Jide Ogundimu SRA Regulated Independent Solicitor of England and Wales

Jide Ogundimu SRA Regulated Independent Solicitor of England and Wales Jide Ogundimu is an SRA Regulated Independent Solicitor of England and Wales providing legal services to the public.

11/06/2026

Obiter

Lawyer referee warms up for World Cup debut
11 June 2026

Obiter’s desperate attempts to shoehorn the World Cup into these pages had proved fruitless, until a late beacon of light in the form of Ali Omar.

The Egyptian referee has been named as the main official for the second match of the tournament, South Korea v Czech Republic, which kicks off at the unappealing UK time of 3am on Friday.

Omar is listed in various media outlets as a lawyer, although we could find no record online of his legal career.

Perhaps a long run in the tournament might raise his profile and help to fill in the blanks. Such a run of games would be a surprise given this is his first senior World Cup, but the Korean media is upbeat on his prospects, one outlet describing that ‘his willingness to maintain the flow of the game rather than blowing the whistle on every contact will be a true asset’. We can judge for ourselves on Friday – if anyone can still be up in those small hours.

10/06/2026

Legal updates

Court clarifies what counts as a 'building'
By James Holton and Philip Byrne 5 June 2026

The Court of Appeal decision in SGL 1 Ltd v FSV Freeholders Ltd is an important development for landlords, investors, developers and advisers dealing with residential leasehold property and rights of first refusal under Part I of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (LTA 1987).

The case considered a practical but difficult question: what is a ‘building’ for the purposes of section 5(3)?

Part I of the act gives qualifying tenants of flats a right of first refusal where a landlord proposes to dispose of the relevant freehold or other interest. Section 5(3) requires a landlord, where a transaction involves more than one building, to sever the transaction so as to deal with each building separately. The difficulty is that the act does not define what a ‘building’ actually is.

The appeal arose from a development in Liverpool in which the freehold title encompassed multiple blocks on a single Land Registry title. Notices had been served on the basis that block A was one building, and blocks B, C and E were another (block D had been demolished following a fire).

At first instance, however, the court had concluded that blocks A, B, C and E together constituted a single building for the purposes of Part I of the 1987 act, rendering the notices invalid.

The issue for the Court of Appeal was to determine how one decides whether the disposal of a freehold under the 1987 act is a disposal of more than one building; and, if it is, then how should one decide on the number of buildings comprised within the disposal?

The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance judgment. It held that the earlier legal test had been applied incorrectly, allowed the appeal, and decided that block A was a separate building, while blocks B, C and E together formed another building. Block A was a refurbished and redeveloped warehouse building which stood on its own and had its own supply of services, whereas blocks B, C and E had shared services. On that basis, the section 5 notices were valid.

One of the most notable aspects of the judgment is the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the earlier case law in this area. The court made clear that previous authority had taken the law in the wrong direction and that a different approach was required.

The court accepted that it is difficult to formulate one universal test for what amounts to a building. However, it said that the central question is likely to be whether the structures are within a ‘functionally integrated built envelope’.

Applying that approach, block A was treated as a separate structure with its own services and utilities, whereas blocks B, C and E were sufficiently integrated, including through shared access arrangements, plant and servicing, to be treated as one building.

Importantly, the court also made clear that the existence of shared amenity areas or rights over common parts does not necessarily mean that otherwise separate structures must be treated as a single building.

This decision is important because it provides clearer guidance to those structuring transactions involving mixed or multi-block residential developments.

It suggests that the focus should be less on broad estate-wide connections and more on whether the structures in question are physically and functionally integrated as part of the same built envelope.

That said, the judgment does not remove all uncertainty. The court acknowledged that the legislation is difficult to interpret and indicated that there is a strong case for the secretary of state to use existing powers to provide a clearer definition.

From our perspective, the decision is a timely reminder that investors, developers and landlords need to think carefully about how multi-block sites are configured, managed and ultimately disposed of.

