Adv. Pradeep Kumar Khatana-CIVIL,CRIMINAL,CYBER Lawyer in Gurgaon

08/01/2026

Rights of the Accused and Complainant in Cross-Examination of Defence Witnesses under CrPC and the Evidence Act

When a witness is summoned at the instance of the accused during a criminal trial, the procedural and substantive rights of the accused and the complainant are governed jointly by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The settled legal position is that such a witness is treated as a defence witness throughout the trial, irrespective of the nature of testimony given.

Under the scheme of the Evidence Act, Sections 137 and 138 clearly lay down the order of examination. The accused, being the party who has called the witness, has the exclusive right to conduct the examination-in-chief. This is followed by the right of the complainant or prosecution to cross-examine the witness. After cross-examination, the accused again has the right to re-examine the witness, strictly limited to matters arising out of cross-examination. The complainant has no right to conduct examination-in-chief or re-examination of such a witness.

The complainant’s right is confined to cross-examination alone. During cross-examination, the complainant may test the veracity of the witness, challenge credibility, and impeach the witness under Section 155 of the Evidence Act. However, the complainant cannot seek to treat a defence witness as hostile under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, as that power ordinarily lies only with the party calling the witness, subject to the Court’s permission.

The accused also retains the right to seek leave of the Court under Section 154 of the Evidence Act if the defence witness turns hostile or departs materially from the expected version. Importantly, a defence witness cannot be converted into a prosecution witness merely because the testimony supports the complainant.

The procedural stages for summoning defence witnesses are governed by Sections 233, 243, and 247 CrPC, depending on the nature of the case, while Section 311 CrPC empowers the Court to summon, recall, or question any witness to ensure a just decision. This power, however, must be exercised with neutrality and not to fill gaps for either side.

In essence, the accused leads the evidence of a defence witness, the complainant cross-examines, and the Court supervises fairness. Any attempt by the complainant to exceed the limited right of cross-examination amounts to procedural illegality and is liable to be objected to at trial or challenged in revision or appeal.

07/01/2026

The Supreme Court of India in Tarun Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa (Criminal Appeal No. 1246 of 2019, decided on 19 August 2019) delivered an important ruling clarifying the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing of charges in serious criminal offences, particularly those involving allegations under the Indian Penal Code relating to sexual misconduct.

The case arose from an order framing charges against the accused under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 341, 342 and 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(k) IPC, read with Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The principal challenge raised by the accused was that the complainant and the investigating officer were the same person, and therefore the entire prosecution stood vitiated at the threshold. It was further contended that the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the framing of charges.

The Supreme Court categorically rejected these submissions and upheld the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court. The Court reiterated that at the stage of framing of charges, the court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial or weigh the evidence meticulously. The only requirement is the existence of sufficient material giving rise to a strong suspicion that the accused has committed the offence. Issues relating to credibility of witnesses, contradictions, or procedural irregularities are matters to be examined during the course of trial.

The Court also clarified the scope of its earlier judgment in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018), holding that criminal proceedings initiated much prior to that decision are not automatically invalidated merely because the complainant and investigating officer are the same. Such a ground, by itself, cannot be the basis for discharge when there is otherwise ample material on record.

The outcome of the judgment firmly establishes that serious criminal allegations, especially those involving offences against women, should not be scuttled at the preliminary stage on technical pleas. The Supreme Court affirmed that when prima facie material exists, the accused must face trial, and the truth must emerge through evidence tested by cross-examination.

This decision strengthens criminal jurisprudence by maintaining a careful balance between the rights of the accused and the societal interest in prosecuting grave offences. It sends a clear message that the framing of charges is a stage of judicial caution, not adjudication, and that justice is best served when contested facts are examined in a full-fledged trial rather than curtailed prematurely.

06/01/2026

Strict Procedural Compliance under the NDPS Act: Lessons from Prakash Kaur vs State of Punjab

The judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (DB) in Prakash Kaur vs State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 262-SB of 2000, decided on 03.07.2006 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mehtab S. Gill and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Baldev Singh, is a significant reminder that under the NDPS Act, procedure is the soul of criminal justice.

In this case, the appellant Prakash Kaur was convicted by the Special Judge, Patiala under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹1 lakh, arising out of an alleged recovery of one kilogram of o***m. The prosecution case was based on a police search conducted at a public place, leading to registration of FIR through rukka and subsequent investigation.

