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21/02/2026

*D.I.D. AL-AMAN COMPANY NIGERIA LTD. & ANOR. vs. MINKO & ORS.(2020)LCN/14780(CA)*

*ISSUE:* PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND-Whether where two parties are both on a piece or parcel of land claiming possession thereof, the law will ascribe possession to the party who proves better little; Whether where radical title pleaded has not been proved it is necessary for a Court to consider acts of possession

*PRINCIPLE:*
"The second hurdle for the claimant where his title is challenged, is to prove the root of his title to the disputed land by leading evidence to establish his claim. In the case at hand the Respondents do not contest the Appellants original ownership of the land in dispute. Their only claim is that they bought the various plots of land from the 2nd Appellant through his well-known agent, the 1st Respondent, to whom they had made payment and that the Appellants instituted the action only to get more money from them. This is their case at pleadings and the general tenor of evidence of their seven witnesses. DW4 Barrister Bashiru Halilu who is the third Respondent stated in cross-examination thus:
“The plot we bought is for Alhaji Dauda the 2nd Plaintiff…”.
Paramountly, issues were not joined at pleadings on the Appellants’ title to the land nor how same was acquired. The Respondents having admitted the Appellants title to the land, bear no burden to prove an admitted title.
The law is trite that where a defendant in an action for declaration of title to land admits in his pleading that the claimant is the original owner of the land in dispute, the onus is on the defendant to establish a change of ownership by sale, gift or otherwise. The onus shifts to the defendant to prove how the claimant forfeited or transferred his original title so acknowledged to the defendant either directly by gift or assignment or even to a third party from whom the defendant derived title. In that case, there is no onus on the plaintiff to establish a sale or a grant of land, the burden having shifted to the defendant. See ONOBRUCHERE VS. ESEGINE (1986) 1 NWLR (PT. 19) 792, where the apex Court held per Oputa, JSC, inter alia: “… The onus or burden of proof is merely an onus to prove or establish an issue. There cannot be any burden of proof where there are no issues in dispute between the parties. For example, if the plaintiff claim is admitted that will be the end of the story... Where for instance the plaintiff pleads possession of the land in dispute as his root of title and the Appellant admits possession but adds that the land was given to plaintiff on pledge, the onus shifts to the Appellant to prove that the plaintiff is not the owner of the land in his possession of which had been admitted.”
Similarly, in the case of MOGEKWU & ANOR. VS. ADELANA & ORS. (2014) LPELR-23617 (CA) this Court per Abiru, JCA, applying among others the above decision of ONOBRUCHERE VS. ESEGINE (Supra) held thus: “It is trite that where a defendant in an action for declaration of title to land admits in his pleadings that the claimant is the original owner of the land in dispute, the onus is on the defendant to establish a change of ownership by sale or otherwise. In that case, there is no onus on the claimant to establish a sale or a grant of the land. Thus, it is the duty of the defendant to begin to adduce evidence, for it is the defendant who would lose if no more evidence is adduced having regard to the state of the pleadings - Ochoma Vs. Unosi (1965) NMLR 301; Isiba Vs. Hanson (1967) 1 All NLR 8; Mogaji Vs. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91; Bello Vs. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101; Onobruchere Vs. Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799; Ezeudu Vs. Obiagwu (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 21) 208; Adedeji Vs. Oloso (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1026) 133; Awure Vs. Iledu (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt 1098) 249; Adole Vs. Gwar (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 562; Orlu Vs. Gogo-Abite (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 307. In the instant case, the Appellants having admitted that the land in dispute originally belonged to the late husband of the first Respondent, the onus was on the Appellants to prove the sale of the land in dispute to them and the first Respondent had no onus”.
In the instant case, the Respondents having admitted and acknowledged the Appellants’ title to the land but averred that they bought the respective plots of land from the Appellants through their agent, the onus was on the Respondents to prove the sale of the land to them by the Appellants’ known agent with the knowledge and on behalf of the Appellants.
What follows is whether there is evidence on record establishing the Respondents’ claim that the 1st Respondent sold the land to them as an agent of the Appellants. In other words, that the sale transactions between the 1st Respondent and the other Respondents were conducted by the 1st Respondent in his capacity as an agent of the Appellants, as the principals.
It is trite that the burden of proof rests on the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue, here, the ownership of the land by purchase from the Appellants through the Appellants’ agent, to prove what they assert. They do this by firstly proving the existence of an agency relationship between the 1st Respondent and the 2nd Appellant, Appellants having vehemently denied such a relationship, and secondly, by proving that they bought the land from the 1st Respondent as agent of the Appellant.
The term “agency” in law connotes a relationship where one person has authority to act on behalf of another to create a legal relationship between that other and third parties. Generally, agency relationship exists in law when one person called the “agent” is vested with authority (express or implied) to act on behalf of another called “the principal” who consents to the act of the agent. An agent denotes one who acts, a doer that accomplishes a thing or things on behalf of the principal and not for himself. He is authorized to act for or in place of another, a representative. BAMGBOYE VS. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN & ANOR. (1999) 10 NWLR (PT. 622) 290 AT 329.
