Adv Gurdeep singh

23/01/2026

@

11/01/2026

Must watch

25/12/2025

https://youtu.be/w7jUALHl1SU?si=wdAHkt7YGFDwfoYs

Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.

23/12/2025

Videography is valid for transparency

26/09/2025

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has directed that all parole applications must be decided by jail authorities within a strict timeframe of four months and in case of violation of the direction the convicts may initiate contempt proceedings against the concerned officials.

The Court underscored the plight of convicts who await responses to their parole applications, facing undue delays even in emergency situations and directed to decide such pleas "expeditiously."

Justice Harpreet Singh Brar said, "to spare unwarranted hardship to the applicants and their families, it is further directed that all applications pertaining to temporary release on parole shall be decided by the concerned authority within a period of 04 months from receipt of such application."

The Court highlighted that, in case, these directions are not adhered to without any justifiable cause, the convicts would be at liberty to move an appropriate application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India seeking initiation of contempt of Court proceedings against the officials concerned.

Justice Brar observed that a any unjustified delay in hearing applications for temporary release, which often pertain to situations of emergency, further exacerbates the plight of the convict.

"In fact, the Act specifies certain situations where release for a convict on parole may be warranted. Since the statute itself bestows the convict with the right to be considered for temporary release and enlists circumstances therefor, it is all the more vital to decide such applications expeditiously," added the judge.

These observations were made while hearing the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, read with Section 3(1)(d) of the Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (Act) seeking release of the petitioner on parole for a period of six weeks to meet his family members.

The petitioner was convicted under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1.00 lakh along with default mechanism.

As per custody certificate, the petitioner had undergone actual sentence of 01 year, 08 months and 24 days.

Counsel for the petitioner had filed an application under the provisions of Section 3(1)(d) of the Act seeking temporary release on parole for eight weeks. However, almost 10 months have passed but no action has been taken on the said application, which is in violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

It was further contended that the petitioner is a married person, having two children. Moreover, his mother is suffering from various age related ailments and he has filed the said application to provide emotional support and care to her.

After hearing the submissions, the Court noted that the application of the petitioner for temporary release has been pending before the concerned authorities for the last 10 months.

Temporary Release Preserves Social Bonds and Promotes Good Conduct

The Court observed that the very object of the Act is humanitarian in nature. "Providing opportunities for temporary release ensures that the ties between the prisoner and the society are not severed. Ensuring that the incarcerated have healthy roots in the society greatly assists in their rehabilitation and reintegration. It also incentivizes the inmates to maintain good conduct while in custody, that aids the jail authorities in administration as well," it added.

Authorities Denied Legal Rights Treated Convicts As Second Class Citizen

The judge said that, It is deeply concerning that State agencies display such laxity in dealing with applications for temporary release.

"The administration cannot truly comprehend the value of liberty as perceived by a prisoner, who lives its absence every single day. Such an undisciplined approach is symptomatic of the culture of apathy that has developed on the subject of rights and well being of convicts," it further said.

Adding that denying them their legal right to be considered for temporary release under a statute that has been created for this very purpose, the Court said that, "the authorities have essentially categorized them as second-class citizens."

The Court prima facie opined that, casual and lackadaisical conduct of the concerned authorities cannot be allowed to continue unchecked.

"The incarcerated cannot be expected to live at the whims and fancies of the State and neither does their incarceration entitle the administration to jeopardize their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India," it added.

In the present case, the Court considering that the convict undergone an actual sentence of 01 year, 08 months and 24 days, directed the authorities to decide the application filed by the petitioner seeking temporary release on parole in light of established jurisprudence "preferably within a period of 02 weeks."

Mr. Lakhwinder Singh Lakhanpal, Advocate for the petitioner.

Title: Jaspal Singh @ Jassa v. State of Punjab and others

08/09/2025

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has set aside a Trial Court order which set aside an ex-parte decree, while holding that an ex parte decree can't be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in service of summons if it is established that the other party had notice of the hearing date and sufficient time to contest the claim.

Justice Satyen Vaidya said: “The second proviso appended to Rule 13 of Order 9 of the Code carves out an exception that no Court shall set-aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim.”