However, the High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused, pointing out serious and fatal infirmities in the prosecution case. Firstly, the search of the female accused was conducted by a male police officer, in complete violation of Section 50(4) of the NDPS Act, which mandates that the search of a woman must be conducted only by a female officer. This violation alone was held sufficient to vitiate the recovery.

Secondly, the Court noted the absence of independent witnesses. A so-called stock witness was joined and later given up, raising serious doubts about the fairness of the investigation. Thirdly, there was an unexplained delay of 10 days in sending the sample to the laboratory, breaking the chain of custody and creating apprehension of tampering. Lastly, no separate special report was sent to the senior police officer from the spot, reflecting non-compliance with mandatory reporting requirements.

The Court held that when the NDPS Act prescribes stringent punishment, its safeguards must be followed with equal strictness. The acquittal in Prakash Kaur reinforces that conviction under the NDPS Act cannot rest on recovery alone, but must stand on legally compliant search, seizure, sampling, and reporting.

This judgment continues to guide NDPS jurisprudence by reaffirming that constitutional liberty under Article 21 cannot be sacrificed for investigative convenience, and that procedural lapses strike at the very root of prosecution cases under special penal laws.

13/04/2025

Title: Importance of Adherence to Order XIX CPC in Civil Trials – Revisiting the Limits of Cross-Examination on Interlocutory Affidavits


In a recent judicial pronouncement, the Hon’ble High Court has clarified the critical procedural safeguard enshrined under Order XIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially in the context of premature cross-examination of the plaintiff. The case in question, Shri A. Parandhama Reddy vs. Mere Shivani Shiva Mika Movies & Ors., serves as an important precedent against attempts to bypass settled legal procedures through miscellaneous applications.

In this matter, the defendant had sought to cross-examine the plaintiff based on an affidavit filed along with an interim injunction application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The Trial Court erroneously permitted the cross-examination at this interlocutory stage. However, the Hon’ble High Court, while setting aside the trial court’s order, emphatically held that affidavits filed for interim reliefs cannot be treated as evidence-in-chief for the purpose of trial, and therefore do not attract the right to cross-examination unless the court finds it necessary under Order XIX Rule 2.

Order XIX Rule 1 allows parties to file affidavits as evidence, and Rule 2 confers discretion upon the court to order cross-examination only if it deems it necessary for adjudication of the matter. The court reiterated that such discretion cannot be exercised mechanically or at the instance of a party merely because an affidavit has been filed. Doing so would violate the due process established under CPC and would distort the procedural discipline of civil litigation.

This judgment also draws attention to Rule 52 of the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1980, often relied upon by parties to invoke procedural liberties. However, the High Court clarified that subordinate procedural rules cannot override or dilute the statutory scheme of the CPC.

Thus, any affidavit tendered during interlocutory proceedings such as under Order 39 cannot form the basis for cross-examination, unless the matter proceeds to the trial stage where evidence is led formally.

This precedent is a timely reminder to all litigants and trial courts that judicial discipline in procedural matters is not a mere formality, but a foundational requirement of fair adjudication. Misuse of interlocutory affidavits for premature cross-examination undermines the integrity of the trial and delays justice.

10/04/2025

Title: Timely Ex*****on of Sale Deeds – A Legal Necessity
– Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana

In property transactions, an Agreement to Sell merely reflects the intention to transfer ownership. However, only a registered Sale Deed conveys valid title under Indian law. Delay in its ex*****on often leads to disputes, litigation, and financial loss.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam & Ors. v. Vairavan (AIR 1997 SC 1751) held that time is of the essence in such contracts, especially when prices escalate or third-party interests arise. An unregistered Sale Deed, as per Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, is inadmissible in evidence and does not confer ownership.

In Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(2012) 1 SCC 656], the Court clarified that GPA or possession documents are not substitutes for a registered Sale Deed. Buyers who pay the full amount but do not get the deed registered risk losing legal rights. Sellers who delay ex*****on may face specific performance suits under the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Judicial trends now reflect stricter views on delay and laxity in real estate dealings. Courts expect parties to honour agreed timelines. Practically, both buyers and sellers must ensure timely ex*****on and registration. Agreements should include fixed dates, clear terms, and consequences of non-performance.

In conclusion, a registered Sale Deed is not a mere formality—it is the legal foundation of ownership. Timely ex*****on ensures enforceable rights, avoids litigation, and protects long-term interests in property.

08/04/2025

Authored by Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana

The recent passage of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 has stirred important legal and constitutional debates across India. As a legal practitioner, I believe this Act deserves a careful legal and social analysis, given its far-reaching implications on religious autonomy, minority rights, and property law.