The existence of agency relationship depends on the nature of the agreement or the circumstances of the relationship between the alleged ‘principal’ and the alleged ‘agent’ and not necessarily on the exact phraseology used. See OSIGWE VS. PSPLS M. CONSTORTIUM LTD. (2009) 3 NWLR (PT. 1128) 378.
Therefore, the relationship arises basically in 3 ways. Namely; (a) by agreement, whether contractual or not between the principal and the agent which may be express or implied from the conduct or situation of parties; (b) retrospectively, by subsequent ratification by the principal of acts done on his behalf by the agent and (c) by operation of law under the doctrine of agency of necessity and some other cases. Agency may also operate by estoppel where the principal by operation of law is precluded from denying that another person acted on his behalf in an arrangement with a third party. See UTC NIG. LTD. VS. WEMA BANK PLC & INTEGRATED TRUST INVESTMENT LTD. (2002) 12 NWLR (PT. 781) 214; ORJI VS. ANYASO (2000) 2 NWLR (PT. 643).
Now, the Respondents pleaded and averred in their respective statements on oath that the 1st Respondent is a known business associate and agent of the 2nd Appellant; that the various sale transactions between them and the 1st Respondent acting as the agent of the Appellants were endorsed and sealed by the Ward Head of Hotoron Arewa; that the transaction and purchase receipts were in the name of the 1st Appellant and the purchase receipts were pleaded. However, none of the 7 witnesses, DWs 1 - 7, tendered the purchase receipts or any document evidencing as they claimed, that the transactions were conducted on the letter headed paper of the 1st Appellant. Ironically, they stated that they handed over their purchase receipts to the 1st Respondent. Quite incredible. Is it reasonable for a purchaser issued with a receipt evidencing payment by him to the vendor to hand over the receipt, his proof of parting with his money and the vendors parting with his property, back to the vendor and not to have a copy of the purchase receipt? Methinks not. This is unbelievable. DW1 like the other defence witnesses admitted not been shown any document evidencing that the 2nd Appellant appointed the 1st Respondent as his agent. Even DW7 who said he was shown the headed paper of 1st Appellant before buying the plot failed to tender any such document or the purchase receipt.
​The palpable explanation for their failure to tender the receipts or any document in proof of their claim that the transactions were rendered by the 1st Respondent on behalf of and on the headed paper of the 1st Appellant is that if they had been tendered, they would have gone against their assertion. I agree with the Appellant’s Counsel that the presumption in Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 operates against the Respondents. See IWOK VS. UNIVERSITY OF UYO (2011) 67 NWLR (PT. 1243) 211, F - H. Additionally, DW1 specifically stated in cross-examination that “I made effort to get to the 2nd plaintiff over the agency of the 1st defendant but (sic) did not take me to the 2nd plaintiff”. This further explains why the 1st Respondent, the person at the centre of it all though served did not even appear to defend the action and to deny or affirm the claim.
Respondents therefore failed to place any documentary or concrete evidence before the Court showing the creation or the existence of an agency relationship between the 1st Respondent and the 2nd Appellant nor did they specifically deny paragraphs 6 & 7 of the amended statement of claim wherein it was pleaded that all documents evidencing sale transactions by the Appellants are on the standard Form of the 1st Appellant with its office address and that all sale transactions by the Appellants must be stamped by them.
The legal conclusion from all these is that the Respondents failed to establish an agency relationship between the 2nd Appellant and the 1st Respondent. They also failed to support their pleadings with evidence that they purchased the respective plots of land from the 1st Respondent, having failed to present the purchase receipts before the Court.
It is not enough to plead that one person is an agent of the other without any evidence to support the assertion. Merely pleading as the Respondents did that the 1st Respondent is a close associate and known agent of the 2nd Appellant without proof does not establish agency relationship. Any person can exploit a close relationship with another to engage in contractual transactions with 3rd parties and create liability for the other to bear without the knowledge and consent of the other on whose behalf he acts. Something more has to be shown to establish the existence of an agency relationship between an acclaimed agent and an acclaimed principal. That proof is absent in the present appeal.
The law is settled that a claimant who fails to prove the root of his title must fail in his claim.
Assuming, (and I am not saying so), that the general principle of law that a declaratory relief cannot be granted upon admission applies even where as in the present appeal pleadings are filed and parties join no issue on the claimant’s title, I will still be in a very comfort zone of the law to say that a minimal proof by the claimant will entitle him to the declaration sought.
Now, in proof of their claim, the Appellants tendered the purchase receipt of the land, Exhibits 1A & 1B as the sale agreement and the purchase receipt between himself as the purchaser and Yahaya Yakubu Hotoro as the vendor. They contain the purchase price of N21,000,000 and the description of the property sold to the 2nd appellant.