Particular care is needed where:

multiple buildings sit within a single freehold title;

there are shared facilities, plant, accessways or utility arrangements;

common parts or external areas are used by occupiers across different blocks; and

a future sale of the freehold may engage the rights of first refusal regime under the 1987 act (including the transfer of the freehold to a residents’ management company, which is common upon completion of a development).

Those acquiring, developing or restructuring residential estates should not assume that title boundaries alone will answer the question. Equally, shared amenity arrangements will not automatically mean that several structures amount to a single building.

The analysis is likely to remain highly fact-sensitive, but the Court of Appeal’s ‘functionally integrated built envelope’ test will now be central.

Unless and until the legislation is clarified, this is an area where careful early advice is essential.

The consequences of getting it wrong can be serious. If a freeholder transfers the freehold without serving notices upon the qualifying tenants pursuant to section 5 of the LTA 1987, then they may be guilty of a criminal offence under section 10A of the LTA 1987, punishable by a fine. The qualifying tenants would also acquire statutory rights against the purchaser to obtain information about the disposal and to compel the purchaser to transfer the property to them on the same terms. It is also possible that property disposed of in breach of the LTA 1987 could be ‘criminal property’, as defined under section 340 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

For those involved in acquiring or disposing of freehold interests in residential estates, SGL 1 Ltd v FSV Freeholders Ltd is an important case. It provides welcome appellate guidance, but it also underlines the continuing need for caution where developments involve multiple buildings and shared infrastructure.

31/03/2026

News
Judge orders naming of barrister who cited AI-faked cases
By John Hyde 30 March 2026

A recorder has ruled that a barrister who presented the court with incorrect information produced by AI searches should be named. Recorder Howard, sitting at Bournemouth Family Court, said that Layla Parsons had held herself out as a lawyer offering paid legal work to the public, so it was in the public interest to name her.

It was agreed by all the advocates in A, B, C, D, Re (Extension of assessment; Use of AI: hallucinations) that Parsons had presented a skeleton argument presenting four cases or propositions that were not real. She accepted that she had used a widely known AI tool to help prepare the skeleton and apologised for inadvertently misleading the court. But she urged the court not to publish either the judgment or her name, saying this would amount to ‘character assassination’ which would place her at risk of actual and psychological harm.

The recorder ruled however that the judgment should be published as it was another example where AI hallucinations have led to the court being misled by a person representing themselves relying on the AI tool without reference to their duty to check the citations.

He added: ‘There is a real and not fanciful possibility that Ms Parsons will in the future offer legal services to members of the public. I consider that this factor, and the need for any person engaging the services of Ms Parsons in legal proceedings, to know that she has misled the court (albeit unintentionally) and does not in my judgement properly understand what she has done wrong is a strong and overwhelming factor in favour of naming Ms Parsons.

‘When I balance that factor against the risks Ms Parsons asserts, I consider it strongly outweighs the risks to her, and that naming her is a necessary and proportionate interference with her right to family life.’

The court heard that Parsons had acted as a lay advocate for her friend, a mother of four who was involved in Children Act proceedings. In the proceedings, she had sought to support the mother and put herself forward to care for all the children if they could not remain in the mother’s care.

Parsons works as a therapist but also held herself out as a lawyer. She is an unregistered barrister who had also done paid legal work as recently as last November. She had made applications in the case to be joined as a party, and for a special guardianship assessment and then as an interim kinship carer.

Following a hearing in January, at which it was discovered that the false cases had been cited, the recorder invited written submissions about whether the judgment should be published and Parsons named. In her submissions, Parsons offered immediate apologies for misleading the court having relied on the output of the AI tool. She was now fully aware that the AI tool may give incorrect information.

The recorder absolved her of any intention to mislead the court, but said he remained concerned that Parsons ‘minimises the seriousness’ of what had happened. He also rejected her suggestion that criticism of AI risks setting a harmful precedent for disabled litigants in person and would discourage access to justice.

20/03/2026

Commentary and opinion
For employment lawyers, the M&S chief compliments officer creates a minefield
By Emma-Jane Taylor-Moran 20 March 2026

The advice to companies? Keep it professional and beware unwelcome familiarity

A major high street store is running a campaign this season based on dressing well and being complimented, with actress Gillian Anderson appointed CCO (Chief Compliments Officer).

