROCEEDINGS- Whether evidence of power of attorney in a suit by an attorney is necessary in a Customary Court(Issue is mine)

*PRINCIPLE:
"A careful consideration of this issue would appear to reveal that the issue of the Power of Attorney has been adequately dealt with by the lower Court. It is clear from the Records, pages 122-124, that the lower Court properly held that non tendering of the written Power of an Attorney as exhibit in Customary Courts is a non issue. For its relevance I hereby reproduce the portion of the judgment of the lower Court thus:
“It is the contention of the learned Counsel to the Appellant, that there is nothing on record to show that OBIEFULA JACOB, the PW1 at the trial, tendered the alleged Power of Attorney given to him to prosecute the suit, and that the failure to tender the Power of Attorney as an exhibit disabled his authority to prosecute the suit in the Court below. The Respondent’s Counsel on the other hand contends that Power of Attorney being a written document is unknown to Customary Law and none tendering of such document cannot vitiate a properly conducted trial by the Court.
I have carefully gone through the Records of appeal and noted that the capacity under which the PW1 prosecuted the suit was not in doubt. On the face of the claim it is disclosed that the Plaintiff is Jacob Efuribe (by his Attorney) Obiefula Jacob. In his evidence in chief the PW1, at page 19 lines 9-10, said “it is as a result of the Defendants to surrender their late father’s properties that made my father sue the defendants to this Honourable Court in my name as ATTORNEY as he is deaf and cannot hear.” The DW1 Dick Efuribe, in his evidence in chief at page 30 lines 10-14 stated, “Obiefula sued me and my brothers, on behalf of his father Jacob Efuribe, our elder brother asking the Court to order and constitute a panel to share our father’s property.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the authority under which the PW1 prosecuted the suit at the trial Court was not in dispute. In the circumstance, it is not necessary for the trial Customary Court to look for evidence of Power of Attorney. In OKEKE VS. PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF CUSTOMARY COURT (2010) 11 NWLR (PT. 725) 507 the Court held that in considering appeals from Customary Courts, an appellate Court is required to examine the entire records as men of common sense and not as lawyers trained in all the technical details of the rule of evidence, procedure and substantive law. The justification of the above is not far reached. This is because the Customary Courts are required to adopt the simplest procedure in dealing with cases before them. It is therefore totally erroneous for the Appellate Court entertaining an appeal from such Courts to start looking for evidence of power of attorney.”
Consequently upon the above, I hold that the failure of the Plaintiff ATTORNEY, to tender the Power of Attorney at the Court below as exhibit, did not disable his authority to prosecute the suit at the Court below. I hereby resolve issue 1 against Appellant.” Per ANDENYANGTSO, JCA.

*ISSUE: CUSTOMARY COURT PROCEEDINGS- Whether the formal requisite of substitution of a living person with a dead person is mandatory in a Customary Court where a provision in the Rules of the Court says proceedings in the Court should not be varied(Issue is mine)

*PRINCIPLE:
"Let me briefly comment on the phraseology of this issue, in which the learned Appellant’s Counsel has indicated that a dead person can be substituted for a living person. I think the reverse should be the case. That is to say the dead should be substituted with the living. I say no more on this.
Now the grouse of the Appellant in this issue is against the portion of the judgment of the lower Court which runs thus:-
“I quite agree with the submission of the Respondent’s Counsel, that an action relating to land survives the deceased and that it is only where the suit is on the personal right of a deceased litigant that the right of action dies with the deceased. However it is my view and I so hold that where the action survives the deceased, it is mandatory to substitute the deceased party, with a person with interest in the subject matter to give live (sic) to the suit.” (page 120 of the Record).
It is clear from the Record, which I have carefully considered, that the Plaintiff at the trial Customary Court sued through an Attorney; the Plaintiff died before hearing commenced; the Attorney did not disclose the fact of the death of the Plaintiff; the Attorney continued with the case, even though the fact of the death was elicited through cross-examination of the Attorney, until judgment was given in favour of the Plaintiff; the trial Customary Court did not substitute the Attorney for the deceased Plaintiff. Now, it is trite that in cases where the action survives the deceased party, such deceased party must of necessity be substituted with a living person who has sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation or suit, who will then continue and complete the case. See OKON VS. AJI (2017) LPELR-43464 (CA) and EJEZIE VS. ANUWU (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1101) 466.
In this case, it was the duty of the Appellant who was the Attorney of the deceased Plaintiff to apply to be substituted for the deceased Plaintiff and the trial Customary Court was duty bound to substitute accordingly, upon the death of the Plaintiff. The failure of the Appellant to apply for, and the trial Customary Court to grant such substitution, rendered the proceedings conducted from the 8/12/2009, when the Plaintiff died, to judgment invalid, as same was conducted in respect of a dead person. Dead persons neither sue nor are sued.
I therefore agree with the Lower Court on this point, that the proceedings conducted by the trial Customary Court from the 8th day of December, 2009 to the delivery of judgment is invalid and null and void. This issue is hereby resolved against the Appellant." Per ANDENYANGTSO, JCA.