Background Facts:

The petitioner, Devi Dass, filed a civil suit for recovery of Rs.20,00,000/- . However, despite repeated summons, during the proceedings of the civil suit, the respondents did not appear and were eventually proceeded against ex parte. Thereafter, an ex parte decree was passed in favour of the petitioner.

After this, the respondents filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, claiming that they were never served and only got to know about the case when they received notice of ex*****on proceedings.

The contentions of the respondent were accepted by the trial court, and his application was allowed. Therefore, the ex parte decree was set aside.

Aggrieved by the Trial Court's Decision, the Petitioner approached the High Court.

Findings:

The High Court observed that the Trial Court held that the respondents were not served properly because the process server did not file any affidavit regarding affixation of summons under Order 5 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, in another order, the Trial Court recorded that the process server duly served the summons. Noting this, the Court remarked that the findings of the Trial Court were contradictory.

The Court observed from the petitioner's evidence that the process server made two attempts to serve the summons. On the second attempt, he affixed the summons on the main gate of the company's office in the presence of an employee, who refused to sign as a witness.

It stated that under Order 5 Rule 17 of the Code, a summons is allowed to be served by affixation when, after using all due and reasonable diligence, the defendant is not found. Further, as per Order 5 Rule 19, when summons are served by affixation, the Court must ensure that this was done properly by examining the process server on oath, unless the server has already filed a sworn statement.

In this case, the Court held that the requirement of Rule 17 stood satisfied. However, the Trial Court found the service invalid because Rule 19 was not followed.

The High Court held that this finding of Trial Court can't be sustained for the reason that the Court is mandated to examine the serving officer on oath and to hold further inquiries in the matter as it thinks fit, in case where the returned summons have not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer.

Since in the present case, the report of the serving officer was verified, it was not mandatory for the Court to have examined the serving officer or to hold any other further inquiry. The absence at most can be construed as an irregularity, the court said.

Therefore, the Court reiterated that under Order 9 Rule 13, an ex parte decree may be set aside if it is proved that the summons was not duly served, or that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause when the suit was called for hearing. In this case, the defendants have taken both these pleas, claiming the summons was not duly served and they had no knowledge about the suit.

However, the exception to Rule 13 says that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground of irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the opposite party had notice of the date of hearing and sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim.

The Court concluded that the summons was properly served, or alternatively, it can be said that it was a case of mere irregularity in the service of the summons. The process server tried to involve company employees as witnesses, but they refused. So, after two tries, he stuck the summons on the office gate.

Rule 2 (b) of Order 29 provides that where the suit is against a company, the summons may be served by leaving it or sending it by post to the Corporation at the registered office or if there is no registered office, then at the place where the Corporation carries on business.

Therefore, the court held that the summons was rightly served, as the summons and copy of the suit were put up on the company's main gate.

Case Name: Devi Dass v/s M/s Ginni Global Pvt. Ltd. & another

Case No.: CMPMO No. 305 of 2022

Date of Decision: 01.07.2025

05/09/2025

The Delhi High Court has observed that the dignity of a dependent wife and child is denied when the financial support is delayed by the husband, underscoring that even a day's lapse defeats the very purpose of maintenance.

“The very object of maintenance is defeated if its disbursal is left at the convenience of the earning spouse. Financial support delayed is dignity denied, and this Court is conscious of the fact that timely maintenance is integral to safeguarding not only subsistence but the basic dignity of those who are legally entitled to such support,” Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma said.

The Court observed that maintenance is not merely a monetary obligation but a legal and moral duty designed to preserve the dignity and security of the dependent spouse and child.

“The very object of maintenance under the statutory framework is to ensure financial stability and a sense of security for the dependent spouse and child. Maintenance is intended to safeguard their right to live with dignity and meet basic expenses such as food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, and education. It is not a benevolence or charity to be delayed at the convenience of the earning spouse,” the Court said.

Justice Sharma was dealing with a husband's plea challenging a family court order directing him to pat Rs. 45,000 to the wife and the minor child per month.

The Court noted that the husband failed to place on record any material to demonstrate that the wife had any independent source of income. It said that there was no document, affidavit, or income proof filed to indicate that the wife was engaged in any gainful employment or possesses any financial resources of her own.

The Court further noted that the husband's claim regarding his parents being financially dependent upon him was completely unsupported by any documentary evidence.