Personally, I’m a giver not a taker. I enjoy dishing out compliments (when merited), but in a truly British way, I often struggle to accept them. We are conditioned to be modest and self-deprecating.

But what about in the workplace? Compliments at work are a veritable minefield, and as an employment lawyer my instinct is to say, 'proceed with caution'.

Have you ever tried to say something nice to someone in the office and immediately worried you’ve said something dreadful? That foot-in-mouth moment. A simple 'you look nice today' can unleash the sort of panic usually caused by an unexpected 'can we have a catchup?’ email from HR.

On the other hand, have you ever received a 'love that dress on you!' comment from a colleague, and instead of invoking a happy glow, it made you feel a bit icky?

In employment law, innocent intent doesn’t override impact. In other words, you may think you’re being charming but the recipient may feel they’ve been ambushed by an unsolicited character reference on their physical appearance. And that’s enough to land an employer in potential trouble.

Workplace compliments fall generally into two camps:

Safe, sensible, HR‑approved remarks, like 'your presentation was crystal clear' or 'you handled that client like a Jedi'.

Personal comments about physical appearance or attributes, which is where the problems usually begin.

Appearance‑based compliments about someone’s body, outfit or hairstyle are in my view 'no bueno' because they can be read in multiple ways. They can feel personal, overly familiar or just plain intrusive. That doesn’t mean everyone reacts badly, but it does mean employers must assume someone might. Whereas compliments about professional competence are much less likely to be misinterpreted. And to be honest, it is the actual work someone does that should be the focus of their workplace experience, not whether Brian likes your shoes.

That brings me on to context. Compliments do not exist in a vacuum; they land within a network of cultural expectations, social conditioning, gender norms and power dynamics.

Let’s address the elephant in the meeting room: a male colleague telling a female colleague, 'you look lovely today,' is not the same as if it were two female colleagues chatting. That’s not about villainising men or assuming women can’t make others uncomfortable, it’s about historic societal imbalances, differing expectations and longstanding inequality of power between the sexes.

When men compliment women on their appearance, it is more likely to be perceived as:

inappropriately personal rather than professional

linked to sexual attractiveness rather than job competence

potentially sexual in tone, even if unintentional

When women compliment women on their appearance, it tends to be interpreted as:

socially normalised and perhaps even welcome

rooted in 'sisterhood' and devoid of sexual connotations

less entangled with power dynamics

None of this is absolute - anyone can cross a line, and anyone can feel uncomfortable, but context forms part of the backdrop that employment tribunals consider when deciding whether conduct was reasonable or harassing. NB I am referring to heterosexual colleagues here, and of course other sexualities create different dynamics in the same scenario.

What can employers do? I’m not a killjoy or a compliment-phobe, and employers don’t need to extinguish all warmth from the workplace, but they do need to set clear boundaries. I would suggest they:

Provide interactive training on harassment, conduct and the law - if you wouldn’t put it in a reference, don’t say it in the lift.

Encourage work‑related praise - say good things about productivity, creativity, hard work or innovation. Steer clear of comments about appearance.

Create easy reporting channels to line managers and HR, and foster a culture of openness - employees shouldn’t have to decide whether a comment was 'bad enough' to mention, and most employers don’t hear about these until it has been going on for too long already.

Respond proportionately and promptly - small everyday issues are easier to resolve than festering ones.

A simple rule for those who like to say nice things to colleagues but fear accidental awkwardness, or a grievance raised against them: if in doubt, rely on the 'Email Test' - would you feel comfortable putting this exact compliment in writing and sending it to their work inbox?

If typing it would make you squirm, or worse you suspect it could be sex-pest territory, then think of it as future evidence in an employment tribunal, and avoid, avoid, avoid. If you’d happily press 'send' and wouldn’t break out in a cold sweat if it were forwarded to HR, then you’re probably in safe territory. I hope. Unless you lack all sensible human judgment, and sadly I have seen many people in tribunals who seem to lack that.