*ISSUE: VOID JUDGMENT- Whether a possible substitution of an attorney for a dead plaintiff at the Customary Court of Appeal can save the judgment of the Customary Court given after the death of plaintiff(Issue is mine)

*PRINCIPLE:
"I have already held in issue two that the trial Customary Court failed in its duty to have substituted the deceased Plaintiff with his Attorney, thereby rendering the proceedings conducted after the death of the Plaintiff null and void. The subsequent substitution of the Plaintiff with the Attorney by the Court below, to me, amounted to naught and therefore not sufficient to save or validate the proceedings including the judgment handed down by the lower Court. It is trite that it is impossible to place something on nothing and expect it to stand. These issues are therefore resolved against the Appellant.
In sum, this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed by me. However an order for retrial is hereby made for the matter to be tried at the Customary Court of Abia State by another Panel. I make no order for cost in view of the family bond between the parties." Per ANDENYANGTSO, JCA.

30/09/2022

The law is banal that the days of technical justice are long since gone and forgotten. A Court of law faced with issue of substantive justice and technical justice has a duty not sacrifice substantive justice on the alter of technical justice. Substantive justice must prevail over technical justice.
UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC vs. MKENA(2019)LCN/13002 (CA)

*ISSUE: LOCUS STANDI- Whether the locus standi to sue in a representative capacity as an administrator of the estate of a deceased person lies mainly in integrity of having been granted letters of administration to administer the estate and not the way a person chooses to describe himself in the suit(Issue is mine)