This new legislation introduces significant changes to the management of waqf properties—endowments that hold deep spiritual and cultural value for the Muslim community. While the government contends that the Act will bring transparency and inclusivity, several legal experts and religious bodies argue otherwise.

Key Amendments:
1. Inclusion of Non-Muslim Members: The Act now mandates the inclusion of non-Muslim members in the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards. While this is presented as a step toward neutrality and accountability, it raises constitutional concerns about minority control over religious institutions.
2. Mandatory Representation of Women: At least two Muslim women are now required on every Waqf Board. This is a welcome reform that promotes gender inclusivity.
3. Abolition of ‘Waqf by User’: This amendment discontinues the recognition of waqf through continuous usage—a practice historically protected by Islamic and Indian jurisprudence. Many fear this may result in the loss of properties with undocumented waqf status.
4. Collector’s Power over Property Disputes: District collectors are now empowered to decide ownership of disputed waqf land. This administrative shift potentially sidelines Waqf Boards, and may invite political interference in religious property matters.
5. Application of the Limitation Act: By repealing Section 107 of the Waqf Act, 1995, the amendment allows the Limitation Act, 1963, to apply—thereby enabling adverse possession claims against waqf property, which could result in legalizing historic encroachments.

While the Home Ministry argues that the Act improves governance and curbs mismanagement, it has sparked strong opposition from civil society, legal professionals, and political leaders. Several Muslim organizations and opposition parties have announced plans to challenge this law before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, citing violations of Articles 25, 26, and 30 of the Constitution.

As a lawyer deeply committed to constitutional values and the rule of law, I believe this Act must be tested judicially. It is essential that any reform in waqf management upholds both administrative efficiency and the autonomy of minority religious institutions. Our democracy thrives when reform respects the foundational rights enshrined in the Constitution.

08/04/2025

Why Registration of a Partnership Firm is Crucial for Enforcing Legal Rights: A Caution for Start-Ups and Entrepreneurs
By Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana

In the rapidly evolving business environment of India, many young entrepreneurs are coming together to form start-ups through partnerships. While enthusiasm and vision drive such collaborations, often the legal formalities—particularly registration of the partnership firm—are overlooked. This oversight may not seem significant at the beginning, but it can have grave legal consequences when a dispute arises, especially concerning enforcement of contractual or civil rights.

In this article, I want to emphasize the legal necessity of registering a partnership firm under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and how non-registration can severely restrict the firm’s ability to claim relief in civil courts. I will also refer to landmark judgments by various High Courts and the Hon’ble Supreme Court that explain this legal principle.

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The Legal Framework: Indian Partnership Act, 1932

Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is the cornerstone provision dealing with the effects of non-registration. The relevant sub-sections are as follows:
• Section 69(1): Bars an unregistered firm from instituting a suit in a civil court for enforcement of a right arising from a contract.
• Section 69(2): Applies to partners intending to sue each other or the firm.
• Section 69(3): Provides exceptions, such as actions for dissolution or accounts.

In essence, if your partnership firm is not registered, you cannot sue any third party to enforce rights arising from contracts.

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A Common Pitfall: Start-Ups and Oral or Unregistered Partnerships

Imagine two friends decide to start a food-tech start-up, pool in resources, sign a partnership deed among themselves, rent a commercial space, and begin operations. They never register the partnership firm thinking it’s just “paperwork.”

A year later, a dispute arises with the landlord—say, an illegal eviction from the rented premises. They approach the civil court for injunction/stay or damages. The court, however, dismisses their suit at the preliminary stage citing Section 69 of the Partnership Act, since their firm is unregistered.

All claims collapse—not because they didn’t have a valid grievance, but because the firm lacked registration.

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Key Supreme Court and High Court Judgments

1. M/s Shreeram Finance Corporation vs Yasin Khan & Others, AIR 1989 SC 1769

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an unregistered firm cannot file a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract. The Court observed:

“The disability to sue under Section 69 is absolute and mandatory in nature.”

This decision reaffirms that registration is a pre-condition for seeking any contractual relief in court.

2. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184

Though this case dealt with the issue of tenancies and license, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that statutory bar under Section 69 must be strictly applied. A party cannot overcome this by pleading equity or hardship.

3. Haldiram Bhujiawala & Anr. vs Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar & Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 250

In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that an unregistered firm cannot sue even for infringement of a trademark or passing off, if the cause of action arises from a contractual relationship.