A final word in praise of safer praise: workplace compliments aren’t completely doomed; they just need a little caution. They can strengthen teams, reinforce confidence and combat the British instinct to apologise for existing. BUT, keep them in the professional lane and away from anything that could be mistaken for a commentary on someone’s desirability.

If you focus on effort, skill, insight, and collaboration, then you might brighten someone’s day without drifting into the realm of unintended innuendo or unwelcome familiarity, because nothing kills a compliment faster than accidentally turning it into evidence.

17/03/2026

Commentary and opinion
Tackling predatory marriage will not be easy
By Rachel Rothwell 17 March 2026

Last week, as the ‘Free Wills Month’ initiative got into full swing, the Law Society called on government to update a 19th-century wills law that is ‘not fit for the future’.

Last May, the Law Commission recommended a raft of changes to the current law, which is still largely based on the Wills Act 1837. The proposals include updating the law on capacity, formalities and electronic wills. One of the more controversial recommendations is to abolish the rule that a will is automatically revoked by a marriage or civil partnership – in an attempt to tackle the growing problem of ‘predatory marriage’.

Predatory marriage is where someone coerces or manipulates a vulnerable elderly person into marrying them, so they can inherit their estate. Under current law, once the marriage or civil partnership takes place, any will previously in place is invalidated.

The true extent of predatory marriage is hard to quantify, because it does not usually come to light until the victim has died; and by law, a marriage cannot be challenged after the death of one of the parties. In its report, the commission said that while predatory marriage is not necessarily common, it is ‘far from uncommon’ and ‘far more widespread’ than it had previously thought.

When BBC Radio 4’s ‘File on 4’ contacted 176 solicitors about predatory marriage, it discovered that 98 suspected cases had been received by their firms during 2020. Meanwhile, Predatory Marriage UK told the commission it was contacted by around two families per month with suspicions of predatory marriage.

Facts often followed the same pattern. The predator moves in fast on the elderly person. They befriend family members before becoming more hostile and isolating the victim, marrying them in secret and keeping the marriage hidden even after the death. The behaviour patterns are so similar that the organisation reported rumours that a ‘how-to’ guide to predatory marriage may be circulating on the dark web.

One solicitor told the commission of a particularly harrowing example of attempted predatory marriage. The younger, female partner – of a few months – of an elderly male client arranged a marriage at the local registry office. The client did not turn up, as he did not want to marry her. Then she tried to force him to change his will, leaving everything to her – but he had a heart attack and died in the firm’s reception before signing the new will. The solicitor believed the predatory partner had seen marriage as an easier option than getting the victim to change his will. Her coercive behaviour did not come to light until after the client’s death.

This evidence of abuse is clearly worrying, but there is another side to the coin. The rule that a will is automatically revoked by marriage or civil partnership offers financial protection to surviving spouses and civil partners. Marriage is a positive action, a new chapter in someone’s life. If no new will is made after marriage, should the law really assume that any existing will, no matter how old, no matter if it was made before the testator had even met their marital partner, still represents their true intentions – ignoring the more recent action of getting married? The risk of unintended financial hardship for surviving spouses is clear, and potentially far more widespread than the issue of predatory marriage, concerning as that is.

In its proposals, the commission acknowledges that a change in the law would disadvantage spouses and civil partners compared to the current position. However, it suggests they will still be ‘protected’ by the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, enabling them to make a claim against the estate for reasonable financial provision if needed. This is where legal rights shatter into tiny pieces as they slam against the cold, hard reality of legal costs.

Bringing a claim under the 1975 act is very expensive and out of reach for the ordinary person. This is not an area of the law where it is easy to find a lawyer willing to act under a no win, no fee agreement. Depending on the outcome, the potential bill could run into tens of thousands of pounds. Ironically, the more the surviving spouse is in need of financial support, the less likely they are to be in a position to bring a claim for it.

Tackling the growing issue of predatory marriage while safeguarding the financial needs of surviving spouses is not easy and I do not claim to have the answer. Whatever steps are taken, however, legislators must be clear-eyed about the cost of using our court system, and how difficult it is for parties to enforce their rights in this area of law.