*PRINCIPLE:
"It is not a fact in dispute that the Respondent, as Plaintiff before the lower Court, sued the Respondent/Defendant as: Ker Mkena (Suing as next of kin of the late Dr. Terlumun Mkena). Therefore, the bone of contention is whether the suit before the lower Court was competent having been so initiated. By a long line of decided cases, it is incontrovertible that where a party purports to bring an action in respect of the estate of a deceased person, in order to be competent, such an action must be instituted by the Trustee, Executor or Administrator of the Estate, and no other. In the case of *The Administrators/Executors of the Estate of General Sani Abacha (Deceased) V. Eke-Spiff (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 467) 1, 21, D-F, & 31, D-E* the Supreme Court held inter alia as follows:
I go further to say that a person does not have the locus standi, indeed, he lacks the competence to bring an action in a representative capacity as an administrator of the estate of a deceased person until he has been granted the letters of administration. If he brought the action before the grant, such grant has no retroactive validity. Similarly, a person, who as a plaintiff has no legal power to sue another person as an administrator or executor of an estate of a deceased person without naming the person of such an administrator or executor on the writ and ascertaining that Letters of Administration or Probate as the case may be, thus legally empowering that person sued to administer the estate of the deceased, was obtained prior to the initiation of the suit.
This is because a person has no locus standi and lacks competence to bring an action in a representative capacity as an administrator of the estate of the deceased person until he has been granted the Letters of Administration. Similarly, a person who has not applied for nor granted letters of administration authorizing him to administer the estate of a deceased person, cannot defend any action against the estate of the deceased. In other words, it is the grant of the letters of administration that confers the right to sue or be sued in the name of the estate of a deceased person.
Thus, for a person to be competent to institute an action in respect of the estate of a deceased person, or even to defend an action commenced against the estate of a deceased, he must be an Administrator or Trustee or Executor of the estate, who has been granted Letters of Administration in that regard to administer the estate. Any other person would lack the requisite locus standi to initiate or sustain an action in respect of the estate.
In the instant case as aforesaid, it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff (now Respondent) commenced this action as the next of kin of the Late Dr. Terlumun Mkena. It goes without saying that such a standing cannot vest the Plaintiff with the requisite capacity to sue. However, notwithstanding the nomenclature used by the Plaintiff, the Respondent proceeded to spell out the actual capacity in which he instituted the action in his Statement of Claim. For ease of reference, paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof are set out hereunder:
3. The plaintiff at all material times is the next of kin of the late Dr. Terlumun Mkena who died intestate sometime in 2006 and was issued letters of administration by the High Court of Justice, Benue State sometime in 2007 to administer the estate including account number 2031010015543 with the defendant. The letters of administration are hereby pleaded.
4. The plaintiff avers that following the discovery of other funds in the said account, the plaintiff on request to the defendant issued an inventory of the amount in the account, processed at the registry of the same Court for a further grant of letters of administration in the sum of N755, 876.68 which the plaintiff paid the sum of N75, 500.00 representing 10% as fees for issuance of letters of administration. The inventory, further grant and official receipt are hereby pleaded.(Emphasis supplied)
Even though the Appellant filed her Statement of Defence in response, with the leave of Court, no evidence whatsoever was adduced in respect of the averments therein as the Appellant rested her case on the case of the Plaintiff. The averments in the Statement of Defence filed are therefore deemed abandoned.
Subsequently during the trial, the Plaintiff, as PW1, tendered both the initial Letters of Administration and the further Letters of Administration granted to him by the Benue State High Court of Justice, and they are in evidence as Exhibits A and A1. By these two sets of Letters of Administration, the Respondent, as the next of kin of late Dr. Terlumun Mkena, was made the Administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Terlumun Mkena. No evidence whatsoever was adduced to controvert these pieces of evidence.
Therefore, the emphasis placed by the Appellant on the fact that the Respondent sued as the next of kin is immaterial in view of the pleadings, substantiated by both oral and documentary evidence disclosing that even as the next of kin, he was properly clothed with the requisite capacity to sue having been granted Letters of Administration to administer the estate of his father (the account of late Dr, Terlumun Mkena with the Appellant inclusive) twice. Therefore, on the peculiar facts of the case, the issue made by the Appellant on the description of the Respondent as the next of kin borders on technicality, the Respondent having fully established the capacity in which he instituted the action. The integrity of the evidence in this regard, to wit: the Letters of Administration was not impugned. Therefore, the learned trial Judge cannot be faulted when he held that the Letters of Administration, Exhibits A and A1, made the Plaintiff the Administrator of the estate of Dr. Terlumun Mkena.
In addition, Order 13 Rule 11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Benue State, 2007 provides:
Trustees, executors and administrators may sue or be sued on behalf of or as representing the property or estate of which they are trustees or representatives, without joining any of the persons beneficiary interested in the trust or estate, and shall be considered as representing such person, but a Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings order any of such persons to be made parties in addition to or in lieu of the previously existing parties. This Rule shall apply to trustees, executors and administrators in proceedings to enforce a security by foreclosure or otherwise.
By virtue of this Rule of Court and the law as set down in decided cases, a grantee of Letters of Administration in respect of the estate of a deceased has the right to sue and be sued. What is important is the legal standing which vests in a party the capacity to approach the Court, and not the way in which he chooses to describe himself. Thus, in my humble view, the description of the Plaintiff as the next of kin of the Estate of the late Dr. Terlumun Mkena on his Court processes, is merely superfluous and does not in any way detract from the fact that he was properly clothed with locus standi to institute the action, having been granted Letters of administration before he did so.
As was earlier pointed out, the Appellant neither adduced any evidence to substantiate her defence nor did she controvert in any way the fact that the Respondent was granted Letters of Administration in respect of the Estate of late Dr. Terlumun Mkena. Her bone of contention is simply the description of the Respondent as the next of kin of the Estate of the late Dr. Terlumun Mkena. To succumb to the argument of the Appellant in the light of the existence of the Letters of Administration, Exhibits A and A1, disclosing the capacity in which the Respondent filed the action and thus clothing him with locus standi, is to sacrifice substance on the altar of technicality. The learned trial Judge therefore acted commendably when he declined the invitation to do so. The days of technical justice are long since gone and forgotten; substantial justice must prevail over technical justice.
The Appellant does not dispute the amount standing to the account of the late Dr. Terlumun Mkena domiciled with it; neither does she dispute that the Respondent was granted the requisite Letters of Administration which enabled him to administer the estate left behind by his deceased father as well as to take legal action on behalf of the estate. Instead, she decided to embark on nitpicking in respect of the description of the Respondent as his deceased father's next of kin. This is unwarranted and the Respondent will not be indulged by this Court. Thus, for all the afore-stated reasons, I decline the invitation to interfere with the well-considered judgment of the lower Court." Per SANKEY, JCA.