The Court also took note of the fact that EMIs were being paid by the husband towards his ancestral house. On this, Justice Sharma observed that the statutory right of the wife and child to receive maintenance cannot be defeated on account of EMIs that the husband was paying towards any property.

“This Court notes that while the petitioner (husband) continues to sleep in peace, secure in the knowledge of his regular income and resources, the respondent (wife) suffers in silence, grappling with uncertainty and anxiety about how she will meet her basic needs if maintenance is not paid in a timely manner. The hardship faced by a dependent spouse or child is not measured merely by the quantum of arrears but by the immediate consequences of financial deprivation that even short delays in maintenance can cause,” the Court said.

It added realitythat even a day's uncertainty over basic expenses causes distress and hardship to the wife, who was entirely dependent on the maintenance for her survival and for providing for the minor child.

The Court modified the impugned order to the extent that the interim maintenance payable to the wife shall remain to be Rs. 22,500 per month, however, the minor child shall be entitled to interim maintenance of Rs. 17,500 per month.

Title: X v. Y

04/09/2025

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a wife cannot be denied maintenance merely because she is a graduate and capable of earning, especially when she is not gainfully employed.

Justice Jasgurpreet Singh Puri said, "mere fact that the respondent/wife is a graduate would not itself mean that she can be denied of the Right of Maintenance which is conferred upon her by way of a statutory provision unless the right to seek maintenance can be curtailed under the grounds which have been mentioned under Section 125 Cr.P.C. or when her income is so high as compared to the husband and it can be found that she is able to maintain herself, then in that situation she may not be entitled for grant of maintenance."

The Court further said that however, in the present case, the mere fact that the wife is a graduate but having no job would not mean that she can be denied maintenance when she is having no source of income at all and at the same time, she is also having the care and custody of a 6 years old minor female child for whom only an amount of Rs. 5,000 per month as maintenance has been fixed.

"By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the aforesaid even quantum of maintenance is on the higher side. This Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by leaned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Ludhiana," it added.

These observations were made while hearing a plea of a husband who had challenged the order passed by the Family Court, Ludhiana vide which a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. filed by the respondents i.e. wife and minor daughter for grant of maintenance against the petitioner was allowed and the total maintenance to the tune of Rs, 14,000 per month (Rs.5000 for minor daughter and Rs.9000 for the wife) was fixed.

The couple had married in 2018 and a female child was born out of wedlock in 2019, who was in custody of the wife.

Counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that at the time of consideration of interim maintenance, his income was Rs. 34,033 per month and he is working as Collection Branch Manager in Piramal Capital Housing Finance Limited, but at the same time he also has other expenditures to make which includes paying premium of Rs. 25,560 per annum and Rs. 9,463 per month as EMI against car loans.

Apart from the above, he also has other liabilities especially to take care of his old aged grandparents and number of other expenditures and therefore, he is not in a position to pay the aforesaid amount of Rs. 14,000 per month as maintenance, he added.

Rejecting the argument the Court said, for the purpose of considering and deciding the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C, a liability is to be fastened upon the husband which is not only a statutory liability under an enactment but also a social, economic and moral responsibility of the husband to maintain his wife and his minor children.

Justice Puri explained that the mere fact that the petitioner also has other expenditures to make is not significant and is irrelevant and the liability is fixed as per the law and therefore, such an argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is unsustainable.

The judge also refused to consider setting aside the maintenance order on the ground that the wife has an ability to work and earn because she is an educated lady having qualification of B.A. PGDCA.

In the light of the above, the Court dismissed the plea with the cost of Rs. 10,000 and directed to deposit the aforesaid costs before the Family Court, Ludhiana within a period of 3 months from the order.

Mr. Amandeep Singh, Advocate for Mr. R.K. Malik, Advocate

Title: A###XX v. ######

02/09/2025

The Gauhati High Court recently set aside the judgment of conviction passed by the Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the ground that the accused had already pleaded guilty before the Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge ignored the said aspect while allowing appeal.

The single judge bench of Justice Parthivjyoti Saikia was hearing an application under Sections 438 and 442 of the BNSS, 2023 challenging the judgment dated March 21, 2025 passed by the Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh.