Counsel for the represented Respondents has contended that because the Appellants pleaded that they divided the land into 44 plots and Exhibit 1A states that the plots sold to the appellants are numbered 1 - 24, 42 and 44, a total of 26 plots, its contents are at variance with the evidence and does not support the appellant’s claim. I disagree. The issue is whether the receipt evidences purchase of land at Hororon Arewa by the 2nd Appellant from his predecessor in title Alhaji Yahaya Yakubu for the stated amount of money. Whether the land was divided into 44 plots, or was divided into plots 1 - 24, 42 and 44 does not affect the fact of the purchase of the land which the document evidences - nor does it render the evidence of PW1 at variance with the pleadings to warrant the evidence being discountenanced.
Paramountly, issues were not joined at pleadings on the Appellants’ title to the land nor how same was acquired. Paragraph 4 of the amended statement of claim wherein the appellants pleaded:
The Plaintiffs avers that precisely on 31st December, 2006, the 2nd Plaintiff bought a Farmland situates at Hotoro Area Quarters, in Nassarawa Local Government Area of Kano State, from one Alhaji Yahaya Hotoro the customary owner for the sum of N21,000,000.00 (Twenty-One Million Naira Only) on behalf of the 1st Plaintiff and since then have been in through the customary owners.
was not specifically denied.
It is not the case of the Respondents that the Appellants’ title through whose agent they claimed to have derived their own title, is a defective title. That couldn’t have been their case.
Furthermore, the evidence of PW1 remained unchallenged and uncontroverted throughout the trial and contrary to the contention of the Respondent’s Counsel, the unchallenged evidence supports the Appellants’ claim. The effect of the failure of the Respondent’s Counsel to cross-examine PW1 on the crucial and material evidence is that they admitted his evidence in chief. By implication, they accepted the truth of the evidence of PW1 on the matter so testified to. See OFORLETE VS. THE STATE (2000) 12 NWLR (PT. 681) 415; BELLO VS. EWEKA (1981) 1 SC 101; ERESIA-EKE VS. ORIKOHA (2010) 8 NWLR (PT. 1197) 421, 448 E.
The fall out of the foregoing is that the Appellants’ title to the land in dispute was never an issue at pleadings. It is a fact admitted by the Respondents in their evidence. I therefore agree with the learned Appellant’s Counsel that the holding by the lower Court that the Appellants were not put into possession by the original vendor is not supported by the record. The case of MANYA VS. IDRIS (2000) LPELR-10172 (CA) relied upon was misapplied.
On the record, the Appellants adduced sufficient evidence to establish their claim and shifted the onus unto the Respondents to prove their claim on the pleadings. The Respondents failed to do that.
This much the lower Court found, that the Respondents’ assertion (that they bought the plots from the 1st Respondent whom they said is an agent to the plaintiffs), was not supported by evidence. However, in a complete somersault the same learned trial Judge who made a finding that he did not believe, to his words “the truth of such testimony” in a 360 degree twist immediately following that finding held:
“Even though the defendant did not counter-claim however available evidence before me both from the plaintiff and the defendants shows that the defendants were in possession of the disputed lands. The plaintiff was not able to prove trespass to enable him possession because the plaintiff has not dislodged the evidence of the defendants being in possession”.
This finding and conclusion are not only in conflict with the law and incongruent with the earlier finding by the Court, but is also perverse. It is in violent conflict with the evidence on record that the radical root of title from whom the Respondents claimed to have derived their title by virtue of which they were in possession, resides in the Appellants. Therefore, the above finding and conclusion clearly run counter to the evidence. They are perverse. Perversity occurs when (i) the judgment of the Court runs counter to the evidence adduced before the Court, or (ii) it has been shown that the trial Court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account or (iii) shuts its eyes to the obvious or a miscarriage of justice. See AGBOMEJI VS. BAKARE (1998) 9 NWLR (PT. 564) 1 SC; MOMOH VS. UMORU (2011) 15 NWLR (PT. 1270) 217; OFFODILE VS. OFFODILE (2019) 16 NWLR (PT. 1698 189.
The law is trite that a party who fails to prove the pleaded root of title, for instance purchase or gift of land, cannot turn round to rely on acts of possession for such acts of possession become acts of trespass and no longer inures him. In the case of OKHUAROBO VS. AIGBE (2002) 9 NWLR (PT. 771) PAGE 29, PP. 61, PARAS. F - J the Supreme Court held thus: “Where a party pleads purchase or gift as his root of title, as in this case, he either succeeds in proving the purchase or gift or he fails. If he fails to prove the title pleaded, he cannot turn round to rely on acts of possession or acts of ownership which are acts in the nature of things derivable from and rooted in the radical title pleaded. Equally once radical title has been pleaded and proved, acts of ownership or possession resulting from such title need no longer be considered for they are non-issues, conversely, where the title pleaded has not been proved it will be unnecessary to consider acts of possession for they became no longer acts of possession but acts of trespass.”
Obviously, the finding and conclusion of the lower Court run counter to the evidence. The pronouncement by the Court entering judgment for the Respondents merely on the basis of being in possession, runs counter to the evidence on record. In a scenario such as the one in this appeal, the duty of an appellate Court when it comes to a finding that a finding or decision of the lower Court is perverse, is to set aside the perverse finding or decision to right the wrong and to put an end to the miscarriage of justice. It is therefore necessary in the circumstances of this appeal for this Court to discharge its duty to set aside the perverse decision of the Court below. It is so set aside." Per WAMBAI, JCA.