30/09/2022

Criminal liability is not transferrable. Anyone who violates criminal law should be made to carry his cross alone.
NIGERIA POLICE FORCE & ANOR. vs. THE STATE (2020) LCN/14403 (CA)

*ISSUE: CRIMINAL LIABILITY-
Whether in the realm of Nigerian criminal law a law enforcement agency can be vicariously liable to pay compensation following the conviction and sentence of its employee for a criminal act (Issue is mine)

*PRINCIPLE:
"The sole issue for determination in this Appeal is “Whether the trial Court wrongly applied the principle of vicarious liability in a criminal case”. The case at the trial Court was that after PC Dan Asabe was convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment without the option of fine for the offence of Culpable Homicide not punishable with death contrary to Section 224 of the Penal Code Law, the 1st Appellant (Nigeria Police Force) in their capacity as his employers were ordered to pay as compensation to the family of late Elder Reuben Iroham the sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira); for the purpose of bearing the actionable conduct of their employee. It therefore follows that the lower Court has employed and applied the doctrine of vicarious liability in a criminal case. The term vicarious liability has been defined by the Apex Court in *Ifeanyi Chukwu (Osondu) Company Ltd. v. Soleh Bonieh (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) LPELR-1432 (SC)* as follows: "The term, vicarious liability has, rightly in my view been defined to mean the case of one person taking the place of another in so far as liability is concerned.”
The issue for determination is whether there is transferred criminal liability under the Nigerian Criminal Justice system. In the case of *Yusuf v. FRN (2016) LPELR-41811 (CA),* this Court per Oho, JCA, held thus: “The settled position of the law is that there is no transfer criminal liability or Agency under the Nigerian Criminal Justice System. See *DINA vs. DANIEL (2010) 11 NWLR (PT.1204) 137.* See also the case of *APC V. PDP & ORS. (2015) 4 SCM 48 AT 99* where the Supreme Court, *per FABIYI, JSC,* had this to say on the subject: “It is basic there is no vicarious liability in the realm of criminal law. Anyone who contravenes the law should carry his own cross.” Learned Appellant Counsel’s insistence on the application of the rules of Agency, i.e that the Appellant as an agent acting on behalf of a disclosed principal; Beal Construction limited, reminds this Court of the proverbial drowning man who would catch at anything including a straw in order to stay afloat just to stay alive. What counsel had done in essence in this insistence on having the Court apply the principle of the law of Agency which is applicable only in civil matters as opposed to where crimes have been committed, is to insist on having the Court misapply the principles of law at the expense of the justice of this case.”
It therefore follows that the lower Court was in error when it awarded compensation of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) against the 1st Appellant for an offence committed by one of its employees. Issue one is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondent." Per BAYERO, JCA.

