23/04/2026
WHETHER THE POWER OF COURT(S) TO SETTLE PROPERTIES IN MATRIMONIAL MATTES AS CONFERRED BY SECTION 72(1) OF THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT IS RESTRICTED TO PROPERTIES JOINTLY OWNED BY PARTY (IES) OR WHICH PARTIES MADE CONTRIBUTIONS TO ACQUIRE*
_BABAOYE v. BABAOYE(2026) LPELR-83474(CA)_
In considering an ancillary relief for settlement of property after dissolution of a marriage the Court is guided by the provisions of Section 72 of the Matrimonial Causes Act. The said provision empowers the Court to order a party to settle any property or properties to which he or she is entitled on any or both parties to the marriage as the Court may consider just and equitable. See ANIETO vs. ANIETO (2019) LPELR (47223) 1 at 24-25, OGUNLESI vs. OGUNLESI (2019) LPELR (51154) 1 at 24-26 and OGUNNUBI vs. OGUNNUBI (supra) at 29-31. Section 72(1)and(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act stipulate as follows:
"(1) The Court may, in proceedings under this Act, by order require the parties to the marriage, or either of them to make, for the benefit of all or any of the parties to, and the children of, the marriage, such a settlement of property to which the parties are, or either of them is, entitled (whether in possession or reversion) as the Court considers just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (2) The Court may, in proceedings under this Act, make such order as the Court considers just and equitable with respect to the application for the benefit of all or any of the parties to, and the children of, the marriage of the whole or part of property dealt with by ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlements on the parties to the marriage, or either of them." It is abecedarian law that where the language of a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the task of interpretation hardly arises. The duty of the Court will be to give the words used their ordinary, natural and grammatical construction. See MOBIL OIL NIG LTD vs FBIR (1977) LPELR (24896) 1 at 22, UWAZURIKE vs. A-G FEDERATION (2007) LPELR (3448) 1 at 12 and VODACOM BUSINESS NIG. LTD vs. FIRS (2019) LPELR (47865) 1 at 11-12.
The plain, natural and grammatical construction of Section 72(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act reproduced above seems clear to me that it does not restrict the property which the Court can make an order of settlement in respect of to property which is jointly owned by the parties or property in which it has been established that the parties made contributions to acquire. Furthermore, it does not require that the settlement of property cannot be made in favour of children of the marriage who are not minors. In fact, Section 72(3) expressly enacts that property can be settled in children over twenty-one years where the Court is of the opinion that special circumstances so to do exist: SUNMONU vs. SUNMONU (supra) at 36-38.
The clear operative words in Section 7(1) is that the order can be made in respect of property "to which the parties are, or either of them is, entitled... as the Court considers just and equitable in the circumstances of the case." The overriding consideration would seem to be not whether it is joint property or whether it was acquired by joint contribution, but whether the Court considers it just and equitable to make the order in the circumstances of the case. It is a matter which the stipulation seems to have left entirely to the discretion of the Court. It is based on what the Court considers just and equitable in the circumstances of a particular case.
In DOHERTY vs. DOHERTY (2010) ALL FWLR (PT 519) 1165, it was stated that the purport of the provisions of Section 72 of the Matrimonial Causes Act is that settlement of property is based on what the Court considers just and equitable in the circumstances of a particular case. The provision gives the Court a lot of discretion on the issue. See also IBEABUCHI vs. IBEABUCHI (supra) at 7, IGWEMOH vs. IGWEMOH (2014) LPELR (46807) 1 at 22-23, ANIETO vs. ANIETO (supra) at 34-38 and IGBUWE vs. IGBUWE (2023) LPELR (60748) 1 at 27-29."