The facts of the case are that the petitioner gave a loan of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the respondent. Thereafter, on October 14, 2022, the respondent wrote a letter to the petitioner whereby he admitted to have taken Rs. 10,00,000/- from him. Moreover, with that letter, the respondent issued six numbers of cheque worth in total Rs. 11,20,000/- to the petitioner. The said cheques were dishonoured by the Bank. Therefore, the petitioner filed the case in the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) at Dibrugarh against the present respondent.

During the pendency of the case before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, on November 30, 2023, the respondent filed a petition whereby he deposited a cash amount of Rs 2,00,000/- and prayed that he may be given opportunity to pay the balance amount to the petitioner in instalments of Rs. 1,00,000/-. After consideration of the prayer made by the respondent, the trial court directed the respondent to pay Rs. 1,50,000/- every month to the present petitioner towards liquidation of loan amount of Rs. 10,000,00/-.

Even after that, the trial court continued the trial by recording evidence, etc. and finally, on August 19, 2024, passed a judgment convicting the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (N.I. Act). The trial court held that though the respondent paid Rs 2,00,000/-, but failed to pay the remaining amount of Rs 9,20,000/-. The respondent was sentenced to pay the fine of Rs.10,00,000/-.

The respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions. The Sessions Judge allowed the appeal and the judgment passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class was set aside.

The Court noted that on November 30, 2023, the respondent actually pleaded guilty and deposited a cash amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- and prayed before the court to allow him to pay the remaining loan amount in instalments of Rs. 1,00,000/-. But the court directed the respondent to repay the loan in monthly instalments of Rs. 1,50,000/-. The petitioner has already received the amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-.

“At this stage, Section 375 of the old Criminal Procedure Code and 416 of the BNSS, 2023 comes into play. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge did not notice the aforesaid aspect of the case,” the Court said.

The Court noted that there is no doubt that the respondent pleaded guilty before the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class.

“Overlooking this aspect of the case, the learned Sessions Judge has disposed of the appeal by allowing the same. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 21.03.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh is bad in law. The judgment dated 21.03.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh in Criminal Appeal No.36(3)/2024 is set aside,” the Court held.

The Court remanded back the matter to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh for deciding the issues afresh.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Gau) 33

Case Title: Atmaram Agarwal v. Sri Bijay Kumar Nawka

Case No.: Crl.Rev.P./155/2025

01/09/2025

The Kerala High Court has clarified the position of law under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882 (NI Act) that a manager of a firm cannot prefer a complaint or prosecute in his personal capacity under Section 138 if the payee of the cheque was the firm.

The judgment was passed by Justice A. Badharudeen while considering a Criminal Appeal preferred by the complainant-manager challenging the acquittal of the accused person by the trial court.

The complainant in this case was the manager of the Perinthalmanna branch of the firm, Kerala Roadways Ltd. He filed a complaint pursuant to dishonour of a cheque or Rs.65,000/- issued by the accused in favour of Kerala Roadways Ltd. The trial court took cognizance for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and proceeded with trial.

The trial court gave two reasons for acquitting the accused. One, that no legal notice was sent during the stipulated time. Two, that the prosecution of the case was by the Manger of the firm in his personal capacity even though the cheque was issued towards the money due towards Kerala Roadways Limited and not pertaining to any personal liability of the complainant.

The learned Single Judge mainly considered the issue of “whether it is legally permissible for the manager of a firm or company or a concern to sue in his individual capacity for the money due towards the firm, company or the concern?”

The Court referred to Sections 7 [definition of 'payee'], 8 [definition of 'holder'], 9 [definition of 'holder in due course'], 138 [dishonour of cheque] and 142(1)(a) [cognizance of offences] of the NI Act to answer the question.

According to the Court, a combined reading of the aforesaid provisions inevitably leads to the conclusion that the competent person to make a complaint alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act is the `payee' or `the holder in due course' of the cheque.

The Court reached the finding that the manager would not come within the purview of the term 'payee' since the amount of consideration is not personally due to him. The consideration of the cheque is due to Kerala Roadways Limited and the same was issued to it.