30/09/2022

BANIRE v. NTA-STAR TV NETWORK LTD. (2021) LPELR-52824 (CA)

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - COPYRIGHT - Position of the law as regards the rights of a holder of copyright of photographs
"At this juncture, I would like to state that image rights must be looked at against the copyright of a photograph. In Nigeria, the law on intellectual property as it relates to photographs is found under the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act provides that the copyright of photographs vests with the author. Photographs by virtue of Section 51 of the Copyrights Act are considered as artistic work. The Section states that: "artistic work" includes, irrespective of artistic quality, any of the following work or works similar thereto - (a) paintings, drawings, etchings, lithographs, woodcuts, engravings and prints; (b) maps, plans and diagrams; (c) works of sculpture; (d) photographs not comprised in a cinematograph film; (e) works of architecture in the form of buildings models; and (f) works of artistic craftsmanship and also (subject to Subsection (3) of Section 1 of this Act) pictorial woven tissues and articles of applied handicraft and industrial art." While Section 10 of the Copyright Act which confers copyright of a photograph to the author provides that: "10.(1) Copyright conferred by Sections 2 and 3 of this Act, shall vest initially in the author. (2) Notwithstanding Subsection (6) of Section 11 of this Act where a work- (a) is commissioned by a person who is not the author's employer under a contract of service or apprenticeship; or (b) not having been so commissioned, is made in the course of the author's employment, the copyright shall belong in the first instance to the author, unless otherwise stipulated in writing under the contract. (3) Where a literary, artistic or musical work is made by the author in the course of his employment by the proprietor of a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical under a contract of service or apprenticeship as is so made for the purpose of publication in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, the said proprietor shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of copyright in the work in so far as the copyright relates to the publication of the work in any newspaper, magazine or similar periodical; or to the reproduction of the work for the purpose of its being so published; but in all other respects, the author shall be the first owner of the copyright in the work." The Section above essentially means that the copyright to any photograph vests with the photographer known as the author except there is a written agreement which states otherwise. Who the author of a photograph is can be found in Section 51 of the Copyright Act which provides thus: "author in the case of a photographic work, means the person who took the photograph." Referring back to the evidence in the case, the Appellant in her witness statement on oath contained on page 10 of the record of appeal stated: "That sometime in March 2012, I had a photo session with Orisun Tv, owned by Virtual Media Network showy before I was engaged by the company as a presenter." This was confirmed in her testimony on page 91 of the record of appeal where she stated that: "in paragraph 3 of my witness statement, I stated that I had a photo session with Orisun Tv and it was for celebrity profiling. Celebrity profiling is the picture data base that all TV stations have for artists for contents." While under cross-examination on page 92 of the record of appeal the Appellant said: "...The photos taken by Virtual Media Network Ltd with my permission were in the custody of the same Virtual Media Network and I requested for my copy." The trial judge after evaluating all evidence came to the conclusion on page 114 of the records of appeal that: "...by allowing Virtual Media Network to be using her photographs and images, ownership and authorship of the copyright automatically in the photographs and images resides/and belongs to Virtual Media Network. See Section 10(1)(2) and (3) of the Copyright Act, 2004..." I am not in total agreement with the trial judge's ratio here although I also agree that Section 10 of the Copyright Act applies to this case. It was the act of the Appellant allowing Virtual Media Network to use the images that gave the ownership of the copyright. It is the act of Virtual Media Network being the ones who took the photographs that makes it the author of the photographs. By taking the photographs they automatically have rights except there is an agreement otherwise. What is evident from the above provision is that the person who is a muse or the person in the photograph is not in fact the author and therefore he/she does not own copyright in the photograph. Rather it is the person who took the photograph that is the author. The Appellant by her own evidence has stated that she had a photo session with Virtual Media Network the owners of Orisun Tv and as such since Virtual Media Network took the photographs then they have authorship and as a result they have copyright of the photograph not the Appellant." Per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JCA (Pp 34 - 38 Paras C - E)