11/03/2026

Legal updates
Appropriate forum for data protection claims
By Masood Ahmed 6 March 2026

At the heart of the appeal in Pawel Wysokinski v OCS Security Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 26 lay a single issue: is the county court the appropriate venue for a data protection claim? The claim concerned an alleged data protection breach arising from a court security guard’s confiscation of the claimant’s medical device and the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive medical information.

Relevant rules
Part 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules governs media and communications claims, including data protection. These claims may be issued in either the High Court or county court, with the appropriate forum determined by factors such as value, complexity, specialist judicial expertise and public importance.

If a claim is issued in the wrong court, the court must decide whether to transfer it to the Royal Courts of Justice (RCJ) or the county court (CPR Part 30). A straightforward and low-value data protection claim is suitable for the county court, whose judges are well equipped to deal with such cases, and claimants should avoid unnecessary complexity and cost (Cleary v Marston (Holdings) Ltd [2021] EWHC 3809 (QB)).

CPR 53.4(1) provides that: ‘A media and communications claim that is issued in the High Court must be issued in the King’s Bench Division, Royal Courts of Justice, and marked in the top left corner “Media and Communications List”.’ CPR 53.4(2) provides: ‘A media and communications claim that is issued in a District Registry of the High Court must be transferred either to the county court or to the Royal Courts of Justice (as appropriate).’

In Pawel Wysokinski, the claim form was issued as a High Court media and communications claim in the Cardiff District Registry. This contravened CPR 53.4(1). The judge was therefore required to consider whether to transfer the claim to the RCJ or to the county court.

Without a hearing and without inviting representations, the judge ordered the transfer of the claim to the county court. The order was sealed and served on the claimant (appellant) by email that day. The order did not record that any party affected by the order may apply to have it set aside, varied or stayed as it should have done pursuant to CPR 3.3(5)(b). In the recitals to the order, the judge recorded that the claim form did not comply with CPR 53.4(1) and that the court was making the order under CPR 53.4(2).

No further reasons were given for the decision to transfer to the county court. The claimant wrote to the court seeking an explanation for the transfer. He was informed that any challenge required an application under form N244. His application was rejected because it had been filed in the wrong court and the transfer had already taken effect. The claimant then appealed the transfer decision to the Court of Appeal on the following grounds:

Substantive error: The decision to transfer to the county court was wrong because the nature and complexity of the claim justified its transfer to the High Court.

Lack of reasons: The judge failed to explain why the county court was considered the appropriate court.

Breach of procedural fairness: The judge should have given the claimant an opportunity to make representations about the transfer.

Court of Appeal’s decision
The Court of Appeal dismissed the claimant’s appeal. It held that the need to give reasons for an order made without a hearing depends on the nature of the decision, although it is usually appropriate to provide brief reasons to enable the parties to understand the basis of the order and decide whether to seek reconsideration. While the recitals arguably gave minimal reasoning by indicating non-compliance with CPR 53.4(1) and reliance on CPR 53.4(2), from which it could be inferred that the judge considered the county court the appropriate forum, a short explanation should nevertheless have been provided once the appellant requested reasons.

The Court of Appeal also held that the failure to include the information required by CPR 3.3(5)(b) was a procedural irregularity, and although the appellant promptly sought reconsideration within the time limit, his request was not treated as an application nor referred to the judge, who should have provided brief reasons and extended time for a formal application.

In the absence of reasons and guidance on the right to apply, the better course would have been to accept the appellant’s application and allow representations, avoiding an unnecessary appeal. However, these procedural defects did not determine the outcome, as the central issue remains whether the county court was the appropriate venue.

The Court of Appeal found that, on the face of the claim form, the issues were straightforward, the value was modest, and no legal or factual complexity or public importance was apparent, which made the county court the appropriate forum. It also noted that subsequent material confirmed that liability was largely admitted and that the remaining issues concerned routine factual matters and assessment of damages. The Court of Appeal found the claimant’s arguments on the complex nature of the legal issues were unfounded.