4. Durga Das Kashyap vs Rajendra Nath, AIR 1973 All 386

The Allahabad High Court held that even a suit for injunction or declaration arising from a contractual obligation is barred under Section 69 unless the partnership firm is registered.

5. S.K. Sikka and Co. vs. S.S. Sikka, AIR 2001 P&H 197

This judgment highlights that even an oral partnership, if not registered, cannot initiate civil proceedings based on contractual rights.

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Implication in Real Life: A Case Study

Consider a case where a start-up entered into a lease agreement for office space. When the landlord, without notice, locks the premises alleging violation of terms, the start-up files a suit for mandatory injunction and damages.

The defendant raises a preliminary objection: “The plaintiff is an unregistered partnership firm. The suit is barred under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act.”

The court upholds the objection and dismisses the suit without going into the merits.

All effort, time, and legal expense go in vain simply because of the non-registration of the firm.

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What Reliefs Are Barred Due to Non-Registration?

If your firm is unregistered, you cannot sue for:
• Breach of contract
• Damages
• Injunction based on contract
• Specific performance of agreements
• Recovery of dues
• Enforcement of lease/license agreements
• Trademark infringement arising out of contract

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What Reliefs Are Still Allowed Even Without Registration?

Under Section 69(3), you can still sue:
• For dissolution of the firm
• For accounts of a dissolved firm
• For realization of the property of a dissolved firm
• In cases not arising from contract (e.g., tortious liability, fraud)

But these are limited and cannot cover general commercial disputes that typically arise in a business setup.

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Conclusion: Register or Regret

The importance of registration cannot be overstated. While the Indian Partnership Act does not make registration mandatory, it effectively renders an unregistered firm toothless in civil litigation.

This problem is increasingly common in the start-up ecosystem where founders are focused on funding, branding, and MVPs—but ignore the basic legal structure of their enterprise.

If you are in a partnership and have signed a deed but haven’t registered the firm, you are inviting trouble. You are exposing yourself to the risk that in the event of any commercial or property dispute—no matter how genuine—you may be left without a legal remedy.

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Pro-Tip for Entrepreneurs and Legal Advisors
1. Register the firm immediately with the Registrar of Firms.
2. Ensure the registration certificate and PAN are linked to all contracts.
3. Mention the firm registration details in all agreements and communications.
4. Consult a legal professional before signing any lease or commercial agreement.
5. Update the Registrar if there is any change in the firm structure.

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Final Thoughts

Law favors the vigilant, not the negligent. In business, precaution is always better than litigation. Registering your partnership firm is not just a procedural formality—it is a legal shield that protects your rights, your contracts, and your capital.

Do not wait for a dispute to arise. By then, it may be too late to fix the foundation.

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Written by
Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana
District Court Gurgaon
www.pradlaw.com
+91-9871765000
Email: [email protected]

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07/04/2025

Is 20% Deposit Mandatory While Filing Appeal Against Conviction in Cheque Bounce Cases?
By Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana

In cheque bounce matters under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, many appellants face a practical hurdle — the requirement of depositing 20% of the compensation/fine amount at the appellate stage under Section 148 of the NI Act. However, recent Supreme Court and High Court judgments have clarified that this provision is not mandatory and is subject to judicial discretion.

In Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (2023), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that while the appellate court may direct the appellant to deposit 20% of the compensation, it is not bound to do so in every case. The court held that if imposing the deposit condition deprives the appellant of the right to appeal, then the court can waive it—provided reasons are recorded in writing.

Reiterating this position, the Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab (2024) observed that interpreting “may” in Section 148 as “shall” would lead to injustice. It clarified that discretion lies with the appellate court, and in exceptional cases, such as financial hardship, the condition can be relaxed.

High Courts have taken similar views. The Delhi High Court in Anuj Ahuja v. Sumitra Mittal (2025) emphasized that courts should consider the financial capacity of the appellant, nature of transaction, and overall equity while deciding on the 20% deposit condition. The Allahabad High Court in Rajesh Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (2025) reaffirmed that the requirement is discretionary and not absolute.

Therefore, any appellant who is financially constrained or has valid exceptional reasons can file an application before the sessions court itself seeking waiver of the 20% deposit. If rejected, the appellant may approach the High Court.

The intent of Section 148 is to ensure that frivolous appeals do not delay compensation to the complainant. However, the courts have made it clear that the right to appeal is a valuable legal right and should not be hindered by mechanical imposition of financial burdens.