21/01/2026

Federal High Court Declares Lower Courts Lack Powers t
A Federal High Court sitting in Lagos has delivered a landmark judgment declaring that Magistrate, Area, and Customary Courts do not have the legal authority to order the freezing or restriction of bank accounts, or the reversal of transactions, at the request of law enforcement agencies, private individuals, or organisations. The ruling has significant implications for banking operations, police investigations, and the protection of customers’ fundamental rights.

The judgment was delivered on Tuesday, October 7, 2025, by Honourable Justice Ibrahim Ahmad Kala in Suit No: FHC/L/CS/07/2025 between Aiman Mahfouz and Fidelity Bank Plc. In his decision, Justice Kala stated clearly that there is no law that empowers Magistrates or other inferior courts to issue orders freezing a customer’s bank account or reversing transactions, regardless of whether such applications are brought by the police or private parties.

Justice Kala emphasized that only courts of competent jurisdiction, particularly the High Courts, have the authority to issue valid orders restricting bank accounts. He cautioned the Nigeria Police Force against acting outside the bounds of the law, stressing that investigative powers do not include freezing accounts without a valid court order from a competent court. According to the judge, adherence to due process is mandatory in all investigations involving alleged proceeds of crime.

The court also issued a strong warning to the leadership of lower courts across the country. Justice Kala described the frequent issuance of such ex parte orders by Magistrate, Area, and Customary Courts as improper and called on heads of courts to issue circulars immediately halting the practice. He urged judicial authorities to ensure that courts under their supervision operate strictly within their jurisdiction.

In addition, the judge called on banks and other financial institutions to protect themselves from unnecessary legal disputes by refusing to recognise or act on account-freezing orders issued by inferior courts. He advised banks to circulate internal directives across all branches instructing staff not to enforce such orders, which have now been clearly declared to be outside the jurisdiction of those courts.

Justice Kala further noted that the Nigeria Police Force played a central role in enabling the restriction of the applicant’s account by securing and executing the Magistrate Court orders. He observed that the applicant would ordinarily be entitled to compensatory damages for the violation of his fundamental rights, particularly against the police, but explained that such relief could not be granted because the police were not joined as parties to the suit.

The case arose from an application brought under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure, in which the applicant sought declarations that Fidelity Bank had no legal authority to restrict his account without following due process as required by the 1999 Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. He also asked the court to declare null and void an order issued by a Magistrate Court in Mararaba, Nasarawa State, which the bank relied on to maintain the restriction on his account.

Court documents revealed that the applicant, a Lagos-based businessman with an account domiciled at Fidelity Bank, first had his account restricted in October 2018 based on a Magistrate Court order from Osogbo, Osun State. Although the police later concluded their investigation, and the same Magistrate Court ordered the lifting of the restriction in March 2023, the bank failed to comply with the order.

Despite receiving a formal letter from the Lagos State Commissioner of Police conveying the court’s directive to lift the restriction, the bank continued to deny the applicant access to his funds. Instead, the bank claimed to be acting on a fresh Magistrate Court order issued in October 2024 by a court in Mararaba, Nasarawa State, which again restricted the account.

As a result, the applicant’s account remained frozen for years without any clear allegation or charge against him. The court’s ruling has now clarified the law on the issue, reinforcing the principle that only courts of competent jurisdiction can authorise such restrictions and reaffirming the need for strict compliance with due process in financial investigations.

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