It clarified the position of law with respect to who a 'payee' is:

“
…The legal position is so clear that when a cheque is issued by a person in favour of a firm, company or concern, the `payee' thereof is the firm, company or concern and the holder in due course is also the firm, company or concern, when the firm or company or concern alone is entitled to receive the money, i.e. the possessor of the cheque legally is entitled to get the consideration…”

In regards to the role of a manager/authorised officer of firm, company or concern, the Court observed as follows:

“
When an authorised officer representing the company is doing such exercise the same is for and on behalf of the firm, company or concern and not on his personal capacity. Therefore, in such cases in order to succeed a prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act, when a cheque issued in favour of the firm, company or concern was dishonoured, the firm, company or concern must be the complainant being `payee' or `the holder in due course', though the firm, company or concern can be represented by an officer, who is legally authorised to represent the firm, company or concern, after arraying the firm, company or concern as the complainant.”

The Court also carved out the exception of a sole proprietor of a proprietorship firm. In such cases, the proprietor can lodge complaint, being the payee of the cheque.

Applying the aforesaid legal principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that the prosecution was defective since the prosecution was initiated by the manager of the firm in his individual capacity. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

Case No: Criminal Appeal No. 968 of 2007

Case Title: K. Ramachandran v. Gopi & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 356

31/08/2025

The Chhattisgarh High Court has reiterated that secondary evidence in respect of a document can be accepted only if it is established that the original document is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by the party against whom such document is sought to be proved. It was also held that a trial Court cannot accept a secondary evidence at the instance of a party during the cross-examination if it is suppressed during investigation and earlier stages of the trial.

The Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru further clarified that the party which seeks to produce such evidence must prove the 'foundational fact' necessitating production of secondary evidence instead of primary evidence.

“It is trite that under the Evidence Act, 1872 facts have to be established by primary evidence and secondary evidence is only an exception to the rule for which foundational facts have to be established to account for the existence of the primary evidence.”

Case Background

The complainant (Respondent No. 2 herein) lodged a written complaint against the petitioner alleging that he committed sexual in*******se with her on the false pretext of marriage but subsequently, refused to marry her. Therefore, a case for commission of offences punishable under Sections 376 and 417 of the IPC was registered and the police arrested the petitioner.

Upon filing of the charge-sheet, the trial Court framed charges against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences. During the course of cross-examination of the victim, she produced one agreement/ Ikrarnama stating that the same was executed by the petitioner. The trial Court accepted the said document and marked the same as an 'exhibit'.

The petitioner protested the acceptance of such document by the Court since the complainant neither filed any application for taking document on record nor she stated about the same during the course of investigation or at the time of recording of her statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC.

The petitioner further contended that during cross-examination, a photo-copy of the Ikrarnama was produced by the victim to show that it bears the signature of the petitioner and without any notice the photo-copy was accepted by the trial Court. He argued that acceptance of such document is gross in violation of Section 66 of the Evidence Act as no notice was given to produce such document. Hence, he urged that the High Court must set aside such illegal acceptance of the photo-copy of the agreement.

Court's Observations

The Court perused the provisions under Sections 65 and 66 of the Evidence Act which provide “cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given” and “rules as to notice to produce such secondary evidence” respectively.

Chief Justice Sinha, who authored the judgment, held that for secondary evidence to be admitted, the foundational evidence has to be given i.e. the reasons as to why the original evidence has not been furnished.

“A perusal of Section 65 makes it clear that secondary evidence may be given with regard to existence, condition or the contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in possession or power against whom the document is sought to be produced, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after notice mentioned in Section 66 such person does not produce it,” he added.

To bolster the above proposition of law, the Court referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube & Anr. (1975) and Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri & Ors. (2015) In the latter case, it was categorically held that unless it is established that the original document is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by the party in respect of whom the document is sought to be used, secondary evidence cannot be accepted.

In this case, the Court held, the Ikrarnama is not a part of the charge-sheet which was brought to light by the complainant for the first time during her cross-examination. The trial Court also accepted the same without recording the objection of the petitioner that original copy of the said document has not been produced by her, which is per se illegal, improper and contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

For the above reasons, the petition was allowed and the order passed by the trial Court to the extents of accepting the photocopy of the Ikrarnama produced by the victim/complainant at the time of cross-examination and marking the same as exhibit was quashed.

Case Title: Vijay Uraon v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.

Case No: CRMP No. 1108 of 2022

Date of Judgment: June 17, 2025

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate

Counsel for the Respond