The decision in Pawel Wysokinski highlights a simple but important point for practitioners: the choice of forum should be guided by the nature of the claim, its value, and the complexity of the issues, rather than the subject matter alone. Adopting this approach can avoid the parties engaging in costly satellite litigation and is consistent with the parties’ obligations in helping the court to further the overriding objective (CPR 1.3).

11/03/2026

Commentary and opinion
The economic riddle of the rule of law
By Jonathan Goldsmith 11 March 2026

The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law published interesting research late last week, trying to answer the question which European economies, including our own, are asking with greater desperation every year: will our rule of law help us to escape our economic decline by attracting investment, and so helping us to grow?

The research, called The Rule of Law and the Institutional Roots of Economic Performance, was undertaken in association with the Law Society, which has a particular interest in its outcome, given the need to promote the economic role of the profession.

There is interesting history inside, with academic citations. For instance, medieval Italian city-states accelerated their growth relative to other cities when they gave up authoritarian princely rule and introduced greater rule of law. Or Costa Rica, following independence, overtook other former Spanish colonies in Central America through reforms that produced increasingly inclusive institutions from the 19th century onwards.

But the stumbling block for all claims about the rule of law being a magic ingredient is China. The Bingham report admits as much.

Since the mid-1990s, China’s GDP has expanded more than twenty-fold. It vies with the US for the position of the world’s largest economy. Yet, according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (2023), China’s rule of law score stood at -0.04 on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, significantly below the scores of advanced economies like Germany (1.55), the UK (1.40), the US (1.33), and France (1.18).

China’s rule of law has progressed, and its scores on various indicators have been rising - it is now approaching the global mean - but there continues to be a sizeable gap separating it from others with more established systems. China rejects central rule of law principles like judicial independence, and it continues with arbitrary detentions (of which lawyers are particular victims). There is no doubt that China has adapted and adjusted its legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks to serve economic growth. But what role do those improvements play in China’s spectacular growth when set against other factors like technological innovation, workforce skills, and size?

To quote what may prove to be a dying metaphor, the jury is still out on the role of the rule of law in China’s growth (‘this is poorly explained by current frameworks and would benefit from further investigation’).

That surely means that the jury is out on the whole premise of whether the rule of law is the magic potion we would like to believe. The Bingham research itself raises the question of publication bias – whether the many studies cited show a positive value for the rule of law in relation to the economy because that is what we would like to believe, ie ‘researchers whose data support the relationship get their findings published, while studies which do not find a relationship are more likely to go unpublished’. A meta-analysis finds not, but I wonder.

There is a long and interesting section on England and Wales. Various studies have found that institutional continuity – and we certainly have that - has underpinned investor confidence, contract enforcement, and innovation-led growth. Our institutions have protected property and restrained arbitrary state power, with everyone, including the sovereign, subject to the law. As an example, the constitutional settlement of seventeenth-century England is cited, particularly the constraints placed on fiscal authority when taxation became a matter for Parliament, which anchored market confidence and public credit credibility, including national borrowing costs.

When the industrial revolution arrived, the legal framework was ready. But again, as with China, there were other factors at play: capital accumulation, access to natural resources, and expanding colonial markets.

Personally, knowing nothing about international economics, I tend to believe that our expanding colonial markets – which eventually covered roughly a quarter of the world’s surface and population - were the largest factor, towering high over the rule of law’s contribution. The report obviously admits that the common law system of England and Wales was not the sole driver of industrialisation, but says it contributed decisively to the architecture which made economic modernisation viable and enduring.

The mechanics of colonialism included the export of the English language and English law. I tend to believe that this legacy is still a leading contributory factor in explaining why London remains a global legal centre, a magnet for the settling of international disputes and a power-house for exporting legal services.

At the end, there is no final answer as to the extent of the rule of law’s contribution. The example of China continues to challenge us – and eventual data from the US after the second Trump administration may do likewise.

But, just in case - and in any case - I obviously agree with the report that we should do what we can to preserve the rule of law regardless.

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