In conclusion, it is advisable for convicted persons to apply for waiver of the 20% deposit citing financial hardship or other exceptional grounds. Courts are duty-bound to consider such applications and pass reasoned orders in light of recent binding precedents. This judicial flexibility helps balance the rights of both parties — ensuring justice is neither delayed nor denied due to financial constraints.

07/04/2025

Understanding the Concept of Separation in Mutual Divorce under Section 13B – A Legal Perspective by Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana

One of the most commonly misunderstood aspects of mutual divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is the requirement of the one-year separation period. Many clients and even young legal practitioners often confuse physical separation with the legal intent of “living separately.” However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of Smt. Sureshta Devi vs. Om Prakash has clarified this concept, establishing that separation is essentially mental, not necessarily physical.

The Court observed in Para 9 of the judgment that the expression “living separately” does not imply residing at different locations. Even if the husband and wife are living under the same roof due to force of circumstances, but are not performing marital obligations and are not living as husband and wife in the true sense, the condition of “separation” stands fulfilled. The crucial element is intent—a clear, continued desire to withdraw from the marital relationship.

It was further held that parties may live under the same roof and yet be living separately in law, provided they no longer cohabit, share emotional companionship, or perform any marital duties. The second requirement, as noted by the Court, is that the parties “have not been able to live together”—indicating the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The third requirement is mutual consent to dissolve the marriage.

In mutual divorce cases, particularly where parties continue to stay in the same house due to practical reasons such as children, financial constraints, or elder care, the proof of separation often becomes a procedural challenge. However, this confusion can be addressed effectively through a simple affidavit.

Courts across the country accept affidavits furnished by both parties stating the date of separation and confirming that they have been living separately—whether under different roofs or within the same household in different rooms, without sharing a marital relationship. No further proof or evidence is required beyond the affidavit. Therefore, to meet the legal requirement of Section 13B, parties must only affirm their mental and emotional separation for a continuous period of at least one year prior to filing the petition.

To conclude, the requirement of separation in mutual divorce proceedings is a legal condition based on intention, not geography. Citing the Sureshta Devi judgment and furnishing a properly worded affidavit are sufficient to satisfy the court. This clarity ensures that couples are not unjustly held back by misconceptions when they have mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage.

— Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana
District Court Gurgaon
Chamber No. 208, Near Gate No. 8 & 9, Chandrashekhar Azad Block
Mobile: +91-9871765000

06/04/2025

Can a Person Be Denied the Right to Travel Abroad Merely Because an FIR is Registered Against Them?
By Advocate Pradeep Kumar Khatana

In India, the right to personal liberty is a cornerstone of our Constitution, protected under Article 21. One of the essential facets of this liberty is the freedom to travel abroad. A common concern arises when an FIR is registered against an individual — does that mean their passport can be seized or that they are barred from travelling overseas? The answer, as clarified by the courts, is no — not without due process and judicial backing.

Police Cannot Seize Passport Arbitrarily
The investigating officer does not have the legal authority to confiscate your passport solely because an FIR has been lodged. Under the Passport Act, 1967, only the Passport Authority can impound a passport, and even then, only on valid and legal grounds. If the investigating agency fears that the accused may abscond, they must approach the court with an application seeking specific directions — but they cannot act unilaterally.

Travel Ban Must Have Judicial Backing
The registration of an FIR does not automatically translate into a travel restriction. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that the right to travel abroad is protected under Article 21 and cannot be curtailed except through a procedure that is fair, just, and reasonable. Further strengthening this position, in Satish Chandra Verma v. Union of India (2019), the Supreme Court reiterated that the right to travel is part of personal liberty, and any restriction must be backed by strong and compelling reasons.

Judicial Oversight is Essential
If a trial court directs an individual to deposit their passport or imposes a travel restriction, that order must be passed with proper reasoning. Such a direction can always be challenged before the High Court under Article 226. Importantly, only the Supreme Court, in rare and exceptional cases, can pass orders having a direct impact on fundamental rights without prior adjudication by a lower court.

Remedies Available
If you are asked to submit your passport without a court’s direction, you have the right to refuse and demand a written order. In case a lower court orders such action without strong justification, an immediate writ petition or appeal can be filed before the High Court seeking relief and restoration of rights.

Conclusion
Mere pendency of an FIR cannot be equated with guilt or used as a ground to deny liberty. The right to travel abroad is a fundamental right, and it cannot be curtailed based on assumptions or apprehensions. Courts must follow due process, and in the absence of a valid and compelling reason, your passport cannot be seized nor can your movement be restricted arbitrarily.